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31 California opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lucido v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025Fi[fth], the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 .) If all the threshold requirements are satisfied, courts then “look[] to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting. 2025We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342-343 .) The doctrine of issue preclusion seeks to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, promotes judicial economy, and prevents a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation. | 7 | 17 |
People v. Simsred2 sentences2009Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. [Citations.] The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 943 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 126 P.3d 1040 ] (Pacific Lumber).) If all of these threshold requirements of collateral estoppel are met, the analysis determining whether that doctrine applies to give preclusive effect then looks to “ ‘the public policies underlying the doct 2009Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. [Citations.] The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 943 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 126 P.3d 1040 ] (Pacific Lumber).) If all of these threshold requirements of collateral estoppel are met, the analysis determining whether that doctrine applies to give preclusive effect then looks to “ ‘the public policies underlying the doct | 3 | 3 |
Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.green2 sentences2021The public policies underlying the doctrine of issue preclusion include “conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation.” (Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 879.) Here, Appellants contend that “equitable considerations” and “ ‘fundamental principles of fairness’ ” counsel against giving Judge McEachen’s decision preclusive effect in this case. 2021The public policies underlying the doctrine of issue preclusion include “conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation.” (Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 879.) Here, Appellants contend that “equitable considerations” and “ ‘fundamental principles of fairness’ ” counsel against giving Judge McEachen’s decision preclusive effect in this case. | 2 | 3 |
DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerbergreen2 sentences2026Issue preclusion Issue preclusion—which historically has been called collateral estoppel—“prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings).) It applies “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.) Courts must consider the public policies underlying t 2025Landis contends those findings conclusively establish that Whitaker lacked probable cause and pursued the Unruh Act claim with malice.3 Issue preclusion—which has historically been called collateral estoppel—“prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings).) It applies “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in th | 2 | 2 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences1994We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting. [Citation.] As the United States Supreme Court has stated, ‘the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a nineteenth century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.’ (Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 444 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ] . . . .)” (Lucido v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 342-343, fn. omitted.) Thus, collateral estoppel 1994We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting. [Citation.] As the United States Supreme Court has stated, ‘the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a nineteenth century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.’ (Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 444 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ] . . . .)” (Lucido v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 342-343, fn. omitted.) Thus, collateral estoppel | 2 | 2 |
Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Boardgreen2 sentences2020Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1507–1508; Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1326 .) Even if these threshold requirements are met, a court may look “ ‘to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting.’ ” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921 , 943–944; Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 343 (Lucido).) In particular, “ ‘courts will not appl 2014We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting.’ (Id. at p. 342-343.)” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921 , 943- 944.) 14 The District has established each of these requirements. | 1 | 5 |
White Motor Corp. v. Teresinskigreen2 sentences2026(Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 835 ; White Motor Corp. v. Teresinski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 754, 763 .) To determine whether collateral estoppel should apply, courts look to 5 the public policies underlying the doctrine. 2007(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342-343 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d 1223 ] (Lucido) [holding that even when all threshold requirements are met, courts must “look[] to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting”].) “It must be remembered that ‘[collateral estoppel is an equitable concept based on fundamental principles of fairness.’ [Citation.]” (White Motor Corp. v. Teresinski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 754, 763 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 26 ].) “[T]he public policies underlying collateral estoppel— preser | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. EXXON MOBIL OIL CORP.green2 sentences2017Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) differs from claim preclusion by incorporating fairness as a requirement that must be satisfied in addition to the threshold requirements of identity of issues, actually and necessarily decided issues, final decision on the merits, and privity. ( Hernandez v. City of Pomona, supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 506 , 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 207 P.3d 506 .) Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and, even when the threshold elements are met, the court must consider when its application would be fair and just, and comport with the public policies underlying the doctr 2017Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) differs from claim preclusion by incorporating fairness as a requirement that must be satisfied in addition to the threshold requirements of identity of issues, actually and necessarily decided issues, final decision on the merits, and privity. ( Hernandez v. City of Pomona, supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 506 , 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 207 P.3d 506 .) Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and, even when the threshold elements are met, the court must consider when its application would be fair and just, and comport with the public policies underlying the doctr | 1 | 2 |
Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Monsongreen2 sentences2017Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) differs from claim preclusion by incorporating fairness as a requirement that must be satisfied in addition to the threshold requirements of identity of issues, actually and necessarily decided issues, final decision on the merits, and privity. ( Hernandez v. City of Pomona, supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 506 , 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 207 P.3d 506 .) Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and, even when the threshold elements are met, the court must consider when its application would be fair and just, and comport with the public policies underlying the doctr 2017Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) differs from claim preclusion by incorporating fairness as a requirement that must be satisfied in addition to the threshold requirements of identity of issues, actually and necessarily decided issues, final decision on the merits, and privity. ( Hernandez v. City of Pomona, supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 506 , 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 207 P.3d 506 .) Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and, even when the threshold elements are met, the court must consider when its application would be fair and just, and comport with the public policies underlying the doctr | 1 | 2 |
