31 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Geegreen2 sentences2025Defendant recognizes that “[o]rdinarily, instructing general intent for a specific intent crime will not, on its own result in fundamental error.” See State v. Gee, 2004-NMCA- 042, ¶¶ 16-17, 135 N.M. 408 , 89 P.3d 80 (considering the instructions as a whole “under a fundamental error analysis” and concluding that “[e]ven with the general intent instruction, the instructions when read as a whole, did not deprive [the d]efendants of an essential part of their defense”). 2025Defendant recognizes that “[o]rdinarily, instructing general intent for a specific intent crime will not, on its own result in fundamental error.” See State v. Gee, 2004-NMCA- 042, ¶¶ 16-17, 135 N.M. 408 , 89 P.3d 80 (considering the instructions as a whole “under a fundamental error analysis” and concluding that “[e]ven with the general intent instruction, the instructions when read as a whole, did not deprive [the d]efendants of an essential part of their defense”). | 3 | 5 |
State v. Stefanigreen2 sentences2023See State v. Stefani, 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 27 , 139 N.M. 719 , 137 P.3d 659 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that the giving of a general intent instruction only served to mislead the jury as to what was required to prove “intent” in the elements instruction). 2016We do not agree that this 2 amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. 3 {17} In State v. Stefani, 2006-NMCA-073 , 139 N.M. 719 , 137 P.3d 659 we held that 4 it was not error for the general intent instruction to be used with a specific intent 5 offense: 6 [The d]efendant’s argument that including the instruction on general 7 criminal intent serves to mislead or confuse the jury as to what is 8 required to prove ‘intent’ is without merit, and has already been 9 addressed and answered by this Court in State v. Gee, 2004-NMCA-042 , 10 ¶ 7, 135 N.M. 408 , 89 P.3d 80 . 11 .... 12 The Use Note F | 3 | 4 |
State v. Parishgreen2 sentences2013Id. at 42 , 878 P.2d at 991 (“Reversible error arises if . . . a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected.”). {33} The general intent instruction given in this case could have confused and misdirected the jury notwithstanding the evidence of Defendant’s guilt. 2013Id. at 42 , 878 P.2d at 991 (“Reversible error arises if . . . a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected.”). {33} The general intent instruction given in this case could have confused and misdirected the jury notwithstanding the evidence of Defendant’s guilt. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2013See Gonzalez, 2005-NMCA-031, ¶ 23 (holding that the general intent instruction “was not sufficient to instruct the jury that Defendant’s knowledge of the cocaine he brought into the Detention Center is an essential element [of the crime] of bringing contraband into a jail”). 2013See Gonzalez, 2005-NMCA-031, ¶ 23 (holding that the general intent instruction “was not sufficient to instruct the jury that Defendant’s knowledge of the cocaine he brought into the Detention Center is an essential element [of the crime] ofbringing contraband into a jail”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Buncegreen2 sentences2022Defendant maintains that a mistake- of-fact defense is distinct from the general intent instruction, whereas the State argues that UJI 14-141 was sufficient to satisfy the requisite criminal intent. [BIC 5; AB 6] See State v. Bunce, 1993-NMSC-057 , ¶ 9, 116 N.M. 284 , 861 P.2d 965 (stating that the district court “need not give a mistake of fact instruction where the intent element of the crime is adequately defined by the other instructions given”). 2022Defendant maintains that a mistake- of-fact defense is distinct from the general intent instruction, whereas the State argues that UJI 14-141 was sufficient to satisfy the requisite criminal intent. [BIC 5; AB 6] See State v. Bunce, 1993-NMSC-057 , ¶ 9, 116 N.M. 284 , 861 P.2d 965 (stating that the district court “need not give a mistake of fact instruction where the intent element of the crime is adequately defined by the other instructions given”). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Stefanigreen2 sentences2023See State v. Stefani, 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 27 , 139 N.M. 719 , 137 P.3d 659 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that the giving of a general intent instruction only served to mislead the jury as to what was required to prove “intent” in the elements instruction). 2023See State v. Stefani, 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 27 , 139 N.M. 719 , 137 P.3d 659 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that the giving of a general intent instruction only served to mislead the jury as to what was required to prove “intent” in the elements instruction). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Noziegreen2 sentences2025The general intent instruction—given to the jury by the district court—permits the jury to infer intent from the evidence of Defendant’s behavior and the surrounding circumstances. “[B]ecause an individual’s intent is seldom subject to proof by direct evidence, intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Nozie, 2009-NMSC-018, ¶ 32 , 146 N.M. 142 , 207 P.3d 1119 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also UJI 14-141 (stating that “[w]hether the defendant acted intentionally may be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances, such as the manner in which he act 2025The general intent instruction—given to the jury by the district court—permits the jury to infer intent from the evidence of Defendant’s behavior and the surrounding circumstances. “[B]ecause an individual’s intent is seldom subject to proof by direct evidence, intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Nozie, 2009-NMSC-018, ¶ 32 , 146 N.M. 142 , 207 P.3d 1119 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also UJI 14-141 (stating that “[w]hether the defendant acted intentionally may be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances, such as the manner in which he act | 1 | 2 |
