Schlup-type claim in Texas

2025The second is a Schlup-type claim, which is a “procedural claim in which applicant’s claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial.” Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d at 567 n.2 (quoting Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 675 ); see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995). 3 “The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” TEX.

2018The second type of claim, a Schlup-type claim, is a “procedural claim in which applicant’s claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial.” Id. (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995)).

2025The second is a Schlup-type claim, which is a “procedural claim in which applicant’s claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial.” Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d at 567 n.2 (quoting Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 675 ); see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995). 3 “The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” TEX.

2018The second type of claim, a Schlup-type claim, is a “procedural claim in which applicant’s claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial.” Id. (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995)).

2016Appellant asserts that his “Schlup-type claim is, in essence, a Herrera-type claim coupled with an independent trial-counsel deficien[cy] claim, without an independent showing of prejudice.” As explained by the court of criminal appeals, a Schlup-type claim is “one that ‘does not by itself provide a basis for relief,’ but is intertwined with constitutional error that renders a person’s conviction constitutionally invalid.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544–45 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 , 115 S. Ct. at 860 ); see Ex parte Villegas, 415 S.W.3d 885, 886 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15, 1

2016Appellant asserts that his “Schlup-type claim is, in essence, a Herrera-type claim coupled with an independent trial-counsel deficien[cy] claim, without an independent showing of prejudice.” As explained by the court of criminal appeals, a Schlup-type claim is “one that ‘does not by itself provide a basis for relief,’ but is intertwined with constitutional error that renders a person’s conviction constitutionally invalid.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544–45 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 , 115 S. Ct. at 860 ); see Ex parte Villegas, 415 S.W.3d 885, 886 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15, 1

2016In a Schlup-type claim, the applicant “must show that the constitutional error probably resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent.” Ex parte Spencer, 337 S.W.3d 869, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2016In a Schlup-type claim, the applicant “must show that the constitutional error probably resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent.” Ex parte Spencer, 337 S.W.3d 869, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2016Appellant asserts that his “Schlup-type claim is, in essence, a Herrera-type claim coupled with an independent trial-counsel deficien[cy] claim, without an independent showing of prejudice.” As explained by the court of criminal appeals, a Schlup-type claim is “one that ‘does not by itself provide a basis for relief,’ but is intertwined with constitutional error that renders a person’s conviction constitutionally invalid.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544–45 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 , 115 S. Ct. at 860 ); see Ex parte Villegas, 415 S.W.3d 885, 886 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15, 1

2016Appellant asserts that his “Schlup-type claim is, in essence, a Herrera-type claim coupled with an independent trial-counsel deficien[cy] claim, without an independent showing of prejudice.” As explained by the court of criminal appeals, a Schlup-type claim is “one that ‘does not by itself provide a basis for relief,’ but is intertwined with constitutional error that renders a person’s conviction constitutionally invalid.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544–45 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 , 115 S. Ct. at 860 ); see Ex parte Villegas, 415 S.W.3d 885, 886 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15, 1

2016See In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 703-09 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). .See id. at 700, 703-04 (stating that "[a] Herrera claim is a substantive claim in which the person asserts a bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence,” and entails a showing “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence,” while “a Schlup- type claim is procedural: it provides a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred c

2016See In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 703-09 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). .See id. at 700, 703-04 (stating that "[a] Herrera claim is a substantive claim in which the person asserts a bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence,” and entails a showing “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence,” while “a Schlup- type claim is procedural: it provides a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred c

2015A “claim” of this sort is also known as a “Schlup-type claim,” id., because Section 5(a)(2) “was enacted in response to” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), Reed IV, 271 S.W.3d at 733 .

2015That is because the standard for such a claim is “more likely than not” test, see Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d at 772 , which is the same “more likely than not” standard utilized in the Schlup-type claim already rejected by this Court concerning the timing inferences to be drawn from morphologically intact sperm, see Reed IV, 271 S.W.3d at 733 . 39 addressed by the Court when Applicant claimed that, after rigor mortis passes, “dilation of the anus [becomes] easier, whether by finger, swab, or another object.” Reed IV, 271 S.W.3d at 743 .

2012See, e.g., Ex parte Henton, 2006 WL 362331 , at *1 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (vacating the judgment and sentence of a successful Heirera claimant yet ordering that applicant be "remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas County so that he may answer the charges against him.”); Ex parte Byars, 176 S.W.3d 841, 842 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (granting Herrera relief and instructing applicant to be “remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Jefferson County to answer to the indictment.”); Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 397 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (granting Herrera relief but returning applicant to "the cust

2012See, e.g., Ex parte Henton, 2006 WL 362331 , at *1 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (vacating the judgment and sentence of a successful Heirera claimant yet ordering that applicant be "remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas County so that he may answer the charges against him.”); Ex parte Byars, 176 S.W.3d 841, 842 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (granting Herrera relief and instructing applicant to be “remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Jefferson County to answer to the indictment.”); Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 397 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (granting Herrera relief but returning applicant to "the cust

2016See id. at 707 . . 265 S.W.3d at 704-08 (construing Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1488, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen.

2012See, e.g., Ex parte Henton, 2006 WL 362331 , at *1 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (vacating the judgment and sentence of a successful Heirera claimant yet ordering that applicant be "remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas County so that he may answer the charges against him.”); Ex parte Byars, 176 S.W.3d 841, 842 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (granting Herrera relief and instructing applicant to be “remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Jefferson County to answer to the indictment.”); Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 397 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (granting Herrera relief but returning applicant to "the cust

2012See, e.g., Ex parte Henton, 2006 WL 362331 , at *1 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (vacating the judgment and sentence of a successful Heirera claimant yet ordering that applicant be "remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas County so that he may answer the charges against him.”); Ex parte Byars, 176 S.W.3d 841, 842 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (granting Herrera relief and instructing applicant to be “remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Jefferson County to answer to the indictment.”); Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388, 397 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (granting Herrera relief but returning applicant to "the cust

2012See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2012See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).