point essential defense (Texas) · Go Syfert
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point essential defense in Texas

32 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 2010–2024 7 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Lemos v. Stategreen
texapp · 2004 · cited in 23 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2024
2 sentences

2015“Although the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).

2015“Although the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).

2323
Keith Ladale Wilson v. Stategreen
texapp · 2015 · cited in 11 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2016–2024
2 sentences

2024“The trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, but it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889 , 901– 02 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)).

2019See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860-62 (1975) (observing that right to effective assistance of counsel applies to closing argument); see also Wilson 11 v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (noting that “[a] trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, but it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense” and that “[p]rohibiting counsel from making a particular jury argument” can constitute denial of right to counsel).

1011
Herring v. New Yorkgreen
scotus · 1975 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2019
2 sentences

2019See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860-62 (1975) (observing that right to effective assistance of counsel applies to closing argument); see also Wilson 11 v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (noting that “[a] trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, but it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense” and that “[p]rohibiting counsel from making a particular jury argument” can constitute denial of right to counsel).

2013Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.); see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 , 862– 64, 95 S. Ct. 2550 , 2555–56 (1975).

33
Nzewi v. Stategreen
texapp · 2012 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015
2 sentences

2014Although the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, “it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Nzewi v. State, 359 S.W.3d 829, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)). –10– “[I]mproper denial of a jury argument may constitute a denial of the right to counsel.” McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. Crim.

2014Although the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, “it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Nzewi v. State, 359 S.W.3d 829, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)). –10– “[I]mproper denial of a jury argument may constitute a denial of the right to counsel.” McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. Crim.

23
McGee v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1989 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Although the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, “it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Nzewi v. State, 359 S.W.3d 829, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)). –10– “[I]mproper denial of a jury argument may constitute a denial of the right to counsel.” McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. Crim.

2014Although the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, “it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Nzewi v. State, 359 S.W.3d 829, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)). –10– “[I]mproper denial of a jury argument may constitute a denial of the right to counsel.” McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. Crim.

22
Roy Vasquez v. Stategreen
texapp · 2016 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021
2 sentences

2021See Vasquez v. State, 484 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).

2020Vasquez, 484 S.W.3d at 531 ; Lemos v. State, 130 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2004, no pet.).

12
State v. Renteriagreen
texcrimapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024“Counsel is entitled to correctly argue the law, even if the law is not included in the jury charge.” Id. (citing State v. Renteria, 977 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (1)

CaseCitedYears
Davis v. State green
texcrimapp · 2010
1 sentence

2024“The trial court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument, but it may not prevent defense counsel from making a point essential to the defense.” Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889 , 901– 02 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)).

12024–2024

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Penal Code § 22.011 (7) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 3.02 (4) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 36.06 (4) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 1.07 (3) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 29.02 (3) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 29.03 (3) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 36.05 (3) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 6.03 (3) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 7.02 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 32 (2010–2024) DC 6 (1974–2017) OH 2 (1988–1999) MO 2 (1996–1997)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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