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192 California opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2026 151 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Cookgreen2 sentences2026(Cook, at p. 452.) Although defendant originally sought a Franklin hearing by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Cook explained, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure in the first instance. ( Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 457–458.) Accordingly, the court’s order denying the habeas petition did not bar the court from ruling on defendant’s subsequent Franklin motion, which was properly raised under section 1203.01 and Cook. 2026(Cook, at p. 452.) Although defendant originally sought a Franklin hearing by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Cook explained, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure in the first instance. ( Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 457–458.) Accordingly, the court’s order denying the habeas petition did not bar the court from ruling on defendant’s subsequent Franklin motion, which was properly raised under section 1203.01 and Cook. | 20 | 80 |
People v. Franklingreen2 sentences2026The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors [citation] in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ [citation].” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284 .) Before the present petition was filed, the trial cour 2026The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors [citation] in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ [citation].” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284 .) Before the present petition was filed, the trial cour | 9 | 118 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [no need “to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”].) Sullivan has not established ineffective assistance of counsel. 26 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 2025(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [no need “to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”].) Sullivan has not established ineffective assistance of counsel. 26 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 4 | 4 |
In re Lozagreen2 sentences2021(See In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 [remanding for a Franklin hearing where a defendant’s “sentencing took place well before” Franklin]; People v. Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [ordering the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding where the defendant had “been incarcerated for over 20 years and he was eligible for the hearing several years before he filed the motion”].) Defendant was convicted in 1984 and was not eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing until 2016. 2021(See In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 [remanding for a Franklin hearing where a defendant’s “sentencing took place well before” Franklin]; People v. Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [ordering the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding where the defendant had “been incarcerated for over 20 years and he was eligible for the hearing several years before he filed the motion”].) Defendant was convicted in 1984 and was not eligible for a youthful offender parole hearing until 2016. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2020(People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340 [the label given a petition is not determinative].) We will remand the matter so the trial court can provide “an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to [defendant’s] eventual youth offender parole hearing. [Citation.] In so doing, the trial court may exercise its discretion to 4 conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132 .) DISPOSITI 2020(People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340 [the label given a petition is not determinative].) We will remand the matter so the trial court can provide “an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to [defendant’s] eventual youth offender parole hearing. [Citation.] In so doing, the trial court may exercise its discretion to 4 conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1132 .) DISPOSITI | 3 | 4 |
People v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2026(People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746 [“when a trial 9 According to the People, “the trial court may have confused terminology regarding a Franklin proceeding versus a [YOPH], being under the impression that a Franklin hearing was something conducted through the [P]arole [B]oard.” This asserted confusion is not at all clear from the record. 2021(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 .) Trial courts “may” also consider whether a Franklin proceeding is unnecessary because it will not produce “fruitful evidence.” (Cook, at p. 459) “Accordingly, we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.” (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746 .) 4 A Franklin hearing is very unlikely to produce fruitful evidence here. | 2 | 6 |
People v. Woodsgreen2 sentences2022(See People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1088-1089 [ “unlike the defendant in Franklin, defendant had both the opportunity and incentive to put information on the record related to a future youth offender parole hearing”].) And for this same reason, 49 Indeed, two days before sentencing, Roman’s counsel was present at a hearing where Ruslan’s counsel cited section 3051 to the trial court: “Based on the way the laws have been evolving regarding youthful offenders, and 3051 in particular allows for parole on youthful people that were sentenced before they were to turn 23 . . . .” 67 Roma 2022(See People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1088-1089 [ “unlike the defendant in Franklin, defendant had both the opportunity and incentive to put information on the record related to a future youth offender parole hearing”].) And for this same reason, 49 Indeed, two days before sentencing, Roman’s counsel was present at a hearing where Ruslan’s counsel cited section 3051 to the trial court: “Based on the way the laws have been evolving regarding youthful offenders, and 3051 in particular allows for parole on youthful people that were sentenced before they were to turn 23 . . . .” 67 Roma | 2 | 4 |
People v. Chatmangreen2 sentences2026“At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman).) Where the challenged law is not based on a suspect classification and does not burden fundamental rights, the law denies equal protection “only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose. [Citation.] This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it 2026“At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman).) Where the challenged law is not based on a suspect classification and does not burden fundamental rights, the law denies equal protection “only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose. [Citation.] This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2020(People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135 ; see People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 327 ; People v. Johnson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 938 , 941–942.) We affirm the portion of the order denying the Franklin hearing. 