severity error in District of Columbia

2003“In making this determination, the appellate court ‘must weigh the severity of the error against the importance of the determination in the whole proceeding and the possibility for prejudice as a result.’ ” Mercer, 724 A.2d at 1194 (quoting (James W.) Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 367 (D.C.1979)).

1999See Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 367 (“[T]he reviewing court must weigh the severity of the error against the importance of the determination in the whole proceeding and the possibility for prejudice as a result.”) (emphasis added).

2022When determining what sanction to impose, trial courts should expressly consider at least four factors, all of which serve to limit the amount assessed: (1) the reasonableness of the injured party’s attorneys’ fees . . . ; (2) the minimum amount that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior . . . ; (3) the offending party’s ability to pay . . . [;] and (4) the offending party’s history, experience, and ability, the severity of the violation, the degree to which malice or bad faith contributed to the violation, the risk of chilling the type of litigation involved, and other facto

1998In imposing a monetary sanction, the trial court should expressly consider at least four factors, all of which serve to limit the amount assessed: (1) the reasonableness of the injured party’s attorneys’ fees, including that party’s “duty to mitigate costs by not overstaffing, overresearehing or ov-erdiseovering clearly meritless claims,” (2) the minimum amount that “will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior,” (3) the offending party’s ability to pay, bearing in mind that sanctions should not be so large as to bankrupt the offending party, drive that party from the practice of la

2014A trial court exercises its discretion erroneously when it relies on an improper factor, but “the reviewing court must weigh the severity of the error against the importance of the determination in the whole proceeding and the possibility for prejudice as a 30 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006).

2014Indeed, Holmes makes clear that a rule of evidence allowing a trial judge to exclude a defendant‟s relevant and otherwise admissible expert testimony when the prosecution‟s evidence of the defendant‟s guilt is strong would contravene the constitutional guarantee of “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Id. 31 See Benn II, 978 A.2d at 1280 , and Hager, 856 A.2d at 1149 . 17 result.”32 It is only when the impact of the error is so serious we must reverse that we say the trial court “abused” its discretion.33 In some cases in which a challenged identification was amply corrobo

2014Cunningham, 719 A.2d at 502 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 .

2012United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) ("Given the severity of such a presumption,. . . which may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct[,] the Court has [presumed an improper vindictive motive] only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists."); see also id. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.").

2012United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) ("Given the severity of such a presumption,. . . which may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct[,] the Court has [presumed an improper vindictive motive] only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists."); see also id. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.").

2003The critical factors for that determination are: “ ‘the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.’ ” (William) Thomas v. United States, 557 A.2d 1296, 1303 (D.C.1989) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.

2002See Hollingsworth v. United States, 531 A.2d 973, 978 (D.C.1987) (“When the trial court’s error is not so extreme as to require reversal by itself the reviewing court must weigh the severity of the error against the importance of the determination in the whole proceeding and the possibility for prejudice as a result.”) (citation and quotations omitted).

1999“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see also Settles v. United States, 615 A.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C.1992); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969).

1999“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see also Settles v. United States, 615 A.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C.1992); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969).

1999“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see also Settles v. United States, 615 A.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C.1992); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969).