permanent custody hearing in Ohio

2026R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). {¶14} The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied because the children had been in the temporary custody of CSB for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

2026R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 98-99 (1996). {¶23} On the first prong of the permanent custody test, the trial court found that both children had been in the temporary custody of CSB for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22- month period under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

2023It maintains that it was not required to demonstrate reasonable efforts at the permanent custody hearing because (1) R.C. 2151.414(E) did not apply, and (2) over the course of two years, the trial court repeatedly determined that the agency had made reasonable efforts and parents did not object to the reasonableness of the agency’s efforts.3 Father responds that the agency was required to show reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification because none of the exceptions provided in R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) apply. {¶ 128} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that by its terms, R.C. 2151.419 “does n

2023See also In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73 , 2007-Ohio-1104 , ¶ 43 (concluding that a reasonable efforts determination is necessary at a permanent custody hearing only if the agency has not demonstrated its use of reasonable efforts prior to that time).

2023See Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 383 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , ¶ 21, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 , 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS A. 12-of-22 Determination {¶18} The juvenile court determined the first prong of the permanent-custody test was satisfied as to M.S. because the child had been in the temporary custody of HCJFS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.

2020When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21 . {¶9} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child in a parent’s custody has been a

2023Clear and convincing evidence is that which will “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶13} The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied in this case because the children could not be returned to Mother’s custody within a reasonable time or should not be returned to her custody because she had failed “conti

2021Clear and convincing evidence is that which will “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶12} Although CSB had alleged numerous alternative grounds under the first prong of the permanent custody test, the trial court based its finding on the “12 of 22” ground to determine that the first prong was satisfied.

2026Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶ 20} We have applied the balancing test set forth in Unger when reviewing a trial court’s denial of a continuance where a parent fails to appear for a permanent custody hearing.

2025“The term ‘abuse-of-discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶32} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who ma

2026November 13, 2000), citing In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316 (8th Dist. 1994). {¶50} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem,

2026November 13, 2000), citing In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316 (8th Dist. 1994). {¶56} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem,

2024In addition, when calculating whether a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for the requisite time, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count.” In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2004-Ohio-6411 , 818 N.E.2d 1176 , ¶ 26.

2023In addition, when calculating whether a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for the requisite time, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count.” In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2004-Ohio- 6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176 , ¶ 26.

2024We have held that the factors set forth in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 , 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981), are applicable to a trial court’s denial of a continuance where a parent fails to appear for a permanent-custody hearing.

2024We have held that the factors set forth in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 , 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981), are applicable to a trial court’s denial of a continuance where a parent fails to appear for a permanent-custody hearing.

2026In re C.S., 2020-Ohio-4414, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.).6 Summary of the Cumulative Effects of Reunification Termination Factors and the 12 of 22 Criteria: {¶ 25} All of the above demonstrates the immediate and cumulative effect the 6.

2026In re C.S., 2020-Ohio-4414, at ¶ 16 . - 12 - Butler CA2025-11-124 Analysis Reunification Efforts for Mother and John Were Not Required {¶ 29} Mother's stated goal of reunification with John began at a disadvantage.

2024S.I.M., 2020-Ohio-162, at ¶ 16 ; K.J., 2018- Ohio-471, at ¶ 28 (“[a]n incarcerated parent does not have ‘an absolute due process right to attend the trial of a civil action to which he is a party’”) (citation omitted). {¶29} To determine whether due process was denied in not allowing an incarcerated defendant to appear at the permanent custody hearing, this court has applied the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

2024S.I.M., 2020-Ohio-162, at ¶ 16 ; K.J., 2018- Ohio-471, at ¶ 28 (“[a]n incarcerated parent does not have ‘an absolute due process right to attend the trial of a civil action to which he is a party’”) (citation omitted). {¶29} To determine whether due process was denied in not allowing an incarcerated defendant to appear at the permanent custody hearing, this court has applied the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

2026Denial of Mother’s Motion for a Continuance {¶ 17} In her assignment of error, Mother claims that the trial court abused its discretion and violated her constitutional right to due process when it denied a continuance to enable her to attend the permanent custody hearing virtually from prison. {¶ 18} The United States Supreme Court has described parents’ interest in the care, custody, and control of their children as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

2016Was a Grant of Permanent Custody in J.P.’s Best Interest? {¶ 31} Mother’s First Assignment of Error states that: The Trial Court Erred in Granting Permanent Custody to Montgomery County Children Services Because that Agency Failed to Prove by Clear and Convincing Evidence that Permanent Custody Was in the Best Interest of the Minor Children. {¶ 32} Under this assignment of error, Mother contends that reunification was a possibility at the time of the permanent custody hearing on April 23, 2015, and that a finding of permanent custody is not supported by reviewing the factors set forth in R.C.