2020The sentence Alonzo partially quotes reads in full: “The authority provided by this subdivision applies to any resentencing that may occur pursuant to any other law.” (Italics added.) (See People v. Hernandez, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 326 [because defendant had not been resentenced pursuant to any other law, Senate Bill 620 was inapplicable].) A Franklin hearing is not a sentencing or resentencing proceeding. | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2023After describing appellant’s childhood, education, and cognitive development, Dr. Kojian applied the factors outlined in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 to recommend that appellant’s particular issues arising from a difficult and challenging upbringing along with the Franklin factors be considered as factors in mitigation in any future parole hearings. 2023After describing appellant’s childhood, education, and cognitive development, Dr. Kojian applied the factors outlined in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 to recommend that appellant’s particular issues arising from a difficult and challenging upbringing along with the Franklin factors be considered as factors in mitigation in any future parole hearings. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Delgadillogreen2 sentences2026(Delgadillo, at pp. 224-226; People v. Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126 .) 2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 “If the defendant . . . files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 .) 2 overlooked the caselaw defendant expressly cited in his motion, People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479 (Briscoe), which specifically held that even those sentenced to LWOP may be entitled to a Franklin hearing if they were con 2026(Delgadillo, at pp. 224-226; People v. Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126 .) 2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 “If the defendant . . . files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 .) 2 overlooked the caselaw defendant expressly cited in his motion, People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479 (Briscoe), which specifically held that even those sentenced to LWOP may be entitled to a Franklin hearing if they were con | 1 | 2 |
People v. Stronggreen2 sentences2025(See, e.g., People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716 [collateral estoppel applies in criminal proceedings, but only where the previous decision was final and on the merits].) We accordingly reverse the order denying appellant’s section 1203.01 Franklin motion and remand to provide the trial court the opportunity to address the motion on its merits. 2024After denying the resentencing petition, the trial court granted Larios’s motion for a Franklin hearing and placed the matter on calendar. 14. subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 , 50–51 (Harden); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 , 707–708.) “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended,” initially codified in former section | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Josephgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Seguragreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dunbargreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mitchellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Majorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Beamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cunninghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grier v. Gregory M.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Maggartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Speightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| P. v.Roagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Barnettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rousegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Streetergreen | 1 | 1 |
| C.S. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cnty.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wende
green
2 sentences2022(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Defendant was invited to submit a supplemental brief on his own behalf, which he has done, arguing that the trial court denied his due process rights by refusing to allow him to present live testimony at the Franklin hearing in order to “create an accurate record of facts” for his youthful offender parole board hearing. 2022(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Defendant was invited to submit a supplemental brief on his own behalf, which he has done, arguing that the trial court denied his due process rights by refusing to allow him to present live testimony at the Franklin hearing in order to “create an accurate record of facts” for his youthful offender parole board hearing. | 6 | 2021–2023 |
People v. Hargis
green
2 sentences2025(See, e.g., People v. Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199, 202 , 204–205 [where opinion remanding for a Franklin hearing was filed on Oct. 31, 2016, juvenile’s case was not final for purposes of Prop. 57].)5 5 Because we hold that remand is required, we need not address Fernandez’s alternative contention that his counsel below provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a transfer hearing when Proposition 57 became effective. 5 DISPOSITION The order is reversed and the matter is remanded with the direction to the trial court to conduct a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions C 2025(See, e.g., People v. Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199, 202 , 204–205 [where opinion remanding for a Franklin hearing was filed on Oct. 31, 2016, juvenile’s case was not final for purposes of Prop. 57].)5 5 Because we hold that remand is required, we need not address Fernandez’s alternative contention that his counsel below provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a transfer hearing when Proposition 57 became effective. 5 DISPOSITION The order is reversed and the matter is remanded with the direction to the trial court to conduct a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions C | 4 | 2020–2025 |
People v. Buycks
green
2 sentences2026(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880 , [“ ‘[w]hen the Legislature “has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded” ’ ”].) As a defendant who was sentenced under the Three Strikes law, Torres is not eligible for a Franklin hearing or a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051.4 4 Torres does not argue that his exclusion as a strike offender violates equal protection. 2026(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880 , [“ ‘[w]hen the Legislature “has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded” ’ ”].) As a defendant who was sentenced under the Three Strikes law, Torres is not eligible for a Franklin hearing or a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051.4 4 Torres does not argue that his exclusion as a strike offender violates equal protection. | 3 | 2021–2026 |
People v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2025As our Supreme Court has recently cautioned, while appellate opinions are generally considered to be part of the record of conviction, “the probative value of an appellate opinion is case-specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 .) On remand, the trial court will have the opportunity to review the prior opinion and the rest of the record of conviction to determine whether defendant is eligible for a Franklin hearing. 2025As our Supreme Court has recently cautioned, while appellate opinions are generally considered to be part of the record of conviction, “the probative value of an appellate opinion is case-specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 .) On remand, the trial court will have the opportunity to review the prior opinion and the rest of the record of conviction to determine whether defendant is eligible for a Franklin hearing. | 3 | 2022–2025 |
