statutes violation in Florida

2016This Court found that' such situation differed from a case where the defendant is charged with trafficking sale and simple possession “because the sale element of the trafficking statute differs from the elements in the simple possession statute.” Id. at 1210 . “[T]he court must focus on the particular component of the statute that is in issue.” Johnson v. State, 712 So.2d 380, 381 (Fla.1998). “[I]f the prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.” Gibbs, 698 So.2d at 1210 ; Connelly, 748

2016This Court found that' such situation differed from a case where the defendant is charged with trafficking sale and simple possession “because the sale element of the trafficking statute differs from the elements in the simple possession statute.” Id. at 1210 . “[T]he court must focus on the particular component of the statute that is in issue.” Johnson v. State, 712 So.2d 380, 381 (Fla.1998). “[I]f the prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.” Gibbs, 698 So.2d at 1210 ; Connelly, 748

2016This Court found that' such situation differed from a case where the defendant is charged with trafficking sale and simple possession “because the sale element of the trafficking statute differs from the elements in the simple possession statute.” Id. at 1210 . “[T]he court must focus on the particular component of the statute that is in issue.” Johnson v. State, 712 So.2d 380, 381 (Fla.1998). “[I]f the prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.” Gibbs, 698 So.2d at 1210 ; Connelly, 748

2016This Court found that such situation differed from a case where the defendant is charged with trafficking sale and simple possession “because the sale element of the trafficking statute differs from the elements in the simple possession statute.” Id. at 1210 . “[T]he court must focus on the particular component of the statute that is in issue.” Johnson v. State, 712 So. 2d 380, 381 (Fla. 1998). “[I]f the prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.” Gibbs, 698 So. 2d at 1210 ; Connelly, 7

2016This Court found that' such situation differed from a case where the defendant is charged with trafficking sale and simple possession “because the sale element of the trafficking statute differs from the elements in the simple possession statute.” Id. at 1210 . “[T]he court must focus on the particular component of the statute that is in issue.” Johnson v. State, 712 So.2d 380, 381 (Fla.1998). “[I]f the prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.” Gibbs, 698 So.2d at 1210 ; Connelly, 748

2016This Court found that such situation differed from a case where the defendant is charged with trafficking sale and simple possession “because the sale element of the trafficking statute differs from the elements in the simple possession statute.” Id. at 1210 . “[T]he court must focus on the particular component of the statute that is in issue.” Johnson v. State, 712 So. 2d 380, 381 (Fla. 1998). “[I]f the prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.” Gibbs, 698 So. 2d at 1210 ; Connelly, 7

2016See Jackson v¡ State, 180 So.3d 1108, 1105-06 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (explicitly rejecting Floyd); Wyehe v. State, 170 So.3d 898, 903-07, 909-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (Wells, J., specially concurring); Cruz v. State, No. 4D13-1408, — So.3d -,- -, 2015 WL 2393281, at *6-8 (Fla. 4th DCA May 20, 2015) (explicitly rejecting Floyd), Woodsmall v. State, 164 So.3d 696 , 697 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Sims v. State, 140 So.3d 1000 , 1003 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA2014). 3 The language employed in both the statutes and in the standard jury instructions confirms this conclusion.

2016See Jackson v¡ State, 180 So.3d 1108, 1105-06 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (explicitly rejecting Floyd); Wyehe v. State, 170 So.3d 898, 903-07, 909-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (Wells, J., specially concurring); Cruz v. State, No. 4D13-1408, — So.3d -,- -, 2015 WL 2393281, at *6-8 (Fla. 4th DCA May 20, 2015) (explicitly rejecting Floyd), Woodsmall v. State, 164 So.3d 696 , 697 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Sims v. State, 140 So.3d 1000 , 1003 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA2014). 3 The language employed in both the statutes and in the standard jury instructions confirms this conclusion.

2011See Gibbs v. State, 698 So.2d 1206, 1210 (Fla.1997) (“[I]f prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes [sections 893.13 and 893.135], a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.”); Williamson v. State, 859 So.2d 553, 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“We conclude that the defendant’s convictions for both trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment .... ”); see also Howard v. State, 916 So.2d 824, 824-25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that the appellant could not

2011See Gibbs v. State, 698 So.2d 1206, 1210 (Fla.1997) (“[I]f prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes [sections 893.13 and 893.135], a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles.”); Williamson v. State, 859 So.2d 553, 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“We conclude that the defendant’s convictions for both trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment .... ”); see also Howard v. State, 916 So.2d 824, 824-25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that the appellant could not

2010In Jones v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Healthcare, Inc., 923 So.2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the plaintiff contended that the hospital was liable for the actions of an anesthesiologist and a nurse anesthetist who were employed by an anesthesiology practice on the theory that they were the apparent agents of the hospital.

2010The Wax court concluded that the same statutes and rule that Reth relies upon here imposed a “duty for non-negligent anesthesia services on all surgical hospitals.” Id. at 9.

2010In Wax, the court quoted the statutes and rule, including section 395.1055(1)(d) which authorizes the Agency to adopt rules ensuring that “[l]icensed facilities are established, organized, and operated consistent with established standards and rules.” See 955 So.2d at 8.

2010See §§ 985.435(5),.455(3), Fla. Stat. (2007). [2] In N.W., 767 So.2d at 446, 448 , and J.M.W., 935 So.2d at 631 , the courts applied prior versions of sections 985.35(4)(a), 985.435(1), (5), and 985.455(1), (3).

2010See §§ 985.435(5),.455(3), Fla. Stat. (2007). [2] In N.W., 767 So.2d at 446, 448 , and J.M.W., 935 So.2d at 631 , the courts applied prior versions of sections 985.35(4)(a), 985.435(1), (5), and 985.455(1), (3).

2009In Cherry v. State , 959 So.2d 702 , 712-13 (Fla. 2007), this Court held that the statutes and rule had a strict cut-off at an IQ of 70 in order to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.

2009In Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla.2007), this Court held that the statutes and rule had a strict cut-off at an IQ of 70 in order to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.

1998"Thus, if prosecution is for the same *1131 conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles." Gibbs, 698 So.2d at 1210 ; see also Anderson, 695 So.2d at 310-11 .

1941See also L’Engle v. Wilson, 21 Fla. 461 .