defendants next claim in Connecticut

2004Accordingly, a new trial is necessary. 10 II The defendants next claim that the court improperly admitted the testimony of the plaintiffs only medical expert over their objections under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2004Accordingly, a new trial is necessary. 10 II The defendants next claim that the court improperly admitted the testimony of the plaintiffs only medical expert over their objections under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2004Accordingly, a new trial is necessary. 10 II The defendants next claim that the court improperly admitted the testimony of the plaintiffs only medical expert over their objections under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002The defendants argue that the court failed to hold a proper hearing under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2004Accordingly, a new trial is necessary. 10 II The defendants next claim that the court improperly admitted the testimony of the plaintiffs only medical expert over their objections under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002The defendants argue that the court failed to hold a proper hearing under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2004Accordingly, a new trial is necessary. 10 II The defendants next claim that the court improperly admitted the testimony of the plaintiffs only medical expert over their objections under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002The defendants argue that the court failed to hold a proper hearing under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2026“Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. [An appellate] 2 “While statutes of limitation[s] are sometimes called statutes of repose, the former bars [a] right of action unless it is filed within a specified period of time after injury occurs, while statute[s] of repose [terminate] any right of action after a specific time has elapsed, regard- less of whether there has as yet been an injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230 Conn. 335, 341 , 644 A.2d 1297 (1994). 3 The defendants also argue that the court err

2026“Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. [An appellate] 2 “While statutes of limitation[s] are sometimes called statutes of repose, the former bars [a] right of action unless it is filed within a specified period of time after injury occurs, while statute[s] of repose [terminate] any right of action after a specific time has elapsed, regard- less of whether there has as yet been an injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230 Conn. 335, 341 , 644 A.2d 1297 (1994). 3 The defendants also argue that the court err

2022An abuse of discretion must be proven by the appellant by showing that the denial of the continuance was unreasonable or arbitrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bevilacqua v. Bevilacqua, 201 Conn. App. 261, 268 , 242 A.3d 542 (2020).

2015Specifi- cally, the defendants claim that the trial court should have interpreted the rejection of the master lease as a voluntary surrender, thus preserving the rights of any subtenants pursuant to Bargain Mart, Inc. v. Lipkis, 212 Conn. 120 , 561 A.2d 1365 (1989).

2015Specifi- cally, the defendants claim that the trial court should have interpreted the rejection of the master lease as a voluntary surrender, thus preserving the rights of any subtenants pursuant to Bargain Mart, Inc. v. Lipkis, 212 Conn. 120 , 561 A.2d 1365 (1989).

2015In considering this issue, we will return to the defendants’ defenses, but will consider them as arguments made by the defendants as to whether the plaintiffs met their burden of proof. 1 The defendants first assert that, with regard to the contract claims as applied to Nyberg, ‘‘there is insuffi- cient evidence to establish that it was clearly [Nyberg’s] intention to assume any personal contractual liability.’’ The proper inquiry, however, is not whether Nyberg so intended, but, rather, whether Nyberg disclaimed personal liability by stating that he was acting as an agent. ‘‘It is clearly the

2015In considering this issue, we will return to the defendants’ defenses, but will consider them as arguments made by the defendants as to whether the plaintiffs met their burden of proof. 1 The defendants first assert that, with regard to the contract claims as applied to Nyberg, ‘‘there is insuffi- cient evidence to establish that it was clearly [Nyberg’s] intention to assume any personal contractual liability.’’ The proper inquiry, however, is not whether Nyberg so intended, but, rather, whether Nyberg disclaimed personal liability by stating that he was acting as an agent. ‘‘It is clearly the

2010Of course, the court is required to instruct the jury on “the issues as outlined by the pleadings and as reasonably supported by the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiStefano v. Milardo, 276 Conn. 416, 421 , 886 A.2d 415 (2005).

2010Of course, the court is required to instruct the jury on “the issues as outlined by the pleadings and as reasonably supported by the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiStefano v. Milardo, 276 Conn. 416, 421 , 886 A.2d 415 (2005).

