third-party culpability instruction in California

2025(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887 (Earp) [so holding].) Sandoval also resists this conclusion, asserting (1) that the failure to give a third-party culpability instruction implicates a 31 panoply of federal constitutional rights, such that we must presume prejudice unless the People establish the absence of the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , and (2) that this demanding standard cannot be met because the evidence of Alicia’s guilt was substantial.

2025(Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 887 .) Its second step is also incorrect, as it is not reasonably probable that giving a third- party culpability instruction would have caused the jury to come to a different conclusion because, as noted above, the jury was elsewhere instructed that it could not convict any defendant unless each defendant’s guilt was established by the People beyond a reasonable doubt.

2025(People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 500, 504 (Hartsch); People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 853 (Harris).) The trial court’s refusal to give the third-party culpability instruction Sandoval requested does not constitute error because the proffered instruction is both duplicative and confusing.

2025There was no prejudice As our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a trial court’s failure to give a third-party culpability instruction is almost never prejudicial “because the [pattern] reasonable doubt instructions give defendants ample opportunity to impress upon the jury that evidence of another party’s liability must be considered in weighing whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.” (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 720 (Ledesma); People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147 , 178; People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 907-908 .) In

2023The closing arguments focused the jury’s attention on that point.” (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; see People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147 , 176–178 [even where parties stipulate to the admissibility of third party culpability evidence, the failure to instruct on third party culpability was not prejudicial when jury was instructed on reasonable doubt].) In People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789 , 824–825, the Supreme Court concluded a third party culpability instruction was not necessary when the jury was 10 properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the gove

2021Because a third party culpability instruction is a “pinpoint” instruction that a court need not give unless requested (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 824 (Gutierrez)), and because defendant’s withdrawal negated her earlier request, defendant forfeited her right to raise this issue on appeal.

2023The trial court declined to give a third-party culpability instruction, citing People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 (Hall) and explaining the defense had not made a sufficient showing to warrant such an instruction.14 13 On cross-examination, Detective Jackson confirmed he had received a report from another detective, Rozzi, who examined defendant’s body; Jackson, however, was not present for the examination.

2023The trial court declined to give a third-party culpability instruction, citing People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 (Hall) and explaining the defense had not made a sufficient showing to warrant such an instruction.14 13 On cross-examination, Detective Jackson confirmed he had received a report from another detective, Rozzi, who examined defendant’s body; Jackson, however, was not present for the examination.

2025Its first step is incorrect, as our Supreme Court has held that the failure to give a third-party culpability instruction is evaluated under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818—not under Chapman.

2013Cruz maintains the court's ruling violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions to present a third party culpability defense and to confront the witnesses against him; he adds the error is not harmless under either the more stringent beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) or the state law standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

2025Further, he does not explain what he means by “two different evidentiary standards.” 30 (Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 1157-1158 [holding that giving a CALJIC instruction similar to CALCRIM No. 373 did not necessitate or otherwise warrant a third-party culpability instruction].) Nor was an instruction needed to correct any misstatement by counsel in closing arguments.

2021(Id., at pp. 824-825; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 854 ; Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1158 (Johnsen) [“There is no precedent that compels the trial court to instruct the jury specifically on the reasonable doubt standard in the context of third party culpability when the jury has already received a general instruction on the reasonable doubt instruction”].) Defendant argues that a third party culpability instruction would not have been duplicative in this case because the court elsewhere gave the CALCRIM No. 373 instruction, which told the

2025(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887 (Earp) [so holding].) Sandoval also resists this conclusion, asserting (1) that the failure to give a third-party culpability instruction implicates a 31 panoply of federal constitutional rights, such that we must presume prejudice unless the People establish the absence of the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , and (2) that this demanding standard cannot be met because the evidence of Alicia’s guilt was substantial.

2013Cruz maintains the court's ruling violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions to present a third party culpability defense and to confront the witnesses against him; he adds the error is not harmless under either the more stringent beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) or the state law standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

2025(People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 500, 504 (Hartsch); People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 853 (Harris).) The trial court’s refusal to give the third-party culpability instruction Sandoval requested does not constitute error because the proffered instruction is both duplicative and confusing.

