severity rule (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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severity rule in Pennsylvania

8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1915–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Heggenstallergreen
pasuperct · 1997 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2024
2 sentences

2024However, while we acknowledge the cumulative nature of a fine is in keeping with the terms of the ordinances, “when an ordinance is written so as to have a punitive . . . effect, without relation to the individual’s ability to pay and the severity of the violation, it does not meet the standard required by the constitution.” Commonwealth v. Heggenstaller, 699 A.2d 767, 769 (Pa. Super. 1997).

2015Moreover, the Pennsylvania Constitution’s prohibition against excessive fines requires the fine to be “reasonably proportionate to the crimes which occasion them.” Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1287 (Pa. 2014).10 Even if a fine is in line with the terms of an ordinance, if said ordinance has a punitive effect, “without relation to the individual’s ability to pay and the severity of the violation, it does not meet the standard required by the constitution.” Commonwealth v. Heggenstaller, 699 A.2d 767, 769 (Pa. Super. 1997).

23
Com. v. Prince, A.green
pasuperct · 2024 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Cf. Commonwealth v. Prince, 320 A.3d 698, 705 (Pa. Super. 2024) (Concluding that a trial court is not bound by a drug and alcohol evaluator’s assessment of whether a DUI offender needs further treatment: “It would be highly unusual for the General Assembly to delegate the determination of whether an offender requires additional treatment to a non-judicial actor.”).

11
Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, M., Apltgreen
pa · 2014 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Moreover, the Pennsylvania Constitution’s prohibition against excessive fines requires the fine to be “reasonably proportionate to the crimes which occasion them.” Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1287 (Pa. 2014).10 Even if a fine is in line with the terms of an ordinance, if said ordinance has a punitive effect, “without relation to the individual’s ability to pay and the severity of the violation, it does not meet the standard required by the constitution.” Commonwealth v. Heggenstaller, 699 A.2d 767, 769 (Pa. Super. 1997).

11
Carsek Corp. v. Stephen Schifter, Inc.green
pa · 1968 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
2 sentences

1979See also 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332 (1964) ("the tendency of modern authority at law as well as in equity is to regard the question as one of construction to be determined by the intent of the parties . . . ."); 6 Williston, Contracts § 847 (3d ed. 1962) ("the absorption of equitable principles by the law has modified the severity of this rule. . . ."). [3] The contract language in Carsek Corp. was more general than that employed here: "`Settlement to take place within thirty days . . but in no case shall the time for settlement be longer than seven months from the date of approval of this A

1979See also 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332 (1964) ("the tendency of modern authority at law as well as in equity is to regard the question as one of construction to be determined by the intent of the parties . . . ."); 6 Williston, Contracts § 847 (3d ed. 1962) ("the absorption of equitable principles by the law has modified the severity of this rule. . . ."). [3] The contract language in Carsek Corp. was more general than that employed here: "`Settlement to take place within thirty days . . but in no case shall the time for settlement be longer than seven months from the date of approval of this A

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
United States v. Goodwin green
scotus · 1982
1 sentence

2022Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373 .

12022–2022
COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP. v. Fiore neutral
pacommwct · 1991
2 sentences

2007In Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Fiore, 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 596 , 588 A.2d 1332 (1991), this Court determined that a trial court could alter the traditional restrictions on the scope of de novo review where DOT had discretion to choose from a range of penalties and admitted that the length of suspension imposed was based on administrative considerations, rather than on the severity of the violation.

2007In Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Fiore, 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 596 , 588 A.2d 1332 (1991), this Court determined that a trial court could alter the traditional restrictions on the scope of de novo review where DOT had discretion to choose from a range of penalties and admitted that the length of suspension imposed was based on administrative considerations, rather than on the severity of the violation.