2010II The defendants next claim that the court improperly determined that the “defendants [had] impliedly, at least, waive [d] [application of] the 120 day requirement,” primarily by way of the defendants’ “overall acquiescence with the litigation’s progress . . . .” Recently, we declined to adopt such reasoning for purposes of finding waiver under § 51-183b, especially where, as here, a litigant files a seasonable objection. 6 See Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 296, 305 , 8 A.3d 524 (2010) (“[b]ecause the most that can reasonably be required is objection seasonably made afte

2010II The defendants next claim that the court improperly determined that the “defendants [had] impliedly, at least, waive [d] [application of] the 120 day requirement,” primarily by way of the defendants’ “overall acquiescence with the litigation’s progress . . . .” Recently, we declined to adopt such reasoning for purposes of finding waiver under § 51-183b, especially where, as here, a litigant files a seasonable objection. 6 See Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 296, 305 , 8 A.3d 524 (2010) (“[b]ecause the most that can reasonably be required is objection seasonably made afte

2008Specifically, they argue that a few isolated remarks by the court during the closing arguments of counsel indicated the court’s belief that the defendants were *560 required to demonstrate that the town had not accepted the right-of-way. 6 The challenged remarks by the court were made shortly after the parties had discussed at length Meshberg v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 180 Conn. 274 , 429 A.2d 865 (1980).

2008Specifically, they argue that a few isolated remarks by the court during the closing arguments of counsel indicated the court’s belief that the defendants were *560 required to demonstrate that the town had not accepted the right-of-way. 6 The challenged remarks by the court were made shortly after the parties had discussed at length Meshberg v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 180 Conn. 274 , 429 A.2d 865 (1980).

2006“Modem summary judgment procedure was adopted in Connecticut in 1963 and was modeled on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 66 Conn. App. 542, 556 , 785 A.2d 265 (2001), rev’d *331 on other grounds, 263 Conn. 140 , 819 A.2d 216 (2003).

2006“Modem summary judgment procedure was adopted in Connecticut in 1963 and was modeled on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 66 Conn. App. 542, 556 , 785 A.2d 265 (2001), rev’d *331 on other grounds, 263 Conn. 140 , 819 A.2d 216 (2003).

2006“Modem summary judgment procedure was adopted in Connecticut in 1963 and was modeled on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 66 Conn. App. 542, 556 , 785 A.2d 265 (2001), rev’d *331 on other grounds, 263 Conn. 140 , 819 A.2d 216 (2003).

2006“Modem summary judgment procedure was adopted in Connecticut in 1963 and was modeled on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 66 Conn. App. 542, 556 , 785 A.2d 265 (2001), rev’d *331 on other grounds, 263 Conn. 140 , 819 A.2d 216 (2003).

2003II The defendants next claim that the commissioner applied the incorrect evidentiary standard by failing to apply the burden shifting analysis set forth by our Supreme Court in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990).

2003II The defendants next claim that the commissioner applied the incorrect evidentiary standard by failing to apply the burden shifting analysis set forth by our Supreme Court in Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990).

2003The trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 246 Conn. 626, 628 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998).

2003The trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 246 Conn. 626, 628 , 717 A.2d 1205 (1998).

2002The doctrine provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Assn. , 259 Conn. 251 , 281 , 788 A.2d 60 (2002).

2002The doctrine provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Assn. , 259 Conn. 251 , 281 , 788 A.2d 60 (2002).

2002“A hearing on an application for prejudgment remedy is not a full-scale trial on the merits of the [plaintiffs] claims . . . but rather concerns only whether and to what extent the plaintiff is entitled to have property of a defendant held in custody of the law pending final adjudication of the merits of the action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soltesz v. Miller, 56 Conn. App. 114, 116 , 741 A.2d 335 (1999).

