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19 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teague v. Sowdergreen2 sentences1958“The habendum on the other hand limits it to a tenancy by the entirety by including the name of his wife, Mae Holloway. “ ‘ granting clause creating a fee simple estate will prevail over the subsequent habendum clause granting a less estate.’ ” Citing Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn. 132 , 114 S.W. 484 ; Simpson v. Simpson, 160 Tenn. 645 , 28 S.W. 2d 349 ; and Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310 , 257 S.W. 1044 . 1954But if the deed, considered as a whole, shows no such intention, then the common law rule still prevails, that “if the habendum clause is in conflict with the estate granted in the granting clause, it must be rejected.” Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn. 132, 160, 161, 162 , 114 S. W. 484 , 491. | 1 | 4 |
Quarles v. Arthurgreen2 sentences2021Quarles, 231 S.W.2d at 591 . 2000See, e.g., Moore v. Stanfill, 313 S.W.2d 486, 487-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (involving a deed where the granting clause conveyed a fee simple title and the habendum clause included conditions that, if they occurred, would convert the interest into a life estate); Quarles v. Arthur, 231 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (involving a deed where the granting clause conveyed a life estate and the habendum a fee simple title). | 1 | 3 |
Bennett v. Langhamgreen2 sentences2024In Morgan, we stated that evidence of a “clear and unmistakable affirmative act indicating a purpose to repudiate ownership” had been 6 Although the general rule is that a court looks to the deed as a whole and surrounding circumstances to ascertain a grantor’s intent, “where the deed is so confused and contradictory in its wording, and where the surrounding circumstances held no light upon the intent of the grantor, then the courts must, as a last resort, rely upon the common law rule which places precedence upon the premises [granting clause] over the habendum clause.” KT Grp., LLC, 578 S.W. 2018However, “where the deed is so confused and contradictory in its wording, and where the surrounding circumstances held no light upon the intent of the grantor, then the courts must, as a last resort, rely upon the common law rule which places precedence upon the premises [granting clause] over the habendum clause.” Bennett v. Langham, -4- 383 S.W.2d 16, 20 (Tenn. 1964) (emphasis added); see also Hall v. Hall, 604 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tenn. 1980) (noting that the Supreme Court has “not totally abandon[ed] this rule of construction . . . .”).3 IV. | 1 | 2 |
Smoky Mountain Railroad v. Paine Oil Co.green2 sentences2018The habendum clause was also followed by a covenant that the grantor “is lawfully seized in fee simple . . . and ha[s] the full power, authority and right to convey the same[.]” Id. 2018Although the granting clause purported to convey “a right of way,” the habendum clause merely referred to the “said strip of land.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Hall v. Hallgreen1 sentence2018However, “where the deed is so confused and contradictory in its wording, and where the surrounding circumstances held no light upon the intent of the grantor, then the courts must, as a last resort, rely upon the common law rule which places precedence upon the premises [granting clause] over the habendum clause.” Bennett v. Langham, -4- 383 S.W.2d 16, 20 (Tenn. 1964) (emphasis added); see also Hall v. Hall, 604 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tenn. 1980) (noting that the Supreme Court has “not totally abandon[ed] this rule of construction . . . .”).3 IV. | 1 | 1 |
Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr.green1 sentence2018The habendum clause, which follows the descriptive clause, gives Round Mountain and “its successors and assigns” the right “[t]o have and to hold the said strip, tract or parcel of land, together with the appurtenances, estate, right, title and interest thereunto belonging . . . in fee simple forever.” As previously stated, “[i]n construing a deed, a court’s primary goal ‘is to ascertain the grantor’s intent from the words of the deed as a whole and from the surrounding circumstances.’ ” Bryant v. Bryant, 522 S.W.3d 392, 412 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Griffis v. Davidson Cty. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Stanfillgreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., Moore v. Stanfill, 313 S.W.2d 486, 487-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (involving a deed where the granting clause conveyed a fee simple title and the habendum clause included conditions that, if they occurred, would convert the interest into a life estate); Quarles v. Arthur, 231 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (involving a deed where the granting clause conveyed a life estate and the habendum a fee simple title). 2000See, e.g., Moore v. Stanfill, 313 S.W.2d 486, 487-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957) (involving a deed where the granting clause conveyed a fee simple title and the habendum clause included conditions that, if they occurred, would convert the interest into a life estate); Quarles v. Arthur, 231 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) (involving a deed where the granting clause conveyed a life estate and the habendum a fee simple title). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Bell
green
