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33 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kassey Benjamin(076612)green2 sentences2025Super. 111 , 123 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 373 ). "[T]he comparative analysis the trial court A-1626-23 16 conduct[s]—examining past cases where the prosecutor had granted Graves Act waivers—is a legitimate component of the robust judicial review needed to ensure that a prosecutor's rejection of a Graves Act waiver" is not unconstitutionally arbitrary. 2024Super. 111 , 123 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 373 ). "[T]he comparative analysis the trial court conduct[s]—examining past cases where the prosecutor had granted Graves Act A-3359-21 23 waivers—is a legitimate component of the robust judicial review needed to ensure that a prosecutor's rejection of a Graves Act waiver" is not unconstitutionally arbitrary. | 3 | 10 |
State v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences2025The State asserts that although the prosecutor’s decision is subject to judicial review, our courts have consistently held that the standard of review is patent and gross abuse of discretion, citing State v. Alvarez, 246 N.J. 2024The Court held that to obtain judicial review of a prosecutor's denial of a Graves Act waiver request, a defendant must demonstrate the denial was arbitrary and not arbitrary in a capricious sense 3 but "'arbitrariness constituting an unconstitutional discrimination or denial of equal protection' in the prosecutor's decision." Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 372 (quoting Alvarez, 246 N.J. | 3 | 8 |
State v. Franklingreen2 sentences2025The Graves Act, codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), “makes the use or possession of a firearm during the commission, attempted commission, or flight from the commission of certain designated offenses a sentencing factor that triggers the imposition of a mandatory term of imprisonment.” Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 367 (quoting State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 529 (2005)). 24 Under the Graves Act, as currently amended, persons convicted of certain enumerated offenses relating to gun possession shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. 2024Defendant asserts the decision should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, not for a "patent and gross abuse of discretion." "The [Graves] Act makes the use or possession of a firearm during the commission, attempted commission, or flight from the commission of certain designated offenses a sentencing factor that triggers the imposition of a mandatory term of imprisonment." State v. Benjamin, 228 N.J. 358, 367 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 529 (2005)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stewartgreen2 sentences1998Robert Stewart argued that because a jury had acquitted him of armed robbery and weapons charges and only convicted him of unarmed robbery, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the sentencing court to decide the Graves Act issue of whether Stewart used or possessed a firearm in the course of the robbery. *76 Stewart, supra, 96 N.J. at 605 , 477 A. 2d 300 . 1998Robert Stewart argued that because a jury had acquitted him of armed robbery and weapons charges and only convicted him of unarmed robbery, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the sentencing court to decide the Graves Act issue of whether Stewart used or possessed a firearm in the course of the robbery. *76 Stewart, supra, 96 N.J. at 605 , 477 A. 2d 300 . | 1 | 4 |
State of New Jersey v. Antwain T. Watersgreen2 sentences2021A-3586-19T4 27 A court reviewing a prosecutor's rejection of a request for a Graves Act waiver, as with the review of a prosecutor's rejection of a PTI application, must "view the prosecutor's decision through the filter of the highly deferential standard of review." State v. Waters, 439 N.J. 2017As in other prosecutorial decisions, a reviewing court lacks authority "to substitute [its own] discretion for that of the prosecutor[.]" State v. Waters, 439 N.J. | 1 | 2 |
State ex rel. V.A.green1 sentence2025The ordinary abuse of discretion standard reflects “a generous deference to prosecutorial actions.” State in re V.A., 212 N.J. 1, 22 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Veneygreen1 sentence2025Moreover, defendant asserts by imposing one-year of parole ineligibility, the trial court issued a sentence consistent with the Code. "[A]bsent explicit statutory authority, the State has no right to appeal a sentence." State v. Veney, 327 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2021Super. 215 , 237–38 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 589 (1996)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'CONNORgreen1 sentence2021The law also is well-settled that the presumption of imprisonment is not satisfied by a term of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation, which is sometimes referred to as a "split sentence." In State v. O'Connor, our Supreme Court explained that a split sentence is a "form of punishment qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from a term of imprisonment ." 