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18 California opinions name it 3 courts 2005–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whorton v. Bocktinggreen2 sentences2022(Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 418 .) Last year, the high court in Edwards, supra, 593 U.S. ___ , [141 S.Ct. at pp. 1551–1552, 1560] acknowledged how narrow the watershed exception has been and eliminated it. 2019First, the rule must be necessary to prevent ‘an “‘impermissibly large risk’”’ of an inaccurate conviction. [Citations.] Second, the rule must ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’” (Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 418 [ 127 S.Ct. 1173 ]; see ibid. [“‘[i]t is . . . not enough . . . to say that [the] rule’ . . . ‘is directed toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense’”]; Schriro, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 352 [“[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule | 4 | 8 |
Schriro v. Summerlingreen2 sentences2020First, the rule must be necessary to prevent "an ' "impermissibly large risk" ' " of an inaccurate conviction. [Citations.] Second, the rule must "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." ' " (Id. at p. 994.) As the Milton court explained, Gallardo meets neither of these requirements.4 The Milton court observed that "Gallardo, though significant, was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure." (Milton, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 994, rev. granted.) "That a new procedural rule is 'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; 2019First, the rule must be necessary to prevent ‘an “‘impermissibly large risk’”’ of an inaccurate conviction. [Citations.] Second, the rule must ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.’” (Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 418 [ 127 S.Ct. 1173 ]; see ibid. [“‘[i]t is . . . not enough . . . to say that [the] rule’ . . . ‘is directed toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense’”]; Schriro, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 352 [“[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule | 3 | 5 |
In Re Gomezgreen2 sentences2015Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at __ [ 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2471 ].) Some courts in other jurisdictions have agreed with 5 Subsequent to Schriro, the United States Supreme Court further clarified the application of the Teague retroactivity test, holding that “the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state 2015Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at __ [ 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2471 ].) Some courts in other jurisdictions have agreed with 5 Subsequent to Schriro, the United States Supreme Court further clarified the application of the Teague retroactivity test, holding that “the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Sean Lamar Sanders, A/K/A Sean Lamont Sandersgreen2 sentences2005None of these cases have suggested that failure to submit [a factual question increasing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum] to a jury is structural error.” (United States v. Sanders, supra, 247 F.3d at p. 150 .) “Apprendi is not within this small core of cases [announcing a watershed rule]. 2005Therefore, Blakely has not declared the kind of "sweeping rule" necessary to fall within the watershed exception. ( United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, supra, 282 F.3d 664, 668-669 ; see also United States v. Sanders, supra, at p. 150.) Finally, noncompliance with Apprendi or Blakely is not accorded the status of a structural error that renders a proceeding fundamentally unfair and requires reversal per se. | 2 | 3 |
In Re Mooregreen2 sentences2022In light of Edwards, which was decided six months after petitioner filed his reply brief, petitioner withdrew his argument that Gallardo announced a watershed rule. 14 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. legitimate interest in having judgments remain final, and collateral review “ ‘is not designed as a substitute for direct review’ ”].) Some California courts have applied the federal retroactivity test in deciding the retroactivity of new procedural rules (e.g., In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 77 [new procedural rule not retroactive under Teague]), while others have applied 2018(Ibid.) Thus, Bockting held Crawford “does not fall within the Teague exception for watershed rules.” (Ibid.; see also In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68 [ruling similarly].) Given this guidance, we cannot see how the Sanchez decision could qualify as a watershed rule. | 2 | 2 |
In re Corpusgreen2 sentences2022In light of Edwards, which was decided six months after petitioner filed his reply brief, petitioner withdrew his argument that Gallardo announced a watershed rule. 14 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. legitimate interest in having judgments remain final, and collateral review “ ‘is not designed as a substitute for direct review’ ”].) Some California courts have applied the federal retroactivity test in deciding the retroactivity of new procedural rules (e.g., In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 77 [new procedural rule not retroactive under Teague]), while others have applied 2022In light of Edwards, which was decided six months after petitioner filed his reply brief, petitioner withdrew his argument that Gallardo announced a watershed rule. 14 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. legitimate interest in having judgments remain final, and collateral review “ ‘is not designed as a substitute for direct review’ ”].) Some California courts have applied the federal retroactivity test in deciding the retroactivity of new procedural rules (e.g., In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 77 [new procedural rule not retroactive under Teague]), while others have applied | 1 | 2 |
