habendum clause (Texas) · Go Syfert
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habendum clause in Texas

125 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1893–2026 16 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (44)

CaseFollowedCited
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompsongreen
tex · 2003 · cited in 20 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2004–2025
2 sentences

2025“A lease’s habendum clause defines the mineral estate’s duration.” Anadarko, 94 S.W.3d at 554 .

2023Id. (noting a habendum clause’s use of the word “produce” means “producing in paying quantities”).

1120
Garcia v. Kinggreen
tex · 1942 · cited in 11 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1957–2017
2 sentences

2017Id, The word “produce” in a habendum clause “is synonymous with the phrase ‘producing in paying quantities.’ ” Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427 , 432 n.4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (quoting Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578 , 164 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (1942)).

2017Id, The word “produce” in a habendum clause “is synonymous with the phrase ‘producing in paying quantities.’ ” Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427 , 432 n.4 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (quoting Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578 , 164 S.W.2d 509, 511-12 (1942)).

811
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. and Endeavor Petroleum, L.L.C. v. Discovery Operating, Inc. and Patriot Royalty and Land, L.L.C.green
· 2018 · cited in 8 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2019–2026
2 sentences

2026As is typical, the lease’s habendum clause defines the duration of the lease by dividing it into a primary term that ends on a date certain followed by a secondary term that continues as long as oil or gas is being “produced in paying quantities from the Leased Premises or lands pooled therewith[.]” See Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 597 (discussing a habendum clause).

2019Co., LLC, 526 S.W.3d at 394 (citing Thompson, 94 S.W.3d at 554 ; see also Endeavor Energy Res., L.P., 554 S.W.3d at 597 (because a mineral lease is a creature of contract, parties may modify the effect of a habendum clause by including other provisions).

68
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Southland Royalty Companygreen
tex · 1973 · cited in 7 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1984–2019
2 sentences

2017“A lease’s habendum clause defines the mineral estate’s duration.” Id.

2017“Although the habendum clause generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may extend the habendum clause’s term.” Thompson, 94 S.W.3d at 554 (citing Southland Royalty, 496 S.W.2d at 552 ).

67
Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co.green
texapp · 1985 · cited in 5 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2011–2022
2 sentences

2022The habendum clause here, however, does not use the word “produced.” It allows the lease to continue past the primary term “as long thereafter as operations, as hereinafter defined, are conducted.” And “operations” include “production of 4 oil, gas, sulphur or other mineral, whether or not in paying quantities.” Under the plain terms of the lease and undisputed evidence in this case, the lease has not terminated because the well has produced gas “whether or not in paying quantities.” See Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 695 S.W.2d 99, 107 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ ref’d n.r.

2015See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 107 ; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128 .

55
Bp America Production Company v. Red Deer Resources, Llcgreen
tex · 2017 · cited in 6 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2023
2 sentences

2023Id. “[T]hough the habendum clause in a lease generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may be considered in determining the habendum clause’s term.” Id.

2023Id. “[T]hough the habendum clause in a lease generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may be considered in determining the habendum clause’s term.” Id.

26
Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporationgreen
texapp · 2019 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2023–2025
2 sentences

2025Id. at 81–85.

2023See Cimarex, 574 S.W.3d at 93 .

23
Greer v. Salmongreen
nm · 1970 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2000–2003
2 sentences

2001For instance, in Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970), the court had before it an habendum clause containing the words “and as long thereafter as oil and gas ... is produced or producible by the lessee....” Id. at 295 (emphasis in original).

2001For instance, in Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970), the court had before it an habendum clause containing the words “and as long thereafter as oil and gas ... is produced or producible by the lessee....” Id. at 295 (emphasis in original).

