genuine judicial inquiry in California

2024Rational basis review “require[s] the court to conduct ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.’ ” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 (Newland).) Here, such inquiry reveals that the exclusion of young offenders convicted of special-circumstance murder is irrational when measured against the Legislature’s stated purpose for establishing and expanding youth offender parole eligibility.

2024As Cooper explains, . . . what is required is that the court ‘conduct “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.” ’ ( 21 Cal.3d at p. 848 [quoting Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 , italics added in Cooper].) We have conducted such an inquiry in all of these cases . . . .” (Fein, at p. 163.) Fein is illustrative.

2024As Cooper explains, . . . what is required is that the court ‘conduct “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.” ’ ( 21 Cal.3d at p. 848 [quoting Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 , italics added in Cooper].) We have conducted such an inquiry in all of these cases . . . .” (Fein, at p. 163.) Fein is illustrative.

2011(Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 163 .) The court stated: “As Cooper explains, under the traditional, rational relationship equal protection standard, what is required is that the court ‘conduct “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.” ’ ( 21 Cal.3d at p. 848 . . . .) We have conducted such an inquiry in all of these cases, and have found that the statutory classifications are rationally related to the ‘realistically conceivable legislative [purposes]’ (Cooper, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 851 ) of MICRA.

2024Rather than 17 PEOPLE v. HARDIN Liu, J., dissenting merely ‘rubberstamping’ the legislative categories at issue here, we should be engaging in ‘ “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals” ’ (Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 711 ), and, more particularly, we should be asking whether the legislative classifications substantially advance the legislative purposes without being ‘grossly overinclusive’ or ‘underinclusive.’ (Brown v. Merlo, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 877 & fn. 17.)” (Warden, at pp. 664–665 (dis

1999Specifically, we have held that the state Constitution requires "`a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between [a legislative] classification and the legislative goals'" ( Neivland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 , quoting Dorrough v. Estelle (5th Cir.1974) 497 F.2d 1007 , 1011) and prohibits legislative classifications, such as those at issue here, that are "grossly overinclusive" or "underinclusive." ( Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 , 877 & fn. 17, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 506 P.2d 212 ; see also Utah v. Mohi (Utah 1

2015(See Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 158, 162 [rational relationship test applicable to equal protection challenge to § 3333.2].) She points out, however, the Supreme Court observed in Fein a reviewing court must “ ‘ “conduct ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the [challenged] classification and the legislative goals.’ ” ’ ” (Fein, at p. 163.) This has “ ‘never been interpreted to mean,’ ” however, that the courts “ ‘may properly strike down a statute simply because [they] disagree with the *612 wisdom of the law or because [they] believe that there is a fair

2015(See Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 158, 162 [rational relationship test applicable to equal protection challenge to § 3333.2].) She points out, however, the Supreme Court observed in Fein a reviewing court must “ ‘ “conduct ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the [challenged] classification and the legislative goals.’ ” ’ ” (Fein, at p. 163.) This has “ ‘never been interpreted to mean,’ ” however, that the courts “ ‘may properly strike down a statute simply because [they] disagree with the *612 wisdom of the law or because [they] believe that there is a fair

1983The California Supreme Court has recently stated that any discrimination by the state between persons must be based “upon ‘some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. ’ ” (Hays v. Wood, supra, 25 Cal.3d 772, 786, citations omitted.) Assessment of classifications under this test requires “ ‘ “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.’”” (Id., at p. 787, citation omitted.) We are unable to find any rational basis for distinguishing between all custodial and noncustodial parents for the purp

1981In so doing our function is, as we have recently indicated, ‘to conduct “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals” [citation]; . . .’ (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ].) The most that we require of that correspondence is that it be ra tional—i.e. that, in the words of Justice Jackson, the classification be found to rest upon ‘some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.’” (Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772, 786-787 [ 160 Cal.Rptr.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

1978(E.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973) 413 U.S. 528, 538 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 782, 790 , 93 S.Ct. 2821 ]; Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309-310 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580-581 , 86 S.Ct. 1497 ]; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22-23 [ 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]; Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 234-235 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 501 , 368 P.2d 101 ]; Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 31, 34-36 [ 59 P.2d 1024 ].) Some of the classifications which were invalidated related to matters of taxation.