People v. Amonsgreen2 sentences2008(See, e.g., Schriro , at p. 353 ["[r]ules that allocate decisionmaking authority [between a judge and a jury] are prototypical procedural rules . . ."]; People v. Amons (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 855 , 864-865 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 908 ] ( Amons ) [ Blakely announced "a procedural rule that affects only the manner of determining the defendant's punishment"].) A procedural rule cannot be applied retroactively in a collateral attack unless "it is a `"watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure" implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.'" ( Whorton, supra , 549 U.S. at p. __ 2008(See, e.g., Schriro , at p. 353 ["[r]ules that allocate decisionmaking authority [between a judge and a jury] are prototypical procedural rules . . ."]; People v. Amons (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 855 , 864-865 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 908 ] ( Amons ) [ Blakely announced "a procedural rule that affects only the manner of determining the defendant's punishment"].) A procedural rule cannot be applied retroactively in a collateral attack unless "it is a `"watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure" implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.'" ( Whorton, supra , 549 U.S. at p. __ | 1 | 1 |
In Re Johnsongreen1 sentence2008That Cunningham "shifts some factfinding duties" during sentencing from a judge to a jury "does not implicate the intrinsic reliability and fundamental fairness of sentencing proceedings." ( Amons, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [ Blakely did not announce a watershed rule]; see also Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ].) A defendant can obtain a fair and accurate trial without the rule in Cunningham because the rule announced in that case "`"merely limits the potential penalty to be imposed on [an undoubtedly] guilty defendant."`" ( In re Consigl | 1 | 1 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008That Cunningham "shifts some factfinding duties" during sentencing from a judge to a jury "does not implicate the intrinsic reliability and fundamental fairness of sentencing proceedings." ( Amons, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [ Blakely did not announce a watershed rule]; see also Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ].) A defendant can obtain a fair and accurate trial without the rule in Cunningham because the rule announced in that case "`"merely limits the potential penalty to be imposed on [an undoubtedly] guilty defendant."`" ( In re Consigl 2008That Cunningham "shifts some factfinding duties" during sentencing from a judge to a jury "does not implicate the intrinsic reliability and fundamental fairness of sentencing proceedings." ( Amons, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [ Blakely did not announce a watershed rule]; see also Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ].) A defendant can obtain a fair and accurate trial without the rule in Cunningham because the rule announced in that case "`"merely limits the potential penalty to be imposed on [an undoubtedly] guilty defendant."`" ( In re Consigl | 1 | 1 |
In Re Consigliogreen1 sentence2008That Cunningham "shifts some factfinding duties" during sentencing from a judge to a jury "does not implicate the intrinsic reliability and fundamental fairness of sentencing proceedings." ( Amons, supra , 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [ Blakely did not announce a watershed rule]; see also Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ].) A defendant can obtain a fair and accurate trial without the rule in Cunningham because the rule announced in that case "`"merely limits the potential penalty to be imposed on [an undoubtedly] guilty defendant."`" ( In re Consigl | 1 | 1 |
| Beard v. Banksgreen | 1 | 1 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Markelgreen1 sentence2005(See In re Markel (2005) 154 Wn.2d 262, 270, fn. 2 [111 *77 P.3d 249, 252].) As the high court recently observed in Beard regarding the retroactive application of new criminal procedural rules, “we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.” (Beard, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 417 [124 S.Ct. at pp. 2513-2514].) Crawford does not rise to the level of Gideon, supra, 372 U.S. 335 , under the watershed rule test. | 1 | 1 |
Marvin Howard Bockting v. Robert Bayergreen1 sentence2005Moore maintains the new rule announced in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 is applicable because it was decided while his case was on direct review and “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final____” (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 649 , 107 S.Ct. 708 ].) Alternatively, he relies on the recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Bockting v. Bayer (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3d 1010, 1021-1024 (Bockting), which held by a two-to-one vote that Crawford was a new wa | 1 | 1 |
