Husband motion in Tennessee

2020See Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 494 (Tenn. 2012) (holding that relief should be granted more liberally when only a partial default judgment is attacked); see also Howard v. Howard, 991 S.W.2d 251 , 256 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“Regardless of whether the Husband’s motion was filed pursuant to rule 59.04 or rule 60.02, however, our analysis of the trial court’s denial of the motion remains the same.”); Madu v. Madu, No. M1999-02302-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 1586461 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2000) (noting that a Rule 59.04 motion is reviewed “using standards similar to those used

2016Accordingly, Husband’s motion was properly brought under Rule 59.04,5 rather than Rule 60.02.6 See Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479 , 489 4 Local Rule 5.03(a), in relevant part, provides that “[a]ll motions . . . together with all affidavits, sworn income and expense statements, depositions, briefs and other matters presented in support of the motion, must be filed and served by personal delivery at least fourteen (14) days prior to the date set for the hearing on the motion.” Local Rule 15.02 provides that “applications for . . . extraordinary interlocutory relief shall be heard upon s

2024“In considering a request for attorney’s fees on appeal, we consider the requesting party’s ability to pay such fees, the requesting party’s success on appeal, whether the appeal was taken in good faith, and any other equitable factors relevant in a given case.” In re C.W., 420 S.W.3d 13, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Darvarmanesh, 2005 WL 1684050 , at *16).

2024“In considering a request for attorney’s fees on appeal, we consider the requesting party’s ability to pay such fees, the requesting party’s success on appeal, whether the appeal was taken in good faith, and any other equitable factors relevant in a given case.” In re C.W., 420 S.W.3d 13, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Darvarmanesh, 2005 WL 1684050 , at *16).

2020See Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 494 (Tenn. 2012) (holding that relief should be granted more liberally when only a partial default judgment is attacked); see also Howard v. Howard, 991 S.W.2d 251 , 256 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“Regardless of whether the Husband’s motion was filed pursuant to rule 59.04 or rule 60.02, however, our analysis of the trial court’s denial of the motion remains the same.”); Madu v. Madu, No. M1999-02302-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 1586461 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2000) (noting that a Rule 59.04 motion is reviewed “using standards similar to those used

2019The parties’ respective attorneys argued their positions with regard to the Husband’s motion to set aside and other issues, but they neither presented the testimony of any witnesses nor properly introduced any affidavits, depositions, or other evidence in support of their respective positions. -5- Id. at 254 .

2014In Knight v. Knight, 11 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), a divorce proceeding, this court considered the same issues presented by Husband herein.

2008Knight, 11 S.W.3d at 906 .

2013Because Husband admits that Wife did testify that she wanted a monetary award, she was not attempting to raise a “new issue” in her motion to alter or amend. 4 Husband argues on appeal that the facts of this case are similar to the facts in Wade v. Wade, 897 S.W.2d 702, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), because in Wade, a spouse impermissibly sought a redistribution of the marital estate after the initial order, based on new evidence on the issue of value.

1997See Inman, 840 S.W.2d at 932-33 ; Wade, 897 S.W.2d at 720 .4 In the instant case, however, Husband’s claim of damages is not based on a reversal in his favor, but is instead based on the appeal of an original award that this Court affirmed.

2012Tennessee Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn. 1985).

2010Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 866 .

2025We next address Husband’s issue regarding whether this appeal should be deemed frivolous such that Husband should be awarded his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. “‘A frivolous appeal is one that is ‘devoid of merit,’ or one in which there is little prospect that [an appeal] can ever succeed.’” Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Indus.

2024Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).

2022“An award of appellate attorney’s fees is a matter within this Court’s sound discretion.” Moran v. Willensky, 339 S.W.3d 651, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).

2022In Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), a wife challenged an attorney fee award on two fronts: the merits of the award, and “the form of the award.” We found that the award of attorney fees was warranted on its merits.

