official duty privilege in California

2006As such, it may not be said that his actions were outside the scope of his official duties, or that his motives were in fact improper.” (Kilgore v. Younger, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 779 .) In Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 499 ], the Court of Appeal extended the official duty privilege to all state and local officials engaged in the policymaking process and to “any statement by a public official, so long as it is made (a) while exercising policy-making functions, and (b) within the scope of his official duties.” (Id. at p. 501; see also Copp v. Paxton (1996) 45 Cal.A

2006As such, it may not be said that his actions were outside the scope of his official duties, or that his motives were in fact improper.” (Kilgore v. Younger, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 779 .) In Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 499 ], the Court of Appeal extended the official duty privilege to all state and local officials engaged in the policymaking process and to “any statement by a public official, so long as it is made (a) while exercising policy-making functions, and (b) within the scope of his official duties.” (Id. at p. 501; see also Copp v. Paxton (1996) 45 Cal.A

2006The so-called official duty privilege reposes in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which states with remarkable succinctness: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [][] (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.” Within the factual context of this case, the most important court decision impacting the question of whether Herrera’s statements fell within the official duty privilege is Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 640 P.2d 793 ].

2006The so-called official duty privilege reposes in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which states with remarkable succinctness: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [][] (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.” Within the factual context of this case, the most important court decision impacting the question of whether Herrera’s statements fell within the official duty privilege is Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 640 P.2d 793 ].

2015(See Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 .) Torres contends that even if Lucas did satisfy her burden of demonstrating falsity, the statements are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made "[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty." This privilege, known as the executive officer privilege (Morrow, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), applies "to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process." (Royer v. S

2013The Official Duty Privilege The trial court found the statements made by Reynolds were privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.” (Ibid.) Sometimes called the executive officer privilege (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), the privilege applies “to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process.” (Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 5

1998The parties concede that Gannett's internal department of human resources is the appropriate intracompany channel for receiving such complaints; however it is a private not a public entity and does not fall within the official duty privilege of section 47, subdivision (b), clause (3), which has never been applied to private individuals. ( Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 156 .) Although the absolute privilege in subdivision (b), clause (4) of section 47 covering other authorized proceedings reviewable by mandate is available for communications between private parties ( Moore v. Co

1986(Slaughter v. Freidman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 156 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 244 , 649 P.2d 886 ].) Unlike the narrow official duty privilege the official proceeding privilege created by section 47, subdivision 2, covers communications by nongovernmental speakers who participate in an official proceeding.

2014(People v. Crockett (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 258, 265-266 ; see also Tenner, supra, 6 Ca1.3d at pp. 565-566 [abstract of judgment and commitment form showing conviction and imprisonment and the official duty presumption are sufficient to demonstrate completion of the prison term].) Thus, the 2010 assault conviction qualified as a prior conviction pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b).

1999If there is no evidence to the contrary, the trial court may consider the abstract and the facts of the particular case, and utilizing the official duty presumption, find a defendant was convicted of and served the term of imprisonment for the listed felony. {People v. Crockett (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 258, 262 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 500 ].) The transcript of appellant’s plea to a violation of section 2800.3 of the Vehicle Code was considered by the trial court.

2022Code, § 664 [official duty presumed to have been regularly performed].) The DMV supported its new interpretation by citing the discussion of the official duty presumption in Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at page 1206 . 26.

2022Code, § 664 [official duty presumed to have been regularly performed].) The DMV supported its new interpretation by citing the discussion of the official duty presumption in Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at page 1206 . 26.

2021“It would be an unduly restrictive view of the scope of the duties of a policy- making executive official to hold that a public statement of agency policy in respect to matters of wide public interest and concern is not action in the line of duty.” (Barr, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 575 [privilege applied to press release by acting agency director announcing a personnel decision].) “ ‘Because a public official's duty includes the duty to keep the public informed of his or her management of the public business, press releases, press conferences and other public statements by such officials are covere

2020“It would be an unduly restrictive view of the scope of the duties of a policy- making executive official to hold that a public statement of agency policy in respect to matters of wide public interest and concern is not action in the line of duty.” (Barr, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 575 [privilege applied to press release by acting agency director announcing a personnel decision].) “ ‘Because a public official's duty includes the duty to keep the public informed of his or her management of the public business, press releases, press conferences and other public statements by such officials are covere

2021As Barr suggests, it is not an officer’s title but rather the relation between the conduct at issue and the officer’s lawful duties that dictates whether the privilege applies. ( Barr, supra, 360 U.S. at pp. 573−574.) Following Morrow’s reasoned approach, we conclude the official duty privilege can apply to statements made by a school superintendent. b.

