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30 California opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2025(Cf. Morelos, at p. 755 [confirming defendant knowingly waived jury trial right where he “made clear his desire” to plead guilty]; Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 973, 1030 (conc. opn. of Kruger, 37 J.) [concluding a more informed waiver of a jury trial would not have been “irrelevant” to a self-represented defendant who “use[d] the law library” and expressed “‘deep remorse’” during penalty phase proceedings].) The People further identify Altamirano’s previous “experience with the criminal justice system” as “demonstrat[ing] that he understood the right he was waiving.” While this circumstanc 2025(See McCray, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 276-277 [“relevant experience with the justice system” was not a “material distinction” where defendant was not advised of the nature of the jury trial right]; accord, Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1001 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“nothing in our prior cases supports the conclusion that a defendant’s receipt of previous advisements is bound to satisfy the requirement that a subsequent waiver of a jury trial be knowing and intelligent”].) In sum, Altamirano did not validly waive his constitutional right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors under | 2 | 2 |
People v. Elliottgreen2 sentences2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review “To require the grant of a mistrial motion, the risk of prejudice must be incurable 19 by admonition or instruction.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 575 (Elliott).) That is, “[a] trial court should grant a motion for mistrial ‘only when “ ‘a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged’ ” ’ [citation]. …” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573 .) “Because the trial court is generally better able than an appellate court to make this determination, a ruling denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed under the deferen 2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review “To require the grant of a mistrial motion, the risk of prejudice must be incurable 19 by admonition or instruction.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 575 (Elliott).) That is, “[a] trial court should grant a motion for mistrial ‘only when “ ‘a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged’ ” ’ [citation]. …” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573 .) “Because the trial court is generally better able than an appellate court to make this determination, a ruling denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed under the deferen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Valdezgreen1 sentence2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review “To require the grant of a mistrial motion, the risk of prejudice must be incurable 19 by admonition or instruction.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 575 (Elliott).) That is, “[a] trial court should grant a motion for mistrial ‘only when “ ‘a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged’ ” ’ [citation]. …” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573 .) “Because the trial court is generally better able than an appellate court to make this determination, a ruling denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed under the deferen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2025(People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 295 (Rodriguez) [“No error results from granting a request to reopen in the absence of a showing of abuse”].) A trial court has broad discretion to permit the prosecution to reopen its case-in-chief after the defense has made a motion under section 1118.1 “‘so long as the court is convinced that the failure to present evidence on the issue was a result of “inadvertence or mistake on the part of the prosecutor and not from an attempt to gain a tactical advantage over [the defendant].”’” (People v. Riley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 754 , 764–765 (Riley) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mathewsgreen1 sentence2025(See, e.g., People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508 , 519–520 [issue of “whether a ‘reasonable person’ in defendant’s situation . . . would be justified in believing he was in imminent danger of bodily harm” for purposes of acting in self-defense was an objective rather than subjective standard]; 2 We also we note that after the trial court denied the motion in limine, the court informed defense counsel he could reraise the objection during trial: “You can, after the officers are testifying, you can raise that objection at any time after your cross[-]examination of them, if you wish.” O | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gossgreen1 sentence2025(People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 295 (Rodriguez) [“No error results from granting a request to reopen in the absence of a showing of abuse”].) A trial court has broad discretion to permit the prosecution to reopen its case-in-chief after the defense has made a motion under section 1118.1 “‘so long as the court is convinced that the failure to present evidence on the issue was a result of “inadvertence or mistake on the part of the prosecutor and not from an attempt to gain a tactical advantage over [the defendant].”’” (People v. Riley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 754 , 764–765 (Riley) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baylisgreen1 sentence2025(See, e.g., People v. Baylis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1073 [“We conclude that where confronted with an actual and substantial conflict of interest involving counsel’s duty of confidentiality to a former client, a trial court may exercise its discretion to disqualify the conflicted attorney absent an informed waiver from the former client.” (Italics added.)].) Cain’s current counsel has no direct or personal loyalty to Melton and has credibly expressed no motive to pull punches. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Olanogreen2 sentences2013(See United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733 [ 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 [waiver is the voluntarily relinquishment of a known right]; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 521 ; In re Hannie (1970) 3 Cal.3d 520, 526-527 [to be valid, a waiver of a statutory right must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary].) Nonetheless, the section 1025 right to have the same jury that decided a defendant’s guilt determine the truth of the prior conviction allegation is based on statute, not the federal or California Constitution. 