sufficiency of the evidence challenge in Maryland

2025Rather, the court only asks ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 534 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 14 IV Discussion A. Reckless Endangerment The crime of reckless endangerment is codified at § 3-204(a)(1) of the Criminal Law (“CR”) Article of the Maryland Annotated Code (2021 Repl.

2001Rather, the court only asks ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Pagotto, 361 Md. 528, 534 , 762 A.2d 97 (2000) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ).

2006In evaluating these circumstances, the Kyles Court applied the four factors enumerated in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), that determined materiality: first, that a showing of materiality does not require a demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal; second, that materiality is not determined by a sufficiency of the evidence test; third, that a Bagley error was not harmless error; and finally, that materiality in terms of suppressed eviden

2006In evaluating these circumstances, the Kyles Court applied the four factors enumerated in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), that determined materiality: first, that a showing of materiality does not require a demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal; second, that materiality is not determined by a sufficiency of the evidence test; third, that a Bagley error was not harmless error; and finally, that materiality in terms of suppressed eviden

2014He asserts that the proper analysis is “the effect that the perjured testimony had on the outcome of [his] trial.” The State, by contrast, argues that the test “is not Vhat the jury would have done if it knew that a witness testified falsely,’ but rather, ‘what would the jury have done if it had not heard the false evidence.’ ” (Quoting Stevenson, 299 Md. at 304-05 , 473 A.2d 450 ).

2014He asserts that the proper analysis is “the effect that the perjured testimony had on the outcome of [his] trial.” The State, by contrast, argues that the test “is not Vhat the jury would have done if it knew that a witness testified falsely,’ but rather, ‘what would the jury have done if it had not heard the false evidence.’ ” (Quoting Stevenson, 299 Md. at 304-05 , 473 A.2d 450 ).

2006In evaluating these circumstances, the Kyles Court applied the four factors enumerated in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), that determined materiality: first, that a showing of materiality does not require a demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal; second, that materiality is not determined by a sufficiency of the evidence test; third, that a Bagley error was not harmless error; and finally, that materiality in terms of suppressed eviden

2006In evaluating these circumstances, the Kyles Court applied the four factors enumerated in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), that determined materiality: first, that a showing of materiality does not require a demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal; second, that materiality is not determined by a sufficiency of the evidence test; third, that a Bagley error was not harmless error; and finally, that materiality in terms of suppressed eviden

2005We frequently have observed that “[i]t is not our role as an appellate court to re-evaluate or re-weigh the testimony and other evidence presented at trial and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Deyesu v. Donhauser, 156 Md.App. 124, 136 , 846 A.2d 28 , cert. denied, 382 Md. 685 , 856 A.2d 721 (2004).

2005We frequently have observed that “[i]t is not our role as an appellate court to re-evaluate or re-weigh the testimony and other evidence presented at trial and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Deyesu v. Donhauser, 156 Md.App. 124, 136 , 846 A.2d 28 , cert. denied, 382 Md. 685 , 856 A.2d 721 (2004).

2005We frequently have observed that “[i]t is not our role as an appellate court to re-evaluate or re-weigh the testimony and other evidence presented at trial and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Deyesu v. Donhauser, 156 Md.App. 124, 136 , 846 A.2d 28 , cert. denied, 382 Md. 685 , 856 A.2d 721 (2004).

2005We frequently have observed that “[i]t is not our role as an appellate court to re-evaluate or re-weigh the testimony and other evidence presented at trial and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Deyesu v. Donhauser, 156 Md.App. 124, 136 , 846 A.2d 28 , cert. denied, 382 Md. 685 , 856 A.2d 721 (2004).

2003“To set aside the jury’s verdict we must be able to say there was no legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could find [appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 174 , 246 A.2d 608 (1968)(citing Pressley v. State, 244 Md. 664, 667 , 224 A.2d 866 (1966)).

2003“To set aside the jury’s verdict we must be able to say there was no legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could find [appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 174 , 246 A.2d 608 (1968)(citing Pressley v. State, 244 Md. 664, 667 , 224 A.2d 866 (1966)).

2003Carmell, 529 U.S. at 530 , 120 S.Ct. 1620 .

2003Carmell, 529 U.S. at 530 , 120 S.Ct. 1620 .

2003“To set aside the jury’s verdict we must be able to say there was no legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could find [appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 174 , 246 A.2d 608 (1968)(citing Pressley v. State, 244 Md. 664, 667 , 224 A.2d 866 (1966)).

2003“To set aside the jury’s verdict we must be able to say there was no legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could find [appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 174 , 246 A.2d 608 (1968)(citing Pressley v. State, 244 Md. 664, 667 , 224 A.2d 866 (1966)).

2002As we explained in Anthony v. State, 117 Md.App. 119 , 699 A.2d 505 , cert. denied, 348 Md. 205 , 703 A.2d 147 (1997), *545 [i]n a criminal action, when a jury is the trier of fact, appellate review of sufficiency of evidence is available only when the defendant moves for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence and argues precisely the ways in which the evidence is lacking.

2002As we explained in Anthony v. State, 117 Md.App. 119 , 699 A.2d 505 , cert. denied, 348 Md. 205 , 703 A.2d 147 (1997), *545 [i]n a criminal action, when a jury is the trier of fact, appellate review of sufficiency of evidence is available only when the defendant moves for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence and argues precisely the ways in which the evidence is lacking.

1972App. 543 , 547 we noted that in applying the sufficiency of the evidence rule as set out in Williams “no distinction is made between a case where there is direct evidence of guilt and a case where the evidence is circumstantial.” And in Graham v. State, j.3 Md. 171, 178 we observed that the statement that for evidence solely circumstantial to be sufficient to convict, the circumstances, taken together, must be inconsistent with, or such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis or theory of innocence, does not accurately reflect the law, pointing to Metz and Streat .