31 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lieber v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.green2 sentences2016In my view, the Third District correctly held that the probation condition could be upheld based on the conclusion that “the sex offender therapy at issue is rationally related to the crime for which Villanueva was convicted—the illegal and inappropriate touching of the child’s breast and buttocks.” Villanueva v. State, 118 So. 3d 999, 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). 2016In my view, the Third District correctly held that the probation condition could be upheld based on the conclusion that “the sex offender therapy at issue is rationally related to the crime for which Villanueva was convicted—the illegal and inappropriate touching of the child’s breast and buttocks.” Villanueva v. State, 118 So. 3d 999, 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). | 2 | 2 |
Stephens v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The First -4- District, in Stephens v. State, 659 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978)), pointed out that the supreme court has also held that a court may impose "any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose." In this case, a prohibition of self-employment may not fit within the three Rodriguez factors, but it would greatly increase the stability of Mr. Pulecio's life and assure that he had a far greater chance of satisfying the normal, general conditions of probation during his ten-year term of prob 2015The First District, in Stephens v. State, 659 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978)), pointed out that the supreme court has also held that a court may impose “any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose.” In this case, a prohibition of self-employment may not fit within the three Rodriguez factors, but it would greatly increase the stability of Mr. Pulecio’s life and assure that he had a far greater chance of satisfying the normal, general conditions of probation during his ten-year term of probation. | 1 | 2 |
Biller v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Biller v. State, 618 So.2d 734 (Fla.1993). 1995The Biller court made it clear that all Rodriguez factors must be present to hold a special probation condition invalid when it stated that “a special condition of probation, when challenged on grounds of relevancy, will only be upheld if the record supports at least one of the circumstances outlined in Rodriguez.” Biller, 618 So.2d at 735 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Diaz v. Bushonggreen1 sentence2026ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION Although we apply an abuse of discretion standard to review an order dismissing a complaint for failure to comply with a court order, such action “is the most severe of all sanctions and should be employed only in extreme circumstances.” Diaz v. Bushong, 619 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 3 As indicated in note 1 supra, although the trial court’s order dismissed the complaint “without prejudice,” Rodriguez was barred by the statute of limitations from refiling her complaint, thus rendering the order on review a dismissal with prejudice. 4 1993); Lahti v. Porn, 624 So. 2 | 1 | 1 |
Lahti v. Porngreen1 sentence2026ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION Although we apply an abuse of discretion standard to review an order dismissing a complaint for failure to comply with a court order, such action “is the most severe of all sanctions and should be employed only in extreme circumstances.” Diaz v. Bushong, 619 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 3 As indicated in note 1 supra, although the trial court’s order dismissed the complaint “without prejudice,” Rodriguez was barred by the statute of limitations from refiling her complaint, thus rendering the order on review a dismissal with prejudice. 4 1993); Lahti v. Porn, 624 So. 2 | 1 | 1 |
Collom v. Holtongreen1 sentence2023See Lukancich v. City of Tampa, 583 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ("An owner or controller of property must refrain from wanton negligence or wilful [sic] misconduct which would injure an uninvited licensee, must refrain from intentionally exposing the uninvited licensee to danger, and must warn an uninvited licensee of a defect or condition known to the owner or controller of the land when the danger is not open to ordinary observation by the licensee (citing Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984))). | 1 | 1 |
Lukancich v. City of Tampagreen1 sentence2023See Lukancich v. City of Tampa, 583 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ("An owner or controller of property must refrain from wanton negligence or wilful [sic] misconduct which would injure an uninvited licensee, must refrain from intentionally exposing the uninvited licensee to danger, and must warn an uninvited licensee of a defect or condition known to the owner or controller of the land when the danger is not open to ordinary observation by the licensee (citing Collom v. Holton, 449 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984))). | 1 | 1 |
Steven Edward Stein v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2018See Rodriguez , 237 So.3d 919 ; Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217 . | 1 | 1 |
Med. Facilities Dev. v. Little Arch Creekgreen1 sentence2018Facilities Dev., Inc. v. Little Arch Creek Props., Inc., 675 So. 2d 915, 917 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that, where an action is not based on a duly recorded instrument, the proponent is entitled to maintain a lis pendens where the proponent shows a “fair nexus between the property and the dispute”). | 1 | 1 |
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Kelleygreen1 sentence2018See Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Kelley, 903 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Montanezgreen1 sentence2018“A discovery order that requires the production of information and records that are protected by the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege is reviewable by certiorari.” Brown v. Montanez, 90 So. 3d 982, 985 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Mann v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Mann, 112 So.3d at 1162 . 2017See Mann, 112 So.3d at 1162 . | 1 | 1 |
Pulecio v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Cf. Pulecio v. State, 160 So.3d 556, 558-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (Alteribernd, J., concurring) (noting that probationary condition against self-employment “may not fit within the three Rodriguez factors, but it would greatly increase the stability of Mr. Pulecio’s life and assure that he had a far greater chance of satisfying” the general conditions of a ten-year term of ■ probation). | 1 | 1 |