2024The plaintiff argued that MICRA’s $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages violates equal protection because it “discriminates between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims” and because it “discriminates within the class of medical malpractice victims, denying a ‘complete’ recovery of damages only to those malpractice plaintiffs with noneconomic damages exceeding $250,000.” ( Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 161–162.) As to the first contention, we cited our earlier cases that had extensively examined the legislative history of MICRA showing that the Legislature, with ample basis, had tar

2011(Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 163 .) The court stated: “As Cooper explains, under the traditional, rational relationship equal protection standard, what is required is that the court ‘conduct “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.” ’ ( 21 Cal.3d at p. 848 . . . .) We have conducted such an inquiry in all of these cases, and have found that the statutory classifications are rationally related to the ‘realistically conceivable legislative [purposes]’ (Cooper, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 851 ) of MICRA.

1992“Some decisions require that the classification ‘ “bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose’” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 , 16 . . .); others, that the classification must rest upon ‘some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation’ (Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71 , 75-76 . . . ; Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 , 861 . . .).” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 , 711 .... [Fn. omitted.]) In Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, the court recognized the differences

1984“Some decisions require that the classification ‘“bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose” ’ (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 , 16 . . .); others, that the classification must rest upon ‘some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation’ (Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71 , 75-76 . . .; Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 , 861 . . .).” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ].) 12 In Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, the court recogni

2024Rather than 17 PEOPLE v. HARDIN Liu, J., dissenting merely ‘rubberstamping’ the legislative categories at issue here, we should be engaging in ‘ “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals” ’ (Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 711 ), and, more particularly, we should be asking whether the legislative classifications substantially advance the legislative purposes without being ‘grossly overinclusive’ or ‘underinclusive.’ (Brown v. Merlo, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 877 & fn. 17.)” (Warden, at pp. 664–665 (dis

2015(See Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 158, 162 [rational relationship test applicable to equal protection challenge to § 3333.2].) She points out, however, the Supreme Court observed in Fein a reviewing court must “ ‘ “conduct ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the [challenged] classification and the legislative goals.’ ” ’ ” (Fein, at p. 163.) This has “ ‘never been interpreted to mean,’ ” however, that the courts “ ‘may properly strike down a statute simply because [they] disagree with the *612 wisdom of the law or because [they] believe that there is a fair

2021(Heller, at p. 320; see Turnage, at p. 75.) If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second- guess its “ ‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’ ” (Heller, at p. 319; see Turnage, at p. 74; Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 .) While “it is irrelevant whether the perceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the Legislature, equal protection ‘does require that a purpose may conceivably or “may reasonably have been the purpose and policy” of the relevant governmental decisionmaker’ [citation] and that ‘the relationship of the classificati

2015(See Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 158, 162 [rational relationship test applicable to equal protection challenge to § 3333.2].) She points out, however, the Supreme Court observed in Fein a reviewing court must “ ‘ “conduct ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the [challenged] classification and the legislative goals.’ ” ’ ” (Fein, at p. 163.) This has “ ‘never been interpreted to mean,’ ” however, that the courts “ ‘may properly strike down a statute simply because [they] disagree with the *612 wisdom of the law or because [they] believe that there is a fair

2015(See Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 158, 162 [rational relationship test applicable to equal protection challenge to § 3333.2].) She points out, however, the Supreme Court observed in Fein a reviewing court must “ ‘ “conduct ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the [challenged] classification and the legislative goals.’ ” ’ ” (Fein, at p. 163.) This has “ ‘never been interpreted to mean,’ ” however, that the courts “ ‘may properly strike down a statute simply because [they] disagree with the *612 wisdom of the law or because [they] believe that there is a fair

2009(Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 481, 482 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 2 P.3d 581 ].) Such “ ‘ “ ‘a statutory classification . . . must be upheld against [an] equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citations.] Where there are “plausible reasons” for [the classification], “our inquiry is at an end.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] [][]... ‘[T]hose attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” ’ . . . [W]e must un

2009(Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 481, 482 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 2 P.3d 581 ].) Such “ ‘ “ ‘a statutory classification . . . must be upheld against [an] equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citations.] Where there are “plausible reasons” for [the classification], “our inquiry is at an end.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] [][]... ‘[T]hose attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” ’ . . . [W]e must un

