7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ford v. Stategreen2 sentences2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha 2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha | 2 | 2 |
Warner v. Stategreen2 sentences2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha 2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha | 2 | 2 |
State v. Parrishgreen2 sentences2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha 2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha | 2 | 2 |
Pike v. Stategreen2 sentences2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha 2014This Court has endorsed the Rodriguez principle in several decisions. 8 See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 302 Ga. App. 838, 840 ( 691 SE2d 888 ) (2010) (“A warrantless search based upon the consent of a third party will be deemed valid when, at the time of entry, police reasonably believe that the third party possesses common authority over the area to be searched.”) (citation omitted); Warner, supra, 299 Ga. App. at 59 (1) (“[E]ven if the parents in fact did not have the authority to consent to a search of Warner’s bedroom, the circumstances led the police to reasonably believe that the parents ha | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Although Rodriguez does not raise the issue on appeal, we have identified a merger error in his sentencing.7 “When the only murder conviction is for felony murder and a defendant is convicted of both felony murder and the predicate felony of the felony murder charge, the conviction for the predicate felony merges into the felony murder conviction.” Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 813, 816 (3) ( 809 SE2d 742 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2020Although Rodriguez does not raise the issue on appeal, we have identified a merger error in his sentencing.7 “When the only murder conviction is for felony murder and a defendant is convicted of both felony murder and the predicate felony of the felony murder charge, the conviction for the predicate felony merges into the felony murder conviction.” Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 813, 816 (3) ( 809 SE2d 742 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2013Where a bona fide controversy exists, attorney fees may be awarded under OCGA § 13-6-11 only where the party sought to be charged has acted in bad faith in the underlying transaction.2 2 (Punctuation omitted.) MARTA v. Mitchell, 289 Ga. App. 1, 2 ( 659 SE2d 605 ) (2007). 5 We will affirm an award under OCGA § 13-6-11 if there is any evidence to support it.3 The trial court directed a verdict for Rodriguez as to the fraud claim. 4 The court, however, denied Rodriguez’s motion for directed verdict as to attorney fees. 2013Where a bona fide controversy exists, attorney fees may be awarded under OCGA § 13-6-11 only where the party sought to be charged has acted in bad faith in the underlying transaction.2 2 (Punctuation omitted.) MARTA v. Mitchell, 289 Ga. App. 1, 2 ( 659 SE2d 605 ) (2007). 5 We will affirm an award under OCGA § 13-6-11 if there is any evidence to support it.3 The trial court directed a verdict for Rodriguez as to the fraud claim. 4 The court, however, denied Rodriguez’s motion for directed verdict as to attorney fees. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2007See id. (factors include length, method, and time of the police interrogation, as well as whether the juvenile has refused to give a statement to police or later repudiated a statement). 2007See id. (factors include length, method, and time of the police interrogation, as well as whether the juvenile has refused to give a statement to police or later repudiated a statement). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Transportation v. Hillside Motors, Inc.green2 sentences1993It is axiomatic that “ ‘ “ ‘jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.’ ” ’ [Cit.]” Dept. of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, 192 Ga. App. 637, 640 (3) ( 385 SE2d 746 ) (1989). 1993It is axiomatic that “ ‘ “ ‘jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.’ ” ’ [Cit.]” Dept. of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, 192 Ga. App. 637, 640 (3) ( 385 SE2d 746 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Brigham
green
1 sentence2014In rejecting Rodriguez’s claim that her detention was prolonged beyond the conclusion of the officer’s investigation into the reason for the stop, the Court found that, although he may have gathered some information that might have dispelled the original impetus for the stop, “the officer had done or said nothing at that point to indicate to the women that his investigation of [the reason for the stop] was concluded.” Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.