watershed rule in Tennessee

2013Dukes v. United States, 255 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that “Apprendi presents a new rule of constitutional law that is not of ‘watershed’ magnitude and, consequently, petitioners may not raise Apprendi claims on collateral review”); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (holding that “the new rule announced in Apprendi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding”’); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257 (agreeing with the other circuits that “Apprendi is not sufficiently fundamental to

2012Dukes v. United States, 255 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that “Apprendi presents a new rule of constitutional law that is not of ‘watershed’ magnitude and, consequently, petitioners may not raise Apprendi claims on collateral review”); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (holding that “the new rule announced in Apprendi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding’”); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257 (agreeing with the other circuits that “Apprendi is not sufficiently fundamental to

2013Dukes v. United States, 255 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that “Apprendi presents a new rule of constitutional law that is not of ‘watershed’ magnitude and, consequently, petitioners may not raise Apprendi claims on collateral review”); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (holding that “the new rule announced in Apprendi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding”’); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257 (agreeing with the other circuits that “Apprendi is not sufficiently fundamental to

2012Dukes v. United States, 255 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that “Apprendi presents a new rule of constitutional law that is not of ‘watershed’ magnitude and, consequently, petitioners may not raise Apprendi claims on collateral review”); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (holding that “the new rule announced in Apprendi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding’”); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257 (agreeing with the other circuits that “Apprendi is not sufficiently fundamental to

2013Dukes v. United States, 255 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that “Apprendi presents a new rule of constitutional law that is not of ‘watershed’ magnitude and, consequently, petitioners may not raise Apprendi claims on collateral review”); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (holding that “the new rule announced in Apprendi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding”’); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257 (agreeing with the other circuits that “Apprendi is not sufficiently fundamental to

2012Dukes v. United States, 255 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that “Apprendi presents a new rule of constitutional law that is not of ‘watershed’ magnitude and, consequently, petitioners may not raise Apprendi claims on collateral review”); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 151 (holding that “the new rule announced in Apprendi does not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure which ‘alters our understanding of the bedrock elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding’”); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257 (agreeing with the other circuits that “Apprendi is not sufficiently fundamental to

2006See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523 (b) (1994). -3- for Apprendi[v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)] purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Recently in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn. 2005), a majority of our supreme court found that, unlike the sentencing scheme discussed in Blakely, “Tennessee’s sentencing structure does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Moreover, this court has previously held that Blakely does not establish a new watershed rule, and that Blake

2006Recently, in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn. 2005), a majority of our supreme court found that, unlike the sentencing scheme discussed in Blakely, “Tennessee’s sentencing structure does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Moreover, this court has previously held that Blakely does not establish a new watershed rule, and that Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral appeal.

2012See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 407 (2007) (noting that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) was the only case the Court had identified as a watershed rule meriting retroactive application).

2012Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S. Ct. 792 , 9 L.

2012While the rule was not, previous to the Padilla decision, dictated by precedent, see Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (noting that “the Court’s view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the issue thus far”) (Alito, J., and Roberts, C.J., concurring), neither is it a watershed rule along the lines of Gideon.

2011App., Knoxville, May 12, 2011), the ruling was not entitled to retroactive application because it did not “exempt those subject to deportation from the criminal lawmaking authority” and “was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure essential to the fairness of a proceeding,” id., slip op. at 6.

2008As our supreme court observed in Van Tran v. State, “a new rule of federal constitutional law is to be applied in cases on collateral review only if it (1) places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe or (2) requires the observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty [ i.e., creates a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings.]” 66 S.W.3d 790, 811 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989)).

2005Based upon Walters, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief based upon the retroactivity test announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), for new “watershed rule[s] of criminal procedure.” However, this court has recently determined that Blakely does not establish a new watershed rule, concluding that Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral appeal.

2019In Bush v. State, the court characterized the Ward ruling as “an important new constitutional rule,” but it nevertheless concluded that because the ruling in Ward was “neither a watershed rule of criminal procedure nor a rule that substantially enhances the accuracy of convictions,” the ruling could not be classified as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” as required by Code section 40-30-122, and, accordingly, did not qualify as “a new constitutional right for which ‘retroactive application . . . is required’ under [Code section] 40-30-102(b)(1).” Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 20-21 (

2019Consequently, the court ruled, the Ward decision “did not toll the Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s one-year filing deadline.” Id. -5- That being said, due process principles may, in very limited circumstances, require tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations.

2012See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 407 (2007) (noting that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) was the only case the Court had identified as a watershed rule meriting retroactive application).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2012E.g., Guevara v. State, 2012 WL 938984 , at *3; see also, e.g., United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mathur, No. 11-6747, 2012 WL 2819603, at *4 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012); Figuereo-Sanchez v. United -5- States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012) (assuming that Padilla announced a new rule and concluding it was not a watershed rule warranting retroactivity); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694 (concluding Padilla announced a new rule).

2008As our supreme court observed in Van Tran v. State, “a new rule of federal constitutional law is to be applied in cases on collateral review only if it (1) places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe or (2) requires the observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty [ i.e., creates a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings.]” 66 S.W.3d 790, 811 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989)).

2006See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523 (b) (1994). -3- for Apprendi[v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)] purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Recently in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn. 2005), a majority of our supreme court found that, unlike the sentencing scheme discussed in Blakely, “Tennessee’s sentencing structure does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Moreover, this court has previously held that Blakely does not establish a new watershed rule, and that Blake

2006See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523 (b) (1994). -3- for Apprendi[v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)] purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Recently in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 661 (Tenn. 2005), a majority of our supreme court found that, unlike the sentencing scheme discussed in Blakely, “Tennessee’s sentencing structure does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Moreover, this court has previously held that Blakely does not establish a new watershed rule, and that Blake

2005Schriro v. Summerlin, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004).