23 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1899–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc.green2 sentences2012See Tucker, 253 Kan. at 380-82 (habendum clause is provision defining secondary term of lease after development takes place); Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 353-55 , 662 P.2d 255 (1983) (detailing burdens on the lessee in establishing applicability of shut-in provisions); Eichman, 19 Kan. 2010The phrase “in paying quantities,” as found in a thereafter provision, “means production of quantities of oil and gas sufficient to yield a profit to the lessee over operating expenses, even though the drilling costs or equipping costs are never recovered and even though the undertaking as a whole may thus result in a loss to the lessee.” Tucker, 253 Kan. at 381 (citing Pray, 233 Kan. at 355 ). “[I]n paying quantities” is an implicit part of a habendum clause; the phrase applies even if it does not appear in the lease. | 1 | 4 |
Wilson v. Holmgreen2 sentences2021Russell Petroleum, Inc., 235 Kan. 6, 14 , 679 P.2d 158 (1984) ("In the usual oil and gas lease the appellant concedes under Kansas law the lease would terminate by its own terms when further production of the lease by the lessee was abandoned by reason of unprofitable production."); Wilson v. Holm, 164 Kan. 229, 237 , 188 P.2d 899 (1948) (permanent cessation of profitable production terminates the lease); 2 Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas §§ 26.8(a) & (c), 26.13(c) (2021) ("The shut-in royalty clause is, of course, designed to modify the habendum clause, and the lease will remain in force and effect 2021Russell Petroleum, Inc., 235 Kan. 6, 14 , 679 P.2d 158 (1984) ("In the usual oil and gas lease the appellant concedes under Kansas law the lease would terminate by its own terms when further production of the lease by the lessee was abandoned by reason of unprofitable production."); Wilson v. Holm, 164 Kan. 229, 237 , 188 P.2d 899 (1948) (permanent cessation of profitable production terminates the lease); 2 Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas §§ 26.8(a) & (c), 26.13(c) (2021) ("The shut-in royalty clause is, of course, designed to modify the habendum clause, and the lease will remain in force and effect | 1 | 2 |
Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp.green2 sentences2010Modem oil-and-gas leases typically provide for a primary term — a fixed number of years during which the lessee has no obligation to develop the premises — and a secondary term (for ‘so long thereafter as oil and gas produced’) once development takes place.” This court has referred to the secondary term described in Black’s Law Dictionary as a “ ‘thereafter’ provision,” or an “extension clause, of the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease.” Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 253 Kan. 373, 380 , 855 P.2d 929 (1993). 2010Modem oil-and-gas leases typically provide for a primary term — a fixed number of years during which the lessee has no obligation to develop the premises — and a secondary term (for ‘so long thereafter as oil and gas produced’) once development takes place.” This court has referred to the secondary term described in Black’s Law Dictionary as a “ ‘thereafter’ provision,” or an “extension clause, of the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease.” Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 253 Kan. 373, 380 , 855 P.2d 929 (1993). | 1 | 2 |
Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.green2 sentences1976Cir. 1931].) The Supreme Court of Kansas in Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas *312 Co., 172 Kan. 351 , 240 P. 2d 465 , was confronted with a drilling clause in an oil and gas lease using the expression “found in paying quantities” and a habendum clause designed to continue the lease beyond the primary term, where oil or gas was found in paying quantities, for a secondary term “as long thereafter'as oil or gas, or either of them is produced from said land.” The court there found it necessary to construe the ambiguity between the habendum (the term clause) and the drilling clause of the oil and gas le 1976Cir. 1931].) The Supreme Court of Kansas in Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas *312 Co., 172 Kan. 351 , 240 P. 2d 465 , was confronted with a drilling clause in an oil and gas lease using the expression “found in paying quantities” and a habendum clause designed to continue the lease beyond the primary term, where oil or gas was found in paying quantities, for a secondary term “as long thereafter'as oil or gas, or either of them is produced from said land.” The court there found it necessary to construe the ambiguity between the habendum (the term clause) and the drilling clause of the oil and gas le | 1 | 2 |
