31 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1883–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rowell v. Gulf, M. O. R. Co.green2 sentences2018The habendum clauses were identical in each Rowell deed: 'To Have And To Hold unto the said Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company and its successors forever .' 248 Ala. at 464 , 28 So.2d at 210 (emphasis added). "... [T]he granting clause prevails over conflicting introductory statements and over the habendum clause, and [the] conveyance of a fee-simple estate is presumed unless it clearly appears from the deed that a less estate was intended.... ".... "... 2018The habendum clauses were identical in each Rowell deed: 'To Have And To Hold unto the said Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company and its successors forever .' 248 Ala. at 464 , 28 So.2d at 210 (emphasis added). "... [T]he granting clause prevails over conflicting introductory statements and over the habendum clause, and [the] conveyance of a fee-simple estate is presumed unless it clearly appears from the deed that a less estate was intended.... ".... "... | 2 | 2 |
Slaten v. Loydgreen2 sentences1989This Court has held that “the granting clause in a deed determines the interest conveyed, and unless there is repugnancy, obscurity or ambiguity in that clause, it prevails over introductory statements or recitals in conflict therewith, and over the habendum, too, if that clause is contradictory or repugnant to it.” Slaten v. Loyd, 282 Ala. 485, 487-88 , 213 So.2d 219, 220-21 (1968). 1989This Court has held that “the granting clause in a deed determines the interest conveyed, and unless there is repugnancy, obscurity or ambiguity in that clause, it prevails over introductory statements or recitals in conflict therewith, and over the habendum, too, if that clause is contradictory or repugnant to it.” Slaten v. Loyd, 282 Ala. 485, 487-88 , 213 So.2d 219, 220-21 (1968). | 2 | 2 |
Slaughter v. Hallgreen2 sentences1956In Powell v. Pearson, 220 Ala. 247, 255 , 125 So. 39, 45 , we said of the provisions then codified as § 6900, Code 1923, now § 14, Title 47, Code 1940, as follows: “* * It is the rule that, when the granting clause does not designate the estate, without more, it is held to vest the fee; to the contrary when the instrument shows the estate is limited by the habendum clause, and that a less estate than the fee was intended to be conveyed or devised * * And in the case of Slaughter v, Hall, 201 Ala. 212 , 77 So. 738, 739 , we said of those provisions then codified as § 3396, Code 1907: “* * The s 1956In Powell v. Pearson, 220 Ala. 247, 255 , 125 So. 39, 45 , we said of the provisions then codified as § 6900, Code 1923, now § 14, Title 47, Code 1940, as follows: “* * It is the rule that, when the granting clause does not designate the estate, without more, it is held to vest the fee; to the contrary when the instrument shows the estate is limited by the habendum clause, and that a less estate than the fee was intended to be conveyed or devised * * And in the case of Slaughter v, Hall, 201 Ala. 212 , 77 So. 738, 739 , we said of those provisions then codified as § 3396, Code 1907: “* * The s | 1 | 3 |
Farr v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences1977See e. g., Farr v. Perkins, 173 Ala. 500 , 55 So. 923 (1911); Park v. Powledge, supra; Howard v. Carusi, supra. Likewise, the language "if still owned by the survivor of them" implies that Maggie Rolison Brashier was free "to dispose of the entire fee for [her] own benefit," thus coming under the statutory definition of an absolute power of disposition. 1977See e. g., Farr v. Perkins, 173 Ala. 500 , 55 So. 923 (1911); Park v. Powledge, supra; Howard v. Carusi, supra. Likewise, the language "if still owned by the survivor of them" implies that Maggie Rolison Brashier was free "to dispose of the entire fee for [her] own benefit," thus coming under the statutory definition of an absolute power of disposition. | 1 | 1 |