23
Texas Electric Railway Co. v. Nealegreen
tex · 1952 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2026
2 sentences

2026See Neale, 252 S.W.2d at 453 (holding “[t]o have and to hold the same unto the said Trustees, . . . their successors and assigns, forever free of all encumbrances, including telephone, telegraph and transmission lines” “evidence[s] the intention on the part of the grantor to convey the title to the tract or strip of land”); Hidalgo Cnty., 443 S.W.2d at 85–86 (“The habendum clause refers to the land and premises and specifically states ‘TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described land and premises together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereunto in any wise belonging * * * fore

2026See Neale, 252 S.W.2d at 453 (holding “[t]o have and to hold the same unto the said Trustees, . . . their successors and assigns, forever free of all encumbrances, including telephone, telegraph and transmission lines” “evidence[s] the intention on the part of the grantor to convey the title to the tract or strip of land”); Hidalgo Cnty., 443 S.W.2d at 85–86 (“The habendum clause refers to the land and premises and specifically states ‘TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described land and premises together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereunto in any wise belonging * * * fore

22
Coker v. Cokergreen
tex · 1983 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–2017
2 sentences

2017Such an interpretation of the Easement violates one of the most basic rules. of contract construction—it fails to give .effect to an entire clause, the habendum clause. 6 See, e.g., Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing presumption that parties to a contract intend every clause to have effect); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (recognizing rule of construction that entire contract will be harmonized to give effect to all provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless).

1999Thus, we eschew such an interpretation of the provision, read the habendum clause in harmony with the entire lease including the force majeure clause, see Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.1996) (stating that the parties’ intent is determined by perusing the entire agreement so the effect one part of the agreement has on another can be assessed); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983) (stating that provisions of a contract cannot be isolated and then interpreted as isolated), and conclude that the force majeure clause has the effect of extending the habe

22
Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBankgreen
tex · 1997 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–2017
2 sentences

2017Such an interpretation of the Easement violates one of the most basic rules. of contract construction—it fails to give .effect to an entire clause, the habendum clause. 6 See, e.g., Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing presumption that parties to a contract intend every clause to have effect); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (recognizing rule of construction that entire contract will be harmonized to give effect to all provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless).

1999Thus, we eschew such an interpretation of the provision, read the habendum clause in harmony with the entire lease including the force majeure clause, see Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.1996) (stating that the parties’ intent is determined by perusing the entire agreement so the effect one part of the agreement has on another can be assessed); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983) (stating that provisions of a contract cannot be isolated and then interpreted as isolated), and conclude that the force majeure clause has the effect of extending the habe

22
Fox v. Thoresongreen
tex · 1966 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2003–2015
2 sentences

2015Fox v. Thoreson, controls the mineral estate's duration, other clauses 398 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex.1966).

2003See Fox, 398 S.W.2d at 92 .

22
Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Investments, Inc.green
tex · 2004 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex.2004).

2014Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. 2004).

22
McDaniel v. Calvertgreen
texapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not).

2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not).

22
Walchshauser v. Hydegreen
texapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not).

2013See Walchshauser v. Hyde, 890 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (transfer of dominant estate “automatically includes the [appurtenant] easement across the servient tenement’s land” regardless of whether easements are referenced in deed or not).

22
Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp.green
texapp · 1984 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 675 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2000Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 675 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

22
Hunt Oil Company v. Dishmangreen
texapp · 1961 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1975–1992
2 sentences

1992See Nafco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Tartan Resources Corp., 522 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that the habendum clause operated independently upon each tract and that production on one 160-acre tract would not maintain the lease on another 160-acre tract); Hunt Oil Co. v. Dishman, 352 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1961, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that, except for 40 acres allotted to oil production, the determinable fee on a 320-acre tract allotted to gas production was forfeited when a gas well was reclassified as an oil well and no reworkin

1975See Hunt Oil Company v. Dishman, 352 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

22
Kokernot v. Caldwellgreen
texapp · 1950 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1978–1984
22
Hydrocarbon Management, Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc.green
texapp · 1993 · cited in 5 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2022
2 sentences

2022Thistle Creek’s reliance on any other case that included a similar purpose or diligence clause is unpersuasive because the habendum clause did not extend the leases based on production “whether or not in paying quantities.” See Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ).