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2005Moore maintains the new rule announced in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 is applicable because it was decided while his case was on direct review and “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final____” (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 649 , 107 S.Ct. 708 ].) Alternatively, he relies on the recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Bockting v. Bayer (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3d 1010, 1021-1024 (Bockting), which held by a two-to-one vote that Crawford was a new wa 2005Moore maintains the new rule announced in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 is applicable because it was decided while his case was on direct review and “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final____” (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 649 , 107 S.Ct. 708 ].) Alternatively, he relies on the recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Bockting v. Bayer (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3d 1010, 1021-1024 (Bockting), which held by a two-to-one vote that Crawford was a new wa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roper v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2015(Ibid.) This class of rules is extremely narrow; a watershed rule is one “ ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’ ” (Ibid.)5 The Attorney General contends that Miller announced a new procedural rule, not a new substantive rule, pointing out that the Miller court stated, “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper[, supra, 543 U.S. 551 ] [barring death penalty for defendants who were under 18 years of age at time of the offense] or Graham[, supra, 560 U.S. 48 ] [barring d 2015(Ibid.) This class of rules is extremely narrow; a watershed rule is one “ ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’ ” (Ibid.)5 The Attorney General contends that Miller announced a new procedural rule, not a new substantive rule, pointing out that the Miller court stated, “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper[, supra, 543 U.S. 551 ] [barring death penalty for defendants who were under 18 years of age at time of the offense] or Graham[, supra, 560 U.S. 48 ] [barring d | 5 | 2015–2015 |
Graham v. Florida
green
2 sentences2015(Ibid.) This class of rules is extremely narrow; a watershed rule is one “ ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’ ” (Ibid.)5 The Attorney General contends that Miller announced a new procedural rule, not a new substantive rule, pointing out that the Miller court stated, “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper[, supra, 543 U.S. 551 ] [barring death penalty for defendants who were under 18 years of age at time of the offense] or Graham[, supra, 560 U.S. 48 ] [barring d 2015(Ibid.) This class of rules is extremely narrow; a watershed rule is one “ ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’ ” (Ibid.)5 The Attorney General contends that Miller announced a new procedural rule, not a new substantive rule, pointing out that the Miller court stated, “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper[, supra, 543 U.S. 551 ] [barring death penalty for defendants who were under 18 years of age at time of the offense] or Graham[, supra, 560 U.S. 48 ] [barring d | 5 | 2015–2015 |
Danforth v. Minnesota
green
2 sentences2015Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at __ [ 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2471 ].) Some courts in other jurisdictions have agreed with 5 Subsequent to Schriro, the United States Supreme Court further clarified the application of the Teague retroactivity test, holding that “the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state 2015Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at __ [ 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2471 ].) Some courts in other jurisdictions have agreed with 5 Subsequent to Schriro, the United States Supreme Court further clarified the application of the Teague retroactivity test, holding that “the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2015Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at __ [ 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2471 ].) Some courts in other jurisdictions have agreed with 5 Subsequent to Schriro, the United States Supreme Court further clarified the application of the Teague retroactivity test, holding that “the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state 2015Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at __ [ 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2471 ].) Some courts in other jurisdictions have agreed with 5 Subsequent to Schriro, the United States Supreme Court further clarified the application of the Teague retroactivity test, holding that “the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state | 3 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Juan Sanchez-Cervantes, AKA Hugo Quirox, Quiroc, Quiroz, Quiroz Trejo, and Quiroz Tapia
green