2013(See United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733 [ 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 [waiver is the voluntarily relinquishment of a known right]; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 521 ; In re Hannie (1970) 3 Cal.3d 520, 526-527 [to be valid, a waiver of a statutory right must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary].) Nonetheless, the section 1025 right to have the same jury that decided a defendant’s guilt determine the truth of the prior conviction allegation is based on statute, not the federal or California Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hanniegreen1 sentence2013(See United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733 [ 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 [waiver is the voluntarily relinquishment of a known right]; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 521 ; In re Hannie (1970) 3 Cal.3d 520, 526-527 [to be valid, a waiver of a statutory right must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary].) Nonetheless, the section 1025 right to have the same jury that decided a defendant’s guilt determine the truth of the prior conviction allegation is based on statute, not the federal or California Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Princegreen2 sentences2011(See People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1284 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ] [“[A] defendant’s right to discovery is intended to ensure a fair trial and an informed defense . . . .”].) The integrity of both procedures contemplates a judicial decision based on sworn testimony. 2011(See People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1284 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ] [“[A] defendant’s right to discovery is intended to ensure a fair trial and an informed defense . . . .”].) The integrity of both procedures contemplates a judicial decision based on sworn testimony. | 1 | 1 |
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2007(See Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 ; see also People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 113 P.3d 1125 ]; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1043 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14-16 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ]; People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 1229; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-53 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ].) In the present case, the trial court found good cause to examine the evidence concerning possib 2007(See Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 ; see also People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 113 P.3d 1125 ]; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1043 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14-16 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ]; People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 1229; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-53 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ].) In the present case, the trial court found good cause to examine the evidence concerning possib | 1 | 1 |
City of San Jose v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2007(See Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 ; see also People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 113 P.3d 1125 ]; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1043 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14-16 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ]; People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 1229; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-53 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ].) In the present case, the trial court found good cause to examine the evidence concerning possib 2007(See Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 ; see also People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 113 P.3d 1125 ]; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1043 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14-16 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ]; People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 1229; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-53 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ].) In the present case, the trial court found good cause to examine the evidence concerning possib | 1 | 1 |
People v. Samuelsgreen2 sentences2007(See Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 ; see also People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 113 P.3d 1125 ]; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1043 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14-16 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ]; People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 1229; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-53 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ].) In the present case, the trial court found good cause to examine the evidence concerning possib 2007(See Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 ; see also People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 113 P.3d 1125 ]; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1043 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14-16 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ]; People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 1229; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-53 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ].) In the present case, the trial court found good cause to examine the evidence concerning possib | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Moocgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alford v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2007(People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 ].) Certainly, a defendant’s right to discovery is intended to ensure a fair trial and an informed defense based upon “ ‘ “all relevant and reasonably accessible information.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 ].) On the other hand, defendant’s right to counsel, to put on a defense, and to confrontation were not violated simply because the court followed the practice we outlined in Pitchess and have endorsed for many years, a practice we have concluded adequately 2007(People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 ].) Certainly, a defendant’s right to discovery is intended to ensure a fair trial and an informed defense based upon “ ‘ “all relevant and reasonably accessible information.