2 sentences2018In fact, the only language which could possibly be interpreted as conveying an easement appeared in the habendum clause, which stated that the “said land” was “to be forever used enjoyed by the said company for Rail Road purposes only and not to be sold by said company or leased to any party for any purpose in whole or in part without the consent of the [grantor] or his legal heirs or representatives.” Id. 1957Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661 , 39 S.W. 2d 1026, 1028 , which contains the language “for railroad purposes only” in the habendum clause; and Boyd v. Ducktown Chemical & Iron Company, 19 Tenn.App. 392, 396 , 89 S.W.2d 360 . | 2 | 1957–2018 |
Simpson v. Simpson
neutral
2 sentences1958“The habendum on the other hand limits it to a tenancy by the entirety by including the name of his wife, Mae Holloway. “ ‘ granting clause creating a fee simple estate will prevail over the subsequent habendum clause granting a less estate.’ ” Citing Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn. 132 , 114 S.W. 484 ; Simpson v. Simpson, 160 Tenn. 645 , 28 S.W. 2d 349 ; and Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310 , 257 S.W. 1044 . 1958“The habendum on the other hand limits it to a tenancy by the entirety by including the name of his wife, Mae Holloway. “ ‘ granting clause creating a fee simple estate will prevail over the subsequent habendum clause granting a less estate.’ ” Citing Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn. 132 , 114 S.W. 484 ; Simpson v. Simpson, 160 Tenn. 645 , 28 S.W. 2d 349 ; and Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310 , 257 S.W. 1044 . | 2 | 1940–1958 |
Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence1990In Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., 551 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn.1977), our Supreme Court addressed a dispute over the meaning of an oil and gas lease. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
East Alabama Railway Co. v. Doe Ex Dem. Visscher
green
2 sentences1972Co. v. Doe, 114 U.S. 340 , 5 S.Ct. 869 , 29 L.Ed. 136 (1885) and in New Mexico v. U. S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171 , 43 L.Ed. 407 , 19 S.Ct. 128 (1898), the United States Supreme Court held that where deeds granted a “right of way,” the easements thereby conveyed were not enlarged by the use of the words “forever” or “fee simple” in the habendum clause. 1972Co. v. Doe, 114 U.S. 340 , 5 S.Ct. 869 , 29 L.Ed. 136 (1885) and in New Mexico v. U. S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171 , 43 L.Ed. 407 , 19 S.Ct. 128 (1898), the United States Supreme Court held that where deeds granted a “right of way,” the easements thereby conveyed were not enlarged by the use of the words “forever” or “fee simple” in the habendum clause. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
New Mexico v. United States Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1972Co. v. Doe, 114 U.S. 340 , 5 S.Ct. 869 , 29 L.Ed. 136 (1885) and in New Mexico v. U. S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171 , 43 L.Ed. 407 , 19 S.Ct. 128 (1898), the United States Supreme Court held that where deeds granted a “right of way,” the easements thereby conveyed were not enlarged by the use of the words “forever” or “fee simple” in the habendum clause. 1972Co. v. Doe, 114 U.S. 340 , 5 S.Ct. 869 , 29 L.Ed. 136 (1885) and in New Mexico v. U. S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171 , 43 L.Ed. 407 , 19 S.Ct. 128 (1898), the United States Supreme Court held that where deeds granted a “right of way,” the easements thereby conveyed were not enlarged by the use of the words “forever” or “fee simple” in the habendum clause. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration
green
2 sentences1972In 132 A.L.R. 137 is found the case of Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S.W.2d 768 (1939), wherein the court held that under a deed which conveyed “a certain strip, tract, or parcel of land for railroad right of way” the railroad received only an easement, even though the habendum clause stated that the property was to be held by the railroad “and its successors and assigns forever, with covenant of general warranty of title.” In the 45-page article following said case is an exhaustive analysis of a multitude of cases on the interpretation of railroad right of way deeds. 1972In 132 A.L.R. 137 is found the case of Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S.W.2d 768 (1939), wherein the court held that under a deed which conveyed “a certain strip, tract, or parcel of land for railroad right of way” the railroad received only an easement, even though the habendum clause stated that the property was to be held by the railroad “and its successors and assigns forever, with covenant of general warranty of title.” In the 45-page article following said case is an exhaustive analysis of a multitude of cases on the interpretation of railroad right of way deeds. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Piles v. Bouldin
green
1 sentence1958The legal effect of a deed is a matter for determination by the Court and, as was held in Piles v. Bouldin, *96 Tenn., 24 U. S. 325, 6 L. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Hicks v. Sprankle
green
1 sentence1958“The habendum on the other hand limits it to a tenancy by the entirety by including the name of his wife, Mae Holloway. “ ‘ granting clause creating a fee simple estate will prevail over the subsequent habendum clause granting a less estate.’ ” Citing Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn. 132 , 114 S.W. 484 ; Simpson v. Simpson, 160 Tenn. 645 , 28 S.W. 2d 349 ; and Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310 , 257 S.W. 1044 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Boyd v. Ducktown Chemical & Iron Co.