Rook v. James E. Russell Petroleum, Inc.green2 sentences2021Russell Petroleum, Inc., 235 Kan. 6, 14 , 679 P.2d 158 (1984) ("In the usual oil and gas lease the appellant concedes under Kansas law the lease would terminate by its own terms when further production of the lease by the lessee was abandoned by reason of unprofitable production."); Wilson v. Holm, 164 Kan. 229, 237 , 188 P.2d 899 (1948) (permanent cessation of profitable production terminates the lease); 2 Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas §§ 26.8(a) & (c), 26.13(c) (2021) ("The shut-in royalty clause is, of course, designed to modify the habendum clause, and the lease will remain in force and effect 2021Russell Petroleum, Inc., 235 Kan. 6, 14 , 679 P.2d 158 (1984) ("In the usual oil and gas lease the appellant concedes under Kansas law the lease would terminate by its own terms when further production of the lease by the lessee was abandoned by reason of unprofitable production."); Wilson v. Holm, 164 Kan. 229, 237 , 188 P.2d 899 (1948) (permanent cessation of profitable production terminates the lease); 2 Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas §§ 26.8(a) & (c), 26.13(c) (2021) ("The shut-in royalty clause is, of course, designed to modify the habendum clause, and the lease will remain in force and effect | 1 | 1 |
Eichman v. Leavell Resources Corp.green1 sentence2012See Tucker, 253 Kan. at 380-82 (habendum clause is provision defining secondary term of lease after development takes place); Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 233 Kan. 351, 353-55 , 662 P.2d 255 (1983) (detailing burdens on the lessee in establishing applicability of shut-in provisions); Eichman, 19 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawsongreen1 sentence1992Many terms have been implied into unitization agreements, e.g., the implied covenants to explore, develop, or market The plaintiffs argue that in the following cases, this court “has treated the habendum clause as a special limitation on the grant and has required express language to change the effect of the clause.” See Reese Enterprises, Inc., 220 Kan. at 309 (“court of equity has no power to extend a lease beyond the term which the parties themselves have fixed by their written contract”); Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , Syl. ¶ 1, 189 Pac. 920 (1920) (although lessee did not complete the | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Farmergreen2 sentences1984In Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732 , Syl. ¶ 7, 594 P.2d 177 (1979), the court summarized the pertinent rules as follows: “Rules governing the construction of oil and gas leases include these: the intent of the parties is the primary question; meaning should be ascertained by examining the documents from all four corners and by considering all of the pertinent provisions, rather than by critical analysis of a single or isolated provision; reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations are favored; a practical and equitable construction must be given to ambiguous terms; and any ambiguities 1984In Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732 , Syl. ¶ 7, 594 P.2d 177 (1979), the court summarized the pertinent rules as follows: “Rules governing the construction of oil and gas leases include these: the intent of the parties is the primary question; meaning should be ascertained by examining the documents from all four corners and by considering all of the pertinent provisions, rather than by critical analysis of a single or isolated provision; reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations are favored; a practical and equitable construction must be given to ambiguous terms; and any ambiguities | 1 | 1 |
Kelwood Farms, Inc. v. Ritchiegreen2 sentences1980In Kelwood Farms, Inc. v. Ritchie, 1 Kan. 1980See Kelwood Farms, Inc. v. Ritchie, 1 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Dyson v. Buxgreen2 sentences1955See Dyson v. Bux, 84 Kan. 596 , 114 Pac. 1092 . 1955See Dyson v. Bux, 84 Kan. 596 , 114 Pac. 1092 . | 1 | 1 |
| Moherman v. Anthonygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baker v. Hugoton Production Co.
neutral
2 sentences1982The journal entry says Brandenburg’s interest is perpetuated by (1) production or (2) development under the “present leases.” Defendants would have us read the habendum clause:, “for so long ... as oil and gas ... be produced from *158 the respectively described lands under the present leases or the respectively described premises are being developed or operated under present leases.” This would do violence to the wording of the document and would be inconsistent with the rule that a determinable term interest, whether mineral or royalty, perpetuated by production is perpetuated by production 1982The journal entry says Brandenburg’s interest is perpetuated by (1) production or (2) development under the “present leases.” Defendants would have us read the habendum clause:, “for so long ... as oil and gas ... be produced from *158 the respectively described lands under the present leases or the respectively described premises are being developed or operated under present leases.” This would do violence to the wording of the document and would be inconsistent with the rule that a determinable term interest, whether mineral or royalty, perpetuated by production is perpetuated by production | 3 | 1980–1990 |