State v. Doegreen2 sentences2015State v. Doe, 1983- 13 NMSC-096, ¶¶ 8, 10, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (disagreeing with the opposite 14 conclusion reached in State v. Curlee, 1982-NMCA-126 , 98 N.M. 576 , 651 P.2d 111 , 15 and State v. Otto, 1982-NMCA-149 , 98 N.M. 734 , 652 P.2d 756 ). 2015State v. Doe, 1983- 13 NMSC-096, ¶¶ 8, 10, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (disagreeing with the opposite 14 conclusion reached in State v. Curlee, 1982-NMCA-126 , 98 N.M. 576 , 651 P.2d 111 , 15 and State v. Otto, 1982-NMCA-149 , 98 N.M. 734 , 652 P.2d 756 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2015Barber, 2004-NMSC-019 , 14 ¶ 19; see State v.Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 11 , 128 N.M. 711 , 998 P.2d 176 . 15 We then “review the entire record, placing the jury instructions in the context of the 16 individual facts and circumstances of the case, to determine whether the [d]efendant’s 17 conviction was the result of a plain miscarriage of justice.” Barber, 2004-NMSC-019 , 18 ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 1 {8} Here, the elements instruction given to the jury for battery upon a peace officer 2 required the State to “prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt” that Defend 2015Barber, 2004-NMSC-019 , 14 ¶ 19; see State v.Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 11 , 128 N.M. 711 , 998 P.2d 176 . 15 We then “review the entire record, placing the jury instructions in the context of the 16 individual facts and circumstances of the case, to determine whether the [d]efendant’s 17 conviction was the result of a plain miscarriage of justice.” Barber, 2004-NMSC-019 , 18 ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 1 {8} Here, the elements instruction given to the jury for battery upon a peace officer 2 required the State to “prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt” that Defend | 1 | 2 |
State v. Duttlegreen1 sentence2020A jury must also infer from the surrounding circumstances whether the defendant acted intentionally, meaning that he acted with intent to violate [a] restraining order.”); Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 18 (interpreting the general intent instruction, when given in conjunction with an instruction on the elements of negligent cruelty to animals, to require evidence that the defendant had “intentionally mistreated, injured, or tormented or abandoned or failed to provide necessary sustenance to” the animals (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Elliott, 2001- NMCA-108, ¶ 9 (reasoning that, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lucerogreen1 sentence2020Cf. Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 33-39 (indicating in dicta that any error in the correctly-given intent instruction was harmless because the state had “never flinched from its early decision to prove to the jury that [the d]efendant had intentionally, violently abused [the victim], resulting in her death”); Magby, 1998- NMSC-042, ¶ 21 (noting that the state had conceded error in the district court’s giving of the general intent instruction where the state’s sole theory throughout trial had been that the defendant’s conduct was negligent). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dowlinggreen2 sentences2019See Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, ¶ 18 . {19} Applying the general intent standard pursuant to Dowling, we hold that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the conviction. 2019See id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123 , 24 ¶ 46, 94 N.M. 771 , 617 P.2d 160 , superceded by statute on other grounds as stated 25 in State v. McCormack, 1984-NMCA-042 , ¶ 12, 101 N.M. 349 , 682 P.2d 742 (“When 9 1 one intends to commit a felony or theft under the burglary statute one also has the 2 general criminal intent of purposely doing an act even though he may not know the 3 act is unlawful.”). 4 {18} Regarding the instruction on breaking and entering itself, the jury did not even 5 consider this offense. 2016See State v. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123 , 24 ¶ 46, 94 N.M. 771 , 617 P.2d 160 , superceded by statute on other grounds as stated 25 in State v. McCormack, 1984-NMCA-042 , ¶ 12, 101 N.M. 349 , 682 P.2d 742 (“When 9 1 one intends to commit a felony or theft under the burglary statute one also has the 2 general criminal intent of purposely doing an act even though he may not know the 3 act is unlawful.”). 4 {18} Regarding the instruction on breaking and entering itself, the jury did not even 5 consider this offense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCormackgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123 , 24 ¶ 46, 94 N.M. 771 , 617 P.2d 160 , superceded by statute on other grounds as stated 25 in State v. McCormack, 1984-NMCA-042 , ¶ 12, 101 N.M. 349 , 682 P.2d 742 (“When 9 1 one intends to commit a felony or theft under the burglary statute one also has the 2 general criminal intent of purposely doing an act even though he may not know the 3 act is unlawful.”). 4 {18} Regarding the instruction on breaking and entering itself, the jury did not even 5 consider this offense. 