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125 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1893–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2025“A lease’s habendum clause defines the mineral estate’s duration.” Anadarko, 94 S.W.3d at 554 . 2023Id. (noting a habendum clause’s use of the word “produce” means “producing in paying quantities”). | 11 | 20 |
Garcia v. Kinggreen2 sentences2017Id, The word “produce” in a habendum clause “is synonymous with the phrase ‘producing in paying quantities.’ ” Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427 , 432 n.4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (quoting Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578 , 164 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (1942)). 2017Id, The word “produce” in a habendum clause “is synonymous with the phrase ‘producing in paying quantities.’ ” Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427 , 432 n.4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (quoting Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578 , 164 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (1942)). | 8 | 11 |
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. and Endeavor Petroleum, L.L.C. v. Discovery Operating, Inc. and Patriot Royalty and Land, L.L.C.green2 sentences2026As is typical, the lease’s habendum clause defines the duration of the lease by dividing it into a primary term that ends on a date certain followed by a secondary term that continues as long as oil or gas is being “produced in paying quantities from the Leased Premises or lands pooled therewith[.]” See Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 597 (discussing a habendum clause). 2019Co., LLC, 526 S.W.3d at 394 (citing Thompson, 94 S.W.3d at 554 ; see also Endeavor Energy Res., L.P., 554 S.W.3d at 597 (because a mineral lease is a creature of contract, parties may modify the effect of a habendum clause by including other provisions). | 6 | 8 |
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Southland Royalty Companygreen2 sentences2017“A lease’s habendum clause defines the mineral estate’s duration.” Id. 2017“Although the habendum clause generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may extend the habendum clause’s term.” Thompson, 94 S.W.3d at 554 (citing Southland Royalty, 496 S.W.2d at 552 ). | 6 | 7 |
Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co.green2 sentences2022The habendum clause here, however, does not use the word “produced.” It allows the lease to continue past the primary term “as long thereafter as operations, as hereinafter defined, are conducted.” And “operations” include “production of 4 oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral, whether or not in paying quantities.” Under the plain terms of the lease and undisputed evidence in this case, the lease has not terminated because the well has produced gas “whether or not in paying quantities.” See Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 695 S.W.2d 99, 107 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ ref’d n.r. 2015See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 107 ; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128 . | 5 | 5 |
Bp America Production Company v. Red Deer Resources, Llcgreen2 sentences2023Id. “[T]hough the habendum clause in a lease generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may be considered in determining the habendum clause’s term.” Id. 2023Id. “[T]hough the habendum clause in a lease generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may be considered in determining the habendum clause’s term.” Id. | 2 | 6 |
Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporationgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 81–85. 2023See Cimarex, 574 S.W.3d at 93 . | 2 | 3 |
Greer v. Salmongreen2 sentences2001For instance, in Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970), the court had before it an habendum clause containing the words “and as long thereafter as oil and gas ... is produced or producible by the lessee....” Id. at 295 (emphasis in original). 2001For instance, in Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970), the court had before it an habendum clause containing the words “and as long thereafter as oil and gas ... is produced or producible by the lessee....” Id. at 295 (emphasis in original). | 2 | 3 |
Texas Electric Railway Co. v. Nealegreen2 sentences2026See Neale, 252 S.W.2d at 453 (holding “[t]o have and to hold the same unto the said Trustees, . . . their successors and assigns, forever free of all encumbrances, including telephone, telegraph and transmission lines” “evidence[s] the intention on the part of the grantor to convey the title to the tract or strip of land”); Hidalgo Cnty., 443 S.W.2d at 85–86 (“The habendum clause refers to the land and premises and specifically states ‘TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described land and premises together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereunto in any wise belonging * * * fore 2026See Neale, 252 S.W.2d at 453 (holding “[t]o have and to hold the same unto the said Trustees, . . . their successors and assigns, forever free of all encumbrances, including telephone, telegraph and transmission lines” “evidence[s] the intention on the part of the grantor to convey the title to the tract or strip of land”); Hidalgo Cnty., 443 S.W.2d at 85–86 (“The habendum clause refers to the land and premises and specifically states ‘TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described land and premises together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereunto in any wise belonging * * * fore | 2 | 2 |