2021The official duty privilege extends to acts by a qualifying government official “in the exercise of an executive function.” (Saroyan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 710 .) We focus on whether the official’s conduct “was an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively.” (Barr, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 575 .) The privilege is construed broadly, “to encompass all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function.” (Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 .) The official duty privilege has long been

2021(Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 604, 615 (Tutor-Saliba) [public comments by a city attorney justifying litigation initiated on the city’s behalf]; Ingram v. Filippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1283 [county district attorney’s press release charging school board with minor violations of the Ralph M.

2020(Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 604, 615 (Tutor-Saliba) [public comments by a city attorney justifying litigation initiated on the city’s behalf]; Ingram v. Filippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1283 [county district attorney’s press release charging school board with minor violations of the Ralph M.

2021Application of the official duty privilege requires “the proper discharge of an official duty.” (§ 47, subd. (a), italics added; see Hale Co. v. Lea (1923) 191 Cal. 202, 207 [state laboratory director exceeded his statutory authority in warning out-of-state official about adulterated walnuts].) Burgess attempts to distinguish Morrow on factual grounds, arguing that District policy prohibited Mueller from issuing the press release.

2020Application of the official duty privilege requires “the proper discharge of an official duty.” (§ 47, subd. (a), italics added; see Hale Co. v. Lea (1923) 191 Cal. 202, 207 [state laboratory director exceeded his statutory authority in warning out-of-state official about adulterated walnuts].) Burgess attempts to distinguish Morrow on factual grounds, arguing that District policy prohibited Mueller from issuing the press release.

2015(See Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 .) Torres contends that even if Lucas did satisfy her burden of demonstrating falsity, the statements are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made "[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty." This privilege, known as the executive officer privilege (Morrow, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), applies "to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process." (Royer v. S

2013The Official Duty Privilege The trial court found the statements made by Reynolds were privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.” (Ibid.) Sometimes called the executive officer privilege (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), the privilege applies “to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process.” (Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 5

2014(Cf. People v. Lilyroth (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [the element of lawful confinement in a charge of escape from an industrial road camp was established by evidence of the legality of defendant’s sentencing and commitment to the custody of the county sheriff; the official duty presumption supported an inference of the regularity of actions taken by prison administrators in transferring prisoners, in the absence of evidence indicating the defendant’s confinement was unlawful.].) The presumption is not mandatory; a defendant remains free to present evidence raising a doubt as to whether he in

1993(Cf. People v. Lilyroth (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [ 342 P.2d 525 ] [the element of lawful confinement in a charge of escape from an industrial road camp was established by evidence of the legality of defendant’s sentencing and commitment to the custody of the county sheriff; the official duty presumption supported an inference of the regularity of actions taken by prison administrators in transferring prisoners, in the absence of evidence indicating the defendant’s confinement was unlawful.].) The presumption is not mandatory; a defendant remains free to present evidence raising a doubt as

1998The parties concede that Gannett's internal department of human resources is the appropriate intracompany channel for receiving such complaints; however it is a private not a public entity and does not fall within the official duty privilege of section 47, subdivision (b), clause (3), which has never been applied to private individuals. ( Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 156 .) Although the absolute privilege in subdivision (b), clause (4) of section 47 covering other authorized proceedings reviewable by mandate is available for communications between private parties ( Moore v. Co

1998The parties concede that Gannett's internal department of human resources is the appropriate intracompany channel for receiving such complaints; however it is a private not a public entity and does not fall within the official duty privilege of section 47, subdivision (b), clause (3), which has never been applied to private individuals. ( Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 156 .) Although the absolute privilege in subdivision (b), clause (4) of section 47 covering other authorized proceedings reviewable by mandate is available for communications between private parties ( Moore v. Co

1986(Ascherman v. Natanson (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 861, 864-865 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 656 ]; Frisk v. Merrihew (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 319, 323 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 85 A.L.R.3d 1128 ].) The official duty privilege created by section 47, subdivision 1, extends to high ranking government officials.