2016See State v. Ruiz, 1980-NMCA-123 , 24 ¶ 46, 94 N.M. 771 , 617 P.2d 160 , superceded by statute on other grounds as stated 25 in State v. McCormack, 1984-NMCA-042 , ¶ 12, 101 N.M. 349 , 682 P.2d 742 (“When 9 1 one intends to commit a felony or theft under the burglary statute one also has the 2 general criminal intent of purposely doing an act even though he may not know the 3 act is unlawful.”). 4 {18} Regarding the instruction on breaking and entering itself, the jury did not even 5 consider this offense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barbergreen2 sentences2015State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 4 633 . 2015State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 4 633 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bernalgreen1 sentence2014See id. 11 {13} We have already discussed the question of the general intent instruction and the 12 fact that it is not inconsistent with the elements instruction of a specific intent crime. 13 In fact, this Court has noted that the general intent instruction is meant to be used for 14 every crime except those few offenses that do not require criminal intent, or for which 15 the intent is specified in a statute or instruction. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mailmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sheetsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Benallygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson v. Memorial General Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Guntergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gunter v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Court of Appealgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Owens v. Garrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2023In State v. Rivera, the defendant argued that the district court 5 erred “in refusing to give a securities fraud instruction that required the jury to find 6 a specific intent.” 2009-NMCA-132, ¶ 35 , 147 N.M. 406 , 223 P.3d 951 . 2023In State v. Rivera, the defendant argued that the district court 5 erred “in refusing to give a securities fraud instruction that required the jury to find 6 a specific intent.” 2009-NMCA-132, ¶ 35 , 147 N.M. 406 , 223 P.3d 951 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Contreras
green
2 sentences2015The 11 physical “entering” and “breaking” elements that Defendant’s version of the facts 12 implicates are “bodily movements, to which the general intent instruction clearly 13 applies.” State v. Contreras, 2007-NMCA-119, ¶ 17 , 142 N.M. 518 , 167 P.3d 966 . 2015The 11 physical “entering” and “breaking” elements that Defendant’s version of the facts 12 implicates are “bodily movements, to which the general intent instruction clearly 13 applies.” State v. Contreras, 2007-NMCA-119, ¶ 17 , 142 N.M. 518 , 167 P.3d 966 . | 2 | 2011–2015 |
State v. Baca
green
2 sentences2006Defendant, relying on State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 51 , 124 N.M. 333 , 950 P.2d 776 , argues that the offenses of conspiracy to commit trafficking and possession of paraphernalia require that the Defendant have the specific intent “to do a further act or achieve a further consequence.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Therefore, according to Defendant, any guidance offered by the general intent instruction only served to mislead the jury as to what was required to prove intent. 2006Defendant, relying on State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 51 , 124 N.M. 333 , 950 P.2d 776 , argues that the offenses of conspiracy to commit trafficking and possession of paraphernalia require that the Defendant have the specific intent “to do a further act or achieve a further consequence.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Therefore, according to Defendant, any guidance offered by the general intent instruction only served to mislead the jury as to what was required to prove intent. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Gunzelman
green
2 sentences2004The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, stating that the larceny statute and the general intent instruction, when read together, “correctly state the law applicable to larceny.” Id. {10} The defendant in Gunzelman was convicted of burglary., Gunzelman, 85 N.M. at 296 , 512 P.2d at 56 . 2004The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, stating that the larceny statute and the general intent instruction, when read together, “correctly state the law applicable to larceny.” Id. {10} The defendant in Gunzelman was convicted of burglary., Gunzelman, 85 N.M. at 296 , 512 P.2d at 56 . | 2 | 1986–2004 |
State v. Sosa
green
2 sentences2025Nevertheless, Defendant maintains that because her intent was the primary element in dispute at trial and the State discussed general intent in closing argument, “a reasonable juror” would have been “confused regarding the requisite intent” and the State’s arguments “fully negate[d] the specific intent requirement.” On those grounds, Defendant argues that “[f]undamental error justifies reversal because of the probability that an inaccurate rendition of the relevant law confused or misdirected the jury on the primary disputed element at trial.” See State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 21 , 278 2025Nevertheless, Defendant maintains that because her intent was the primary element in dispute at trial and the State discussed general intent in closing argument, “a reasonable juror” would have been “confused regarding the requisite intent” and the State’s arguments “fully negate[d] the specific intent requirement.” On those grounds, Defendant argues that “[f]undamental error justifies reversal because of the probability that an inaccurate rendition of the relevant law confused or misdirected the jury on the primary disputed element at trial.” See State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 21 , 278 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Arrendondo
