general intent instruction in California

2016In People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222 and People v. Lyons (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1456 , the courts considered this very situation and found it significant that while the general intent instruction speaks broadly to the issue of "wrongful intent," it also directs the jury to consider the instruction in light of the substantive offense or act at issue.

1995“Since the general intent instruction is dependent upon ‘that which the law declares to be a crime,’ its effect turns upon the substantive elements of the offense to which it is applied.” (People v. Lyons (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1456, 1462 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 763 ]; see also People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [ 223 P.2d 223 ].) The jury was instructed on the substantive elements of arson, that it requires an intent to set fire to or bum or cause to be burned the defendant’s house.

2026Section 288.5, subdivision (a) may be violated by three or more acts of either “substantial sexual conduct” or “lewd or lascivious conduct.” The former requires general intent and the latter requires the specific intent of “arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child.” (§ 288, subd. (a); see People v. Whitham (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1293 .) The charge here was based on both substantial sexual conduct and lewd or lascivious acts.

2026Section 288.5, subdivision (a) may be violated by three or more acts of either “substantial sexual conduct” or “lewd or lascivious conduct.” The former requires general intent and the latter requires the specific intent of “arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child.” (§ 288, subd. (a); see People v. Whitham (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1293 .) The charge here was based on both substantial sexual conduct and lewd or lascivious acts.

2002(But see People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 806 , limited on other grounds by People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 657-658 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 54 , 995 P.2d 186 ] [violation of all prongs of § 273a, subd. (a) must be willful].) Moreover, use of a general intent standard is appropriate when the statute criminalizes commission of a battery, or direct infliction of unjustifiable pain or suffering.

2002(But see People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 806 , limited on other grounds by People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 657-658 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 54 , 995 P.2d 186 ] [violation of all prongs of § 273a, subd. (a) must be willful].) Moreover, use of a general intent standard is appropriate when the statute criminalizes commission of a battery, or direct infliction of unjustifiable pain or suffering.

1967(People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ] ; People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [223 P.2d 223] ; People v. Snyder, supra, 15 Cal.2d 706 , 709-710 ; People v. Richardson, 161 Cal. 552, 564-565 [120 P.20].) In cases where a specific intent crime alone is charged, the general intent instruction should only be given where some evidence suggests that defendant’s acts may not have been voluntary or intentional, or where defendant raises the issue or requests a general intent instruction.

1967(People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ] ; People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [223 P.2d 223] ; People v. Snyder, supra, 15 Cal.2d 706 , 709-710 ; People v. Richardson, 161 Cal. 552, 564-565 [120 P.20].) In cases where a specific intent crime alone is charged, the general intent instruction should only be given where some evidence suggests that defendant’s acts may not have been voluntary or intentional, or where defendant raises the issue or requests a general intent instruction.

1967(People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] ; People v. Johnson, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d 694, 702 .) Defendant also argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the specific intent to commit a felony had to be formed before or at the moment defendant entered the building.

1967(People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] ; People v. Johnson, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d 694, 702 .) Defendant also argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the specific intent to commit a felony had to be formed before or at the moment defendant entered the building.

1967(People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [ 223 P.2d 223 ]; People v. Snyder, supra, 15 Cal.2d 706, 709-710 ; People v. Richardson, 161 Cal. 552, 564-565 [ 120 P. 20 ].) [12] In cases where a specific intent crime alone is charged, the general intent instruction should only be given where some evidence suggests that defendant's acts may not have been voluntary or intentional, or where defendant raises the issue or requests a general intent instruction.

1967(People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 183 [ 238 P.2d 1001 ] ; People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [223 P.2d 223] ; People v. Snyder, supra, 15 Cal.2d 706 , 709-710 ; People v. Richardson, 161 Cal. 552, 564-565 [120 P.20].) In cases where a specific intent crime alone is charged, the general intent instruction should only be given where some evidence suggests that defendant’s acts may not have been voluntary or intentional, or where defendant raises the issue or requests a general intent instruction.

1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably

1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably

1967(People v. Booth, supra, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 108-109 .) The general intent instruction here told the jury that “the intent to do the forbidden thing constitutes the criminal intent.” When the jury then heard the specific intent instruction they might well have believed that they should automatically infer specific intent from the voluntary doing of the act.

1967(People v. Butcher, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d 722 , 731 ; People v. Booth, supra, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 108 .) In the instant case there was no need to give a general intent instruction, and the instruction read to the jury was not clearly qualified by the subsequently given instruction on specific intent.

2023(Lyons, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1463 .) At most, the erroneous inclusion of failure to appear in the general-intent instruction created ambiguity. “[N]ot every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.” (Mills, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 677 .) We consider if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instruction.

2016In People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222 and People v. Lyons (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1456 , the courts considered this very situation and found it significant that while the general intent instruction speaks broadly to the issue of "wrongful intent," it also directs the jury to consider the instruction in light of the substantive offense or act at issue.