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 , 135 P.3d 649 ].) On the other hand, defendant’s right to counsel, to put on a defense, and to confrontation were not violated simply because the court followed the practice we outlined in Pitchess and have endorsed for many years, a practice we have concluded adequately | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mroczkogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yorn v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oregon v. Elstadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Bayergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Waidlagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cowan v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Baileygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Guerragreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Yurkogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Zerbstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carnley v. Cochrangreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Van Bruntgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Tran
green
2 sentences2020(See Tran, supra, 61 Cal. 4th at 1167 ; Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 1125 .) Moreover, even assuming appellant was incompetent to make a jury-waiver decision at the time of his interview with Dr. Knapke, we could not conclude he would necessarily have been in a similar state almost a week later, at the time of the April 25 hearing. 2017(See People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 , 1169, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 251 , 354 P.3d 148 .) Both the high court and this court hold that the complete deprivation of the constitutional jury trial right is a structural error compelling reversal. | 2 | 2017–2020 |
People v. Mosby
green
2 sentences2013In fact, at the pretrial hearing the court did review with defendant the year, if not the specific date, of the robbery conviction and explained to defendant the impact on sentencing of the conviction, using both terms “strike” and “serious felony.” Because we evaluate the informed nature of a defendant’s waiver on the basis of the entire record, taking into consideration defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 ), the discussions from the earlier hearing can be considered to demonstrate defendant was aware of the nature and impl 2013In fact, at the pretrial hearing the court did review with defendant the year, if not the specific date, of the robbery conviction and explained to defendant the impact on sentencing of the conviction, using both terms “strike” and “serious felony.” Because we evaluate the informed nature of a defendant’s waiver on the basis of the entire record, taking into consideration defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 ), the discussions from the earlier hearing can be considered to demonstrate defendant was aware of the nature and impl | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1996Part knew that the police had made a tape recording of their interrogation of petitioner shortly after his arrest, and Part apparently had listened to the recording himself. [9] As the People concede, nowhere in the recording do the police interrogators advise petitioner of his Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ] (hereafter Miranda )) and obtain an informed waiver of those rights. 1996Part knew that the police had made a tape recording of their interrogation of petitioner shortly after his arrest, and Part apparently had listened to the recording himself. [9] As the People concede, nowhere in the recording do the police interrogators advise petitioner of his Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ] (hereafter Miranda )) and obtain an informed waiver of those rights. | 2 | 1966–1996 |
People v. Montes
green
1 sentence2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review “To require the grant of a mistrial motion, the risk of prejudice must be incurable 19 by admonition or instruction.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 575 (Elliott).) That is, “[a] trial court should grant a motion for mistrial ‘only when “ ‘a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged’ ” ’ [citation]. …” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573 .) “Because the trial court is generally better able than an appellate court to make this determination, a ruling denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed under the deferen | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Avila
green
1 sentence2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review “To require the grant of a mistrial motion, the risk of prejudice must be incurable 19 by admonition or instruction.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 575 (Elliott).) That is, “[a] trial court should grant a motion for mistrial ‘only when “ ‘a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged’ ” ’ [citation]. …” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573 .) “Because the trial court is generally better able than an appellate court to make this determination, a ruling denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed under the deferen | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Riley
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 295 (Rodriguez) [“No error results from granting a request to reopen in the absence of a showing of abuse”].) A trial court has broad discretion to permit the prosecution to reopen its case-in-chief after the defense has made a motion under section 1118.1 “‘so long as the court is convinced that the failure to present evidence on the issue was a result of “inadvertence or mistake on the part of the prosecutor and not from an attempt to gain a tactical advantage over [the defendant].”’” (People v. Riley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 754 , 764–765 (Riley) | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Finney
green
1 sentence2025(See, e.g., People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508 , 519–520 [issue of “whether a ‘reasonable person’ in defendant’s situation . . . would be justified in believing he was in imminent danger of bodily harm” for purposes of acting in self-defense was an objective rather than subjective standard]; 2 We also we note that after the trial court denied the motion in limine, the court informed defense counsel he could reraise the objection during trial: “You can, after the officers are testifying, you can raise that objection at any time after your cross[-]examination of them, if you wish.” O | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Collins
