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30 California opinions name it 2 courts 1907–1968 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCarthy v. Tallygreen2 sentences1966See McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal.2d 577, 583 [ 297 P.2d 981 ], and eases cited.) Thus the validity of a provision for liquidated damages will depend in each case upon the sufficiency of the evidence to bring the ease within the exception of section 1671. 1966See McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal.2d 577, 583 [ 297 P.2d 981 ], and eases cited.) Thus the validity of a provision for liquidated damages will depend in each case upon the sufficiency of the evidence to bring the ease within the exception of section 1671. | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Mulkeygreen2 sentences1950See Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ], where the court says (p. 575): “Fraud or mistake is extrinsic when it deprives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to present his case to the court. [Citations.] ’ ’ With certain statutory exceptions, consent to an adoption is considered a jurisdictional prerequisite. (1 Cal.Jur. 436.) “Where required, consent is ordinarily held an essential requisite to jurisdiction on the part of the court to make an order of adoption unless conditions or exceptions exist, specially provided by the statute itself, which render consent unnecessary. 1950See Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ], where the court says (p. 575): “Fraud or mistake is extrinsic when it deprives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to present his case to the court. [Citations.] ’ ’ With certain statutory exceptions, consent to an adoption is considered a jurisdictional prerequisite. (1 Cal.Jur. 436.) “Where required, consent is ordinarily held an essential requisite to jurisdiction on the part of the court to make an order of adoption unless conditions or exceptions exist, specially provided by the statute itself, which render consent unnecessary. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Helmgreen2 sentences1948(Estate of Kelpsch, 203 Cal. 613, 616-617 [ 265 P. 214 ]; Estate of Helm, 6 Cal.App.2d 752, 754-755 [ 45 P.2d 250 ].) As to the husband’s claim that the real property is separate property passing to him on termination of joint tenancy by the wife’s death, the determination of that question is of course equally beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. 1948(Estate of Kelpsch, 203 Cal. 613, 616-617 [ 265 P. 214 ]; Estate of Helm, 6 Cal.App.2d 752, 754-755 [ 45 P.2d 250 ].) As to the husband’s claim that the real property is separate property passing to him on termination of joint tenancy by the wife’s death, the determination of that question is of course equally beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. | 1 | 1 |
Beckner v. Kelpschgreen2 sentences1948(Estate of Kelpsch, 203 Cal. 613, 616-617 [ 265 P. 214 ]; Estate of Helm, 6 Cal.App.2d 752, 754-755 [ 45 P.2d 250 ].) As to the husband’s claim that the real property is separate property passing to him on termination of joint tenancy by the wife’s death, the determination of that question is of course equally beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. 1948(Estate of Kelpsch, 203 Cal. 613, 616-617 [ 265 P. 214 ]; Estate of Helm, 6 Cal.App.2d 752, 754-755 [ 45 P.2d 250 ].) As to the husband’s claim that the real property is separate property passing to him on termination of joint tenancy by the wife’s death, the determination of that question is of course equally beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. | 1 | 1 |
Pritchard v. Kinggreen2 sentences1948(Estate of King, 199 Cal. 113, 117-118 [ 248 P. 519 ].) It is said in Estate of Klumpke, supra, 167 Cal. at page 421 ; “A surviving husband claiming that certain prop *684 erty was community property up to the time of the death of his wife is thereby asserting a claim of title adverse to that of the estate of his wife, which cannot be determined by the court in probate. ’ ’ The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus br 1948(Estate of King, 199 Cal. 113, 117-118 [ 248 P. 519 ].) It is said in Estate of Klumpke, supra, 167 Cal. at page 421 ; “A surviving husband claiming that certain prop *684 erty was community property up to the time of the death of his wife is thereby asserting a claim of title adverse to that of the estate of his wife, which cannot be determined by the court in probate. ’ ’ The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus br | 1 | 1 |