2002“A hearing on an application for prejudgment remedy is not a full-scale trial on the merits of the [plaintiffs] claims . . . but rather concerns only whether and to what extent the plaintiff is entitled to have property of a defendant held in custody of the law pending final adjudication of the merits of the action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soltesz v. Miller, 56 Conn. App. 114, 116 , 741 A.2d 335 (1999).

2001They argue, pursuant to Skolnick v. Skolnick, 131 Conn. 561 , 41 A.2d 452 (1945), that, as a matter of public policy, the conduct of a wife may be presumed to be for the benefit of her husband.

2001They argue, pursuant to Skolnick v. Skolnick, 131 Conn. 561 , 41 A.2d 452 (1945), that, as a matter of public policy, the conduct of a wife may be presumed to be for the benefit of her husband.

2001Specifically, the defendants argue that the court’s finding is inconsistent with Shelinsky v. Foster, 87 Conn. 90, 94 , 87 A. 35 (1913), in which our Supreme Court held that a finding that a deed was left by a party in the physical custody of his attorney did not give rise to the conclusion that the deed was delivered in escrow.

2000The court agrees that the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . "`To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.' West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 , 48 , 108 S.Ct. 2250 , 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); see also Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 , 155 , 98 S.Ct. 1729 , 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).

2000The court agrees that the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . "`To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.' West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 , 48 , 108 S.Ct. 2250 , 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); see also Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 , 155 , 98 S.Ct. 1729 , 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).

1996“The jury forms no part of our equity system, though its use is permitted by statute upon issues of fact in equitable actions.” Doris v. McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 608 , 156 A.2d 52 (1931). 13 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly submitted the CUTPA claim to the jury. 14 II The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly refused to set aside the jury’s verdict on the claim of fraud.

1996“The jury forms no part of our equity system, though its use is permitted by statute upon issues of fact in equitable actions.” Doris v. McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 608 , 156 A.2d 52 (1931). 13 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly submitted the CUTPA claim to the jury. 14 II The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly refused to set aside the jury’s verdict on the claim of fraud.

1995The defendants next claim that the mere lapse of time does not constitute good cause for the eviction of a tenant under Section 8 leasing. "[B]efore a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process under § 47a-23 , the landlord must prove its compliance with all the applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for the termination for a CT Page 12439 lease." Jefferson Garden supra. Section 8 leases, in this case, under the Section 8 moderate rehabilitation program, are governed by federal law and may only be terminated in accordance with federal regulations and the terms o

1993III The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly permitted Manzi to testify, over their objections and exceptions, to an ultimate fact contrary to the principle that we articulated in State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35 , 540 A.2d 42 (1988).

1993III The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly permitted Manzi to testify, over their objections and exceptions, to an ultimate fact contrary to the principle that we articulated in State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35 , 540 A.2d 42 (1988).

1992II The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly admitted certain statements and lifestyle evidence of alleged coconspirators under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule without making an adequate preliminary finding, as required by State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644 , 500 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 , 106 S. Ct. 1642 , 90 L.

1992II The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly admitted certain statements and lifestyle evidence of alleged coconspirators under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule without making an adequate preliminary finding, as required by State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644 , 500 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 , 106 S. Ct. 1642 , 90 L.

1992II The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly admitted certain statements and lifestyle evidence of alleged coconspirators under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule without making an adequate preliminary finding, as required by State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644 , 500 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 , 106 S. Ct. 1642 , 90 L.

1992II The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly admitted certain statements and lifestyle evidence of alleged coconspirators under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule without making an adequate preliminary finding, as required by State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644 , 500 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 , 106 S. Ct. 1642 , 90 L.

1992II The defendants next claim that the trial court improperly admitted certain statements and lifestyle evidence of alleged coconspirators under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule without making an adequate preliminary finding, as required by State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644 , 500 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 , 106 S. Ct. 1642 , 90 L.

1991It is axiomatic that a “ ‘defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him.’ ” Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 320 , 240 A.2d 881 (1968).

1991It is axiomatic that a “ ‘defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him.’ ” Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 320 , 240 A.2d 881 (1968).