105 N.J. 399, 409 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nwobugreen2 sentences2021For example, the court commented, "[t]herefore, the court gives [the contention that defendant's rifle was possessed in furtherance of drug distribution activity] minimal weight and instead weighs [d]efendant's lack of criminal history more heavily." In explaining the patent and gross abuse of discretion standard, the Court in Nwobu noted a clear error of judgment constituting a patent and gross abuse of discretion is one that "could not have reasonably been made upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 254 (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 366 (1984)). 2021See Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 247 (holding that a prosecutor's failure to consider all relevant factors constitutes a patent and gross abuse of prosecutorial discretion). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rothgreen1 sentence2021For example, the court commented, "[t]herefore, the court gives [the contention that defendant's rifle was possessed in furtherance of drug distribution activity] minimal weight and instead weighs [d]efendant's lack of criminal history more heavily." In explaining the patent and gross abuse of discretion standard, the Court in Nwobu noted a clear error of judgment constituting a patent and gross abuse of discretion is one that "could not have reasonably been made upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 254 (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 366 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Camachogreen2 sentences1998“It follows, however, that if defendant is convicted only of possession with intent to use the firearm against the property of another, the Graves Act does not apply at all and there is no need for a Graves Act hearing.” Ibid. 1998“It follows, however, that if defendant is convicted only of possession with intent to use the firearm against the property of another, the Graves Act does not apply at all and there is no need for a Graves Act hearing.” Ibid. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McBridegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Shaquille A. Nance State v. Taja L. Willis Bolton State v. Alvin D. Williams(076626)
green
2 sentences2025In "harmoniz[ing] the two components of the Code's sentencing scheme," id. at 395-96 , the Court noted, "[n]othing in either provision suggests that a Graves Act waiver exempts a defendant convicted of a . . . second-degree A-0177-24 13 offense from the presumption of incarceration." Id. at 396 . 2025In "harmoniz[ing] the two components of the Code's sentencing scheme," id. at 395-96 , the Court noted, "[n]othing in either provision suggests that a Graves Act waiver exempts a defendant convicted of a . . . second-degree A-0177-24 13 offense from the presumption of incarceration." Id. at 396 . | 2 | 2021–2025 |
State v. Yarbough
red
2 sentences2024We remanded the matter for resentencing with directions that the court reconsider the aggravating and mitigating factors, the imposition of consecutive sentences pursuant to State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), and defendant’s eligibility for a Graves Act waiver under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. 2020Appellate counsel for defendant contended that his sentence on the possession of a shotgun was illegal because no parole bar was mandated for a Graves Act violation under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c), and the A-4458-18T3 4 sentencing court did not give sufficient reasoning to impose consecutive sentences under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). | 2 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Vasquez
green
2 sentences2017In State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992), and State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189 (1992), the Court upheld the statutory delegation of sentencing discretion to prosecutors to waive the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act’s mandatory minimum term of incarceration, provided that (1) the Attorney General promulgated guidelines to help prosecutors uniformly apply the statute; (2) prosecutors stated on the record the reasons supporting their decision in order to enable judicial review and ensure compliance with the guidelines; and (3) a court could review and overturn the prosecutor’s decision if a defendant d 2017In State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992), and State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189 (1992), the Court upheld the statutory delegation of sentencing discretion to prosecutors to waive the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act’s mandatory minimum term of incarceration, provided that (1) the Attorney General promulgated guidelines to help prosecutors uniformly apply the statute; (2) prosecutors stated on the record the reasons supporting their decision in order to enable judicial review and ensure compliance with the guidelines; and (3) a court could review and overturn the prosecutor’s decision if a defendant d | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State of New Jersey v. Kassey Benjamin
green