Butcher v. Brouwergreen2 sentences1947We have held that “even though the creditor may have satisfied the court that he has proceeded with due diligence to enforce his judgment under section 681, the court may still deny him its process if the debtor shows circumstances occurring subsequent to the five-year period upon which, in the exercise of a sound discretion, it should conclude that he is not now entitled to collect his judgment.” (Butcher v. Brouwer, 21 Cal.2d 354, 358 [ 132 P.2d 205 ].) Defendant’s reliance on the assurance that the judgment would not be enforced against him, the failure to make any demand on him for payment 1947We have held that “even though the creditor may have satisfied the court that he has proceeded with due diligence to enforce his judgment under section 681, the court may still deny him its process if the debtor shows circumstances occurring subsequent to the five-year period upon which, in the exercise of a sound discretion, it should conclude that he is not now entitled to collect his judgment.” (Butcher v. Brouwer, 21 Cal.2d 354, 358 [ 132 P.2d 205 ].) Defendant’s reliance on the assurance that the judgment would not be enforced against him, the failure to make any demand on him for payment | 1 | 1 |
Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling, & Developing Co.green2 sentences1944(Wait v. Kern River Mining etc. Co., 157 Cal. 16, 23 [ 106 P. 98 ].) The pleadings and facts established in the present case are sufficient to authorize the judgment given. 1944(Wait v. Kern River Mining etc. Co., 157 Cal. 16, 23 [ 106 P. 98 ].) The pleadings and facts established in the present case are sufficient to authorize the judgment given. | 1 | 1 |
Fleishman v. Woodsgreen2 sentences1944(See also Fleishman v. Woods, 135 Cal. 256, 260 [ 67 P. 276 ].) It has been well established in this state that if the facts alleged in the pleadings and those proved are sufficient to bring a ease within the exception and show inadequacy of legal remedy, that is enough. 1944(See also Fleishman v. Woods, 135 Cal. 256, 260 [ 67 P. 276 ].) It has been well established in this state that if the facts alleged in the pleadings and those proved are sufficient to bring a ease within the exception and show inadequacy of legal remedy, that is enough. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Cookgreen2 sentences1943(Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 630-639 [ 209 P. 576 ]; Thompson v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569-573 [ 127 P.2d 909 ].) As originally filed the answers alleged a good will or going concern value but made no mention of the company’s liabilities which may have been greater. 1943(Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 630-639 [ 209 P. 576 ]; Thompson v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569-573 [ 127 P.2d 909 ].) As originally filed the answers alleged a good will or going concern value but made no mention of the company’s liabilities which may have been greater. | 1 | 1 |
Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurancegreen2 sentences1943Co. 13 Cal.2d 306, 315 [89 P.2d 637 ].) It is claimed that defendants’ answers herein admit the company was solvent, thus bringing this ease within the rule that where a party admits facts showing invalidity of a judgment valid on its face it must be set aside. 1943Co. 13 Cal.2d 306, 315 [89 P.2d 637 ].) It is claimed that defendants’ answers herein admit the company was solvent, thus bringing this ease within the rule that where a party admits facts showing invalidity of a judgment valid on its face it must be set aside. | 1 | 1 |
Akley v. Bassettgreen2 sentences1943(Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 630-639 [ 209 P. 576 ]; Thompson v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569-573 [ 127 P.2d 909 ].) As originally filed the answers alleged a good will or going concern value but made no mention of the company’s liabilities which may have been greater. 1943(Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 630-639 [ 209 P. 576 ]; Thompson v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569-573 [ 127 P.2d 909 ].) As originally filed the answers alleged a good will or going concern value but made no mention of the company’s liabilities which may have been greater. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cosbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lapierregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rolls v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Barnett
green
2 sentences1968Thus he asserts that the failure of the police officers to keep the informer under constant observation brings the ease within the rule of People v. Barnett (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 257 P.2d 1041 ], where it was held that such failure constituted a fatal flaw in the chain of evidence. 1968Thus he asserts that the failure of the police officers to keep the informer under constant observation brings the ease within the rule of People v. Barnett (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 336 [ 257 P.2d 1041 ], where it was held that such failure constituted a fatal flaw in the chain of evidence. | 2 | 1961–1968 |
Bauer v. Bauer
green