12007–2007
Weaver v. Griffith green
pa · 1904
2 sentences

1979See also 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332 (1964) ("the tendency of modern authority at law as well as in equity is to regard the question as one of construction to be determined by the intent of the parties . . . ."); 6 Williston, Contracts § 847 (3d ed. 1962) ("the absorption of equitable principles by the law has modified the severity of this rule. . . ."). [3] The contract language in Carsek Corp. was more general than that employed here: "`Settlement to take place within thirty days . . but in no case shall the time for settlement be longer than seven months from the date of approval of this A

1979See also 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332 (1964) ("the tendency of modern authority at law as well as in equity is to regard the question as one of construction to be determined by the intent of the parties . . . ."); 6 Williston, Contracts § 847 (3d ed. 1962) ("the absorption of equitable principles by the law has modified the severity of this rule. . . ."). [3] The contract language in Carsek Corp. was more general than that employed here: "`Settlement to take place within thirty days . . but in no case shall the time for settlement be longer than seven months from the date of approval of this A

11979–1979
Hartman v. Citizens Natural Gas Co. green
pa · 1904
2 sentences

1979See also 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332 (1964) ("the tendency of modern authority at law as well as in equity is to regard the question as one of construction to be determined by the intent of the parties . . . ."); 6 Williston, Contracts § 847 (3d ed. 1962) ("the absorption of equitable principles by the law has modified the severity of this rule. . . ."). [3] The contract language in Carsek Corp. was more general than that employed here: "`Settlement to take place within thirty days . . but in no case shall the time for settlement be longer than seven months from the date of approval of this A

1979See also 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332 (1964) ("the tendency of modern authority at law as well as in equity is to regard the question as one of construction to be determined by the intent of the parties . . . ."); 6 Williston, Contracts § 847 (3d ed. 1962) ("the absorption of equitable principles by the law has modified the severity of this rule. . . ."). [3] The contract language in Carsek Corp. was more general than that employed here: "`Settlement to take place within thirty days . . but in no case shall the time for settlement be longer than seven months from the date of approval of this A

11979–1979
Furniss v. Furniss neutral
pa · 1857
2 sentences

1915Opinion by Kefhart, J., It was decided in Furniss v. Furniss, 29 Pa. 15 , that “Where a public road has been opened, and worked on ground different from that marked out and reported by viewers, it will be a safe rule to extend its-breadth, when necessary, from the middle of the road so worked and used, to the limit allowed by law.” In order to some extent to relieve the severity of this rule, the legislature, by Act of June 19, 1901, P. L. 573, restricted its operation by providing that where the opened and used portion of a highway was within the lines of the road as originally surveyed “such

1915Opinion by Kefhart, J., It was decided in Furniss v. Furniss, 29 Pa. 15 , that “Where a public road has been opened, and worked on ground different from that marked out and reported by viewers, it will be a safe rule to extend its-breadth, when necessary, from the middle of the road so worked and used, to the limit allowed by law.” In order to some extent to relieve the severity of this rule, the legislature, by Act of June 19, 1901, P. L. 573, restricted its operation by providing that where the opened and used portion of a highway was within the lines of the road as originally surveyed “such

11915–1915

Where else courts name it

KY 31 (1979–2026) OH 27 (1905–2026) NC 19 (1975–2021) IL 19 (1883–2024) NY 13 (1888–2007) DC 13 (1987–2023) CA 10 (2013–2025) PA 8 (1915–2024) TX 7 (1993–2018) FL 6 (1990–2018) IA 6 (1970–2026) MO 5 (1987–2018) MA 5 (1902–2023) IN 4 (1937–2026) CO 4 (1941–2015) NM 4 (1994–2017) MD 4 (1961–2017) UT 4 (2000–2018) RI 3 (1996–2004) MT 3 (2010–2010) GA 3 (1989–1995) TN 3 (2009–2012) OK 3 (1998–2015) OR 3 (1982–2022) WA 2 (2006–2006) ID 2 (1905–2005) LA 2 (1976–1993) MI 2 (1853–2022) CT 2 (1992–1995) WI 2 (2002–2004) MN 2 (1890–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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