Elliott v. Crystal Springs Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1992Many terms have been implied into unitization agreements, e.g., the implied covenants to explore, develop, or market The plaintiffs argue that in the following cases, this court “has treated the habendum clause as a special limitation on the grant and has required express language to change the effect of the clause.” See Reese Enterprises, Inc., 220 Kan. at 309 (“court of equity has no power to extend a lease beyond the term which the parties themselves have fixed by their written contract”); Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , Syl. ¶ 1, 189 Pac. 920 (1920) (although lessee did not complete the 1992Many terms have been implied into unitization agreements, e.g., the implied covenants to explore, develop, or market The plaintiffs argue that in the following cases, this court “has treated the habendum clause as a special limitation on the grant and has required express language to change the effect of the clause.” See Reese Enterprises, Inc., 220 Kan. at 309 (“court of equity has no power to extend a lease beyond the term which the parties themselves have fixed by their written contract”); Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , Syl. ¶ 1, 189 Pac. 920 (1920) (although lessee did not complete the | 2 | 1952–1992 |
Baldwin v. Blue Stem Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1992Many terms have been implied into unitization agreements, e.g., the implied covenants to explore, develop, or market The plaintiffs argue that in the following cases, this court “has treated the habendum clause as a special limitation on the grant and has required express language to change the effect of the clause.” See Reese Enterprises, Inc., 220 Kan. at 309 (“court of equity has no power to extend a lease beyond the term which the parties themselves have fixed by their written contract”); Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , Syl. ¶ 1, 189 Pac. 920 (1920) (although lessee did not complete the 1992Many terms have been implied into unitization agreements, e.g., the implied covenants to explore, develop, or market The plaintiffs argue that in the following cases, this court “has treated the habendum clause as a special limitation on the grant and has required express language to change the effect of the clause.” See Reese Enterprises, Inc., 220 Kan. at 309 (“court of equity has no power to extend a lease beyond the term which the parties themselves have fixed by their written contract”); Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , Syl. ¶ 1, 189 Pac. 920 (1920) (although lessee did not complete the | 2 | 1952–1992 |
Welsch v. Trivestco Energy Co.
green
1 sentence2010In the absence of *948 production in paying quantities, the lease expires by its own terms.” Welsch, 43 Kan. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Texaco, Inc. v. Fox
green
1 sentence2003The court stated that “commercial quantities” as used in a mineral reservation clause has the same meaning as “paying quantities” as used in a habendum clause of an oil and gas lease. 228 Kan. at 592 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co.
green
1 sentence1994However, the words “developed” and “operated” were not made an issue in the case, and the Wagner court did not focus on the additional phrase, interpreting the habendum clause as if it conditioned extension of the lease on continued production alone. 182 Kan. at 88 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Clark v. Perez
green
1 sentence1992“When there is a certain answer as to the term of the lease, that answer can not be changed with words elsewhere not specifically directed to the term of the lease.” 679 S.W.2d at 714 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Smith v. Holmes
neutral
2 sentences1984In Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732 , Syl. ¶ 7, 594 P.2d 177 (1979), the court summarized the pertinent rules as follows: “Rules governing the construction of oil and gas leases include these: the intent of the parties is the primary question; meaning should be ascertained by examining the documents from all four corners and by considering all of the pertinent provisions, rather than by critical analysis of a single or isolated provision; reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations are favored; a practical and equitable construction must be given to ambiguous terms; and any ambiguities 1984In Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732 , Syl. ¶ 7, 594 P.2d 177 (1979), the court summarized the pertinent rules as follows: “Rules governing the construction of oil and gas leases include these: the intent of the parties is the primary question; meaning should be ascertained by examining the documents from all four corners and by considering all of the pertinent provisions, rather than by critical analysis of a single or isolated provision; reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations are favored; a practical and equitable construction must be given to ambiguous terms; and any ambiguities | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Davis v. Laster
green
2 sentences1983First, such clauses actually modify the lease’s habendum clause to provide for a type of “constructive production.” Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 756-57 , 138 So. 2d 558 (1962). 1983First, such clauses actually modify the lease’s habendum clause to provide for a type of “constructive production.” Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 756-57 , 138 So. 2d 558 (1962). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc.
