sufficiency of the evidence standard in Texas

2025App. 2003) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “[W]hen faced with a sufficiency of the evidence claim based upon a variance between the indictment and the proof, only a ‘material’ variance will render the evidence insufficient.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257 .

2023See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 (citing the well-established sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard as outlined in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)); see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim.

2018When we face a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we review all trial evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” to determine if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

2013The sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. at 2789 ; accord Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

2025“The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240 ). “[W]hen faced with a sufficiency of the evidence claim based upon a variance between the indictment and the proof, only a ‘material’ variance will render the evidence insufficient.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257 (Tex. Crim.

2025App. 2003) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “[W]hen faced with a sufficiency of the evidence claim based upon a variance between the indictment and the proof, only a ‘material’ variance will render the evidence insufficient.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257 .

2019See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314 , 318 & n.11, 320; see also Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518 . 4 The sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard gives due credit to the role of the factfinder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

2015See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314 , 318 & n.11, 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786 , 2788–89 & n.11; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518 . 6 The sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard gives full play to the responsibility of the fact finder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

2025“The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240 ). “[W]hen faced with a sufficiency of the evidence claim based upon a variance between the indictment and the proof, only a ‘material’ variance will render the evidence insufficient.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257 (Tex. Crim.

2025“The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240 ). “[W]hen faced with a sufficiency of the evidence claim based upon a variance between the indictment and the proof, only a ‘material’ variance will render the evidence insufficient.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257 (Tex. Crim.

2026“The Court of Criminal Appeals has decreed that a materiality inquiry must be made in all cases involving a sufficiency of the evidence claim based on a variance between the indictment and the evidence.” Rogers v. State, 200 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (citing Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. Crim.

2011A court must conduct a materiality analysis in all cases “that involve a sufficiency of the evidence claim based upon a variance between the indictment and the proof.” Fuller , 73 S.W.3d at 253 (quoting Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 257 ).

2022Relying on Bocquet v. Herring, Victoria argues that an award of attorney’s fees is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998).

2015See court." Id. § 38.004(1) (W est 1997). [HN12] W e may Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 , 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. presume that the trial court took judicial notice of the J. 650 (Tex. 1998); EMC Mortgage Corp. v. D avis, 167 usual and customary fees pursuant to section 38.004 of S.W.3d 406, 418 [*17] (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, pet. the civil practices and remedies code even if it did not filed).

2023See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 (citing the well-established sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard as outlined in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)); see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim.

2014A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law In resolving a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we must decide “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S. Ct. 6 2781, 2789 (1979); accord Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 (citing the well-established sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard as outlined in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)); see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 (citing the well-established sufficiency-of-the- evidence standard as outlined in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S. Ct. 2781 , 61 L.

2018See Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. Crim.

2015Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim.

2011Van Dam v. Lewis, 307 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2009, no pet.); Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied).

2009Id. (citing Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied)).

2008See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 167 S.W.3d 406, 418 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied).

2008See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 167 S.W.3d 406, 418 (Tex. App.–Austin 2005, pet. denied).

2004Moreover, this contention is analogous to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, see generally Givens v. State, 26 S.W.3d 739, 740 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); Flanary v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 495 , 316 S.W.2d 897, 898 (1958), or error based on an ex post facto claim.

2004Moreover, this contention is analogous to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, see generally Givens v. State , 26 S.W.3d 739, 740 (Tex. App. -- Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); Flanary v. State , 166 Tex. Crim. 495 , 316 S.W.2d 897, 898 (1958), or error based on an ex post facto claim.

2004See generally Ieppert v. State, 908 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (holding that an ex post facto claim may be presented for the first time on appeal because a categorical prohibition may not be waived).

2004See generally Ieppert v. State , 908 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Cr.

2004Moreover, this contention is analogous to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, see generally Givens v. State, 26 S.W.3d 739, 740 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); Flanary v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 495 , 316 S.W.2d 897, 898 (1958), or error based on an ex post facto claim.

2004Moreover, this contention is analogous to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, see generally Givens v. State, 26 S.W.3d 739, 740 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); Flanary v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 495 , 316 S.W.2d 897, 898 (1958), or error based on an ex post facto claim.

2008Appellant relies on Butler v. State to argue that, in his words, “historically, the United States Supreme Court has held that criminal convictions could not be sustained under a sufficiency of the evidence analysis if there was no evidence.” 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex .

1995Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Jackson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).

2026In fact, Arteaga borrowed from the sufficiency context in asserting a nonstandard remedy for the jury-charge error it addressed.49 The jury- charge error in that case, as in the present case, could have easily been reframed as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. 48 Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 298-99 (Tex. Crim.

2017See Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 303 (Tex. Crim.

2020Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim.

2014Appellant acknowledges that we have consistently held that we will not conduct a sufficiency of the evidence analysis for mitigation, reasoning that no evidence is per se 18 351 S.W.3d 878, 903 (Tex. Crim.

2015There, the Court held that a defendant is proeedurally defaulted under Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), from asserting error that “could readily have been raised ... in a direct appeal from the initial judgment imposing community supervision.” Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 320 (emphasis added).

2015There, the Court held that a defendant is procedurally defaulted under Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Crim.

2010In reviewing an alleged variance for materiality, we determine whether the charging instrument "'informed the defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense at trial, and whether prosecution under the deficiently drafted indictment would subject the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.'" Id . (quoting United States v. Sprick , 233 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir. 2000)).

2010In reviewing an alleged variance for materiality, we determine whether the charging instrument “‘informed the defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense at trial, and whether prosecution under the deficiently drafted indictment would subject the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir. 2000)).

2009Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000).

2009Osterberg v. Peca , 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000).

2009Lonza AG v. Blum, 70 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).

2009Lonza AG v. Blum, 70 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).

2025In a sufficiency of the evidence challenge like this one, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2015Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 ; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 , 16–17 (Tex. Crim.

2012“The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does 8 not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at 612 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109 ).

2012"The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." Hampton , 86 S.W.3d at 612 (quoting Agurs , 427 U.S. at 109 ).

2015Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens ruled that the application of Texas Article 38.07, as amended, to Cannell's four contested convictions, could not be sustained under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitu- tion.175 In particular, the Court reasoned that application of amended Texas Article 38.07 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause under the fourth category of ex post facto laws as defined in the 176 early case of Calder v. BulL The Court first analyzed the components of the Texas statute, and determined that "Texas courts treat Article 38.07 as a sufficiency of the evide

2008The Court also held that “article 38.07 is a sufficiency of the evidence rule,” which “does not merely ‘regulate ... the mode in which the facts constituting guilt may be placed before the jury,’ (Rule 601(a) already does that), but governs the sufficiency of those facts for meeting the burden of proof.” Id. at 545 , 120 S.Ct. at 1639 .

2015See Gibson, 383 S.W.3d at 159 .

2015See Gibson, 383 S.W.3d at 159 .