191 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 52 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2026Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R. 2026A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R. | 143 | 150 |
State v. Burlisongreen2 sentences2024See State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. 2024See State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2020Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 316-17 (Tenn. 2007); see also State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. 2017State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2024The inquiry of whether the confinement of the victim was essentially incidental to the underlying felony “is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 . “[A]bsence of this instruction, when warranted, results in instructional error that must be subjected to constitutional harmless error review.” State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 610 (Tenn. 2013)). 2024The inquiry of whether the confinement of the victim was essentially incidental to the underlying felony “is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 . | 2 | 22 |
State v. Anthonyred2 sentences2017The especially aggravated kidnapping conviction with respect to Mr. Gilman was dismissed by the trial court. -8- eliminated the need for a separate due process analysis on appellate review, and held that “[t]his inquiry . . . is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” Id. at 562 (overruling State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tenn. 1991)). 2016The White court eliminated the need for a separate due process analysis on appellate review, and held that “[t]his inquiry . . . is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” Id. at 562 (overruling State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tenn. 1991)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dorantesgreen2 sentences2015In January 2011, our Supreme Court issued Dorantes, which adopted the federal standard that the sufficiency of the evidence standard was the same for circumstantial or direct evidence. 331 S.W.3d at 381 . 2014In January 2011, our Supreme Court issued Dorantes, which adopted the federal standard that the sufficiency of the evidence standard was the same for circumstantial or direct evidence. 331 S.W.3d at 381 . | 1 | 4 |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Jereller Alston, Kris Theotis Young, and Joshua Edward Webbgreen2 sentences2025Alston, 465 S.W.3d at 562 . 2024The inquiry of whether the confinement of the victim was essentially incidental to the underlying felony “is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 . “[A]bsence of this instruction, when warranted, results in instructional error that must be subjected to constitutional harmless error review.” State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 610 (Tenn. 2013)). | 1 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Antonio Cecilgreen2 sentences2024The inquiry of whether the confinement of the victim was essentially incidental to the underlying felony “is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 562 . “[A]bsence of this instruction, when warranted, results in instructional error that must be subjected to constitutional harmless error review.” State v. Alston, 465 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599, 610 (Tenn. 2013)). 2024The Cecil court remanded the conviction for false imprisonment without conducting a sufficiency of the evidence analysis because “the proof in this case could be interpreted in different ways, [and] we cannot conclude that the absence of the White instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 613 . | 1 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2025See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“[T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen1 sentence2025A sufficiency of the evidence challenge requires us to “determine whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883, 903 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Finch v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 316-17 (Tenn. 2007); see also State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Adamsgreen1 sentence2019See State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Marlon Keith Bartongreen1 sentence2003See United States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66 , 68-69 (5th Cir. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Evansgreen1 sentence2000Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-91 (Tenn. 1992); Tenn. R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duncan
green
2 sentences2010Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); T.R.A.P. 13(e); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1985). 1998Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1985); T.R.A.P. 13(e). | 6 | 1996–2010 |
STATE of Tennessee v. DeWayne COLLIER AKA Patrick Collier
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 898–900 (“[H]aving determined that no corroboration of the victim’s testimony is required, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of aggravated statutory rape beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 2024Id. at 898–900 (“[H]aving determined that no corroboration of the victim’s testimony is required, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of aggravated statutory rape beyond a reasonable doubt.”). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences2018In Boykin, a panel of this court explained that “because venue is not an element of any offense, . . . it is not an issue that may be properly reviewed pursuant to a sufficiency of the evidence standard.” Id. (citing Young, 196 S.W.3d at 101 ). 2011Because venue is not an element of any offense, see Young, 196 S.W.3d at 101 ; Davis, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 461 , at *4, it is not an issue that may be properly reviewed pursuant to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. | 2 | 2011–2018 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2011The trial court ruled that the March 13 memo was not material because the fact that the defense might have used the memo to impeach the police investigation did not “rise to the level of putting ‘the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence of the verdict[,]’ ” quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 . 2011The trial court ruled that the March 13 memo was not material because the fact that the defense might have used the memo to impeach the police investigation did not “rise to the level of putting ‘the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence of the verdict[,]’ ” quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 . | 2 | 2006–2011 |
State v. Watkins
green
1 sentence2017This inquiry, however, is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard. 3 The State takes issue with Defendant’s failure to use the words “violation of Double Jeopardy” and the failure to cite State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn. 2012), in his argument. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Sisk
green
1 sentence2012Sisk, 343 S.W.3d at 65 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Winters
green
1 sentence2011App. P. 13(e); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 307 ; Winters, 137 S.W.3d at 654-55 , and we do not reweigh the video evidence to determine whether it “was necessarily more reliable than the testimony of the witnesses testifying on behalf of the State,” see State v. Teddy Ray Mitchell, S.W.3d. , , No. E2008-02672-SC-R11-CD, slip op. at 10 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2011). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2011On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) the state withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) the post-conviction court erred by applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard to the materiality prong of the Brady test; (3) the state’s suppression of evidence violated Article 1, sections 1 and 2, of the Tennessee Constitution; and (4) in *87 the alternative, the petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate the case. 2011On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) the state withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) the post-conviction court erred by applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard to the materiality prong of the Brady test; (3) the state’s suppression of evidence violated Article 1, sections 1 and 2, of the Tennessee Constitution; and (4) in *87 the alternative, the petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate the case. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2006Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , 115 S.Ct. at 1566 ; Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 58 . 2006Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 , 115 S.Ct. at 1566 ; Johnson, 38 S.W.3d at 58 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Flake
green
1 sentence2003Id. at 551 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.