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32 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re DSgreen2 sentences2023See In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). 2022As such, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support a violation of subsections B, F, N, O, and P. See In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). | 14 | 14 |
JSC Neftegas-Impex v. Citibank, N.A.green2 sentences2018JSC Neftegas-Impex v. Citibank, N.A., 365 S.W.3d 387, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied); see also In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1994) (“[Q]uestions of law are always subject to de novo review.”). 2018JSC Neftegas-Impex v. Citibank, N.A. , 365 S.W.3d 387 , 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) ; see also In re Humphreys , 880 S.W.2d 402 , 404 (Tex. 1994) ("[Q]uestions of law are always subject to de novo review."). | 4 | 4 |
Matter of Humphreysgreen2 sentences2018JSC Neftegas-Impex v. Citibank, N.A., 365 S.W.3d 387, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied); see also In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1994) (“[Q]uestions of law are always subject to de novo review.”). 2018JSC Neftegas-Impex v. Citibank, N.A. , 365 S.W.3d 387 , 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) ; see also In re Humphreys , 880 S.W.2d 402 , 404 (Tex. 1994) ("[Q]uestions of law are always subject to de novo review."). | 4 | 4 |
Cardona v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. 2014See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Gamino, Cesar Alejandrogreen1 sentence2024Under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may affirmatively raise the claim of self-defense if the use of force is “justified.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 606 ; see also Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
in Re Interest of N.G., a Childgreen1 sentence2024See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 232-33 . | 1 | 1 |
Twyman v. Twymangreen1 sentence2023Thus, we conclude that Wyly Development sufficiently raised, and did not waive, a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support this claim. 6 To meet the second element, a defendant’s conduct must be “‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re AVgreen1 sentence2020See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 ; In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (“If multiple predicate grounds are found by the trial court, we will affirm based on any one ground because only one is necessary for termination of parental rights.”). | 1 | 1 |
in the Interest of S.R., S.R. and B.R.S., Childrengreen1 sentence2020See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360 (subsections D and E both use the term “endanger[,]” which means “to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health[]”). 32 Because we have concluded that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to establish predicate grounds for termination under (D) and (E), we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support a violation of subsection O. | 1 | 1 |
Wooten, Codiem Renoirgreen1 sentence2016See Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 605 ; McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569 ; Trevino, 100 S.W.3d at 238-39 . | 1 | 1 |
Pat Baker Co., Inc. v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2012It is “axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment absent properly assigned error.” Pat Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Hallaway v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2001See Hallaway v. Thompson, 148 Tex. 471 , 226 S.W.2d 816, 820 (1950). 2001See Hallaway v. Thompson, 148 Tex. 471 , 226 S.W.2d 816, 820 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
Paul Leonard Jones, Jr. v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, A.K.A. Conrailgreen1 sentence1993Jones v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 590, 593 (6th Cir.1986); Smalley v. Duluth, Winnipeg & Pac. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Braughton, Christopher Ernest
green
1 sentence2024Under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may affirmatively raise the claim of self-defense if the use of force is “justified.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 606 ; see also Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kroger Texas Ltd. Partnership v. Suberu
green
1 sentence2023“Meritorious claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are relatively rare precisely because most human conduct, even that which causes injury to others, cannot be fairly characterized as extreme and outrageous.” Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 796 (citing Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814 , 815 n.1 (Tex. 2005)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2023“Meritorious claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are relatively rare precisely because most human conduct, even that which causes injury to others, cannot be fairly characterized as extreme and outrageous.” Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 796 (citing Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814 , 815 n.1 (Tex. 2005)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Trevino v. State
green
1 sentence2016See Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 605 ; McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569 ; Trevino, 100 S.W.3d at 238-39 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
McKinney v. State
green
1 sentence2016See Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 605 ; McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569 ; Trevino, 100 S.W.3d at 238-39 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Palmer v. Zaklama
green
2 sentences2015(See Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 667 .) A party who "asserts a real property claim" may record a lis pendens. (§ 405.20.) Section 405.4 defines a '"[r]eal property claim'" as "the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if 6 It is apparent that Palmer, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1367 , in adding an evidentiary requirement, erroneously merged the evidentiary standard for a motion to expunge into the distinct question of whether the privilege applies. 16. meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property ...." Thus, "[s]ection 405.4 2015(See Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 667 .) A party who "asserts a real property claim" may record a lis pendens. (§ 405.20.) Section 405.4 defines a '"[r]eal property claim'" as "the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if 6 It is apparent that Palmer, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1367 , in adding an evidentiary requirement, erroneously merged the evidentiary standard for a motion to expunge into the distinct question of whether the privilege applies. 16. meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property ...." Thus, "[s]ection 405.4 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015(See Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 667 .) A party who "asserts a real property claim" may record a lis pendens. (§ 405.20.) Section 405.4 defines a '"[r]eal property claim'" as "the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if 6 It is apparent that Palmer, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1367 , in adding an evidentiary requirement, erroneously merged the evidentiary standard for a motion to expunge into the distinct question of whether the privilege applies. 16. meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property ...." Thus, "[s]ection 405.4 2015Instead, it is clear from the plain language of section 405.4 that a 'real property claim' is determined from the cause or causes of action set forth in the pleading(s)." {Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 667 .) Consistent with this definition, Civil Code section 47(b)(4) states in like terms that, for the privilege to apply, a recorded lis pendens must identify "an action ... which affects" title or possession of real property. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Whitaker v. Rose
green
2 sentences2015In his restricted appeal, the driver alleged three grounds for setting aside the default judgment and granting a Civil Procedure > ... > Pretrial Judgments > Default & new trial: (1) no reporter's record was made at the Default Judgments > Relief From Default default judgment hearing; (2) the family members failed Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > General to prove their damages; and (3) the judgment failed to Overview 218 S.W.3d 216, *216 ; 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 842 , **1 HN2 Because a restricted appeal affords an appellant damages, however, the trial court must hear evidence th 2015In his restricted appeal, the driver alleged three grounds for setting aside the default judgment and granting a Civil Procedure > ... > Pretrial Judgments > Default & new trial: (1) no reporter's record was made at the Default Judgments > Relief From Default default judgment hearing; (2) the family members failed Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > General to prove their damages; and (3) the judgment failed to Overview 218 S.W.3d 216, *216 ; 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 842 , **1 HN2 Because a restricted appeal affords an appellant damages, however, the trial court must hear evidence th | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Breazeale v. State
green
1 sentence2013Accordingly, appellant should have known “to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support this requirement as of the time of any direct appeal from that judgment.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Wiley, Sam Jr.
green
2 sentences2013The court of criminal appeals concluded that Wiley “was aware of the requirement that he pay court costs, including the cost of court appointed attorney fees, even as of the time he signed the judgment” and that “[h]e would therefore have known to challenge the sufficiency of *457 the evidence to support this requirement as of the time of any direct appeal from that judgment.” Id. 2013Instead of doing so, however, he “waived his right to appeal, though not required to do so by the terms of any negotiation with the State.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Chaffin
green
1 sentence1993Chaffin, 658 S.W.2d at 190 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Willis v. State
green
1 sentence1991In Willis, 785 S.W.2d 378 , we upheld a capital murder conviction where a defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the claim that he killed a woman by setting fire to the house in which the woman slept. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.