2 sentences1951(Ex parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269 [ 12 P. 118 ]; Estate of Haas, 97 Cal. 232 [ 31 P. 893 , 32 P. 327 ].) This is necessarily so for the reason that either the person initiating the attack or the person resisting the attack is lacking in privity to the probate proceedings.” And at page 684: “The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus bringing the ease within the exception mentioned in Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 201 Cal. 267 , an 1948(Estate of King, 199 Cal. 113, 117-118 [ 248 P. 519 ].) It is said in Estate of Klumpke, supra, 167 Cal. at page 421 ; “A surviving husband claiming that certain prop *684 erty was community property up to the time of the death of his wife is thereby asserting a claim of title adverse to that of the estate of his wife, which cannot be determined by the court in probate. ’ ’ The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus br | 2 | 1948–1951 |
People v. Burke
green
2 sentences1966It is argued that this brings the ease within the principle of People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ], As far as the finding of the beer is concerned, this was brought out by defense counsel and fit in with his theory of intoxication. 1966It is argued that this brings the ease within the principle of People v. Burke, 61 Cal.2d 575 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 531 , 394 P.2d 67 ], As far as the finding of the beer is concerned, this was brought out by defense counsel and fit in with his theory of intoxication. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
People v. Citrino
green
1 sentence1959Even if we assume that there is some validity to this argument, it still does not bring the instant ease within the rule of People v. Citrino, supra, 46 Cal.2d 284 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Womar v. City of Long Beach
neutral
2 sentences1957Defendant also seeks to bring this ease within the rule of Womar v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 114 P.2d 704 ], where the injury was due to a “set of unfortunate natural circumstances for which the law provides no remedy.” However, whether the injury was due to the acts of the defendant when it made the 1955 changes in the outfall line, as contended by the plaintiff, or due to the unusually heavy rainfall, as contended by the defendant, was a matter of fact properly left to the jury and resolved in favor of the plaintiffs here. 1957Defendant also seeks to bring this ease within the rule of Womar v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 114 P.2d 704 ], where the injury was due to a “set of unfortunate natural circumstances for which the law provides no remedy.” However, whether the injury was due to the acts of the defendant when it made the 1955 changes in the outfall line, as contended by the plaintiff, or due to the unusually heavy rainfall, as contended by the defendant, was a matter of fact properly left to the jury and resolved in favor of the plaintiffs here. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
People v. Davenport
green
2 sentences1955Defendant contends that this fact brings the ease within the rule of People v. Davenport, 13 Cal.2d 681 [ 91 P.2d 892 ], People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d 765 , and others, that “It is settled that the Corporate Securities Law was not intended to afford supervision and regulation of instruments which constitute agreements with persons who expect to reap a profit from their own services or other active participation in a business venture.” (People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 768 .) The facts of that case are easily distinguishable from the facts in our case. 1955Defendant contends that this fact brings the ease within the rule of People v. Davenport, 13 Cal.2d 681 [ 91 P.2d 892 ], People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d 765 , and others, that “It is settled that the Corporate Securities Law was not intended to afford supervision and regulation of instruments which constitute agreements with persons who expect to reap a profit from their own services or other active participation in a business venture.” (People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 768 .) The facts of that case are easily distinguishable from the facts in our case. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
People v. Syde
green
2 sentences1955Defendant contends that this fact brings the ease within the rule of People v. Davenport, 13 Cal.2d 681 [ 91 P.2d 892 ], People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d 765 , and others, that “It is settled that the Corporate Securities Law was not intended to afford supervision and regulation of instruments which constitute agreements with persons who expect to reap a profit from their own services or other active participation in a business venture.” (People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 768 .) The facts of that case are easily distinguishable from the facts in our case. 1955Defendant contends that this fact brings the ease within the rule of People v. Davenport, 13 Cal.2d 681 [ 91 P.2d 892 ], People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d 765 , and others, that “It is settled that the Corporate Securities Law was not intended to afford supervision and regulation of instruments which constitute agreements with persons who expect to reap a profit from their own services or other active participation in a business venture.” (People v. Syde, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 768 .) The facts of that case are easily distinguishable from the facts in our case. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