green
2 sentences1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land 1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Lowe
green
1 sentence1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita
green
1 sentence1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Stratmann v. Stratmann
green
2 sentences1982The journal entry says Brandenburg’s interest is perpetuated by (1) production or (2) development under the “present leases.” Defendants would have us read the habendum clause:, “for so long ... as oil and gas ... be produced from *158 the respectively described lands under the present leases or the respectively described premises are being developed or operated under present leases.” This would do violence to the wording of the document and would be inconsistent with the rule that a determinable term interest, whether mineral or royalty, perpetuated by production is perpetuated by production 1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Dewell v. Federal Land Bank
green
2 sentences1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land 1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita
green
2 sentences1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land 1982When Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426 , 617 P.2d 1255 (1980); Friesen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 522 , 608 P.2d 915 (1980); Smith v. Home Royalty Association, Inc., 209 Kan. 609 , 498 P.2d 98 (1972); Stratmann v. Stratmann, 204 Kan. 658 ; and Dewell v. Federal Land Bank, 191 Kan. 258 , 380 P.2d 379 (1963), are analyzed and read together, we learn that where a defeasible term oil and gas interest is perpetuated by production, production from anywhere on the premises subject to the interest perpetuates the interest in and to the whole premises and if the land | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Tedrow v. Shaffer
green
2 sentences1976R. 3d 8 [1972].) In Tedrow v. Shaffer, 23 Ohio App. 343 , 5 Ohio L. 1976R. 3d 8 [1972].) In Tedrow v. Shaffer, 23 Ohio App. 343 , 5 Ohio L. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Fry v. Dewees
green
2 sentences1955(Fry v. Dewees, 151 Kan. 488 , 99 P. 2d 844 .) Under the facts and evidence we cannot approve appellants’ theory that the royalty conveyance and lease must be considered as one and the same transaction because the royalty deed conveyed a vested interest in the minerals in place by its very terms which were subject to conditions subsequent whereby the interest would terminate at the end of five years unless there was production. 1955(Fry v. Dewees, 151 Kan. 488 , 99 P. 2d 844 .) Under the facts and evidence we cannot approve appellants’ theory that the royalty conveyance and lease must be considered as one and the same transaction because the royalty deed conveyed a vested interest in the minerals in place by its very terms which were subject to conditions subsequent whereby the interest would terminate at the end of five years unless there was production. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Perkins v. Sanders
neutral
2 sentences1952(Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248 , 187 Pac. 692 ; Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , 189 Pac. 920 ; Perkins v. Sanders, 109 Kan. 372 , 198 Pac. 954 ; Caylor v. Oil Co., 110 Kan. 224 , 203 Pac. 735 ; Warner v. Oil & Gas Co., 114 Kan. 118 , 217 Pac. 288 ; and for a related case see, also, Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585 , 156 P. 2d 865 .) We need not unduly labor this particular point. 1952(Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248 , 187 Pac. 692 ; Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , 189 Pac. 920 ; Perkins v. Sanders, 109 Kan. 372 , 198 Pac. 954 ; Caylor v. Oil Co., 110 Kan. 224 , 203 Pac. 735 ; Warner v. Oil & Gas Co., 114 Kan. 118 , 217 Pac. 288 ; and for a related case see, also, Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585 , 156 P. 2d 865 .) We need not unduly labor this particular point. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Caylor v. Bankers Oil Co.
neutral
2 sentences1952(Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248 , 187 Pac. 692 ; Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , 189 Pac. 920 ; Perkins v. Sanders, 109 Kan. 372 , 198 Pac. 954 ; Caylor v. Oil Co., 110 Kan. 224 , 203 Pac. 735 ; Warner v. Oil & Gas Co., 114 Kan. 118 , 217 Pac. 288 ; and for a related case see, also, Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585 , 156 P. 2d 865 .) We need not unduly labor this particular point. 1952(Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248 , 187 Pac. 692 ; Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , 189 Pac. 920 ; Perkins v. Sanders, 109 Kan. 372 , 198 Pac. 954 ; Caylor v. Oil Co., 110 Kan. 224 , 203 Pac. 735 ; Warner v. Oil & Gas Co., 114 Kan. 118 , 217 Pac. 288 ; and for a related case see, also, Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585 , 156 P. 2d 865 .) We need not unduly labor this particular point. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Warner v. Kulp neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Berline v. Waldschmidt
green
2 sentences1952(Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248 , 187 Pac. 692 ; Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , 189 Pac. 920 ; Perkins v. Sanders, 109 Kan. 372 , 198 Pac. 954 ; Caylor v. Oil Co., 110 Kan. 224 , 203 Pac. 735 ; Warner v. Oil & Gas Co., 114 Kan. 118 , 217 Pac. 288 ; and for a related case see, also, Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585 , 156 P. 2d 865 .) We need not unduly labor this particular point. 1952(Elliott v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248 , 187 Pac. 692 ; Baldwin v. Oil Co., 106 Kan. 848 , 189 Pac. 920 ; Perkins v. Sanders, 109 Kan. 372 , 198 Pac. 954 ; Caylor v. Oil Co., 110 Kan. 224 , 203 Pac. 735 ; Warner v. Oil & Gas Co., 114 Kan. 118 , 217 Pac. 288 ; and for a related case see, also, Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585 , 156 P. 2d 865 .) We need not unduly labor this particular point. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Brady v. Fuller green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Aycock v. Paraffine Oil Co. neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| L. D. Powell Co. v. Casteel neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carrell green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Keechi Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Faivre v. Daley green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Barnett v. Barnett green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Ontario Land & Imp. Co. v. Howard neutral | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Bodine's Adm'rs v. Arthur neutral | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.