7 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1987–1995 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Burpogreen2 sentences1995The majority is correct to point out that the defendant's interpretation of the statute is "flawed," as it fails to consider all of the statute's elements, especially that directed to the victim's consent. ( 164 Ill.2d at 264 , 207 Ill.Dec. at 505 , 647 N.E.2d at 998 ("[u]nder the statute, the prosecution must prove not only the act of sexual penetration but also that the defendant knew that the patient did not consent").) A prosecution of an accused under section 12-13(a)(2) must prove both the accused's intentional act of penetration and knowledge of the victim's inability to give knowing co 1995The majority is correct to point out that the defendant's interpretation of the statute is "flawed," as it fails to consider all of the statute's elements, especially that directed to the victim's consent. ( 164 Ill.2d at 264 , 207 Ill.Dec. at 505 , 647 N.E.2d at 998 ("[u]nder the statute, the prosecution must prove not only the act of sexual penetration but also that the defendant knew that the patient did not consent").) A prosecution of an accused under section 12-13(a)(2) must prove both the accused's intentional act of penetration and knowledge of the victim's inability to give knowing co | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1995Thus, by this construction, the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute, as applied to physicians conducting vaginal examinations, now appears to possess both the general intent requirement (see Terrell, 132 Ill.2d at 209 , 138 Ill.Dec. 176 , 547 N.E.2d 145 (proof of an intentional or knowing act by the accused)) and this particular specific intent requirement (proof of the accused's intent to exceed the scope of reasonable medical standards). ( Cf. People v. Williams (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 269, 275 , 138 Ill.Dec. 441 , 547 N.E.2d 608 (criminal sexual assault is a general intent offense).) 1995Thus, by this construction, the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute, as applied to physicians conducting vaginal examinations, now appears to possess both the general intent requirement (see Terrell, 132 Ill.2d at 209 , 138 Ill.Dec. 176 , 547 N.E.2d 145 (proof of an intentional or knowing act by the accused)) and this particular specific intent requirement (proof of the accused's intent to exceed the scope of reasonable medical standards). ( Cf. People v. Williams (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 269, 275 , 138 Ill.Dec. 441 , 547 N.E.2d 608 (criminal sexual assault is a general intent offense).) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Terrellgreen2 sentences1995Thus, by this construction, the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute, as applied to physicians conducting vaginal examinations, now appears to possess both the general intent requirement (see Terrell, 132 Ill.2d at 209 , 138 Ill.Dec. 176 , 547 N.E.2d 145 (proof of an intentional or knowing act by the accused)) and this particular specific intent requirement (proof of the accused's intent to exceed the scope of reasonable medical standards). ( Cf. People v. Williams (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 269, 275 , 138 Ill.Dec. 441 , 547 N.E.2d 608 (criminal sexual assault is a general intent offense).) 1995Thus, by this construction, the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute, as applied to physicians conducting vaginal examinations, now appears to possess both the general intent requirement (see Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d at 209 (proof of an intentional or knowing act by the accused)) and this particular specific intent requirement (proof of the accused’s intent to exceed the scope of reasonable medical standards). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences1988App. 3d at 792 , 508 N.E.2d at 494 .) An offense involving sexual penetration is a general intent crime, and a mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness would be implied to satisfy the general intent requirement. ( 155 Ill. 1988App. 3d at 792 , 508 N.E.2d at 494 .) An offense involving sexual penetration is a general intent crime, and a mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness would be implied to satisfy the general intent requirement. ( 155 Ill. | 3 | 1988–1990 |
People v. Leonard
green
1 sentence1990(People v. Leonard (1988), 171 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Talley
green
1 sentence1989(People v. Talley (1988), 177 Ill. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Hollins
green
1 sentence1987App. 3d 1, 9 , 482 N.E.2d 1053 .) In any event, it has been determined that an offense involving sexual penetration is a general intent crime such that a mental state of either intent, knowledge, or recklessness will be implied to satisfy the general intent requirement. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Burmeister
green
1 sentence1987(People v. Burmeister (1986), 147 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.