McCalla v. Grosse
green
2 sentences1953It is argued that the allegations that Maurer *408 purchased the vehicle and permitted it to be registered in the name of Wardwell, knowing that he was a reckless and careless driver and not licensed to drive, were sufficient to bring this ease within the rule announced in McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal.App.2d 546 [ 109 P.2d 358 ], “that one who knowingly permits an unfit driver to use his automobile is liable for damages caused by the negligent acts of the unfit driver in the operation of the car.” It is also argued that the allegations of uncertainty set forth in the demurrer are not well taken s 1953It is argued that the allegations that Maurer *408 purchased the vehicle and permitted it to be registered in the name of Wardwell, knowing that he was a reckless and careless driver and not licensed to drive, were sufficient to bring this ease within the rule announced in McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal.App.2d 546 [ 109 P.2d 358 ], “that one who knowingly permits an unfit driver to use his automobile is liable for damages caused by the negligent acts of the unfit driver in the operation of the car.” It is also argued that the allegations of uncertainty set forth in the demurrer are not well taken s | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Hathaway v. Siskiyou Union High School District
green
2 sentences1953The respondent contends that no cause of action is stated against him since it is not alleged that he was the owner of this car, but on the contrary it is directly alleged that Ward-well was the owner; that the allegations are not sufficient to show that he had legal custody of the defendant Wardwell, citing Hathaway v. Siskiyou Union High School Dist., 66 Cal.App.2d 103 [ 151 P.2d 861 ], in which it was held that the person having custody of a minor, within the meaning of subdivision (b) of section 352, means a person having the permanent legal custody and not one whose control is limited in 1953The respondent contends that no cause of action is stated against him since it is not alleged that he was the owner of this car, but on the contrary it is directly alleged that Ward-well was the owner; that the allegations are not sufficient to show that he had legal custody of the defendant Wardwell, citing Hathaway v. Siskiyou Union High School Dist., 66 Cal.App.2d 103 [ 151 P.2d 861 ], in which it was held that the person having custody of a minor, within the meaning of subdivision (b) of section 352, means a person having the permanent legal custody and not one whose control is limited in | 1 | 1953–1953 |
American Colonial Bank v. Peña
green
1 sentence1951(Ex parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269 [ 12 P. 118 ]; Estate of Haas, 97 Cal. 232 [ 31 P. 893 , 32 P. 327 ].) This is necessarily so for the reason that either the person initiating the attack or the person resisting the attack is lacking in privity to the probate proceedings.” And at page 684: “The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus bringing the ease within the exception mentioned in Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 201 Cal. 267 , an | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Ex parte Casey
green
2 sentences1951(Ex parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269 [ 12 P. 118 ]; Estate of Haas, 97 Cal. 232 [ 31 P. 893 , 32 P. 327 ].) This is necessarily so for the reason that either the person initiating the attack or the person resisting the attack is lacking in privity to the probate proceedings.” And at page 684: “The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus bringing the ease within the exception mentioned in Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 201 Cal. 267 , an 1951(Ex parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269 [ 12 P. 118 ]; Estate of Haas, 97 Cal. 232 [ 31 P. 893 , 32 P. 327 ].) This is necessarily so for the reason that either the person initiating the attack or the person resisting the attack is lacking in privity to the probate proceedings.” And at page 684: “The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus bringing the ease within the exception mentioned in Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 201 Cal. 267 , an | 1 | 1951–1951 |
In re Estate of Haas
green
1 sentence1951(Ex parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269 [ 12 P. 118 ]; Estate of Haas, 97 Cal. 232 [ 31 P. 893 , 32 P. 327 ].) This is necessarily so for the reason that either the person initiating the attack or the person resisting the attack is lacking in privity to the probate proceedings.” And at page 684: “The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus bringing the ease within the exception mentioned in Bauer v. Bauer, supra, 201 Cal. 267 , an | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Matter of Cozza
green
2 sentences1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili 1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Díaz v. Arkadia Sugar Co.