2 sentences2017Additionally, the appellate panel interpreted the Attorney General’s Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of the “Graves Act” (Oct. 23, 2008, as corrected Nov. 25, 2008) (Directive) as requiring prosecutors to memorialize their reasons for denying a Graves Act waiver “as a means to ensure that waiver decisions are not disparate.” Benjamin, supra, 442 N.J.Super. at 266 , 122 A.3d 341 . 2017Additionally, the appellate panel interpreted the Attorney General’s Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of the “Graves Act” (Oct. 23, 2008, as corrected Nov. 25, 2008) (Directive) as requiring prosecutors to memorialize their reasons for denying a Graves Act waiver “as a means to ensure that waiver decisions are not disparate.” Benjamin, supra, 442 N.J.Super. at 266 , 122 A.3d 341 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Lagares
green
2 sentences2017In State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992), and State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189 (1992), the Court upheld the statutory delegation of sentencing discretion to prosecutors to waive the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act’s mandatory minimum term of incarceration, provided that (1) the Attorney General promulgated guidelines to help prosecutors uniformly apply the statute; (2) prosecutors stated on the record the reasons supporting their decision in order to enable judicial review and ensure compliance with the guidelines; and (3) a court could review and overturn the prosecutor’s decision if a defendant d 2017In State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992), and State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189 (1992), the Court upheld the statutory delegation of sentencing discretion to prosecutors to waive the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act’s mandatory minimum term of incarceration, provided that (1) the Attorney General promulgated guidelines to help prosecutors uniformly apply the statute; (2) prosecutors stated on the record the reasons supporting their decision in order to enable judicial review and ensure compliance with the guidelines; and (3) a court could review and overturn the prosecutor’s decision if a defendant d | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Brimage
green
2 sentences2017Brimage, supra, 153 N.J. at 22 . 18 Second, the Directive requires prosecutors to “document in the case file [their] analysis of all the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” even if a Graves Act waiver is not being sought. 2017Brimage, supra, 153 N.J. at 22 . 18 Second, the Directive requires prosecutors to “document in the case file [their] analysis of all the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” even if a Graves Act waiver is not being sought. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Zaire J. Cromedy
green
1 sentence2026As part of his sentencing argument, defendant contends a remand is required under State v. Cromedy, 261 N.J. 421 , 434 (2025), because a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) is not subject to the Graves Act requirement of a one-half period of parole ineligibility. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Watson
green
1 sentence2025Watson, 346 N.J. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Spivey
green
1 sentence2021The Court's reference that the decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal is left "to the sound discretion of our trial courts," id. at 240 , does not suggest that in the context of a pretrial motion to overrule a prosecutor's denial of a Graves Act waiver, discretion resides with the trial court rather than the prosecutor. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Sutton
green
1 sentence2021We thus determined the prosecutor "failed to respond to the trial's concerns," id. at 123 , leading us to affirm the trial court's grant of a Graves Act waiver. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In the Matter of the Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite Parole Hearings, and Identify Vulnerable Prisoners (084412)(Statewide)
green
2 sentences2020In reaching his decision, the judge considered the seriousness of the weapons offense committed by defendant, the fact that it was his second time committing a Graves Act violation, the risk of defendant's future "criminality," and the lack of evidence as to "a severe depreciation of defendant's health since incarceration." After the judge denied defendant's motion, on June 5, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion In re Matter of Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite Parole Hearings, and Identify Vulnerable Prisoners, 242 N.J. 357 (2020). 2020In reaching his decision, the judge considered the seriousness of the weapons offense committed by defendant, the fact that it was his second time committing a Graves Act violation, the risk of defendant's future "criminality," and the lack of evidence as to "a severe depreciation of defendant's health since incarceration." After the judge denied defendant's motion, on June 5, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion In re Matter of Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite Parole Hearings, and Identify Vulnerable Prisoners, 242 N.J. 357 (2020). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Federanko
green