2010Prejudice The trial court's error in failing to instruct on specific intent is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, in that it could not have misled the jury in light of the facts of the case and the court's instruction with the language of section 485. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]; People v. Brenner (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 335, 339 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 ] [applying Chapman where the court failed to instruct on specific intent].) The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 250, the general intent instruction, which referred the jury to the instructi

2010Prejudice The trial court's error in failing to instruct on specific intent is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, in that it could not have misled the jury in light of the facts of the case and the court's instruction with the language of section 485. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]; People v. Brenner (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 335, 339 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 ] [applying Chapman where the court failed to instruct on specific intent].) The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 250, the general intent instruction, which referred the jury to the instructi

2014The Erroneous General Intent Instruction on Count One21 Above, we hold that sexual penetration of a child under 10 is a specific intent crime, requiring the jury to find the defendant penetrated the victim “for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.” (§ 289, subd. (k)(1); People v. McCoy, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1538 .) The trial court properly included this language when instructing the jury on the definition of penetration for Count One, but the court also instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 250, a general intent instruction.

2014The Erroneous General Intent Instruction on Count One21 Above, we hold that sexual penetration of a child under 10 is a specific intent crime, requiring the jury to find the defendant penetrated the victim “for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.” (§ 289, subd. (k)(1); People v. McCoy, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1538 .) The trial court properly included this language when instructing the jury on the definition of penetration for Count One, but the court also instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 250, a general intent instruction.

2004(See CALJIC No. 1.20.) Furthermore, like the `ignorance of the law is no excuse' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36) given in Garcia, the general intent instruction given here (CALJIC No. 3.30) `on its face would allow the jury to convict [appellant] of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so.' ( People v. Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 .) We therefore find that the instructions given in this case also were erroneous in that they failed to clearly state that a conviction required actual knowledge of the duty to register. ( Ibid.

2004(See CALJIC No. 1.20.) Furthermore, like the `ignorance of the law is no excuse' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36) given in Garcia, the general intent instruction given here (CALJIC No. 3.30) `on its face would allow the jury to convict [appellant] of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so.' ( People v. Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 .) We therefore find that the instructions given in this case also were erroneous in that they failed to clearly state that a conviction required actual knowledge of the duty to register. ( Ibid.

2024(See People v. ZarateCastillo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1168 .) Thus, while the trial court’s omission in giving the general intent instruction was error, the trial court “did nothing to remove the mental state element from the jury’s consideration or relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof.” (People v. Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th, at p. 1161 .) This is distinguishable from People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917 , cited by defendant, where the trial court completely omitted instructing the jury on intent.

2024(Ibid.) A. Union of Act and Intent “A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on all of the elements of a charged offense [citations], including the mental state required to commit the offense and the union of that mental state and the defendant’s act [citations].” (People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1160 (Jo).) The Judicial Council’s Bench Notes to CALCRIM Nos. 250 (general intent) and 251 (specific intent) state that the general intent instruction must not be used if the crime requires a specific mental state, such as knowledge or malice.

2015Rather, assault only requires an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against 17 another.” (Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 790 .)6 We accordingly are not persuaded by defendant’s contention that the court erred in “giving a general intent instruction where a greater mental state is required.” Nor are we persuaded by his attempt to analogize this case to People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 , which involved the specific intent crime of burglary.

1974(People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 117-118 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 429 P.2d 586 ].) Again it must be noted, despite defendant’s argument, that the record does not indicate that the trial court gave the instructions upon its own motion or upon a motion from one of the parties. *965 However, assuming that defendant did not request the general intent instruction, there was no error because the instruction was clearly qualified by the subsequently given instructions on specific intent (“willful, deliberate and premeditated”) or “lying in wait” in order to convict of first degree murder.

2004(See CALJIC No. 1.20.) Furthermore, like the `ignorance of the law is no excuse' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36) given in Garcia, the general intent instruction given here (CALJIC No. 3.30) `on its face would allow the jury to convict [appellant] of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so.' ( People v. Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 .) We therefore find that the instructions given in this case also were erroneous in that they failed to clearly state that a conviction required actual knowledge of the duty to register. ( Ibid.

2003In Edgar , Division Two of this court concluded that "like the `"ignorance of the law is no excuse"' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36) given in Garcia , the general intent instruction given here (CALJIC No. 3.30) `on its face would allow the jury to convict [appellant] of failing to register even if he were unaware of his *809 obligation to do so.' [Citation.]" ( Edgar, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 219 , 127 Cal. Rptr.2d 662 .) On this basis, the Edgar court held that the same instructions given in this case — i.e., CALJIC Nos. 1.20 and 3.30, in combination with general instructions on the element

2025As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]lthough the mens rea requirements are somewhat differently described [in sections 246 and 246.3], both are general intent crimes.” (Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 990 ; see also Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357, fn. 5 [“As used in section 246, the terms ‘maliciously’ and ‘willfully’ are expressions of the statute’s general intent requirement”].) The required mental state for sections 246 and 246.3 alike is thus limited to “an intent to do the act that causes the harm.” (Overman, at p. 1361; People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611 , 620–6