| Stanley v. Danielgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graves v. Wheeler
neutral
2 sentences1972In Graves v. Wheeler, 180 Ala. 412, 416 , 61 So. 341, 343 , Mr. Justice Anderson, writing for the court, observed: “One of the rules of construction is that the granting clause in a deed prevails over introductory statements in conflict therewith, and over the habendum also, if that clause is contradictory of, or repugnant to, said granting clause. 1972In Graves v. Wheeler, 180 Ala. 412, 416 , 61 So. 341, 343 , Mr. Justice Anderson, writing for the court, observed: “One of the rules of construction is that the granting clause in a deed prevails over introductory statements in conflict therewith, and over the habendum also, if that clause is contradictory of, or repugnant to, said granting clause. | 4 | 1923–1972 |
Petty v. Boothe
green
2 sentences1953“One of the rules in the construction of deeds is that if there be two clauses which are utterly inconsistent with each other, and which cannot be reconciled or made to stand together, the last shall give way to the first, the maxim being ‘the first clause in a deed, and the last in a will shall prevail.’ Petty v. Boothe, supra. The rule has been stated many times in our cases that the granting clause, unless ambiguous or obscure, prevails over introductory recitals, statements in the habendum clause or other clauses in the deed, if they are contradictory or repugnant to the granting clause. * 1952One of the rules in the construction of deeds is that if there be two clauses which are utterly inconsistent with each other, and which cannot be reconciled or made to stand together, the last shall give way to the first, the maxim being “the first clause in a deed, and the last in a will shall prevail.” Petty v. Boothe, supra. The rule has been stated many times in our cases that the granting clause, unless ambiguous or obscure, prevails over introductory recitals, statements in the habendum clause or other clauses in the deed, if they are contradictory or repugnant to the granting clause. | 3 | 1952–1975 |
Head v. Hunnicutt
green
2 sentences1952Webb v. Webb’s Heirs, 29 Ala. 588 ; Dickson v. Van Hoose, supra; Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273 , 49 So. 676 ; Head v. Hunnicutt, 172 Ala. 48 , 55 So. 161 ; Graves v. Wheeler, supra; Porter v. Henderson, 203 Ala. 312 , 82 So. 668 ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 Ala. 674 , 95 So. 180 ; Gargis v. Kennemer, 216 Ala. 494 , 113 So. 620 ; King v. King, 242 Ala. 53 , 4 So.2d 740 ; Rowell v. Gulf, M. & O. 1952Webb v. Webb’s Heirs, 29 Ala. 588 ; Dickson v. Van Hoose, supra; Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273 , 49 So. 676 ; Head v. Hunnicutt, 172 Ala. 48 , 55 So. 161 ; Graves v. Wheeler, supra; Porter v. Henderson, 203 Ala. 312 , 82 So. 668 ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 Ala. 674 , 95 So. 180 ; Gargis v. Kennemer, 216 Ala. 494 , 113 So. 620 ; King v. King, 242 Ala. 53 , 4 So.2d 740 ; Rowell v. Gulf, M. & O. | 3 | 1925–1952 |
Hunter v. Patterson
neutral
2 sentences2010And by another court it has been said: ‘It is a rule in the construction of deeds that of two repugnant clauses therein the first shall prevail against the second; and, according to this rule, the meaning of the premises shall not be changed by the words of the habendum as to irreconcilable differences.’ Chamberlain v. Runkle, 28 Ind.App. 599 , 63 N.E. 486 [ (1902) ]; Hunter v. Patterson, 142 Mo. 310 , 44 S.W. 250 [(1898)]; Budd v. Brooke, 3 Gill (Md.) 198, 43 Am. 2010And by another court it has been said: ‘It is a rule in the construction of deeds that of two repugnant clauses therein the first shall prevail against the second; and, according to this rule, the meaning of the premises shall not be changed by the words of the habendum as to irreconcilable differences.’ Chamberlain v. Runkle, 28 Ind.App. 599 , 63 N.E. 486 [ (1902) ]; Hunter v. Patterson, 142 Mo. 310 , 44 S.W. 250 [(1898)]; Budd v. Brooke, 3 Gill (Md.) 198, 43 Am. | 2 | 1908–2010 |
Chamberlain v. Runkle
green