green
2 sentences2025Nevertheless, Defendant maintains that because her intent was the primary element in dispute at trial and the State discussed general intent in closing argument, “a reasonable juror” would have been “confused regarding the requisite intent” and the State’s arguments “fully negate[d] the specific intent requirement.” On those grounds, Defendant argues that “[f]undamental error justifies reversal because of the probability that an inaccurate rendition of the relevant law confused or misdirected the jury on the primary disputed element at trial.” See State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 21 , 278 2025Nevertheless, Defendant maintains that because her intent was the primary element in dispute at trial and the State discussed general intent in closing argument, “a reasonable juror” would have been “confused regarding the requisite intent” and the State’s arguments “fully negate[d] the specific intent requirement.” On those grounds, Defendant argues that “[f]undamental error justifies reversal because of the probability that an inaccurate rendition of the relevant law confused or misdirected the jury on the primary disputed element at trial.” See State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 21 , 278 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Little
green
2 sentences2024This is in contrast to the federal precedent cited by Defendant, in which the jury was instructed that the government had to prove that the defendant “ha[d] the power at a given time to exercise dominion or control over an object.” See Little, 829 F.3d at 1183 . 2024A general intent instruction together with the federal possession instruction would establish only that the defendant intentionally “had the power” to exercise control, see id., while the general intent instruction in UJI 14-141 together with the language of UJI 14-3130 required the jury to find, in part, that Defendant intentionally exercised control over the substance and/or paraphernalia. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Skippings
green
1 sentence2022In making the legal determination, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the requested instructions.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). {4} Here, the jury was given the general intent instruction, UJI 14-141 NMRA: In addition to the other elements of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that [D]efendant acted intentionally when he committed the crime. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Stewart
green
1 sentence2020Id. ¶ 32 (citing UJI 14-141 and UJI 14-610 NMRA (2005)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Montoya
green
1 sentence2020Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 46 ; see UJI 13-342, Use Notes 3 and 5 (noting that a general intent instruction must be given with the instruction for shooting from a motor vehicle). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Blain v. Stillwater Mining Co.
green
1 sentence2015State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 4 633 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Otto
green
2 sentences2015State v. Doe, 1983- 13 NMSC-096, ¶¶ 8, 10, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (disagreeing with the opposite 14 conclusion reached in State v. Curlee, 1982-NMCA-126 , 98 N.M. 576 , 651 P.2d 111 , 15 and State v. Otto, 1982-NMCA-149 , 98 N.M. 734 , 652 P.2d 756 ). 2015State v. Doe, 1983- 13 NMSC-096, ¶¶ 8, 10, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (disagreeing with the opposite 14 conclusion reached in State v. Curlee, 1982-NMCA-126 , 98 N.M. 576 , 651 P.2d 111 , 15 and State v. Otto, 1982-NMCA-149 , 98 N.M. 734 , 652 P.2d 756 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Curlee
green
2 sentences2015State v. Doe, 1983- 13 NMSC-096, ¶¶ 8, 10, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (disagreeing with the opposite 14 conclusion reached in State v. Curlee, 1982-NMCA-126 , 98 N.M. 576 , 651 P.2d 111 , 15 and State v. Otto, 1982-NMCA-149 , 98 N.M. 734 , 652 P.2d 756 ). 2015State v. Doe, 1983- 13 NMSC-096, ¶¶ 8, 10, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (disagreeing with the opposite 14 conclusion reached in State v. Curlee, 1982-NMCA-126 , 98 N.M. 576 , 651 P.2d 111 , 15 and State v. Otto, 1982-NMCA-149 , 98 N.M. 734 , 652 P.2d 756 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Chris & Christine L. v. Vanessa O.
green
1 sentence2015Furthermore, “[i]nvited error occurs where a party has contributed, at least in 4 part, to perceived shortcomings in a trial court’s ruling, and, as a result, the party 5 should hardly be heard to complain about those shortcomings on appeal.” Chris L. v. 6 Vanessa O., 2013-NMCA-107, ¶ 27 , 320 P.3d 16 (emphasis added) (alteration, 7 omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 8 {6} In any event, omission of the general intent instruction in this case is not 9 reversible error under any standard, fundamental or otherwise. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| White v. Solomon green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Lopez v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Masters green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Clifford green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.