green
2 sentences1957Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661 , 39 S.W. 2d 1026, 1028 , which contains the language “for railroad purposes only” in the habendum clause; and Boyd v. Ducktown Chemical & Iron Company, 19 Tenn.App. 392, 396 , 89 S.W.2d 360 . 1957Ry. v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661 , 39 S.W. 2d 1026, 1028 , which contains the language “for railroad purposes only” in the habendum clause; and Boyd v. Ducktown Chemical & Iron Company, 19 Tenn.App. 392, 396 , 89 S.W.2d 360 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Templeton v. Stong
neutral
1 sentence1952And as a corollary, to reach the intention it is proper to consider the entire instrument without regard to technical parts or divisions of the deed.’ Templeton v. Stong, 182 Tenn. [591], 594, [ 188 S. W. (2d) 560 ], citing N[ashville] C. & St. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
McCord v. Ransom
green
2 sentences1951McCord v. Ransom, 185 Tenn. 677 , 207 S. W. (2d) 581 . 1951McCord v. Ransom, 185 Tenn. 677 , 207 S. W. (2d) 581 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Beecher v. Hicks
neutral
1 sentence1944This estate is subject to the life estate of the appellee. *57 We have examined numerous authorities on the subject and'find those of this state 'uniformly reaching the same conclusion we have reached from the case of Beecher v. Hicks, 75 Tenn. 207 , at page 213, were it is said: ‘ ‘ The habendum is clearly not repugnant to the premises, but determines the estate granted, and only adds new grantees who take by way of remainder. ’ ’ In Fogarty v. Stack, 86 Tenn. 610 , 8 S. W. 846 , a husband conveyed real property to his wife, ‘ ‘ and her heirs, in fee-simple, forever. ’ ’ The habendum clause l | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Fogarty v. Stack
green
2 sentences1944This estate is subject to the life estate of the appellee. *57 We have examined numerous authorities on the subject and'find those of this state 'uniformly reaching the same conclusion we have reached from the case of Beecher v. Hicks, 75 Tenn. 207 , at page 213, were it is said: ‘ ‘ The habendum is clearly not repugnant to the premises, but determines the estate granted, and only adds new grantees who take by way of remainder. ’ ’ In Fogarty v. Stack, 86 Tenn. 610 , 8 S. W. 846 , a husband conveyed real property to his wife, ‘ ‘ and her heirs, in fee-simple, forever. ’ ’ The habendum clause l 1944This estate is subject to the life estate of the appellee. *57 We have examined numerous authorities on the subject and'find those of this state 'uniformly reaching the same conclusion we have reached from the case of Beecher v. Hicks, 75 Tenn. 207 , at page 213, were it is said: ‘ ‘ The habendum is clearly not repugnant to the premises, but determines the estate granted, and only adds new grantees who take by way of remainder. ’ ’ In Fogarty v. Stack, 86 Tenn. 610 , 8 S. W. 846 , a husband conveyed real property to his wife, ‘ ‘ and her heirs, in fee-simple, forever. ’ ’ The habendum clause l | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Meredith v. Owen
neutral
1 sentence1931In Meredith v. Owen, 36 Tenn., 223 -224, the deed of gift construed was as follows: “Know all men by these presents that I, John Beaty, Sr., for and in consideration of the love and affection I have for my daug’hter Polly Owen, wife of Joshua Owen, do give a certain negro girl slave named Celia, about nine years of age, to be the right and property of said Polly during her life; and for the love and affection I have for her, I give to her the aforesaid girl Celia, to her and her heirs, to have and to hold said negro girl free from the lawful claims of all and every person whomsoever.” In the o | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Ballard v. Farley
green
1 sentence1930For this, complainants cite: Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn., 314 ; Ballard v. Farley, 143 Tenn., 161 ; Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn., 132 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
France v. Deep River Logging Co.
green
2 sentences1921In France v. Deep River Logging Co., 79 Wash., 336 , 140 Pac., 361 , Ann. 1921In France v. Deep River Logging Co., 79 Wash., 336 , 140 Pac., 361 , Ann. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.