2 sentences2010And by another court it has been said: ‘It is a rule in the construction of deeds that of two repugnant clauses therein the first shall prevail against the second; and, according to this rule, the meaning of the premises shall not be changed by the words of the habendum as to irreconcilable differences.’ Chamberlain v. Runkle, 28 Ind.App. 599 , 63 N.E. 486 [ (1902) ]; Hunter v. Patterson, 142 Mo. 310 , 44 S.W. 250 [(1898)]; Budd v. Brooke, 3 Gill (Md.) 198, 43 Am. 2010And by another court it has been said: ‘It is a rule in the construction of deeds that of two repugnant clauses therein the first shall prevail against the second; and, according to this rule, the meaning of the premises shall not be changed by the words of the habendum as to irreconcilable differences.’ Chamberlain v. Runkle, 28 Ind.App. 599 , 63 N.E. 486 [ (1902) ]; Hunter v. Patterson, 142 Mo. 310 , 44 S.W. 250 [(1898)]; Budd v. Brooke, 3 Gill (Md.) 198, 43 Am. | 2 | 1908–2010 |
Ratliffe v. Marrs
green
2 sentences2010It has been said that the ha-bendum must give way, because the granting clause is necessary to make the deed effective, while the habendum clause is not. [Ratliffe ] v. Marrs, 87 Ky. 26 , 7 S.W. 395 , 8 S.W. 876 [ (1888) ]. 2010It has been said that the ha-bendum must give way, because the granting clause is necessary to make the deed effective, while the habendum clause is not. [Ratliffe ] v. Marrs, 87 Ky. 26 , 7 S.W. 395 , 8 S.W. 876 [ (1888) ]. | 2 | 1908–2010 |
Henry v. White
green
2 sentences1982This Court in Willis v. James , 287 Ala. 653 , 659 , 254 So.2d 717 , 722 (1971), quoted Henry v. White , 257 Ala. 549 , 552 , 60 So.2d 149 , 152-53 (1952), which stated: "If the granting clause does not expressly designate the estate conveyed, and there is nothing in the other parts of the deed to indicate the estate intended to be conveyed, the provisions of Title 47, § 14, Code 1940, [now § 35-4-2 ] have application. 1982This Court in Willis v. James , 287 Ala. 653 , 659 , 254 So.2d 717 , 722 (1971), quoted Henry v. White , 257 Ala. 549 , 552 , 60 So.2d 149 , 152-53 (1952), which stated: "If the granting clause does not expressly designate the estate conveyed, and there is nothing in the other parts of the deed to indicate the estate intended to be conveyed, the provisions of Title 47, § 14, Code 1940, [now § 35-4-2 ] have application. | 2 | 1975–1982 |
Webb v. Webb's Heirs
green
2 sentences1952Webb v. Webb’s Heirs, 29 Ala. 588 ; Dickson v. Van Hoose, supra; Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273 , 49 So. 676 ; Head v. Hunnicutt, 172 Ala. 48 , 55 So. 161 ; Graves v. Wheeler, supra; Porter v. Henderson, 203 Ala. 312 , 82 So. 668 ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 Ala. 674 , 95 So. 180 ; Gargis v. Kennemer, 216 Ala. 494 , 113 So. 620 ; King v. King, 242 Ala. 53 , 4 So.2d 740 ; Rowell v. Gulf, M. & O. 1952Webb v. Webb's Heirs, 29 Ala. 588 ; Dickson v. Van Hoose, supra; Hill v. Gray, 160 Ala. 273 , 49 So. 676 ; Head v. Hunnicutt, 172 Ala. 48 , 55 So. 161 ; Graves v. Wheeler, supra; Porter v. Henderson, 203 Ala. 312 , 82 So. 668 ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 Ala. 674 , 95 So. 180 ; Gargis v. Kennemer, 216 Ala. 494 , 113 So. 620 ; King v. King, 242 Ala. 53 , 4 So.2d 740 ; Rowell v. Gulf, M. & O. | 2 | 1927–1952 |
Dickson v. Van Hoose
green
2 sentences1941Dickson et al. v. Van Hoose et al., 157 Ala. 459 , 47 So. 718 , 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 719; McClelland v. Coston, 227 Ala. 267 , 149 So. 697 ; Vizard v. Robinson, 181 Ala. 349 , 61 So. 959 . 1941Dickson et al. v. Van Hoose et al., 157 Ala. 459 , 47 So. 718 , 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 719; McClelland v. Coston, 227 Ala. 267 , 149 So. 697 ; Vizard v. Robinson, 181 Ala. 349 , 61 So. 959 . | 2 | 1927–1941 |
Little v. Hunter
neutral