Coker v. Cokergreen2 sentences2017Such an interpretation of the Easement violates one of the most basic rules. of contract construction—it fails to give .effect to an entire clause, the habendum clause. 6 See, e.g., Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing presumption that parties to a contract intend every clause to have effect); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (recognizing rule of construction that entire contract will be harmonized to give effect to all provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless). 1999Thus, we eschew such an interpretation of the provision, read the habendum clause in harmony with the entire lease including the force majeure clause, see Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.1996) (stating that the parties’ intent is determined by perusing the entire agreement so the effect one part of the agreement has on another can be assessed); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983) (stating that provisions of a contract cannot be isolated and then interpreted as isolated), and conclude that the force majeure clause has the effect of extending the habe | 2 | 2 |
Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBankgreen2 sentences2017Such an interpretation of the Easement violates one of the most basic rules. of contract construction—it fails to give .effect to an entire clause, the habendum clause. 6 See, e.g., Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing presumption that parties to a contract intend every clause to have effect); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (recognizing rule of construction that entire contract will be harmonized to give effect to all provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless). 1999Thus, we eschew such an interpretation of the provision, read the habendum clause in harmony with the entire lease including the force majeure clause, see Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.1996) (stating that the parties’ intent is determined by perusing the entire agreement so the effect one part of the agreement has on another can be assessed); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983) (stating that provisions of a contract cannot be isolated and then interpreted as isolated), and conclude that the force majeure clause has the effect of extending the habe | 2 | 2 |
Fox v. Thoresongreen2 sentences2015Fox v. Thoreson, controls the mineral estate's duration, other clauses 398 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex.1966). 2003See Fox, 398 S.W.2d at 92 . | 2 | 2 |
Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Investments, Inc.green2 sentences2014Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex.2004). 2014Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. 2004). | 2 | 2 |
McDaniel v. Calvertgreen2 sentences2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not). 2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not). | 2 | 2 |
Walchshauser v. Hydegreen2 sentences2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not). 2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not). | 2 | 2 |
Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp.green2 sentences2000Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 675 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 2000Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 675 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 2 | 2 |
Hunt Oil Company v. Dishmangreen2 sentences1992See Nafco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Tartan Resources Corp., 522 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that the habendum clause operated independently upon each tract and that production on one 160-acre tract would not maintain the lease on another 160-acre tract); Hunt Oil Co. v. Dishman, 352 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1961, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that, except for 40 acres allotted to oil production, the determinable fee on a 320-acre tract allotted to gas production was forfeited when a gas well was reclassified as an oil well and no reworkin 1975See Hunt Oil Company v. Dishman, 352 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.). | 2 | 2 |
| Kokernot v. Caldwellgreen | 2 | 2 |
Hydrocarbon Management, Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc.green2 sentences2022Thistle Creek’s reliance on any other case that included a similar purpose or diligence clause is unpersuasive because the habendum clause did not extend the leases based on production “whether or not in paying quantities.” See Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ). 2021The lease provided that each “[s]uch unit acreage shall only be held by production.” “The word ‘produce’ in a habendum clause ‘is synonymous with the phrase “producing in paying quantities.”’” Red Deer, 526 S.W.3d at 394 (quoting 13 Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427 , 432 n.4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ)). “‘Production in paying quantities’ means ‘the production is sufficient to pay the lessee a profit, even small, over the operating and marketing expenses, although the cost of drilling the well may never be repaid.’” Id. (quoting Tracker, 861 S.W.2d at 432 n | 1 | 5 |
Nafco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Tartan Resources Corp.green2 sentences2014In Naf-co, the court held that the habendum clause, as modified by the retained acreage clause, operated independently upon each tract and that production on one 160-acre tract would not maintain the lease as to another 160-acre tract on which production had ceased. 522 S.W.2d at 707-08 . 2014In Nafco, the court held that the habendum clause, as modified by the retained acreage clause, operated independently upon each tract and that production on one 160-acre tract would not maintain the lease as to another 160-acre tract on which production had ceased. 522 S.W.2d at 707-08 . | 1 | 4 |