2 sentences2005Therefore, Blakely has not declared the kind of "sweeping rule" necessary to fall within the watershed exception. ( United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, supra, 282 F.3d 664, 668-669 ; see also United States v. Sanders, supra, at p. 150.) Finally, noncompliance with Apprendi or Blakely is not accorded the status of a structural error that renders a proceeding fundamentally unfair and requires reversal per se. 2005Therefore, Blakely has not declared the kind of "sweeping rule" necessary to fall within the watershed exception. ( United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, supra, 282 F.3d 664, 668-669 ; see also United States v. Sanders, supra, at p. 150.) Finally, noncompliance with Apprendi or Blakely is not accorded the status of a structural error that renders a proceeding fundamentally unfair and requires reversal per se. | 3 | 2005–2005 |
Penry v. Lynaugh
red
2 sentences2015(See Penry v. Lynaugh (1889) 492 U.S. 302, 330 , abrogated on other grounds; Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 ; Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 551 .) The Court has treated the rule forbidding life imprisonment for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense as a substantive rule (see Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 61-62), as it has a decision that modifies the elements of an offense because new elements alter the range of conduct the statute punishes, rendering some formerly unlawful conduct lawful or vice versa. 2015(See Penry v. Lynaugh (1889) 492 U.S. 302, 330 , abrogated on other grounds; Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 ; Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 551 .) The Court has treated the rule forbidding life imprisonment for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense as a substantive rule (see Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 61-62), as it has a decision that modifies the elements of an offense because new elements alter the range of conduct the statute punishes, rendering some formerly unlawful conduct lawful or vice versa. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Atkins v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2015(See Penry v. Lynaugh (1889) 492 U.S. 302, 330 , abrogated on other grounds; Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 ; Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 551 .) The Court has treated the rule forbidding life imprisonment for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense as a substantive rule (see Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 61-62), as it has a decision that modifies the elements of an offense because new elements alter the range of conduct the statute punishes, rendering some formerly unlawful conduct lawful or vice versa. 2015(See Penry v. Lynaugh (1889) 492 U.S. 302, 330 , abrogated on other grounds; Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 ; Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 551 .) The Court has treated the rule forbidding life imprisonment for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense as a substantive rule (see Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 61-62), as it has a decision that modifies the elements of an offense because new elements alter the range of conduct the statute punishes, rendering some formerly unlawful conduct lawful or vice versa. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
In re Melvin Hiram Thomas II On Habeas Corpus
green
2 sentences2022In light of Edwards, which was decided six months after petitioner filed his reply brief, petitioner withdrew his argument that Gallardo announced a watershed rule. 14 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. legitimate interest in having judgments remain final, and collateral review “ ‘is not designed as a substitute for direct review’ ”].) Some California courts have applied the federal retroactivity test in deciding the retroactivity of new procedural rules (e.g., In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 77 [new procedural rule not retroactive under Teague]), while others have applied 2022In light of Edwards, which was decided six months after petitioner filed his reply brief, petitioner withdrew his argument that Gallardo announced a watershed rule. 14 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. legitimate interest in having judgments remain final, and collateral review “ ‘is not designed as a substitute for direct review’ ”].) Some California courts have applied the federal retroactivity test in deciding the retroactivity of new procedural rules (e.g., In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 77 [new procedural rule not retroactive under Teague]), while others have applied | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re Hansen
green
1 sentence2022We have neither explicitly disavowed Johnson nor explicitly adopted the federal Teague test for state collateral review proceedings (In re Hansen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 906, 910 ), and we need not decide in this case what test applies to new procedural rules, because we reach the same conclusion under both tests. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Gallardo
green
1 sentence2019(See Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 136 .) But the California Supreme Court did not reach this conclusion because a sentencing court’s factfinding, or the kind of evidence sentencing courts used to consider in connection with that factfinding, was somehow inaccurate or unreliable. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Reid
green