2021In order “[t]o protect the institution of marriage in Tennessee, regularly solemnized marriages are presumed to be valid.” Id. at 380 (citing Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). “[I]n cases involving a subsequent marriage, courts presume that the previous marriage ended in divorce.” Id. (citing Emmit v. Emmit, 174 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

2021In order “[t]o protect the institution of marriage in Tennessee, regularly solemnized marriages are presumed to be valid.” Id. at 380 (citing Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). “[I]n cases involving a subsequent marriage, courts presume that the previous marriage ended in divorce.” Id. (citing Emmit v. Emmit, 174 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

2021As such, “we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings.” Williams v. Williams, 286 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). 7 As noted earlier, the trial court found that neither Wife nor Husband had a residence in Missouri at the time the divorce action was filed.

2021In order “[t]o protect the institution of marriage in Tennessee, regularly solemnized marriages are presumed to be valid.” Id. at 380 (citing Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). “[I]n cases involving a subsequent marriage, courts presume that the previous marriage ended in divorce.” Id. (citing Emmit v. Emmit, 174 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

2021Because the argument section of Husband’s brief contains no discussion or reference to issues other than that regarding the issue of annulment, we find that Husband has waived any other issues. -2- DISCUSSION “Except as restricted by constitutional provisions, the inception, duration, status, conditions, and termination of a marriage in Tennessee are subject to state legislative power and control.” Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Crawford v. Crawford, 277 S.W.2d 389, 391 (1955)).

2021In order “[t]o protect the institution of marriage in Tennessee, regularly solemnized marriages are presumed to be valid.” Id. at 380 (citing Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). “[I]n cases involving a subsequent marriage, courts presume that the previous marriage ended in divorce.” Id. (citing Emmit v. Emmit, 174 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

2021See Whalum, 224 S.W.3d at 175 .

2021Because the argument section of Husband’s brief contains no discussion or reference to issues other than that regarding the issue of annulment, we find that Husband has waived any other issues. -2- DISCUSSION “Except as restricted by constitutional provisions, the inception, duration, status, conditions, and termination of a marriage in Tennessee are subject to state legislative power and control.” Guzman v. Alvares, 205 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Crawford v. Crawford, 277 S.W.2d 389, 391 (1955)).

2021As such, “we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings.” Williams v. Williams, 286 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). 7 As noted earlier, the trial court found that neither Wife nor Husband had a residence in Missouri at the time the divorce action was filed.

2021See Riley v. Whybrew, 185 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2020The Trial Court entered an order that same day finding as follows concerning the application of attorney-client privilege: “To be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the communications must involve the subject matter of the representation.” Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); see also, Jackson v. State, 293 S.W. 539 (Tenn. 1926) (where client consulted attorney about a legal matter and made remarks about another matter, separate and distinct from such legal matter, those remarks were not privileged) and State v. Buford, 216 S.W.3d 323 (Tenn. 2007) (if a

2020See Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 342 (Tenn. 2002)) (holding that in setting an alimony award, the court should consider a number of factors, but “the two that are considered the most important are the disadvantaged spouse’s need and the obligor spouse’s ability to pay”); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i) (outlining all of the statutory factors that should be considered in determining an award of alimony).

2020See Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 342 (Tenn. 2002)) (holding that in setting an alimony award, the court should consider a number of factors, but “the two that are considered the most important are the disadvantaged spouse’s need and the obligor spouse’s ability to pay”); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i) (outlining all of the statutory factors that should be considered in determining an award of alimony).

2020The Trial Court entered an order that same day finding as follows concerning the application of attorney-client privilege: “To be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the communications must involve the subject matter of the representation.” Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); see also, Jackson v. State, 293 S.W. 539 (Tenn. 1926) (where client consulted attorney about a legal matter and made remarks about another matter, separate and distinct from such legal matter, those remarks were not privileged) and State v. Buford, 216 S.W.3d 323 (Tenn. 2007) (if a

2019However, Husband failed to designate this as an issue presented for review on appeal or develop any argument with regard to this issue. “[W]here a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010).