7 Michigan opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Karstgreen2 sentences2003See People v DeLong, 128 Mich App 1, 3 ; 339 NW2d 659 (1983). “[WJhere the knowledge element of an offense is necessary simply to prevent innocent acts from constituting crimes, the knowledge element is merely a general intent requirement and the offense is not a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is a defense.” People v Karst, 138 Mich App 413, 416 ; 360 NW2d 206 (1984). 2003See People v DeLong, 128 Mich App 1, 3 ; 339 NW2d 659 (1983). “[WJhere the knowledge element of an offense is necessary simply to prevent innocent acts from constituting crimes, the knowledge element is merely a general intent requirement and the offense is not a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is a defense.” People v Karst, 138 Mich App 413, 416 ; 360 NW2d 206 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
People of Michigan v. Christopher Duran Headgreen1 sentence2025See Head, 323 Mich App at 539 . -5- D. | 1 | 1 |
People v. DeLonggreen2 sentences2003See People v DeLong, 128 Mich App 1, 3 ; 339 NW2d 659 (1983). “[WJhere the knowledge element of an offense is necessary simply to prevent innocent acts from constituting crimes, the knowledge element is merely a general intent requirement and the offense is not a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is a defense.” People v Karst, 138 Mich App 413, 416 ; 360 NW2d 206 (1984). 2003See People v DeLong, 128 Mich App 1, 3 ; 339 NW2d 659 (1983). “[WJhere the knowledge element of an offense is necessary simply to prevent innocent acts from constituting crimes, the knowledge element is merely a general intent requirement and the offense is not a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is a defense.” People v Karst, 138 Mich App 413, 416 ; 360 NW2d 206 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Buckgreen1 sentence1995Id. at 416; People v Watts, 133 Mich App 80, 83 ; 348 NW2d 39 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Watts
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 416; People v Watts, 133 Mich App 80, 83 ; 348 NW2d 39 (1984). 1995Id. at 416; People v Watts, 133 Mich App 80, 83 ; 348 NW2d 39 (1984). | 2 | 1984–1995 |
People v. Janes
green
2 sentences2019People v Janes, 302 Mich App 34, 45-46 ; 836 NW2d 883 (2013). 2019People v Janes, 302 Mich App 34, 45-46 ; 836 NW2d 883 (2013). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Morissette v. United States
green
1 sentence2019However, as noted in Schumacher, 276 Mich App at 169, Morissette, 342 US at 251 n 8, “recognized exceptions to this rule of statutory construction: for example, sex offenses, such as rape, and offenses of negligence, such as involuntary manslaughter or criminal negligence and the whole range of crimes arising from omission of duty.” (Cleaned up.) Under this exception, statutory rape is a strict liability crime in Michigan even though it is not a public welfare offense and carries stiff penalties. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Flowers
green
2 sentences1995People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169 ; 477 NW2d 473 (1991). 1995People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169 ; 477 NW2d 473 (1991). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Lane
green
2 sentences1984People v Watts, 133 Mich App 80, 83 ; 348 NW2d 39 (1984); People v Lane, 102 Mich App 11, 14-15 ; 300 NW2d 717 (1980). 1984People v Watts, 133 Mich App 80, 83 ; 348 NW2d 39 (1984); People v Lane, 102 Mich App 11, 14-15 ; 300 NW2d 717 (1980). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.