2 sentences1997We note that "the granting clause in a deed prevails over the habendum [clause], if that clause is contradictory of, or repugnant to, said granting clause." Little v. Hunter , 289 Ala. 6 , 13 , 265 So.2d 441 , 446 (1972). 2 See note 1 regarding resolution of any inconsistency between the granting clause and the habendum clause. 1997We note that "the granting clause in a deed prevails over the habendum [clause], if that clause is contradictory of, or repugnant to, said granting clause." Little v. Hunter , 289 Ala. 6 , 13 , 265 So.2d 441 , 446 (1972). 2 See note 1 regarding resolution of any inconsistency between the granting clause and the habendum clause. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hanners v. Hanners
green
2 sentences1989If either or any of the said Johnny Holt Salters, Linda Irving Harbin, or James Comer Salters, who are children of the life tenant shall die without issue, or descendants of issue surviving then the share shall go to the surviv- or or survivors of the life tenant’s said children, Johnny Holt Salters, Linda Irving Harbin, and James Comer Salters, thereby releasing and waiving all rights of homestead and dower.” James contends that the granting clause and the habendum clause conflict and that the granting clause prevails over all other clauses in the event of a conflict, relying on Hanners v. Ha 1989If either or any of the said Johnny Holt Salters, Linda Irving Harbin, or James Comer Salters, who are children of the life tenant shall die without issue, or descendants of issue surviving then the share shall go to the surviv- or or survivors of the life tenant’s said children, Johnny Holt Salters, Linda Irving Harbin, and James Comer Salters, thereby releasing and waiving all rights of homestead and dower.” James contends that the granting clause and the habendum clause conflict and that the granting clause prevails over all other clauses in the event of a conflict, relying on Hanners v. Ha | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Delatte v. Woods
green
2 sentences1984TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur. 1 Lessees, or their predecessors in title, conducted drilling operations on the leased land on two occasions, but none of the operations resulted in a producing well. 2 The lease included a provision for $100.00 to be paid annually for a shut-in gas well to be considered as producing under the habendum clause of the lease. 3 In passing, we note our agreement with the view of the Supreme Court of Louisiana that the orders of the regulatory authority charged with the responsibility of preventing waste of the state's oil and gas "supersed 1984Delatte v. Woods , 232 La. at 358 , 94 So.2d at 288. 5 Lessors stipulated that the shut-in royalty payment, and all other payments made by lessee, were made in a timely fashion and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the subject lease. 6 Lessors concede that the lease remains in full force and effect as to those parts of the leased acreage within the unit established by the Board. 7 A Pugh clause. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Ivy Ellis Mize and Wife, Voncile Mize v. Exxon Corporation
green
1 sentence1984Jones v. Bronco Oil Gas Co., supra; Mize v. Exxon Corp. , 640 F.2d at 641 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Johnson v. Keener
green
1 sentence1983Johnson v. Keener , 370 So.2d 265 (Ala. 1979). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Willis v. James
neutral
2 sentences1982This Court in Willis v. James , 287 Ala. 653 , 659 , 254 So.2d 717 , 722 (1971), quoted Henry v. White , 257 Ala. 549 , 552 , 60 So.2d 149 , 152-53 (1952), which stated: "If the granting clause does not expressly designate the estate conveyed, and there is nothing in the other parts of the deed to indicate the estate intended to be conveyed, the provisions of Title 47, § 14, Code 1940, [now § 35-4-2 ] have application. 1982This Court in Willis v. James , 287 Ala. 653 , 659 , 254 So.2d 717 , 722 (1971), quoted Henry v. White , 257 Ala. 549 , 552 , 60 So.2d 149 , 152-53 (1952), which stated: "If the granting clause does not expressly designate the estate conveyed, and there is nothing in the other parts of the deed to indicate the estate intended to be conveyed, the provisions of Title 47, § 14, Code 1940, [now § 35-4-2 ] have application. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Palmateer v. Reid