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Reidgreen2 sentences2009The word “produced,” as used in the habendum clause in this lease, means “production in paying quantities.” Gulf Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d at 269 ; Dreher v. Cassidy Ltd. 2009Gulf Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d at 270 . 6 Although the lack of a market will not excuse the failure to produce during either the primary term or the secondary term of a lease of this nature and even though the habendum clause generally controls the duration of the lease, other provisions might extend the term provided for in the habendum clause. | 1 | 4 |
Grinnell v. Munsongreen2 sentences2011A typical Texas mineral lease contains an habendum clause that defines the duration of the lease, typically providing a relatively short fixed term of years as the primary term and then a secondary term for “as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced.” Id.; Grinnell, 137 S.W.3d at 714 . 2011The habendum clause defines 2 the duration of the lease, and it usually provides for a relatively short fixed term of years (the primary term) followed by a secondary term for “as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced.” Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2002); Grinnell, 137 S.W.3d at 714 . | 1 | 3 |
Clifton v. Koontzgreen2 sentences2021“Although the habendum clause generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may extend the habendum clause’s term.” Id. (quoting Thompson, 94 S.W.3d at 554 ). 1992Pshigoda v. Texaco, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Ballan-fonte v. Kimbell, 373 S.W.2d 119, 120-21 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82 , 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (1959). | 1 | 2 |
| BNSF Railway Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gordon v. West Houston Trees, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ice Bros., Inc. v. Bannowskygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Benedict G. Wenske and Elizabeth Wenske v. Steve Ealy and Deborah Ealygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hysaw v. Dawkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Community Bank of Raymore, as Trustee or Agent v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. and Anadarko Petroleum Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Claytongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daugherty v. Helena & Northwestern Railwaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Humphrey v. Sealegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Houston Pipe Line Company v. Dwyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Linda Ann Parrish Richardson and Gary Bruce Richardson, Co-Trustees of the M.C. Parrish, Jr. Testamentary Trust v. Donald Roger Millsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gulf Coast Water Co. v. Hamman Exploration Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Tate v. Sartaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Employers Casualty Company v. Tilleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whelan v. Placid Oil Company
green
2 sentences2015See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 107 ; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128 . 2012See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 107 ; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128 . | 4 | 2011–2015 |
Armstrong v. American Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1987However, in Waters v. Ellis, 312 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 1958), the Texas Supreme Court stated that "it is a recognized rule of construction that where there is a `necessary repugnance' of clauses in a conveyance, the granting clause prevails over the other provisions of the deed." In another case, an agreement by a grantee to care for the grantor was found to be a covenant, and not a condition, even though the habendum clause was followed by the phrase "subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter provided." Sisk v. Randon, 70 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1934). 1987However, in Waters v. Ellis, 312 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 1958), the Texas Supreme Court stated that “it is a recognized rule of construc- don that where there is a 'necessary repugnance' of clauses in a conveyance. the granting clause prevails over the other provisions of the deed.' In another case, an agreement by a grantee to care for the grantor was found to be a covenant, and not a condition, even though the habendum clause was followed by the phrase "subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter provided." Sisk v. Bandon, 70 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1934). | 4 | 1946–1987 |
Berry v. Spivey
neutral
2 sentences1957Especially is this true where the deed has obviously, from its appearance, been drawn by unskilled hands. , .. ■; It has been held, and is now considered settled law, that where the granting clause and the habendum clause are contradictory, the intention of the parties is to be given effect, and such intention is to be' gathered from the entire instrument construed as a whole: Ogletree v. Abrams, Tex.Com.App., 67 S.W.2d 227 ; Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549 , 84 S.W.2d 442 ; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison, 138 Tex. 84 , 156 S.W.2d 963 ; Berry v. Spivey, 44 Tex.Civ.App. 18 , 97 S.W 1957Especially is this true where the deed has obviously, from its appearance, been drawn by unskilled hands. , .. ■; It has been held, and is now considered settled law, that where the granting clause and the habendum clause are contradictory, the intention of the parties is to be given effect, and such intention is to be' gathered from the entire instrument construed as a whole: Ogletree v. Abrams, Tex.Com.App., 67 S.W.2d 227 ; Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549 , 84 S.W.2d 442 ; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison, 138 Tex. 84 , 156 S.W.2d 963 ; Berry v. Spivey, 44 Tex.Civ.App. 18 , 97 S.W | 4 | 1941–1957 |
Garrett v. Christopher
neutral