1 sentence2013Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has subsequently held that its Crawford decision is not a watershed rule necessary to the fundamental fairness of a trial and the accuracy of criminal proceedings. 15 (Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 409, 417-421 [refusing to apply Crawford rule retroactively to cases already final on direct review].) Thus, we agree with those federal and state courts that have rejected Cromer and held that “ ‘a defendant can open the door to the admission of evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.’ ” (People v. Reid (2012) 19 N.Y.3d 382, 38 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Brown
green
1 sentence2005(See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins (3d Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 151, 153-154 ; United States v. Sanders (4th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 139, 149-151 ; United States v. Brown (5th Cir. 2002) 305 F3d 304, 309 ; United States v. Moss (8th Cir. 2001) 252 F.3d 993, 999-1000 ; United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes (9th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3d 664, 669-670 ; McCoy v. United States (11th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1245, 1257-1258 .) “As these courts have recognized, it is possible for a criminal defendant to have a fair and accurate trial without the new procedural protection offered by Apprendi . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2005Moore maintains the new rule announced in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 is applicable because it was decided while his case was on direct review and “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final____” (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 649 , 107 S.Ct. 708 ].) Alternatively, he relies on the recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Bockting v. Bayer (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3d 1010, 1021-1024 (Bockting), which held by a two-to-one vote that Crawford was a new wa 2005As the Attorney General correctly points out in his supplemental briefing, the record clearly shows Moore’s case was final and he had exhausted his direct appeal avenues at the time the decision in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , announced a new rule of procedural constitutional law. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Chester McCoy v. United States
green
1 sentence2005(See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins (3d Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 151, 153-154 ; United States v. Sanders (4th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 139, 149-151 ; United States v. Brown (5th Cir. 2002) 305 F3d 304, 309 ; United States v. Moss (8th Cir. 2001) 252 F.3d 993, 999-1000 ; United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes (9th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3d 664, 669-670 ; McCoy v. United States (11th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1245, 1257-1258 .) “As these courts have recognized, it is possible for a criminal defendant to have a fair and accurate trial without the new procedural protection offered by Apprendi . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Gideon v. Wainwright green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Hugh Von Meshack Lawayne Thomas Linda Parker Terrence Ian Hodges, Also Known as Guda
green
1 sentence2005(See United States v. Kentz (9th Cir.2001) 251 F.3d 835, 842 ; United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, supra, 282 F.3d 664, 669-670 ; United States v. Terry (1st Cir.2001) 240 F.3d 65, 74-75 ; United States v. Nance (7th Cir.2000) 236 F.3d 820, 823-824 ; United States v. Meshack (5th Cir.2000) 225 F.3d 556, 575 .) Instead, the harmless error analysis for federal constitutional errors ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ) has been employed to determine whether reversal is required. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Kenneth B. Terry, A/K/A \Kenny Polo
green
1 sentence2005(See United States v. Kentz (9th Cir.2001) 251 F.3d 835, 842 ; United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, supra, 282 F.3d 664, 669-670 ; United States v. Terry (1st Cir.2001) 240 F.3d 65, 74-75 ; United States v. Nance (7th Cir.2000) 236 F.3d 820, 823-824 ; United States v. Meshack (5th Cir.2000) 225 F.3d 556, 575 .) Instead, the harmless error analysis for federal constitutional errors ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ) has been employed to determine whether reversal is required. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Wendell Nance, Sr. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Charles Lowell Kentz green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Darius M. Moss
green
1 sentence2005(See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins (3d Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 151, 153-154 ; United States v. Sanders (4th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 139, 149-151 ; United States v. Brown (5th Cir. 2002) 305 F3d 304, 309 ; United States v. Moss (8th Cir. 2001) 252 F.3d 993, 999-1000 ; United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes (9th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3d 664, 669-670 ; McCoy v. United States (11th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1245, 1257-1258 .) “As these courts have recognized, it is possible for a criminal defendant to have a fair and accurate trial without the new procedural protection offered by Apprendi . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. William R. Jenkins green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.