F.E.V. v. City of Anaheimgreen2 sentences2026(See Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637 .) “The public policies underlying [issue preclusion] are preserving the integrity of the judicial system, promoting judicial economy, preventing inconsistent judgments, and protecting litigants from vexatious litigation.” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 462, 475 (F.E.V.).) In our view, applying preclusion here would be inconsistent with—if not undermine—several core policies behind these doctrines.9 Defendants argue that preclusion would advance the parties’ and the courts’ interest in finality by preventing O’ 2026(See Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637 .) “The public policies underlying [issue preclusion] are preserving the integrity of the judicial system, promoting judicial economy, preventing inconsistent judgments, and protecting litigants from vexatious litigation.” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 462, 475 (F.E.V.).) In our view, applying preclusion here would be inconsistent with—if not undermine—several core policies behind these doctrines.9 Defendants argue that preclusion would advance the parties’ and the courts’ interest in finality by preventing O’ | 1 | 1 |
L'AnzA Research International, Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., a New York Corporationgreen1 sentence2022(Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1218 (Association of Irritated Residents) [“Because it is a question of law, we review de novo the trial court’s conclusion that res judicata was applicable in this case”].) Under title 11 of United States Code section 502, subdivision (a), “[a] claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title . . . , is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.” The “allowance or disallowance of ‘a claim in bankruptcy is binding and conclusive on all parties or their privies, | 1 | 1 |
Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of Conservationgreen1 sentence2022(Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1218 (Association of Irritated Residents) [“Because it is a question of law, we review de novo the trial court’s conclusion that res judicata was applicable in this case”].) Under title 11 of United States Code section 502, subdivision (a), “[a] claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title . . . , is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.” The “allowance or disallowance of ‘a claim in bankruptcy is binding and conclusive on all parties or their privies, | 1 | 1 |
Shirk v. Vista Unified School Districtred2 sentences2017We thus conclude that as of January 1, 2003, plaintiff's causes of action against the School District were barred by expiration of the time for presenting a claim to the School District." ( Shirk , at p. 213, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) We found support for this conclusion "in the public policies underlying the claim presentation requirement of the government claims statute. 2017We thus conclude that as of January 1, 2003, plaintiff's causes of action against the School District were barred by expiration of the time for presenting a claim to the School District." ( Shirk , at p. 213, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 , 164 P.3d 630 .) We found support for this conclusion "in the public policies underlying the claim presentation requirement of the government claims statute. | 1 | 1 |
City of Stockton v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing 2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing | 1 | 1 |
Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oaklandgreen2 sentences2010Those policies include conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation. ( Allen v. McCurry (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 94 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 308 , 101 S.Ct. 411 ]; Montana v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 210 , 99 S.Ct. 970 ]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 ].) Considerations of comi 2010Those policies include conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation. ( Allen v. McCurry (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 94 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 308 , 101 S.Ct. 411 ]; Montana v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 210 , 99 S.Ct. 970 ]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 ].) Considerations of comi | 1 | 1 |
Montana v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Those policies include conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation. ( Allen v. McCurry (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 94 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 308 , 101 S.Ct. 411 ]; Montana v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 210 , 99 S.Ct. 970 ]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 ].) Considerations of comi 2010Those policies include conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation. ( Allen v. McCurry (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 94 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 308 , 101 S.Ct. 411 ]; Montana v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 210 , 99 S.Ct. 970 ]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 ].) Considerations of comi | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. McCurrygreen2 sentences2010Those policies include conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation. ( Allen v. McCurry (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 94 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 308 , 101 S.Ct. 411 ]; Montana v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 210 , 99 S.Ct. 970 ]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 ].) Considerations of comi 2010Those policies include conserving judicial resources and promoting judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and avoiding the harassment of parties through repeated litigation. ( Allen v. McCurry (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 94 [ 66 L.Ed.2d 308 , 101 S.Ct. 411 ]; Montana v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 210 , 99 S.Ct. 970 ]; Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Syufy Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 ].) Considerations of comi | 1 | 1 |
| Swartzendruber v. City of San Diegogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court of Sacramento Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shackelton v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lynch v. Glassgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buttimer v. Alexisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dyson v. State Personnel Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. City of Sacramentogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. City of Pomona
green
2 sentences2017Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) differs from claim preclusion by incorporating fairness as a requirement that must be satisfied in addition to the threshold requirements of identity of issues, actually and necessarily decided issues, final decision on the merits, and privity. ( Hernandez v. City of Pomona, supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 506 , 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 207 P.3d 506 .) Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and, even when the threshold elements are met, the court must consider when its application would be fair and just, and comport with the public policies underlying the doctr 2017Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) differs from claim preclusion by incorporating fairness as a requirement that must be satisfied in addition to the threshold requirements of identity of issues, actually and necessarily decided issues, final decision on the merits, and privity. ( Hernandez v. City of Pomona, supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 506 , 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 207 P.3d 506 .) Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and, even when the threshold elements are met, the court must consider when its application would be fair and just, and comport with the public policies underlying the doctr | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Panos v. Great Western Packing Co.