green
1 sentence2025In Collins, when discussing whether defendant would waive his right to a jury trial, the trial court informed defense counsel that not taking two weeks’ time to try the case “ ‘has some effect on the court.’ ” (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 309 .) The court then went on to say: “ ‘I didn’t specify and I’m not specifying that there’s any particular benefit, but that by waiving jury, you are getting some benefit, but I can’t tell you what that is because I don’t know yet. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Jefferson
green
1 sentence2025(See, e.g., People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508 , 519–520 [issue of “whether a ‘reasonable person’ in defendant’s situation . . . would be justified in believing he was in imminent danger of bodily harm” for purposes of acting in self-defense was an objective rather than subjective standard]; 2 We also we note that after the trial court denied the motion in limine, the court informed defense counsel he could reraise the objection during trial: “You can, after the officers are testifying, you can raise that objection at any time after your cross[-]examination of them, if you wish.” O | 1 | 2025–2025 |
New York v. Hill
green
1 sentence2024Although it is indisputable that “[f]or certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver” (New York v. Hill (2000) 528 U.S. 110, 114 ), neither McCoy nor any other decision cited by Guerrero persuades us that counsel’s request for a continuance made over the objection of a defendant, yet for his or her benefit, runs afoul of the right established in McCoy. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Sivongxxay
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166 .) A failure to obtain an informed waiver results in a complete denial of the defendant’s right to a jury trial and is structural error. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Blackburn
green
2 sentences2020(See Tran, supra, 61 Cal. 4th at 1167 ; Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 1125 .) Moreover, even assuming appellant was incompetent to make a jury-waiver decision at the time of his interview with Dr. Knapke, we could not conclude he would necessarily have been in a similar state almost a week later, at the time of the April 25 hearing. 2020(See Tran, supra, 61 Cal. 4th at 1167 ; Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 1125 .) Moreover, even assuming appellant was incompetent to make a jury-waiver decision at the time of his interview with Dr. Knapke, we could not conclude he would necessarily have been in a similar state almost a week later, at the time of the April 25 hearing. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
green
1 sentence2016(Id. at p. 306, citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 362-363 .) After the trial court in Collins learned the defendant might waive a jury trial, the court informed defense counsel ‘“there might well be a benefit in it,’ because ‘just by having waived jury’ and thus not taking two weeks’ time to try the case, ‘that has some effect on the court.’” The court then informed the defendant he would receive a benefit of an unspecified nature if he waived his right to a jury trial. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Reid v. Google, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013(See United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733 [ 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 [waiver is the voluntarily relinquishment of a known right]; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 521 ; In re Hannie (1970) 3 Cal.3d 520, 526-527 [to be valid, a waiver of a statutory right must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary].) Nonetheless, the section 1025 right to have the same jury that decided a defendant’s guilt determine the truth of the prior conviction allegation is based on statute, not the federal or California Constitution. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls
green
2 sentences2010No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls (2002) 536 U.S. 822 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 735 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 ] (Pottawatomie), it is sufficient here to permit an informed analysis of the policy and its purposes. 2010No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls (2002) 536 U.S. 822 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 735 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 ] (Pottawatomie), it is sufficient here to permit an informed analysis of the policy and its purposes. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Greer v. Buzgheia
green
1 sentence2009In Greer , the trial court denied the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the amount of medical expenses billed to the plaintiff that exceeded the amount paid on the plaintiff's behalf to his medical providers. ( Greer, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154 .) The Court of Appeal noted that in denying the defendant's motion in limine, "the trial court informed defense counsel that, while a postverdict reduction of the jury's award of medical expenses might be justified, defendant could not prevent the jury from hearing evidence regarding reasonable medical costs for plaintiff's car | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Pitchess v. Superior Court red | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People Ex Rel. Deparment of Corporations. v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Jimmy D. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Silva green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Hardy green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Ognibene green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Killpatrick v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Wells green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Boykin v. Alabama green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| In Re Mosley green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| People v. Kramer green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Escobedo v. Illinois green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| People v. Dorado green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Lawrence E. Wilson, Warden, San Quentin Prison v. Fred R. Harris green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.