watershed rule in Pennsylvania

2022Indeed, to date only one right has been recognized as watershed—the right to counsel for indigent defendants announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

2013According to the Court, the exception is limited to “sweeping” changes on the order of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (holding that all indigent defendants charged with felonies are entitled to appointed counsel); modifications of a less broadscale nature, while they may be very important, simply do not require retroactive application, under the second Teague exception.

2019Id. at 463 (emphasis in original). -7- J-S49022-19 The PCRA court also properly rejected Appellant’s reliance on Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), to resurrect his time-barred claim under the new constitutional right exception.

2015Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition in which he alleged that under the authority of -4- J-S24020-15 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) and the Pennsylvania Constitution his sentence of mandatory life imprisonment is unconstitutional since he was a child at the time he participated as the non-shooting accomplice in a robbery in which his adult co-defendant killed the victim? (a) Did the PCRA court err in refusing to apply Miller retroactively on the basis that the United States Supreme Court has already applied Miller retroactively? (b) Did the PCRA court err

2014Moreover, with regard to Appellant’s claim that Melendez-Diaz should be applied retroactively, we have encountered this claim previously and have explained: Melendez–Diaz has not been held by the Supreme Court to apply retroactively on collateral appeal[fn] and “the [Court] has expressly provided that its decision in Crawford, upon which Melendez–Diaz relies, does not apply retroactively to cases -6- J-S55016-14 already final on direct review.” Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1147 (Pa.Super.2011) (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 , 127 S.Ct. 1173 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007) (holding

2014Moreover, with regard to Appellant’s claim that Melendez-Diaz should be applied retroactively, we have encountered this claim previously and have explained: Melendez–Diaz has not been held by the Supreme Court to apply retroactively on collateral appeal[fn] and “the [Court] has expressly provided that its decision in Crawford, upon which Melendez–Diaz relies, does not apply retroactively to cases -6- J-S55016-14 already final on direct review.” Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1147 (Pa.Super.2011) (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 , 127 S.Ct. 1173 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007) (holding

2014“This Court is bound by existing precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis and continues to follow controlling precedent as long as the decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court.” Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272 , 278 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Dixon v. GEICO, 1 A.3d 921 , 925–26 (Pa. Super. 2010).9 Here, the question of whether Miller represents a watershed rule has been addressed by our Supreme Court.

2014“This Court is bound by existing precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis and continues to follow controlling precedent as long as the decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court.” Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272 , 278 n. 9 (Pa.Super.2014) (citing Dixon v. GEICO, 1 A.3d 921, 925-26 (Pa.Super.2010)). 9 Here, the question of whether Miller represents a watershed rule' has been addressed by our Supreme Court.

2019In particular, Appellant argues that, in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. ____________________________________________ Commonwealth v. Kretchmar, 189 A.3d 459, 464 (Pa. Super. 2018), held that Burton did not establish a new constitutional right or a watershed rule of criminal procedure.

2018Consequently, there is no need to address whether "the right 'has been held' by 'that court' to apply retroactively." Abdul-Salaam , 812 A.2d at 501 .

2018Id. at 14-15. 11 In particular, it quotes the reasoning in United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2014), in which the Third Circuit concluded that Alleyne announced neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure; therefore it did not provide “Reyes with any basis for relief because, the Supreme Court has not chosen to apply Alleyne’s new rule retroactively to cases on collateral review.” See Commonwealth’s Brief at 14 (citing Reyes, 755 F.3d at 212-13 ).

2018Id. at 14-15. 11 In particular, it quotes the reasoning in United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2014), in which the Third Circuit concluded that Alleyne announced neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure; therefore it did not provide “Reyes with any basis for relief because, the Supreme Court has not chosen to apply Alleyne’s new rule retroactively to cases on collateral review.” See Commonwealth’s Brief at 14 (citing Reyes, 755 F.3d at 212-13 ).