green
1 sentence1980In Palmateer v. Reid , 212 Or. 179 , 254 P. 359 (1927), the court construed the following language placed after the habendum clause: "provided, however, that the said party of the second part shall have no power to sell and convey said premises, but that at his death it is to descend to his heirs." The Oregon court construed the clause under a statutory provision similar to Code 1975, § 35-4-2 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Karr
neutral
2 sentences1975Co. of America v. Karr, 241 Ala. 525 , 3 So.2d 409 (1941) ; and there is, therefore, no repugnance between the granting clause and the habendum clause. 1975Co. of America v. Karr, 241 Ala. 525 , 3 So.2d 409 (1941) ; and there is, therefore, no repugnance between the granting clause and the habendum clause. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Webb v. Jones
green
2 sentences1972White v. Harrison, 202 Ala. 623 , 81 So. 565 ; Webb v. Jones, 163 Ala. 637 , 50 So. 887 . 1972White v. Harrison, 202 Ala. 623 , 81 So. 565 ; Webb v. Jones, 163 Ala. 637 , 50 So. 887 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Parsons v. Boyd
green
2 sentences1972Justice Simpson in writing the opinion of the court cited Parsons v. Boyd, supra, and stated that joint tenancy was abolished in Alabama and that the common law right of survivorship was the evil the statute (§ 19) sought to destroy. 1972Justice Simpson in writing the opinion of the court cited Parsons v. Boyd, supra, and stated that joint tenancy was abolished in Alabama and that the common law right of survivorship was the evil the statute (§ 19) sought to destroy. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Allen v. Axford
green
2 sentences1972In such a case there is no conflict between the grant' and the limitation ...” ( 216 Ala., 289 , 112 So., 816 ) When Assignments 2 and 5 are considered together, the appellant, Dr. Little, contends that the trial court erred in entering its final decree in that it failed, “to find, from the evidence presented at the trial, that the restrictions set forth in paragraph three (3) of the habendum clause of the subject deed were personal to the Grantors and did not run with the land.” In the recent case of Allen v. Axford, 285 Ala. 251, 258 , 231 So.2d 122 , we said: “The paramount factor in determ 1972In such a case there is no conflict between the grant' and the limitation ...” ( 216 Ala., 289 , 112 So., 816 ) When Assignments 2 and 5 are considered together, the appellant, Dr. Little, contends that the trial court erred in entering its final decree in that it failed, “to find, from the evidence presented at the trial, that the restrictions set forth in paragraph three (3) of the habendum clause of the subject deed were personal to the Grantors and did not run with the land.” In the recent case of Allen v. Axford, 285 Ala. 251, 258 , 231 So.2d 122 , we said: “The paramount factor in determ | 1 | 1972–1972 |
White v. Harrison
neutral
2 sentences1972White v. Harrison, 202 Ala. 623 , 81 So. 565 ; Webb v. Jones, 163 Ala. 637 , 50 So. 887 . 1972White v. Harrison, 202 Ala. 623 , 81 So. 565 ; Webb v. Jones, 163 Ala. 637 , 50 So. 887 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Ward v. Torian
neutral
2 sentences1972Ward v. Torian, 216 Ala. 288 , 112 So. 815 . 1972Ward v. Torian, 216 Ala. 288 , 112 So. 815 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Bernhard v. Bernhard
red