green
1 sentence1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Pico v. Cohn
green
1 sentence1950As said in Matter of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 [ 126 P. 161 , Ann.Cas. 1914A 214], “Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption ...” (P. 522.) In Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129 [ 25 P. 970 , 27 P. 537 , 25 Am.St.Rep. 159 , 13 L.R.A. 336 ], cited by defendants, the court, after stating the general rule that where parties have submitted a matter to a court for determination, or have had an opportunity to submit it, the court’s determination must be final, gives the exception to that rule: “. . . unless it can be shown that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevaili | 1 | 1950–1950 |
In Re the Estate of Klumpke
green
1 sentence1948(Estate of King, 199 Cal. 113, 117-118 [ 248 P. 519 ].) It is said in Estate of Klumpke, supra, 167 Cal. at page 421 ; “A surviving husband claiming that certain prop *684 erty was community property up to the time of the death of his wife is thereby asserting a claim of title adverse to that of the estate of his wife, which cannot be determined by the court in probate. ’ ’ The only cases where the husband’s claim against the wife’s estate that property was community has been held to be within the probate court’s jurisdiction are cases where the husband was the personal representative, thus br | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Russell v. Miller
green
2 sentences1945In the ease just cited, it is further held that it is the duty of the petitioner to set forth in his petition for the writ his objections to the proceedings had before the board, if such proceedings are to be questioned. *8 Nowhere in the petition for a writ of supersedeas, nor at the argument thereon, was any showing made that the questions raised on the appeal bring this ease within the doctrine enunciated in Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, or Russell v. Miller, 21 Cal.2d 817 [ 136 P.2d 318 ], By stipulation, the record of the mandamus proceeding in the superior court is now befor 1945In the ease just cited, it is further held that it is the duty of the petitioner to set forth in his petition for the writ his objections to the proceedings had before the board, if such proceedings are to be questioned. *8 Nowhere in the petition for a writ of supersedeas, nor at the argument thereon, was any showing made that the questions raised on the appeal bring this ease within the doctrine enunciated in Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, or Russell v. Miller, 21 Cal.2d 817 [ 136 P.2d 318 ], By stipulation, the record of the mandamus proceeding in the superior court is now befor | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Franck v. Spencer
green
2 sentences1944Appellant claims that this testimony, which was uncontradicted, brings the ease within the rule announced in Estate of Franck, 190 Cal. 28 [ 210 P. 417 ]. 1944Appellant claims that this testimony, which was uncontradicted, brings the ease within the rule announced in Estate of Franck, 190 Cal. 28 [ 210 P. 417 ]. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| People v. King green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| People v. Lisenba green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| People v. Knight green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
People v. Northcott
green
2 sentences1940It is conceded that the general rule is that evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove the charges for which the defendant stands charged, but there are limitations and exceptions to the rule allowing introduction of evidence of other offenses and it is the contention of respondent that the evidence pertaining to the commission of a similar offense by appellant as here described brings the instant ease within the exception and limitation of the rule, citing People v. Cosby, 137 Cal. App. 332, 334 [ 31 Pac. (2d) 218 ], People v. Northcott, 209 Cal. 639 [ 289 Pac. 634 , 70 A. L. 1940It is conceded that the general rule is that evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove the charges for which the defendant stands charged, but there are limitations and exceptions to the rule allowing introduction of evidence of other offenses and it is the contention of respondent that the evidence pertaining to the commission of a similar offense by appellant as here described brings the instant ease within the exception and limitation of the rule, citing People v. Cosby, 137 Cal. App. 332, 334 [ 31 Pac. (2d) 218 ], People v. Northcott, 209 Cal. 639 [ 289 Pac. 634 , 70 A. L. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc. green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| MacDonald v. Reich & Lievre, Inc. green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| McKibbin v. McKibbin green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Breyfogle v. Tighe green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Bell v. Mortgage Guarantee Co. neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Dauch v. Ginsburg green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co. green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Mitchell v. Hawley green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Spring Street Co. v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Roehm v. Horst green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Pearson v. McKinney green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Vickrey v. Maier green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| McKannay v. Horton green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Furlong v. Cooney green | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Smith v. Furlong neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Smith v. Boston neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Campbell v. Moran green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.