People v. Crayton
green
2 sentences2025Further, because a Franklin motion for evidence preservation for a youth offender parole hearing is brought “under the authority of section 1203.01,” the proceedings necessarily afford the defendant the right to counsel. ( Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 447, 452.) “The … right to the assistance of counsel applies at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding in which the defendant’s substantial rights are at stake.” (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 362 .) Given the critical role a Franklin proceeding plays in determining parole eligibility at a subsequent youth offender parole hearin 2021The right to counsel “applies at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake.” (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 362 .) Section 3051 provides an opportunity to significantly reduce the time for parole eligibility and a Franklin hearing is fundamental to this opportunity; it creates a record so that the Parole Board “may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ [such] factors [citation] in determining whether the offender is ‘fit’ ” for parole. | 3 | 2021–2025 |
People v. Camden
green
2 sentences2022(People v. 1 I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court was indeed authorized to hear from defendant’s family at a Franklin hearing. 2 Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 816 .) “ ‘In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel’s performance was “deficient” because his “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable p 2022(People v. 1 I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court was indeed authorized to hear from defendant’s family at a Franklin hearing. 2 Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 816 .) “ ‘In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel’s performance was “deficient” because his “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable p | 3 | 2021–2022 |
Anders v. California
green
2 sentences2022(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) Defendant was invited to submit a supplemental brief on his own behalf, which he has done, arguing that the trial court denied his due process rights by refusing to allow him to present live testimony at the Franklin hearing in order to “create an accurate record of facts” for his youthful offender parole board hearing. 2022To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified possible issues that were considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: Whether the trial court erred in denying the request for a Franklin hearing and in denying the motion to strike the firearm enhancements. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Shalabi v. City of Fontana
green
2 sentences2022A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ’ ” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832-833 , disapproved on another point in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2012) 11 Cal.5th 842 , 855; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 ].) In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 , our Supreme Court held that an offender like defendant, who will be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing in the future, must be given “sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” ( 2022A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ’ ” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832-833 , disapproved on another point in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2012) 11 Cal.5th 842 , 855; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 ].) In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 , our Supreme Court held that an offender like defendant, who will be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing in the future, must be given “sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” ( | 3 | 2021–2022 |
In Re Harris
green
2 sentences2022A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ’ ” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832-833 , disapproved on another point in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2012) 11 Cal.5th 842 , 855; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 ].) In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 , our Supreme Court held that an offender like defendant, who will be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing in the future, must be given “sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” ( 2022A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” ’ ” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832-833 , disapproved on another point in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2012) 11 Cal.5th 842 , 855; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 ].) In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 , our Supreme Court held that an offender like defendant, who will be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing in the future, must be given “sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” ( | 3 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Myers
green
2 sentences2019The People argued that Berg's sentence would be lawful under Miller under the amended version of section 3051 because he would have a " 'meaningful opportunity for release no more than 25 years into [his] incarceration.' " (Quoting Franklin , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 277 , 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) The trial court issued an ex part minute order on August 31 that stated in relevant part: "Counsel and the court meet in an unreported chambers conference to address, among other things, the possible impact on this case of pending legislation that would make juvenile offenders sentenced 2018Consequently, we direct the trial court to conduct a " Franklin hearing" on remand allowing both parties to put on the record any relevant evidence that demonstrates Loza's "culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors." ( Id . at p. 284, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) III DISPOSITION Loza's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted. | 3 | 2018–2019 |
People v. Boyer
red
2 sentences2018But it poses no obstacle here since "[t]he record does not make clear whether this decision was a 'conscious and deliberate' tactical choice." ( People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412 , 473 fn. 47, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 133 P.3d 581 [no invited error where "[t]he clerk's transcript indicate[d] that the defense joined in requesting the instruction"].) As such, we consider the merits of Franklin's claim. 2018But it poses no obstacle here since "[t]he record does not make clear whether this decision was a 'conscious and deliberate' tactical choice." ( People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412 , 473 fn. 47, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677 , 133 P.3d 581 [no invited error where "[t]he clerk's transcript indicate[d] that the defense joined in requesting the instruction"].) As such, we consider the merits of Franklin's claim. | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2023(People v. Ortega (June 28, 2022, C095041 [nonpub. opn.].)2 Most recently, defendant appealed the trial court’s order entered at his October 2021 Franklin hearing denying him the right to self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 2020I Procedural History Defendant’s motion to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) was granted on June 20, 2012. | 2 | 2020–2023 |
People v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.