2 sentences1971Subsequently, this court has considered some of the problems in Bernhard v. Bernhard, 278 Ala. 240 , 177 So.2d 565 , wherein this court held that an habendum clause substantially identical with the clause quoted above” did create a tenancy in common during the joint lives of the tenants with right of survivorship in the survivor.” Under the deed to Farmer Seale and Carolyn Seale, Farmer Seale owned two different interests in the property, to wit: an undivided half interest for His life and a contingent remainder in the whole. 1971Subsequently, this court has considered some of the problems in Bernhard v. Bernhard, 278 Ala. 240 , 177 So.2d 565 , wherein this court held that an habendum clause substantially identical with the clause quoted above” did create a tenancy in common during the joint lives of the tenants with right of survivorship in the survivor.” Under the deed to Farmer Seale and Carolyn Seale, Farmer Seale owned two different interests in the property, to wit: an undivided half interest for His life and a contingent remainder in the whole. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Owens v. Owens
green
2 sentences1971Bernhard v. Bernhard, supra; Owens v. Owens, 281 Ala. 239 , 201 So.2d 396 , ¶ [2]; Title 47, § 140. 1 Shrout and Shrout recovered judgment against Farmer Seale and recorded a certificate of that judgment. 1971Bernhard v. Bernhard, supra; Owens v. Owens, 281 Ala. 239 , 201 So.2d 396 , ¶ [2]; Title 47, § 140. 1 Shrout and Shrout recovered judgment against Farmer Seale and recorded a certificate of that judgment. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Powell v. Pearson
green
2 sentences1956In Powell v. Pearson, 220 Ala. 247, 255 , 125 So. 39, 45 , we said of the provisions then codified as § 6900, Code 1923, now § 14, Title 47, Code 1940, as follows: “* * It is the rule that, when the granting clause does not designate the estate, without more, it is held to vest the fee; to the contrary when the instrument shows the estate is limited by the habendum clause, and that a less estate than the fee was intended to be conveyed or devised * * And in the case of Slaughter v, Hall, 201 Ala. 212 , 77 So. 738, 739 , we said of those provisions then codified as § 3396, Code 1907: “* * The s 1956In Powell v. Pearson, 220 Ala. 247, 255 , 125 So. 39, 45 , we said of the provisions then codified as § 6900, Code 1923, now § 14, Title 47, Code 1940, as follows: “* * It is the rule that, when the granting clause does not designate the estate, without more, it is held to vest the fee; to the contrary when the instrument shows the estate is limited by the habendum clause, and that a less estate than the fee was intended to be conveyed or devised * * And in the case of Slaughter v, Hall, 201 Ala. 212 , 77 So. 738, 739 , we said of those provisions then codified as § 3396, Code 1907: “* * The s | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Green v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Stratford v. Lattimer
green
1 sentence1953The majority view, however, seems to be that the habendum clause changes all this; that this clause shows a clear intent on the part of the grantor to change or limit the grant to “a contingent stirpital disposition of the property to the grantee’s children after grantee’s death”. [ 255 Ala. 201 , 50 So. 423 .] This means, as I understand it, that the right to pass a fee-simple title to the property could not come into being until after the death of Eugenia Stratford. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Alabama Power Co. v. Atkins neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Hill v. Gray neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Reynolds v. Reynolds neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Porter v. Henderson green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Gargis v. Kennemer neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| King v. King neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Vizard v. Robinson green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| McClelland v. Coston green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Parker v. Olliver neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Moore v. Crandall green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Patton v. Beecher green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Wolffe v. Loeb neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.