2021The lease provided that each “[s]uch unit acreage shall only be held by production.” “The word ‘produce’ in a habendum clause ‘is synonymous with the phrase “producing in paying quantities.”’” Red Deer, 526 S.W.3d at 394 (quoting 13 Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427 , 432 n.4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ)). “‘Production in paying quantities’ means ‘the production is sufficient to pay the lessee a profit, even small, over the operating and marketing expenses, although the cost of drilling the well may never be repaid.’” Id. (quoting Tracker, 861 S.W.2d at 432 n

15
Nafco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Tartan Resources Corp.green
texapp · 1975 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–2017
2 sentences

2014In Naf-co, the court held that the habendum clause, as modified by the retained acreage clause, operated independently upon each tract and that production on one 160-acre tract would not maintain the lease as to another 160-acre tract on which production had ceased. 522 S.W.2d at 707-08 .

2014In Nafco, the court held that the habendum clause, as modified by the retained acreage clause, operated independently upon each tract and that production on one 160-acre tract would not maintain the lease as to another 160-acre tract on which production had ceased. 522 S.W.2d at 707-08 .

14
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Reidgreen
tex · 1960 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1964–2009
2 sentences

2009The word “produced,” as used in the habendum clause in this lease, means “production in paying quantities.” Gulf Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d at 269 ; Dreher v. Cassidy Ltd.

2009Gulf Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d at 270 . 6 Although the lack of a market will not excuse the failure to produce during either the primary term or the secondary term of a lease of this nature and even though the habendum clause generally controls the duration of the lease, other provisions might extend the term provided for in the habendum clause.

14
Grinnell v. Munsongreen
texapp · 2004 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011A typical Texas mineral lease contains an habendum clause that defines the duration of the lease, typically providing a relatively short fixed term of years as the primary term and then a secondary term for “as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced.” Id.; Grinnell, 137 S.W.3d at 714 .

2011The habendum clause defines 2 the duration of the lease, and it usually provides for a relatively short fixed term of years (the primary term) followed by a secondary term for “as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced.” Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2002); Grinnell, 137 S.W.3d at 714 .

13
Clifton v. Koontzgreen
tex · 1959 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–2021
2 sentences

2021“Although the habendum clause generally controls the mineral estate’s duration, other clauses may extend the habendum clause’s term.” Id. (quoting Thompson, 94 S.W.3d at 554 ).

1992Pshigoda v. Texaco, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Ballan-fonte v. Kimbell, 373 S.W.2d 119, 120-21 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82 , 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (1959).

12
BNSF Railway Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.green
texapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
11
Gordon v. West Houston Trees, Ltd.green
texapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc.green
tex · 1989 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Ice Bros., Inc. v. Bannowskygreen
texapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Benedict G. Wenske and Elizabeth Wenske v. Steve Ealy and Deborah Ealygreen
tex · 2017 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
11
Hysaw v. Dawkinsgreen
tex · 2016 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLCgreen
texapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmanngreen
tex · 2018 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Community Bank of Raymore, as Trustee or Agent v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. and Anadarko Petroleum Corp.green
texapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
11
Thompson v. Claytongreen
texapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Daugherty v. Helena & Northwestern Railwaygreen
ark · 1952 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Humphrey v. Sealegreen
texapp · 1986 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Houston Pipe Line Company v. Dwyergreen
tex · 1964 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Linda Ann Parrish Richardson and Gary Bruce Richardson, Co-Trustees of the M.C. Parrish, Jr. Testamentary Trust v. Donald Roger Millsgreen
texapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Gulf Coast Water Co. v. Hamman Exploration Co.green
texapp · 1942 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
11
Tate v. Sartaingreen
texapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
Employers Casualty Company v. Tilleygreen
tex · 1973 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (36)

CaseCitedYears
Whelan v. Placid Oil Company green
texapp · 1954
2 sentences

2015See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 107 ; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128 .

2012See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 107 ; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128 .

42011–2015
Armstrong v. American Bank & Trust Co. green
tex · 1934
2 sentences

1987However, in Waters v. Ellis, 312 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 1958), the Texas Supreme Court stated that "it is a recognized rule of construction that where there is a `necessary repugnance' of clauses in a conveyance, the granting clause prevails over the other provisions of the deed." In another case, an agreement by a grantee to care for the grantor was found to be a covenant, and not a condition, even though the habendum clause was followed by the phrase "subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter provided." Sisk v. Randon, 70 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1934).