green
2 sentences2021(See People v. Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 201 , 204 [Franklin hearing does not affect finality of judgment].) 4 an adult.” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 , 304–305 (Lara).) Proposition 57, however, eliminated the ability of prosecutors to file charges against juveniles directly in a court of criminal jurisdiction (adult court). 2020At the Franklin hearing, the trial court also entertained defendant’s “Motion to Remand under SB 1391” and ruled that “without any guidance, other than the [People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 ] Court’s ruling, I do not believe I’m in a position to grant the motion.” The court then “den[ied] the request to return this to juvenile court.” The majority concludes that Senate Bill No. 1391 did not apply to defendant’s indisputably final judgment; thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant defendant the requested relief. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Marsden
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 , 2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 . 4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3. 276; § 3051, subd. (e).) Youth offender parole hearings are available, with some exceptions, to offenders who were under 25 years old when they committed their controlling offenses.5 (§ 3051, subd. (b).) To ensure that the youth offender parole hearing is meaningful, youth offenders must have an opportunity for a so-called Franklin hearing in the trial court, in order to make an accurate r 2021(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 , 2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 . 4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3. 276; § 3051, subd. (e).) Youth offender parole hearings are available, with some exceptions, to offenders who were under 25 years old when they committed their controlling offenses.5 (§ 3051, subd. (b).) To ensure that the youth offender parole hearing is meaningful, youth offenders must have an opportunity for a so-called Franklin hearing in the trial court, in order to make an accurate r | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–443; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 , 125–126.) The appeal is dismissed. 2021(Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 ; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119 ; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Vieira
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Federico (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 318 , 324, review granted Aug. 26, 2020, S263082; People v. Superior Court (I.R.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 383, 386 , review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257773.) 3 determining retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed.’” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 .) The grant of a Franklin hearing does not reopen a final judgment. 2021(People v. Federico (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 318 , 324, review granted Aug. 26, 2020, S263082; People v. Superior Court (I.R.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 383, 386 , review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S257773.) 3 determining retroactive application of an amendment to a criminal statute, a judgment is not final until the time for petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed.’” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306 .) The grant of a Franklin hearing does not reopen a final judgment. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Diaz
green
2 sentences2019(See, e.g., People v. Diaz (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 538 , 546, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) Since a Franklin hearing does not affect the judgment, however, that sequence need not be invariable. 2019(See, e.g., People v. Diaz (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 538 , 546, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) Since a Franklin hearing does not affect the judgment, however, that sequence need not be invariable. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Kinney v. Overton green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission
green
1 sentence2026We may only review on direct appeal “(1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 .) The present appeal is to the court’s order denying defendant’s Franklin motion under section 1203.01 as successive, which is an appealable order. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Fisher green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Lucas green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Guilford green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. De Soto green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Price red | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Gallardo green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Ledesma green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Garrett green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Wilkinson green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Padilla green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Norco Delivery Service, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Chavez green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Sonoqui green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Roper v. Simmons green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Minnis green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Scott green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Jacobs green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. McDonald green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Filbin v. Fitzgerald green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.