2021(Id., at pp. 824-825; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 854 ; Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1158 (Johnsen) [“There is no precedent that compels the trial court to instruct the jury specifically on the reasonable doubt standard in the context of third party culpability when the jury has already received a general instruction on the reasonable doubt instruction”].) Defendant argues that a third party culpability instruction would not have been duplicative in this case because the court elsewhere gave the CALCRIM No. 373 instruction, which told the

2025There was no prejudice As our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a trial court’s failure to give a third-party culpability instruction is almost never prejudicial “because the [pattern] reasonable doubt instructions give defendants ample opportunity to impress upon the jury that evidence of another party’s liability must be considered in weighing whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.” (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 720 (Ledesma); People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147 , 178; People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 907-908 .) In

2023The closing arguments focused the jury’s attention on that point.” (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; see People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147 , 176–178 [even where parties stipulate to the admissibility of third party culpability evidence, the failure to instruct on third party culpability was not prejudicial when jury was instructed on reasonable doubt].) In People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789 , 824–825, the Supreme Court concluded a third party culpability instruction was not necessary when the jury was 10 properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the gove

2017(People v. Chavez (1958) 50 Cal.2d 778, 790 [presumption that jury followed court’s instructions]; see also People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918-919 (Farmer) [instruction on unjoined perpetrators does not interfere with a third party culpability defense], overruled on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 .) Second, defendant’s argument that the jury instruction had to “dispel” some vague “natural instinct” on the part of the jury to hold someone responsible for the crime is 9 insufficient to raise a concern with the instruction.

2014(People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918-919 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724 , fn. 5 6.) "[T]he instruction does not tell the jury it cannot consider evidence that someone else committed the crime. [Citation.] It merely says the jury is not to speculate on whether someone else might or might not be prosecuted." (Id. at p. 918 [considering predecessor instruction CALJIC No. 2.11.5].) CALCRIM No. 373 did not preclude or diminish Suarez's defense of third party culpability; it merely directed the jury not to be distracted from its task of determining

2017(People v. Chavez (1958) 50 Cal.2d 778, 790 [presumption that jury followed court’s instructions]; see also People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918-919 (Farmer) [instruction on unjoined perpetrators does not interfere with a third party culpability defense], overruled on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 .) Second, defendant’s argument that the jury instruction had to “dispel” some vague “natural instinct” on the part of the jury to hold someone responsible for the crime is 9 insufficient to raise a concern with the instruction.

2014(People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918-919 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724 , fn. 5 6.) "[T]he instruction does not tell the jury it cannot consider evidence that someone else committed the crime. [Citation.] It merely says the jury is not to speculate on whether someone else might or might not be prosecuted." (Id. at p. 918 [considering predecessor instruction CALJIC No. 2.11.5].) CALCRIM No. 373 did not preclude or diminish Suarez's defense of third party culpability; it merely directed the jury not to be distracted from its task of determining

2025(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 196 , 222–223 [counsel’s performance was deficient where he chose to not investigate a diminished capacity defense based on a competency evaluation and the defendant’s alleged confession, both of which said “little if anything about defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing”]; In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 777 [counsel’s decision to focus on a third party culpability defense without investigating the victim’s time of death was constitutionally deficient; “the two lines of defense were potentially complementary, not mutually exc

2025(See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 196 , 222–223 [counsel’s performance was deficient where he chose to not investigate a diminished capacity defense based on a competency evaluation and the defendant’s alleged confession, both of which said “little if anything about defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing”]; In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 777 [counsel’s decision to focus on a third party culpability defense without investigating the victim’s time of death was constitutionally deficient; “the two lines of defense were potentially complementary, not mutually exc

2025There was no prejudice As our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a trial court’s failure to give a third-party culpability instruction is almost never prejudicial “because the [pattern] reasonable doubt instructions give defendants ample opportunity to impress upon the jury that evidence of another party’s liability must be considered in weighing whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.” (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 504 ; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 720 (Ledesma); People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147 , 178; People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 907-908 .) In

2021The trial court has the duty “to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved.” (§ 1044; see People v. Ybarra (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1069 , 1080–1081, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 [trial court properly exercised its broad discretionary power to control the proceedings in the courtroom]; People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 255 [trial cour

2021Because two people can knowingly possess the same stolen property at the same time (People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 [“[p]ossession may be shared with others”], overruled on other grounds, People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295 ; CALCRIM No. 1600 [“[t]wo or more people may possess something at the same time”]), the girlfriend’s possible guilt of this crime says nothing about defendant’s possible guilt.

2021The trial court has the duty “to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved.” (§ 1044; see People v. Ybarra (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1069 , 1080–1081, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 [trial court properly exercised its broad discretionary power to control the proceedings in the courtroom]; People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 255 [trial cour