1987However, in Waters v. Ellis, 312 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 1958), the Texas Supreme Court stated that “it is a recognized rule of construc- don that where there is a 'necessary repugnance' of clauses in a conveyance. the granting clause prevails over the other provisions of the deed.' In another case, an agreement by a grantee to care for the grantor was found to be a covenant, and not a condition, even though the habendum clause was followed by the phrase "subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter provided." Sisk v. Bandon, 70 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1934).

41946–1987
Berry v. Spivey neutral
texapp · 1906
2 sentences

1957Especially is this true where the deed has obviously, from its appearance, been drawn by unskilled hands. , .. ■; It has been held, and is now considered settled law, that where the granting clause and the habendum clause are contradictory, the intention of the parties is to be given effect, and such intention is to be' gathered from the entire instrument construed as a whole: Ogletree v. Abrams, Tex.Com.App., 67 S.W.2d 227 ; Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549 , 84 S.W.2d 442 ; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison, 138 Tex. 84 , 156 S.W.2d 963 ; Berry v. Spivey, 44 Tex.Civ.App. 18 , 97 S.W

1957Especially is this true where the deed has obviously, from its appearance, been drawn by unskilled hands. , .. ■; It has been held, and is now considered settled law, that where the granting clause and the habendum clause are contradictory, the intention of the parties is to be given effect, and such intention is to be' gathered from the entire instrument construed as a whole: Ogletree v. Abrams, Tex.Com.App., 67 S.W.2d 227 ; Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549 , 84 S.W.2d 442 ; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison, 138 Tex. 84 , 156 S.W.2d 963 ; Berry v. Spivey, 44 Tex.Civ.App. 18 , 97 S.W

41941–1957
Garrett v. Christopher neutral
tex · 1889
2 sentences

1896In the case of Garrett v. Christopher, 74 Texas, 453 , the deed under discussion contained a granting clause very similar to that in the deed to Bedford, defendant in this case, but the habendum clause in the case cited was “To have and to hold the above described premises unto the said C.

1893It recites the very inadequate consideration of $10; in terms bargains, sells, and quitclaims all the right, title, and interest of the grantor in and to an undivided one-third interest in and to the Cosmopolitan Hotel, as that interest may appear from a certain sheriff’s deed therein referred to; and is endorsed “ a. quitclaim deed.” Following reluctantly the decision in Garrett v. Christopher, 74 Texas, 453 , we held, on the former hearing, that this, with other deeds in appellee’s chain of title, was more than a mere conveyance of the chance of title, because of the controlling effect given

41893–1921
Veltmann v. Damon green
tex · 1985
2 sentences

2023As support for this argument, Lee relies on Veltmann v. Damon, in which a granting clause in a deed conveyed the grantor’s “undivided one-half (1/2) interest” in property subject to a life estate retained by the grantor, but the habendum clause recited that the grantee was to have and to hold all of the property, including the grantor’s spouse’s other undivided one-half interest in the property that was not 30 included in the granting clause. 701 S.W.2d 247 , 247–48 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).

2023As support for this argument, Lee relies on Veltmann v. Damon, in which a granting clause in a deed conveyed the grantor’s “undivided one-half (1/2) interest” in property subject to a life estate retained by the grantor, but the habendum clause recited that the grantee was to have and to hold all of the property, including the grantor’s spouse’s other undivided one-half interest in the property that was not 30 included in the granting clause. 701 S.W.2d 247 , 247–48 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).

21990–2023
Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P. green
texapp · 2015
2 sentences

2023P’ship, No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 WL 3197920 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. denied) (noting that the parties did not dispute that a lease with a five-year primary term starting August 1, 2006, had a default end date of July 31, 2011), with Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P., 473 S.W.3d 341 , 344–46 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied) (noting that “[t]he Bass Lease’s primary term began June 1, 2008 and was slated to end three years later on June 1, 2011 per the habendum clause,” id. at 346 , when the lease stated that it would “remain in force for three (3) years from

2023P’ship, No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 WL 3197920 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. denied) (noting that the parties did not dispute that a lease with a five-year primary term starting August 1, 2006, had a default end date of July 31, 2011), with Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. v. BMT O & G TX, L.P., 473 S.W.3d 341 , 344–46 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied) (noting that “[t]he Bass Lease’s primary term began June 1, 2008 and was slated to end three years later on June 1, 2011 per the habendum clause,” id. at 346 , when the lease stated that it would “remain in force for three (3) years from

22023–2023
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson green
texapp · 2001
2 sentences

2015But the court of appeals reasoned that the habendum clause must of appeals' analysis incorrectly assumes that the ces- require actual production to further the lease's objec- sation-of-production clause is triggered any time ac- tive—to reap economic gain. 60 S.W.3d at 140 .