Austin v. Stategreen2 sentences2015"All three Rodriguez factors must exist for an appellate court to strike a special probation condition as an abuse of discretion." Austin v. State, 67 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). 2015“All three Rodriguez factors must exist for an appellate court to strike a special probation condition as an abuse of discretion.” Austin v. State, 67 So.3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). | 1 | 1 |
| Hines v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'Neill v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Diaz v. Bell MicroProducts-Future Tech, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Barruzza v. Suddath Van Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Muhammad v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodriguez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGregor v. Provident Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| PALM AFC HOLDINGS INC. v. Palm Beach Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pope v. Wainwrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shull v. Duggergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Groover v. Singletarygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodriguez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
James Ernest Hitchcock v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2018Rodriguez responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), and Rodriguez v. State , 237 So.3d 918 (Fla. 2018), petition for cert. filed , No. 18-6505 (U.S. July 2, 2018), should not be dispositive in this case. 2018This Court stayed Rodriguez's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Allen v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Rodriguez responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), and Rodriguez v. State , 237 So.3d 918 (Fla. 2018), petition for cert. filed , No. 18-6505 (U.S. July 2, 2018), should not be dispositive in this case. 2018This Court stayed Rodriguez's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Sedlak v. Smith
green
2 sentences2018Rodriguez responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), and Rodriguez v. State , 237 So.3d 918 (Fla. 2018), petition for cert. filed , No. 18-6505 (U.S. July 2, 2018), should not be dispositive in this case. 2018This Court stayed Rodriguez's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in *919 Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). 2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in *919 Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Gary Czajkowski v. State of Florida
red
2 sentences2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). 2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in *919 Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Cleveland v. Sharp
green
2 sentences2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). 2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in *919 Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Florida v. Hurst
red
2 sentences2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). 2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in *919 Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Cherry v. State
red
2 sentences2017We have considered the issues raised, and affirm the trial court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion as time-barred for the reasons stated by the trial court. - 16 - Id. 2016We have considered the issues raised, and affirm the trial court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion as time-barred for the reasons stated by the trial court. - 16 - Id. | 2 | 2016–2017 |
People v. Dominguez
green
2 sentences2016The three-part Biller/Rodriguez analysis is derived from California law where it was first articulated in People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), and subsequently adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975). 2016The three-part Biller/Rodriguez analysis is derived from California law where it was first articulated in People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), and subsequently adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Lent
green
2 sentences2016The three-part Biller/Rodriguez analysis is derived from California law where it was first articulated in People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), and subsequently adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975). 2016The three-part Biller/Rodriguez analysis is derived from California law where it was first articulated in People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), and subsequently adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008Florida's Death Penalty Statute Violates Ring Pooler further contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). 2008Florida's Death Penalty Statute Violates Ring Pooler further contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). | 2 | 2006–2008 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2025Additionally, the order concludes that, even if there were legal error on the part of the trial court and ineffective assistance on the part of trial counsel, Rodriguez failed to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Manuel Antonio Rodriguez v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2018Rodriguez responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), and Rodriguez v. State , 237 So.3d 918 (Fla. 2018), petition for cert. filed , No. 18-6505 (U.S. July 2, 2018), should not be dispositive in this case. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ana Maria Cardona v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2017Contrary to Rodriguez’s claim, the circuit court did not disregard his IQ scores by simply ignoring expert opinions as occurred in Cardona, 185 So.3d at 526-27 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Basham v. State
green
1 sentence2016P. 3.720(d)(1)), “[I]t is error to impose such a lien without giving the defendant the required notice.” Id. (citing Basham v. State, 695 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). *462 Here, the trial court relied on the following exchange when it denied Rodriguez’s claim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Richie v. State
green
1 sentence2016P. 3.720(d)(1)), “[I]t is error to impose such a lien without giving the defendant the required notice.” Id. (citing Basham v. State, 695 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). *462 Here, the trial court relied on the following exchange when it denied Rodriguez’s claim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Pooler v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Rose v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Poore v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Servis v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Miles green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Bonine v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Richardson v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.