statutes exception in California

2021(See id. at pp. 632, 633, citing In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 (S.B.); see also, e.g., In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1302-1303 [discussing and distinguishing S.B.], disapproved in Caden C., at pp. 637, fn. 6., 638, fn. 7.) The Supreme Court clarified, among other points, that the beneficial relationship exception has three elements.

2021(See id. at pp. 632, 633, citing In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 (S.B.); see also, e.g., In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1302-1303 [discussing and distinguishing S.B.], disapproved in Caden C., at pp. 637, fn. 6., 638, fn. 7.) The Supreme Court clarified, among other points, that the beneficial relationship exception has three elements.

2014First, all mediation participants may expressly agree in writing, or orally if statutory requirements are met, to waive confidentiality. (§ 1122, subd. (a)(1).) Second, if a mediation-generated communication was prepared by or on behalf of fewer than all the participants, then those participants may agree in writing or orally to disclose the communication so long as that communication does not disclose anything said or done in the course of the mediation. (§ 1122, subd. (a)(2).) 11 The purpose of these provisions is to encourage mediation of disputes by assuring that communications made in con

2013First, all mediation participants may expressly agree in writing, or orally if statutory requirements are met, to waive confidentiality. (§ 1122, subd. (a)(1).) Second, if a mediation-generated communication was prepared by or on behalf of fewer than all the participants, then those participants may agree in writing or orally to disclose the communication so long as that communication does not disclose anything said or done in the course of the mediation. (§ 1122, subd. (a)(2).) 11 The purpose of these provisions is to encourage mediation of disputes by assuring that communications made in con

2012In Ahmed., supra, 53 Cal.4th 156 , at pages 162-163, the court said, “As we noted in People v. Coronado [(1995)] 12 Cal.4th [145,] 157 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 , 906 P.2d 1232 ], ‘the appellate courts have disagreed on whether section 654 applies to enhancements.’ The disagreement persists, although the modern trend has been for courts to hold, or at least assume, that section 654 does apply to enhancements that go to the nature of the offense, and then either to apply that section or find that the specific statutes provide an exception to it.

2012In Ahmed., supra, 53 Cal.4th 156 , at pages 162-163, the court said, “As we noted in People v. Coronado [(1995)] 12 Cal.4th [145,] 157 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 , 906 P.2d 1232 ], ‘the appellate courts have disagreed on whether section 654 applies to enhancements.’ The disagreement persists, although the modern trend has been for courts to hold, or at least assume, that section 654 does apply to enhancements that go to the nature of the offense, and then either to apply that section or find that the specific statutes provide an exception to it.

2012(People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218-1221 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 ] [holding that § 654 precludes imposing the specific enhancement at issue and not deciding the broader question of § 654’s application to enhancements in general]; People v. Chaffer (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1044-1046 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 441 ] [the specific statute operates as an implied exception to § 654]; People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 54-57 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 ] [§ 654 does apply to enhancements]; People v. Arndt (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 387, 394-396 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 ] [§ 654 does apply to enhanceme

2012(People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218-1221 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 ] [holding that § 654 precludes imposing the specific enhancement at issue and not deciding the broader question of § 654’s application to enhancements in general]; People v. Chaffer (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1044-1046 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 441 ] [the specific statute operates as an implied exception to § 654]; People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 54-57 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 728 ] [§ 654 does apply to enhancements]; People v. Arndt (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 387, 394-396 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 415 ] [§ 654 does apply to enhanceme

2007They each reviewed the relevant statutes and the analysis provided in Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th 117 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 , 106 P.3d 305 in the course of accepting the concession. ( Galindo, at pp. 536-537, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 241 ; Bowers, at p. 878, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 .) Moreover, the case law leading up to Galindo and Bowers is primarily concerned with the due process rights of mentally ill persons in civil commitment proceedings, and is not limited to volitional disorders. [8] For example, our Supreme Court in Howard N. although relying heavily on two United States Supreme Court cases involvin

2007They each reviewed the relevant statutes and the analysis provided in Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th 117 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 , 106 P.3d 305 in the course of accepting the concession. ( Galindo, at pp. 536-537, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 241 ; Bowers, at p. 878, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 .) Moreover, the case law leading up to Galindo and Bowers is primarily concerned with the due process rights of mentally ill persons in civil commitment proceedings, and is not limited to volitional disorders. [8] For example, our Supreme Court in Howard N. although relying heavily on two United States Supreme Court cases involvin

2007They each reviewed the relevant statutes and the analysis provided in Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th 117 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 , 106 P.3d 305 in the course of accepting the concession. ( Galindo, at pp. 536-537, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 241 ; Bowers, at p. 878, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 .) Moreover, the case law leading up to Galindo and Bowers is primarily concerned with the due process rights of mentally ill persons in civil commitment proceedings, and is not limited to volitional disorders. [8] For example, our Supreme Court in Howard N. although relying heavily on two United States Supreme Court cases involvin

2007They each reviewed the relevant statutes and the analysis provided in Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th 117 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 , 106 P.3d 305 in the course of accepting the concession. ( Galindo, at pp. 536-537, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 241 ; Bowers, at p. 878, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 .) Moreover, the case law leading up to Galindo and Bowers is primarily concerned with the due process rights of mentally ill persons in civil commitment proceedings, and is not limited to volitional disorders. [8] For example, our Supreme Court in Howard N. although relying heavily on two United States Supreme Court cases involvin

