31 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences2023KRS 439.3106(1) provides that supervised individuals shall be subject to: (a) Violation revocation proceedings and possible incarceration for failure to comply with the conditions of supervision when such failure constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the supervised individual or the community at large, and cannot be appropriately managed in the community; or (b) Sanctions other than revocation and incarceration as appropriate to the severity of the violation behavior, the risk of future criminal behavior by the offender, and the need for, and availability of, interventions which m 2021Before revoking probation, a trial court must consider KRS 439.3106(1), which provides that “[s]upervised individuals shall be subjected to: (a) Violation revocation proceedings and possible incarceration for failure to comply with the conditions of supervision when such failure constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the supervised individual or the community at large, and cannot be appropriately managed in the community; or (b) Sanctions other than revocation and incarceration as appropriate to the severity of the violation behavior, the risk of future criminal behavior by the off | 7 | 21 |
Helms v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022It states: Supervised individuals shall be subject to: (a) Violation revocation proceedings and possible incarceration for failure to comply with the conditions of supervision when such failure constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the supervised individual or the community at large, and cannot be appropriately managed in the community; or (b) Sanctions other than revocation and incarceration as appropriate to the severity of the violation behavior, the risk of future criminal behavior by the offender, and the need for, and availability of, interventions which may assist the offen 2022Accordingly, “[t]here must be proof in the record established by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated the terms of his release and the statutory criteria for revocation has been met.” Helms, 475 S.W.3d at 645 . | 2 | 3 |
Tussey v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022In Tussey v. Commonwealth, we established that “the value of the stolen property on the date the offender receives it is proper for determining the severity of the violation.” 589 S.W.2d 215, 215 (Ky. 1979). 2013Pursuant to KRS 514.110(3), “Receiving stolen property is a Class A misdemeanor unless: (a) The value of the property is five hundred dollars ($500) or more but less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), in which case it is a Class D felony.” “[T]he burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the value of the property received in a prosecution for that charge.” Macklin v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Ky.App.1984). “[T]he value of the stolen property on the date the offender receives it is the proper date for determining the severity of the violation.” Tussey v. Commonwealth, 589 S.W.2d 215 (Ky | 1 | 2 |
Burnett v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022However, Hunt’s counsel did not expressly ask the court to impose lesser sanctions, nor did the trial court expressly state that it had considered, but rejected, imposing lesser sanctions.15 Of course, 13 Of course, it is an appellant’s responsibility to ensure we have a complete record and we may presume missing portions of a record support a trial court’s decision, but that presumption is blunted here due to the significant procedural difficulties and irregularities in obtaining the certified record. 14 KRS 439.3106(1)(b), formerly codified as KRS 439.3106(2), provides for “[s]anctions other | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leapgreen1 sentence2018"Given the severity of such a presumption, ... which may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct," we have made clear that _this Court will presume vindictiveness "only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists." Commonwealth v. Leap, 179 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Ky. 2005) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Reedgreen1 sentence2013Pursuant to KRS 514.110(3), “Receiving stolen property is a Class A misdemeanor unless: (a) The value of the property is five hundred dollars ($500) or more but less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), in which case it is a Class D felony.” “[T]he burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the value of the property received in a prosecution for that charge.” Macklin v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Ky.App.1984). “[T]he value of the stolen property on the date the offender receives it is the proper date for determining the severity of the violation.” Tussey v. Commonwealth, 589 S.W.2d 215 (Ky | 1 | 1 |
Macklin v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2013Pursuant to KRS 514.110(3), “Receiving stolen property is a Class A misdemeanor unless: (a) The value of the property is five hundred dollars ($500) or more but less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), in which case it is a Class D felony.” “[T]he burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the value of the property received in a prosecution for that charge.” Macklin v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Ky.App.1984). “[T]he value of the stolen property on the date the offender receives it is the proper date for determining the severity of the violation.” Tussey v. Commonwealth, 589 S.W.2d 215 (Ky | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McClure v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2023As this Court has previously stated, “the General Assembly intended the task of considering and making findings regarding the two factors of KRS 439.3106(1) to serve as the analytical precursor to a trial court’s ultimate decision: whether revocation or a lesser sanction is appropriate.” McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 732 . 2018It is Embry's position that the circuit court failed to comply with the statute's directives and post-enactment case law. 3 See Commonwealth. v. Marshall , 345 S.W.3d 822 , 834 (Ky. 2011) ; Commonwealth v. Andrews , 448 S.W.3d 773 (Ky. 2014) ; and McClure v. Commonwealth , 457 S.W.3d 728 (Ky. App. 2015). | 2 | 2018–2023 |
United States v. Goodwin
green
2 sentences2018"Given the severity of such a presumption, ... which may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct," we have made clear that _this Court will presume vindictiveness "only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists." Commonwealth v. Leap, 179 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Ky. 2005) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , (1982)). 2005Given the severity of such a presumption, however— which may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct — the court has done so only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists.” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 2489 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). | 2 | 2005–2018 |
Haney v. City of Lexington
green
2 sentences2025Prior to Haney, our courts adhered to the rule of municipal immunity from liability sounding in tort, and our jurisprudence’s sole means to “lessen the severity of the rule of municipal immunity” to individuals harmed by the negligence of a municipal corporation was by drawing a distinction between “functions of the municipal corporation that purportedly were governmental or public and those thought to be proprietary or private.” Id. at 739-40 . 2025Municipal liability was denied in cases involving a governmental function but was imposed in situations involving a proprietary action. 11 Id. at 740 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Marshall
green
1 sentence2018It is Embry's position that the circuit court failed to comply with the statute's directives and post-enactment case law. 3 See Commonwealth. v. Marshall , 345 S.W.3d 822 , 834 (Ky. 2011) ; Commonwealth v. Andrews , 448 S.W.3d 773 (Ky. 2014) ; and McClure v. Commonwealth , 457 S.W.3d 728 (Ky. App. 2015). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Clatos v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1979We conclude that this position conforms not only to existing law in Kentucky (Clatos v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 851 , 184 S.W.2d 125 (1944)) but also to a logical interpretation of the statute. 1979We conclude that this position conforms not only to existing law in Kentucky (Clatos v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 851 , 184 S.W.2d 125 (1944)) but also to a logical interpretation of the statute. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.