2 sentences2017As this Court has observed, [w]hen ascertaining legislative intent, we can infer that the Legislature was “familial- with its own enactments, with judicial declarations relating to them, and ... passed or preserved cognate laws with the intention that they be construed to serve a useful and consistent purpose.” Those principles require us to look to related legislation to determine the contours of [a] statutory right .... [State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38, 46 , 834 A.2d 1016 (2003) (first omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Federanko, 26 N.J. 119, 129 , 139 A.2d 30 (1958)). 2017As this Court has observed, [w]hen ascertaining legislative intent, we can infer that the Legislature was “familial- with its own enactments, with judicial declarations relating to them, and ... passed or preserved cognate laws with the intention that they be construed to serve a useful and consistent purpose.” Those principles require us to look to related legislation to determine the contours of [a] statutory right .... [State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38, 46 , 834 A.2d 1016 (2003) (first omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Federanko, 26 N.J. 119, 129 , 139 A.2d 30 (1958)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Greeley
green
2 sentences2017As this Court has observed, [w]hen ascertaining legislative intent, we can infer that the Legislature was “familial- with its own enactments, with judicial declarations relating to them, and ... passed or preserved cognate laws with the intention that they be construed to serve a useful and consistent purpose.” Those principles require us to look to related legislation to determine the contours of [a] statutory right .... [State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38, 46 , 834 A.2d 1016 (2003) (first omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Federanko, 26 N.J. 119, 129 , 139 A.2d 30 (1958)). 2017As this Court has observed, [w]hen ascertaining legislative intent, we can infer that the Legislature was “familial- with its own enactments, with judicial declarations relating to them, and ... passed or preserved cognate laws with the intention that they be construed to serve a useful and consistent purpose.” Those principles require us to look to related legislation to determine the contours of [a] statutory right .... [State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38, 46 , 834 A.2d 1016 (2003) (first omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Federanko, 26 N.J. 119, 129 , 139 A.2d 30 (1958)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State of New Jersey v. Shaquille A. Nance
neutral
2 sentences2017The Graves Act waiver provision provides in pertinent part: On a motion by the prosecutor made to the assignment judge that the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under (a) subsection c. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:43-6 for a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense under that subsection, or (b) subsection e. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:39-10 for a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense 4 A-2190-15T4 under chapter 39 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, does not serve the interests of justice, the assignment judge shall place the defendant on probat 2017The Graves Act waiver provision provides in pertinent part: On a motion by the prosecutor made to the assignment judge that the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under (a) subsection c. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:43-6 for a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense under that subsection, or (b) subsection e. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:39-10 for a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense 4 A-2190-15T4 under chapter 39 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes, does not serve the interests of justice, the assignment judge shall place the defendant on probat | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Shelley
green
1 sentence2017Ibid. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Rumblin
green
2 sentences2001State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550, 557 , 766 A.2d 1141 (2001). 2001State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550, 557 , 766 A.2d 1141 (2001). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Wooters
green
2 sentences2000Cf. State v. Wooters, 228 N.J.Super. 171, 179-180 , 549 A. 2d 441 (App.Div.1988). 2000Cf. State v. Wooters, 228 N.J.Super. 171, 179-180 , 549 A. 2d 441 (App.Div.1988). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Gantt
green
2 sentences1998For purposes of the Graves Act hearing and its preponderance of evidence standard, this unobjected-to evidence of defendant’s own statement and his “never stuck a gun to anybody before” comment to the police, considered together with the victim’s description of the gun, was alone sufficient to meet the standards laid down in State v. Gantt, 101 N.J. 573, 589-90 , 503 A.2d 849 (1986). 1998For purposes of the Graves Act hearing and its preponderance of evidence standard, this unobjected-to evidence of defendant’s own statement and his “never stuck a gun to anybody before” comment to the police, considered together with the victim’s description of the gun, was alone sufficient to meet the standards laid down in State v. Gantt, 101 N.J. 573, 589-90 , 503 A.2d 849 (1986). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Des Marets green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Martin green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Morgan green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.