green
2 sentences2026(See Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637 .) “The public policies underlying [issue preclusion] are preserving the integrity of the judicial system, promoting judicial economy, preventing inconsistent judgments, and protecting litigants from vexatious litigation.” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 462, 475 (F.E.V.).) In our view, applying preclusion here would be inconsistent with—if not undermine—several core policies behind these doctrines.9 Defendants argue that preclusion would advance the parties’ and the courts’ interest in finality by preventing O’ 2026(See Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637 .) “The public policies underlying [issue preclusion] are preserving the integrity of the judicial system, promoting judicial economy, preventing inconsistent judgments, and protecting litigants from vexatious litigation.” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 462, 475 (F.E.V.).) In our view, applying preclusion here would be inconsistent with—if not undermine—several core policies behind these doctrines.9 Defendants argue that preclusion would advance the parties’ and the courts’ interest in finality by preventing O’ | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Vandenberg v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026(Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 835 ; White Motor Corp. v. Teresinski (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 754, 763 .) To determine whether collateral estoppel should apply, courts look to 5 the public policies underlying the doctrine. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
YKA Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose
green
1 sentence2023Industries, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 356-357.) Here, all five requirements of the first prong are met. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Vogel
green
1 sentence2021(Id. at p. 343.) “ ‘In deciding whether the doctrine is applicable in a particular situation a court must balance the need to limit litigation against the right of a fair adversary proceeding in which a party may fully present his case.’ ” (People v. Vogel (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 131, 136 .) 1. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bridgeford v. Pacific Health Corp.
green
1 sentence2020Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1507–1508; Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1326 .) Even if these threshold requirements are met, a court may look “ ‘to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting.’ ” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921 , 943–944; Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 343 (Lucido).) In particular, “ ‘courts will not appl | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ayala v. Dawson
green
1 sentence2020Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1507–1508; Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1326 .) Even if these threshold requirements are met, a court may look “ ‘to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting.’ ” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921 , 943–944; Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 343 (Lucido).) In particular, “ ‘courts will not appl | 1 | 2020–2020 |
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing 2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Slater v. Blackwood
green
2 sentences2017(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342-324 [“We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting”]; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Monson (1938) 11 Cal.2d 621, 630 [res judicata is an equitable principle]; Smith v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 [“even when the technical requirements are met, the doctrine is to be applied ‘only where such application comports with fairness and sound public policy’”].) 15 legal principles.” (Slater, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p 2017(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342-324 [“We have repeatedly looked to the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular setting”]; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Monson (1938) 11 Cal.2d 621, 630 [res judicata is an equitable principle]; Smith v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 [“even when the technical requirements are met, the doctrine is to be applied ‘only where such application comports with fairness and sound public policy’”].) 15 legal principles.” (Slater, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Perez v. Golden Empire Transit District
green
2 sentences2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing 2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing | 1 | 2017–2017 |
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara
green
2 sentences2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing 2017Requiring a person allegedly harmed by a public entity to first present a claim to the entity, before seeking redress in court, affords the entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] The requisite timely claim presentation before commencing a lawsuit also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Castillo v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2013(Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 879 ; Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 343 ; Castillo, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 483-484.) Giving preclusive effect to the Board's decisions fosters the integrity of both administrative and judicial proceedings. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Kleinwort Benson North America, Inc. v. Quantum Financial Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Johnson v. City of Loma Linda
green
1 sentence2009(Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 896, 903-904, 909 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 64 ] [failure of police officer to challenge decision of city civil service commission to uphold discharge by mandamus precluded later-asserted action in tort and for federal civil rights violations as plaintiff was bound by unreviewed administrative findings involving same primary right], disapproved on another ground in Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 72 .) *358 In Briggs , the Agency and Grayson’s leading case here, the plaintiffs brought an action for civil rights violations under 42 United States | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Roberts v. State of California green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Pawlowski v. Pierce green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Chamblin v. Municipal Court green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.