sufficiency of the evidence standard in District of Columbia

2009“The evidence must support an inference, rather than mere speculation, as to each element of an offense.” Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C.2001).

2009"The evidence must support an inference, rather than mere speculation, as to each element of an offense." Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C.2001).

2009The Evidence Was Not Sufficient to Convict L.L. of First Degree Child Sex Abuse In an attempt to prevent the government from retrying him for first degree child sexual abuse, L.L. argues that the evidence was “insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential element of penetration.” 4 When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “we must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give deference to the right of the [fact finder] to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw all justifiable inferences of fact, making

2009The Evidence Was Not Sufficient to Convict L.L. of First Degree Child Sex Abuse In an attempt to prevent the government from retrying him for first degree child sexual abuse, L.L. argues that the evidence was "insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential element of penetration." [4] When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, "we must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give deference to the right of the [fact finder] to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw all justifiable inferences of fact, makin

2002Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987) (citation omitted).

1992See Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987) (whether “a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Ray v. United States, 575 A.2d 1196, 1198 (D.C.1990) (assault consists of (1) an attempt or threat by defendant to injure victim, (2) defendant’s apparent ability to injure victim and (3) defendant’s intent to do act constituting assault); Super.Ct.Crim.R. 29.

2025Schools v. United States, 84 A.3d 503, 508 (D.C. 2013) (“The standard is not so strict that the defendant’s evidence must be disregarded.” (quoting United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1980))).

2025Schools v. United States, 84 A.3d 503, 508 (D.C. 2013) (“The standard is not so strict that the defendant’s evidence must be disregarded.” (quoting United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1980))).

2024Since the court is vacating that conviction on other grounds, we need not consider his jury coercion argument. 46 credibility of the witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony.” Dickerson v. United States, 650 A.2d 680, 683 (D.C. 1994).

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause . . . may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 842 A.2d 716, 726 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (Mass. 1998); State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 240 (Conn. 1987); State v. Hussong, 739 N.W.2d 922, 928 (M

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 , 87 S.Ct. 408 , 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause ... may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425 , 842 A.2d 716, 726 (2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675 , 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (1998); State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456 , 534 A.

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause . . . may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 842 A.2d 716, 726 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (Mass. 1998); State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 240 (Conn. 1987); State v. Hussong, 739 N.W.2d 922, 928 (M

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 , 87 S.Ct. 408 , 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause ... may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425 , 842 A.2d 716, 726 (2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675 , 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (1998); State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456 , 534 A.

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause . . . may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 842 A.2d 716, 726 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (Mass. 1998); State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 240 (Conn. 1987); State v. Hussong, 739 N.W.2d 922, 928 (M

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 , 87 S.Ct. 408 , 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause ... may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425 , 842 A.2d 716, 726 (2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675 , 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (1998); State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456 , 534 A.

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause . . . may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 842 A.2d 716, 726 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (Mass. 1998); State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 240 (Conn. 1987); State v. Hussong, 739 N.W.2d 922, 928 (M

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 , 87 S.Ct. 408 , 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause ... may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425 , 842 A.2d 716, 726 (2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675 , 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (1998); State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456 , 534 A.

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause . . . may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 842 A.2d 716, 726 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (Mass. 1998); State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 240 (Conn. 1987); State v. Hussong, 739 N.W.2d 922, 928 (M

2016See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 , 87 S.Ct. 408 , 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (“[T]he minimum evidence to establish probable cause ... may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”); see also Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 179 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires “a higher degree of certainty than the probable cause standard”); State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425 , 842 A.2d 716, 726 (2004); Commonwealth v. Collado, 426 Mass. 675 , 690 N.E.2d 424 , 428 n.8 (1998); State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456 , 534 A.

2011In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the judge, as the trier of fact, to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inference.” In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1990).

2003Ms. Cook contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion “for judgment as a matter of law on the drug haven claim.” She maintains that “no facts were alleged or proven to establish any of the [RDEA’s] seven elements.” The landlord argues that ample evidence was presented to allow the case to go to the jury and that “the presence] of any one of the [statutory factors] enumerated in § 45-2559(a) [§ 42-3602(a)] is *945 sufficient to find that the rental unit is a drug haven.” “We review [a denial of] motions for judgment as a matter of law de novo." Landise v. Mauro, 725 A.2d 4

2002Circuit "review[s] an appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for plain error when a motion for judgment of acquittal was based on specific (and different) grounds.” United States v. Spinner, 332 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 6 , 152 F.3d 950, 955 (1998) (citation omitted).

2002Circuit "review[s] an appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for plain error when a motion for judgment of acquittal was based on specific (and different) grounds.” United States v. Spinner, 332 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 6 , 152 F.3d 950, 955 (1998) (citation omitted).

1992See Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987) (whether “a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Ray v. United States, 575 A.2d 1196, 1198 (D.C.1990) (assault consists of (1) an attempt or threat by defendant to injure victim, (2) defendant’s apparent ability to injure victim and (3) defendant’s intent to do act constituting assault); Super.Ct.Crim.R. 29.