statutes rule in Texas

2024Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440 .

2024During oral argument, the Attorney General cited Klumb v. Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, wherein the Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs “failed to plead a viable equal-protection claim because the board’s actions are rationally related to at least two legitimate government objectives which are promoted by the challenged classification.” 458 S.W.3d 1 , 13–14 (Tex. 2015).

2015Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514 , enabled the court to give a practical illustration of sincerity with which the A plain distinction exists between the statutes which principle I have quoted was declared.

2015The Punishment Scheme Due Process Clause will not tolerate placing a capital i. Statutes defendant in a straitjacket by barring him from rebutting the prosecution's arguments of future dangerousness with In Texas, the jury must answer the the fact that he is ineligible for parole under State law." following special issue: Simmons, 512 U.S. at , 114 S. Ct. at 2194-95 n.5, 129 L.

2006Rule 13.5(e) provides for the transfer of tag-along cases and states, "The order of the pretrial court may be appealed to the MDL Panel by a motion for rehearing filed with the MDL Panel Clerk." Id.

2000Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 696 , 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2147 , 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989).

2000Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 696 , 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2147 , 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989).

1987Rather, we agree with, and adopt, the interpretation of the emergency grant of jurisdiction stated in Hache v. Riley, 186 N.J.Super. 119 , 451 A.2d 971 (Ch.Div.1982).

1987Rather, we agree with, and adopt, the interpretation of the emergency grant of jurisdiction stated in Hache v. Riley, 186 N.J.Super. 119 , 451 A.2d 971 (Ch.Div.1982).

1968Richardson v. Terry, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W. 523 (disc, w.o.j.) Our Supreme Court in Sanborn v. Murphy, 86 Tex. 437 , 25 S.W. 610 , at page 614, .said: “Persons who are not affected by such -contracts are not permitted to set up that they are contrary to the statute of frauds * * *” These decisions require a holding that appellants cannot use the statutes as a defense to Withers’ suit for damages for knowingly interfering with performance of the commission contract by the parties thereto, unless they were given the right to set up the statutes as a defense by the Scout Foundation’s agreement in

1968Richardson v. Terry, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W. 523 (disc, w.o.j.) Our Supreme Court in Sanborn v. Murphy, 86 Tex. 437 , 25 S.W. 610 , at page 614, .said: “Persons who are not affected by such -contracts are not permitted to set up that they are contrary to the statute of frauds * * *” These decisions require a holding that appellants cannot use the statutes as a defense to Withers’ suit for damages for knowingly interfering with performance of the commission contract by the parties thereto, unless they were given the right to set up the statutes as a defense by the Scout Foundation’s agreement in

1968Richardson v. Terry, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W. 523 (disc, w.o.j.) Our Supreme Court in Sanborn v. Murphy, 86 Tex. 437 , 25 S.W. 610 , at page 614, .said: “Persons who are not affected by such -contracts are not permitted to set up that they are contrary to the statute of frauds * * *” These decisions require a holding that appellants cannot use the statutes as a defense to Withers’ suit for damages for knowingly interfering with performance of the commission contract by the parties thereto, unless they were given the right to set up the statutes as a defense by the Scout Foundation’s agreement in

1965In the first place, when relied on, waiver must be specially pleaded. 60 Tex.Jur.2d § 12, p. 197; Middle States Petroleum Corp. v. Messenger, Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 645 ; Young v. De La Garza, Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 667 .

1965In the first place, when relied on, waiver must be specially pleaded. 60 Tex.Jur.2d § 12, p. 197; Middle States Petroleum Corp. v. Messenger, Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 645 ; Young v. De La Garza, Tex.Civ.App., 368 S.W.2d 667 .