2003After considering the lease’s implicit and explicit objectives, language in the lease’s continuous operations clause, and other jurisdictions’ case law, the court of appeals construed the lease’s habendum clause to require actual production in paying quantities. 60 S.W.3d at 140-41 .

22003–2015
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. green
· 1940
2 sentences

2012Duhig v. Peevey, 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940).

1952Appellant relies upon the case of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 , in support of his contention.

21952–2012
Hughes v. Gladewater County Line Independent School Dist. green
texcommnapp · 1934
21987–1987
Waters v. Ellis green
tex · 1958
21987–1987
Sisk v. Random green
tex · 1934
21946–1967
Nichols v. Schmittou neutral
tex · 1915
21944–1966
Threadgill v. Bickerstaff green
tex · 1895
21917–1965
Richardson v. Levi green
· 1887
21921–1965
Cook v. Smith green
· 1915
21917–1965
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill green
texapp · 1937
21960–1964
West Texas Utilities Co. v. Lee green
texapp · 1930
21936–1960
Sun Oil Co. v. Burns green
tex · 1935
21957–1960
Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. green
tex · 1943
21952–1960
Vineyard v. O'Connor green
tex · 1896
21920–1958
Snow v. Gallup green
· 1909
21920–1958
Ogletree v. Abrams neutral
texcommnapp · 1934
21944–1957
Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison green
tex · 1941
21944–1957
Olcott v. Gabert green
tex · 1893
21915–1923
Hidalgo County v. Pate green
texapp · 1969
12026–2026
Steeple Oil & Gas Corp. v. Amend green
texapp · 1960
12023–2023
Harris v. Strawbridge green
texapp · 1960
12023–2023
BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd. green
tex · 2017
12022–2022
City of Stamford v. King green
texapp · 1940
12021–2021
Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam green
texapp · 2002
12021–2021
Bass v. Harper green
tex · 1969
12018–2018
Shell Western E&P, Inc. v. Dolores County Board of Commissioners green
colo · 1997
12015–2015
Montfort v. Trek Resources, Inc. green
texapp · 2006
12012–2012
Wilson v. Dearing, Inc. green
texapp · 1967
12005–2005
Fenn v. Boxwell green
texapp · 1958
12005–2005
Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals green
okla · 1994
12003–2003

Where else courts name it

TX 125 (1893–2026) OK 52 (1919–2023) OH 36 (1921–2024) CA 31 (1860–2021) AL 31 (1883–2018) PA 28 (1915–2025) NY 27 (1852–2015) GA 23 (1899–2015) KY 23 (1895–2023) KS 23 (1899–2021) NC 21 (1908–2010) IL 19 (1899–1987) TN 19 (1921–2024) MD 17 (1910–2009) MO 16 (1883–2024) IN 15 (1893–2023) AR 13 (1915–1975) WV 11 (1896–2016) WA 10 (1915–2007) VT 8 (1865–2026) SC 8 (1907–2006) CO 7 (1904–2021) MT 7 (1926–2008) MI 7 (1897–2014) ND 7 (1977–2024) LA 6 (1938–2012) CT 6 (1895–2019) NJ 5 (1845–1989) MA 5 (1935–1992) NE 5 (1958–1993) OR 5 (1905–2021) NM 4 (1931–2026) ME 4 (1960–2012) IA 4 (1877–2003) WI 4 (1902–1945) WY 3 (1981–1994) UT 3 (1999–2012) VA 2 (1913–1969) HI 2 (1910–2018) DE 2 (1949–1982)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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