1999Specifically, we have held that the state Constitution requires “ ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between [a legislative] classification and the legislative goals’ ” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ], quoting Dorrough v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2d 1007 , 1011) and prohibits legislative classifications, such as those at issue here, that are “grossly overinclusive” or “underinclusive.” (Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 , 877 & fn. 17 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 506 P.2d 212 , 66 A.L.R.3d 505 ]; see also

1999Specifically, we have held that the state Constitution requires "`a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between [a legislative] classification and the legislative goals'" ( Neivland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 , quoting Dorrough v. Estelle (5th Cir.1974) 497 F.2d 1007 , 1011) and prohibits legislative classifications, such as those at issue here, that are "grossly overinclusive" or "underinclusive." ( Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 , 877 & fn. 17, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 506 P.2d 212 ; see also Utah v. Mohi (Utah 1

1999Rather than merely "rubberstamping" the legislative categories at issue here, we should be engaging in "`a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals'" ( Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 711 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ), and, more particularly, we should be asking whether the legislative classifications substantially advance the legislative purposes without being "grossly overinclusive" or "underinclusive." ( Brown v. Merlo, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 877 & fn. 17, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 506 P.2d 212 .)

1999Rather than merely "rubberstamping" the legislative categories at issue here, we should be engaging in "`a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals'" ( Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 711 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ), and, more particularly, we should be asking whether the legislative classifications substantially advance the legislative purposes without being "grossly overinclusive" or "underinclusive." ( Brown v. Merlo, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 877 & fn. 17, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 506 P.2d 212 .)

1997(Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, supra, 38 Cal.3d 137, 163 .) However, equal protection violations are generally not found under the rational relationship test unless the “ ‘classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.’ ” (Hoffman v. United States, supra, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435 .) The question therefore is not “ ‘[whether in fact the Act will promote [the legislative objectives] . . . [but whether] ... the Legislature could rationally have decided that [it] . . . might [do so].” (American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, supra, 36 Cal.3d

1997(Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, supra, 38 Cal.3d 137, 163 .) However, equal protection violations are generally not found under the rational relationship test unless the “ ‘classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.’ ” (Hoffman v. United States, supra, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435 .) The question therefore is not “ ‘[whether in fact the Act will promote [the legislative objectives] . . . [but whether] ... the Legislature could rationally have decided that [it] . . . might [do so].” (American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, supra, 36 Cal.3d

1992“Some decisions require that the classification ‘ “bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose’” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 , 16 . . .); others, that the classification must rest upon ‘some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation’ (Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71 , 75-76 . . . ; Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 , 861 . . .).” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 , 711 .... [Fn. omitted.]) In Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, the court recognized the differences

1992“Some decisions require that the classification ‘ “bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose’” (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 , 16 . . .); others, that the classification must rest upon ‘some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation’ (Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71 , 75-76 . . . ; Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 , 861 . . .).” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 , 711 .... [Fn. omitted.]) In Newland v. Board of Governors, supra, the court recognized the differences

1991(Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 , 711 ....)....’ (Hooper v. Deukmejian, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.)” (People v. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120, 126 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 382 ].) The inquiry under the “rational basis” test requires the court to conduct “ ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals’ ” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ]; see also People v. Jones, supra; Cooper v. Bray (1978) 21 Cal.3d 841, 847-848 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 148 , 582

1991(Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 , 711 ....)....’ (Hooper v. Deukmejian, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.)” (People v. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120, 126 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 382 ].) The inquiry under the “rational basis” test requires the court to conduct “ ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals’ ” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ]; see also People v. Jones, supra; Cooper v. Bray (1978) 21 Cal.3d 841, 847-848 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 148 , 582

1991(Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 , 711 ....)....’ (Hooper v. Deukmejian, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.)” (People v. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120, 126 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 382 ].) The inquiry under the “rational basis” test requires the court to conduct “ ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals’ ” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ]; see also People v. Jones, supra; Cooper v. Bray (1978) 21 Cal.3d 841, 847-848 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 148 , 582

1991(Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705 , 711 ....)....’ (Hooper v. Deukmejian, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.)” (People v. Jones (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 120, 126 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 382 ].) The inquiry under the “rational basis” test requires the court to conduct “ ‘a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals’ ” (Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 566 P.2d 254 ]; see also People v. Jones, supra; Cooper v. Bray (1978) 21 Cal.3d 841, 847-848 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 148 , 582