2013See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.2013) (concluding that Miller is not retroactive because it was neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule); Craig v. Cain, 2013 WL 69128 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013)(concluding Miller not retroactive because it did not create a categorical bar to a penalty and because it was not a watershed rule); People v. Carp, 298 Mich.App. 472 , 828 N.W.2d 685 (2012)(deeming Miller procedural because it altered the manner in which the punishment was imposed); Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012)(concluding Miller not retroactive, inter ali

2013See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.2013) (concluding that Miller is not retroactive because it was neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule); Craig v. Cain, 2013 WL 69128 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013)(concluding Miller not retroactive because it did not create a categorical bar to a penalty and because it was not a watershed rule); People v. Carp, 298 Mich.App. 472 , 828 N.W.2d 685 (2012)(deeming Miller procedural because it altered the manner in which the punishment was imposed); Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012)(concluding Miller not retroactive, inter ali

2013See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.2013) (concluding that Miller is not retroactive because it was neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule); Craig v. Cain, 2013 WL 69128 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013)(concluding Miller not retroactive because it did not create a categorical bar to a penalty and because it was not a watershed rule); People v. Carp, 298 Mich.App. 472 , 828 N.W.2d 685 (2012)(deeming Miller procedural because it altered the manner in which the punishment was imposed); Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012)(concluding Miller not retroactive, inter ali

2004The High Court has never held that Riggins is such a watershed rule. [3] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [4] I note that, in disposing of other claims on this collateral appeal, the Majority does recognize the principle of contemporary assessment.

2004The High Court has never held that Riggins is such a watershed rule. [3] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [4] I note that, in disposing of other claims on this collateral appeal, the Majority does recognize the principle of contemporary assessment.

2004While the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty in denoting the contours of this exception, see Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 , 110 S.Ct. at 1264 , as explained in Attica , a watershed rule affects a large class of cases and, 18 thus far, only one rule has been identified as meeting such criteria, namely, the right to counsel.

2004While the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty in denoting the contours of this exception, see Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495 , 110 S.Ct. at 1264 , as explained in Attica , a watershed rule affects a large class of cases and, 18 thus far, only one rule has been identified as meeting such criteria, namely, the right to counsel.

2004Accord Attica, 2001 WL 827455 , at *6; cf. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665 , 121 S.Ct. at 2484 (declining to treat the rule regarding an unconstitutional reasonable doubt instruction announced in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), as satisfying the second exception in Teague for retroactivity). 19 Ac cordingly, Cooper is not retroactively applicable to Appellant’s case. 20 In his remaining pre-trial claim, Appellant argues that his confessions were involuntary, and that he did not validly waive his constitutional rights.

2004Accord Attica, 2001 WL 827455 , at *6; cf. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665 , 121 S.Ct. at 2484 (declining to treat the rule regarding an unconstitutional reasonable doubt instruction announced in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), as satisfying the second exception in Teague for retroactivity). 19 Ac cordingly, Cooper is not retroactively applicable to Appellant’s case. 20 In his remaining pre-trial claim, Appellant argues that his confessions were involuntary, and that he did not validly waive his constitutional rights.

2004We recognize that the accuracy of the competency determination is affected by the burden of proof, and that a defendant’s competency affects his ability to exercise rights associated with a fair trial, see Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362-64 , 116 S.Ct. at 1381 ; nevertheless, we do not believe that the change in the burden of proof constitutes a watershed rule as the United States Supreme Court has defined it, that seriously undermines the reliability of the trial’s outcome and alters bedrock procedural elements.

2004We recognize that the accuracy of the competency determination is affected by the burden of proof, and that a defendant’s competency affects his ability to exercise rights associated with a fair trial, see Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362-64 , 116 S.Ct. at 1381 ; nevertheless, we do not believe that the change in the burden of proof constitutes a watershed rule as the United States Supreme Court has defined it, that seriously undermines the reliability of the trial’s outcome and alters bedrock procedural elements.