2007In substance, the court in Tenet Healthsystem found that the authority of the hearing officer to terminate a hearing can be implied from various provisions of section 809.2, the bylaws of the hospital involved in that case, and from the principle that, as a general matter, a hearing officer has wide latitude in conducting a hearing. ( Tenet Healthsystem, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 557-561, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 .) The court noted that there is no express provision in the statutes that permits a hearing officer to terminate a hearing based on a party's conduct in disobeying the hearing officer'

2007In substance, the court in Tenet Healthsystem found that the authority of the hearing officer to terminate a hearing can be implied from various provisions of section 809.2, the bylaws of the hospital involved in that case, and from the principle that, as a general matter, a hearing officer has wide latitude in conducting a hearing. ( Tenet Healthsystem, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 557-561, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 .) The court noted that there is no express provision in the statutes that permits a hearing officer to terminate a hearing based on a party's conduct in disobeying the hearing officer'

2007They each reviewed the relevant statutes and the analysis provided in Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th 117 , in the course of accepting the concession.

2007They each reviewed the relevant statutes and the analysis provided in Howard N., supra, 35 Cal.4th 117 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 , 106 P.3d 305 in the course of accepting the concession. ( Galindo, at pp. 536-537, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 241 ; Bowers, at p. 878, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 .) Moreover, the case law leading up to Galindo and Bowers is primarily concerned with the due process rights of mentally ill persons in civil commitment proceedings, and is not limited to volitional disorders. [8] For example, our Supreme Court in Howard N. although relying heavily on two United States Supreme Court cases involvin

1992She also argues that the reunification plan unreasonably required her to continue treatment by her psychiatrist and, if ordered, to take medication. (4) "A good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan is required. [Citation.] A reunification plan `"must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family."' [Citation.] This reunification plan is a crucial part of the dispositional order. [Citation.] In light of the mandatory language of the statutes and the rule, *948 `"failure to formulate an adequate reunification plan [has] been

1992“A good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan is required. [Citation.] A reunification plan ‘ “must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.” ’ [Citation.] This reunification plan is a crucial part of the dispositional order. [Citation.] In light of the mandatory language of the statutes and the rule, ‘“failure to formulate an adequate reunification plan [has] been held to be reversible error under rule 1376(b) [Cal. Rules of Court].” ’ [Citation.]" (In re Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 254 .) On the record be

2025At issue in Anderson was whether defendant’s sentence for multiple 25-year- to-life vicarious firearm discharge enhancements should be struck because they were not alleged in the information as to his five robbery counts. ( Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 950–952.) Although Anderson explained that a pleading defect does not necessarily result in an unauthorized sentence which may be raised for the first time on appeal, it ultimately reached the merits of the sentencing error because the error was “clear and obvious” in that the trial court imposed 25-year-to-life enhancements that were never

2024(Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1245, 1250-1251, italics omitted.) Although the court noted various “references [in the statutes and a rule of court] to setting a time for, and hearing, the argument regarding a petition for a prerogative writ,” those references “appear in provisions that apply only if a return is filed,” not where a court issues a writ in the first instance.

2016We see no reason to graft on to the statutes a requirement of a home study based on a common law distinction not recognized by the statutes. 6 Carl was, at the time of termination, an eight-year-old child with both cerebal palsy and severe quadriparesis who had the “emotional maturity of an eight-month-old child.” (Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058 .) The prospective adoptive parents planned to home school Carl, a point on which the appellant mother based her appeal.

2014The rule of lenity applies “ ‘ “only if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify invoking the rule.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘the rule of lenity is a tie-breaking principle, of relevance when “ ‘two reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise . . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 889 .) There is egregious ambiguity and uncertainty here with regard to the question of whether the Legislature intended to limit the prescription defense to

2012In Ahmed., supra, 53 Cal.4th 156 , at pages 162-163, the court said, “As we noted in People v. Coronado [(1995)] 12 Cal.4th [145,] 157 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 , 906 P.2d 1232 ], ‘the appellate courts have disagreed on whether section 654 applies to enhancements.’ The disagreement persists, although the modern trend has been for courts to hold, or at least assume, that section 654 does apply to enhancements that go to the nature of the offense, and then either to apply that section or find that the specific statutes provide an exception to it.

2012The California Constitution “ ‘is a limitation or restriction on the powers of the Legislature’ ” and “ ‘ “we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the Legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited.” ’ ” (County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 284 .) Although “ ‘all intendments favor the exercise of the Legislature’s plenary authority ‘we also must enforce the provisions of our Constitution and “may not lightly disregard or blink at... a clear constitutional mandate.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 284-285.) Neville argues that there is no conflict because s

1999We noted, however, that this duty of equitable apportionment would not apply if the employer and the employee were represented by separate counsel. ( 15 Cal.3d 162, 176, fn. 19 .) In Walsh v. Woods (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 764 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 267 ] (Walsh I), the amount of the judgment was less than the amount of the benefits that had been paid to the employer.

1999We noted, however, that this duty of equitable apportionment would not apply if the employer and the employee were represented by separate counsel. ( 15 Cal.3d 162, 176, fn. 19 .) In Walsh v. Woods (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 764 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 267 ] (Walsh I), the amount of the judgment was less than the amount of the benefits that had been paid to the employer.