2026No single factor is given more weight than others.” In re N.R.S., 2018-Ohio-125, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). {¶22} If the trial court makes these statutorily required determinations, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s decision unless it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

2025The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the trial court is not obligated, under R.C. 2151.419, to make a determination that the agency used reasonable efforts to reunify the family at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to the hearing. -7- Case Nos. 1-24-23, 24, 25, 26, 27 (Emphasis in original.) In re N.R.S., 2018-Ohio-125, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.), citing In re C.F. at ¶ 41, 43 (concluding that the reasonable efforts determination under R.C. 2151.419 does not apply to permanent-custody motions under R.C. 2151.4

2025In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102 , at ¶ 19.

2024Id., citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). {¶ 45} For the first prong, the juvenile court determined by clear and convincing evidence that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applied to appellant-father, which states: 1 One case worker testified that appellant-father finally requested H.G.’s medical records on June 17, 2024, a mere week prior to the permanent custody hearing on June 25. 16 [T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines . . . by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that

2026See In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 13 . {¶13} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under Sect

2025See In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 13. {¶17} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C.

2025It is well settled that “the statute imposes no requirement for such a determination at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to that hearing.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re L.R., 2019-Ohio-2305, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting In re A.C.-B., 10 2017-Ohio-374, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.); see also In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104 , ¶ 41-43 (concluding that a reasonable efforts determination is necessary at a permanent custody hearing only if the agency has not demonstrated its use of reasonable efforts prior to that time).

2024It is well settled that “the statute imposes no requirement for such a determination at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to that hearing.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re L.R., 2019-Ohio-2305, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting In re A.C.-B., 2017-Ohio-374, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.); see also In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104 , ¶ 41-43 (concluding that a 22 reasonable efforts determination is necessary at a permanent custody hearing only if the agency has not demonstrated its use of reasonable efforts prior to that time).

2025Lesser tests of prejudice have been rejected: “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Bradley at 142, fn. 1 , quoting Strickland at 693 . {¶92} The mother criticizes her first attorney for trying to convince her to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights in this case (when the case was originally called for the permanent custody hearing).

2009Id.; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 . {¶ 26} Appellant has not identified what testimony she would have offered had the juvenile court allowed her to attend the permanent custody hearing or continued the hearing until she was released from prison.

2023Id. {¶33} When considering the best interest of a child in a permanent custody hearing, the juvenile court is required under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) to consider all relevant factors.

2023Id. {¶37} When considering the best interest of a child in a permanent custody hearing, the juvenile court is required under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) to consider all relevant factors.

2025In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990).

2023A parent has a “‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody and management” of his or her child, In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156 , 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), and the right to raise one’s own child is “‘an essential and basic civil right.’” In re N.B., 8th Dist.

2026Mother asserts the Supreme Court of Ohio, in In re R.K., 2018-Ohio-23 , held that a juvenile court may not infer that a parent has waived his or her right to counsel based on the parent’s unexplained failure to appear at the permanent custody hearing. {¶ 19} Mother asserts that the juvenile court “granted a withdraw[al] of counsel and made know [sic] finding that [mother] waived her right to counsel,” but “[t]he record shows no valid waiver of [her] right to counsel.” Mother cites to her counsel’s explanation for moving to withdraw: “‘I have had contact with my client and at times it has been

2024These rights shall arise when a person becomes a party to a juvenile court proceeding.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that “a parent has the right to counsel at a permanent-custody hearing, including the right to appointed counsel if the parent is indigent.” In re R.K., 2018-Ohio-23, ¶ 5 , citing R.C. 2151.352; Juv.R. 4(A).

2025It is well settled that “the statute imposes no requirement for such a determination at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to that hearing.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re L.R., 2019-Ohio-2305, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting In re A.C.-B., 10 2017-Ohio-374, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.); see also In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104 , ¶ 41-43 (concluding that a reasonable efforts determination is necessary at a permanent custody hearing only if the agency has not demonstrated its use of reasonable efforts prior to that time).

2024It is well settled that “the statute imposes no requirement for such a determination at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to that hearing.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re L.R., 2019-Ohio-2305, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting In re A.C.-B., 2017-Ohio-374, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.); see also In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104 , ¶ 41-43 (concluding that a 22 reasonable efforts determination is necessary at a permanent custody hearing only if the agency has not demonstrated its use of reasonable efforts prior to that time).