1951The Supreme Court in Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S.W.2d 69, 71 , ruled as follows: “What a plaintiff must allege and prove in order to maintain his suit in a county other than that of defendant’s domicile, over the latter’s proper protest, has been denominated ‘venue facts’ and defined as ‘those which are stated in the particular exception of article 1995 that is applicable or appropriate to the character of suit alleged in plaintiff’s petition.’ Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 .” The Supreme Court further ruled in Cowden v. ' Cowden, supra: “Applicable provisions o

1951The Supreme Court in Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S.W.2d 69, 71 , ruled as follows: “What a plaintiff must allege and prove in order to maintain his suit in a county other than that of defendant’s domicile, over the latter’s proper protest, has been denominated ‘venue facts’ and defined as ‘those which are stated in the particular exception of article 1995 that is applicable or appropriate to the character of suit alleged in plaintiff’s petition.’ Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 .” The Supreme Court further ruled in Cowden v. ' Cowden, supra: “Applicable provisions o

1951The Supreme Court in Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S.W.2d 69, 71 , ruled as follows: “What a plaintiff must allege and prove in order to maintain his suit in a county other than that of defendant’s domicile, over the latter’s proper protest, has been denominated ‘venue facts’ and defined as ‘those which are stated in the particular exception of article 1995 that is applicable or appropriate to the character of suit alleged in plaintiff’s petition.’ Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 .” The Supreme Court further ruled in Cowden v. ' Cowden, supra: “Applicable provisions o

1951The Supreme Court in Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S.W.2d 69, 71 , ruled as follows: “What a plaintiff must allege and prove in order to maintain his suit in a county other than that of defendant’s domicile, over the latter’s proper protest, has been denominated ‘venue facts’ and defined as ‘those which are stated in the particular exception of article 1995 that is applicable or appropriate to the character of suit alleged in plaintiff’s petition.’ Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 .” The Supreme Court further ruled in Cowden v. ' Cowden, supra: “Applicable provisions o

1941Also where, as in the case of Pena v. Sling, Tex.Sup., 140 S.W.2d 441 , 128 A.L.R. 1223 , the defendants plead that plaintiff’s petition, although in form an action for the partition of land, in fact, camouflaged an action for the recovery of land, to evade the controlling venue statute, and plaintiffs failing to discharge the burden of proof resting upon them in such a situation, the suit, in our opinion, was properly held to be an action for the recovery of land, and controlled by exception 14 to Art. 1995.

1941De La Vega v. League, 64 Tex. 205 ; Banks v. Blake [Tex.Civ.App.] 143 S.W. [1183] 1184, 1185.” We therefore respectfully submit that, the statutes and the doctrine of the adjudicated cases, lead inescapably to the following conclusions: (1) That suits for the recovery of land, denominated in the statute “trespass to try title”, venue of which is controlled by exception 14 to Art. 1995, essentially, is an action between rival claimants of land or the right to the possession thereof, and that, incidentally, partition may follow in accordance with the adjudication as to title or right to the poss

1931We quote the following from the syllabus of that decision in 98 Tex. 146 : "The owner of the soil has the right to collect by wells and to use, without limitations of amount or use to which it is put, the waters percolating or flowing beneath the surface, though he drains, thereby, the well of a neighboring proprietor to his damage." It is further contended that Rule 40 of the Railroad Commission can furnish no proper basis for plaintiffs' suit because it does not purport to give a private right of action for damages; that the only authority conferred upon the Railroad Commission by the Legisl

1925The reason for and wisdom of the statutes and rule of decision, which vests solely in the state, acting through its Attorney General, the right to maintain a suit to cancel a" contract made by the state, is thus clearly and forcibly stated by our Supreme Court in the case of Charles Scribner’s Sons v. Marrs, 262 S. W. 722 : *512 “The state itself, through- its proper officers, may contest the validity of its contracts, or for sufficient cause may maintain action to annul them.

1919They cite Aldridge v. Webb Hill, 92 Tex. 122 , 46 S.W. 224 , which sustains such contention, and we believe it logically follows that a person who presents a plea at a different time than that fixed by the statutes and the rule referred to in said case has the burden of showing that his plea has not been abandoned by his previous neglect.

1919They cite Aldridge v. Webb Hill, 92 Tex. 122 , 46 S.W. 224 , which sustains such contention, and we believe it logically follows that a person who presents a plea at a different time than that fixed by the statutes and the rule referred to in said case has the burden of showing that his plea has not been abandoned by his previous neglect.