2 sentences1896In the case of Garrett v. Christopher, 74 Texas, 453 , the deed under discussion contained a granting clause very similar to that in the deed to Bedford, defendant in this case, but the habendum clause in the case cited was “To have and to hold the above described premises unto the said C. 1893It recites the very inadequate consideration of $10; in terms bargains, sells, and quitclaims all the right, title, and interest of the grantor in and to an undivided one-third interest in and to the Cosmopolitan Hotel, as that interest may appear from a certain sheriff’s deed therein referred to; and is endorsed “ a. quitclaim deed.” Following reluctantly the decision in Garrett v. Christopher, 74 Texas, 453 , we held, on the former hearing, that this, with other deeds in appellee’s chain of title, was more than a mere conveyance of the chance of title, because of the controlling effect given | 4 | 1893–1921 |
Veltmann v. Damon
green
2 sentences2023As support for this argument, Lee relies on Veltmann v. Damon, in which a granting clause in a deed conveyed the grantor’s “undivided one-half (1/2) interest” in property subject to a life estate retained by the grantor, but the habendum clause recited that the grantee was to have and to hold all of the property, including the grantor’s spouse’s other undivided one-half interest in the property that was not 30 included in the granting clause. 701 S.W.2d 247 , 247–48 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam). 2023As support for this argument, Lee relies on Veltmann v. Damon, in which a granting clause in a deed conveyed the grantor’s “undivided one-half (1/2) interest” in property subject to a life estate retained by the grantor, but the habendum clause recited that the grantee was to have and to hold all of the property, including the grantor’s spouse’s other undivided one-half interest in the property that was not 30 included in the granting clause. 701 S.W.2d 247 , 247–48 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam). | 2 | 1990–2023 |
Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P.
green
2 sentences2023P’ship, No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 WL 3197920 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. denied) (noting that the parties did not dispute that a lease with a five-year primary term starting August 1, 2006, had a default end date of July 31, 2011), with Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P., 473 S.W.3d 341 , 344–46 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied) (noting that “[t]he Bass Lease’s primary term began June 1, 2008 and was slated to end three years later on June 1, 2011 per the habendum clause,” id. at 346 , when the lease stated that it would “remain in force for three (3) years from 2023P’ship, No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 WL 3197920 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. denied) (noting that the parties did not dispute that a lease with a five-year primary term starting August 1, 2006, had a default end date of July 31, 2011), with Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P., 473 S.W.3d 341 , 344–46 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied) (noting that “[t]he Bass Lease’s primary term began June 1, 2008 and was slated to end three years later on June 1, 2011 per the habendum clause,” id. at 346 , when the lease stated that it would “remain in force for three (3) years from | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2015But the court of appeals reasoned that the habendum clause must of appeals' analysis incorrectly assumes that the ces- require actual production to further the lease's objec- sation-of-production clause is triggered any time ac- tive—to reap economic gain. 60 S.W.3d at 140 . 2003After considering the lease’s implicit and explicit objectives, language in the lease’s continuous operations clause, and other jurisdictions’ case law, the court of appeals construed the lease’s habendum clause to require actual production in paying quantities. 60 S.W.3d at 140-41 . | 2 | 2003–2015 |
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2012Duhig v. Peevey, 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). 1952Appellant relies upon the case of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 , in support of his contention. | 2 | 1952–2012 |
| Hughes v. Gladewater County Line Independent School Dist. green | 2 | 1987–1987 |
| Waters v. Ellis green | 2 | 1987–1987 |
| Sisk v. Random green | 2 | 1946–1967 |
| Nichols v. Schmittou neutral | 2 | 1944–1966 |
| Threadgill v. Bickerstaff green | 2 | 1917–1965 |
| Richardson v. Levi green | 2 | 1921–1965 |
| Cook v. Smith green | 2 | 1917–1965 |
| Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill green | 2 | 1960–1964 |
| West Texas Utilities Co. v. Lee green | 2 | 1936–1960 |
| Sun Oil Co. v. Burns green | 2 | 1957–1960 |
| Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. green | 2 | 1952–1960 |
| Vineyard v. O'Connor green | 2 | 1920–1958 |
| Snow v. Gallup green | 2 | 1920–1958 |
| Ogletree v. Abrams neutral | 2 | 1944–1957 |
| Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison green | 2 | 1944–1957 |
| Olcott v. Gabert green | 2 | 1915–1923 |
| Hidalgo County v. Pate green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Steeple Oil & Gas Corp. v. Amend green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Harris v. Strawbridge green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| City of Stamford v. King green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Bass v. Harper green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Shell Western E&P, Inc. v. Dolores County Board of Commissioners green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Montfort v. Trek Resources, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Wilson v. Dearing, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Fenn v. Boxwell green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.