1986(Ascherman v. Natanson (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 861, 864-865 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 656 ]; Frisk v. Merrihew (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 319, 323 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 85 A.L.R.3d 1128 ].) The official duty privilege created by section 47, subdivision 1, extends to high ranking government officials.

2015(See Delgado, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1066 [“[I]f the prosecution presents, by [certified record from the trial court], prima facie evidence of a prior conviction that satisfies the recidivist enhancement at issue, and if there is no contrary evidence, the fact finder, utilizing the official duty presumption, may determine that a qualifying conviction occurred.”].) Because those records constitute prima facie evidence of a prior conviction for a serious felony (i.e., assault with a deadly weapon in violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1)), the trial court did not err in finding tha

2013Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed”].) Some evidence must rebut this presumption before the authenticity, accuracy, or sufficiency of the prior conviction records can be called into question.‟ [Citation.] [¶] Thus, if the prosecutor presents, by such records, prima facie evidence of a prior conviction that satisfies the elements of the recidivist enhancement at issue, and if there is no contrary evidence, the fact finder, utilizing the official duty presumption, may determine that a qualifying conviction occurred. [Citations.]” (People v. Delgado, supr

2021(Saroyan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at 11 pp. 710−711.) But in doing so, Saroyan did not cite Barr or have occasion to consider whether the privilege might also apply to lower-ranking officials.5 A decade after Saroyan, our high court observed that state courts had extended the official duty privilege “only to high-ranking state and federal officials,” whereas Barr extended the privilege further. ( Sanborn, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 412−413.) It did not need to resolve that tension, however, as the city clerk “was not exercising policy-making functions when he defamed plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 413.) Sanborn

2020(Saroyan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at 11 pp. 710−711.) But in doing so, Saroyan did not cite Barr or have occasion to consider whether the privilege might also apply to lower-ranking officials.5 A decade after Saroyan, our high court observed that state courts had extended the official duty privilege “only to high-ranking state and federal officials,” whereas Barr extended the privilege further. ( Sanborn, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 412−413.) It did not need to resolve that tension, however, as the city clerk “was not exercising policy-making functions when he defamed plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 413.) Sanborn

2021Construing the official duty privilege in accordance with common law principles, as we must (Saroyan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 710 ), Morrow properly applied it to statements made by a school superintendent.

2021(Saroyan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at 11 pp. 710−711.) But in doing so, Saroyan did not cite Barr or have occasion to consider whether the privilege might also apply to lower-ranking officials.5 A decade after Saroyan, our high court observed that state courts had extended the official duty privilege “only to high-ranking state and federal officials,” whereas Barr extended the privilege further. ( Sanborn, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 412−413.) It did not need to resolve that tension, however, as the city clerk “was not exercising policy-making functions when he defamed plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 413.) Sanborn

2021The official duty privilege extends to acts by a qualifying government official “in the exercise of an executive function.” (Saroyan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 710 .) We focus on whether the official’s conduct “was an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively.” (Barr, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 575 .) The privilege is construed broadly, “to encompass all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function.” (Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 .) The official duty privilege has long been

2020The official duty privilege extends to acts by a qualifying government official “in the exercise of an executive function.” (Saroyan, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 710 .) We focus on whether the official’s conduct “was an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively.” (Barr, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 575 .) The privilege is construed broadly, “to encompass all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function.” (Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 .) The official duty privilege has long been

2008Code, § 664 [‘It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed’].) Some evidence must rebut this presumption before the authenticity, accuracy, or sufficiency of the prior conviction records can be called into question.” (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 27 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 , 18 P.3d 2 ].) Thus, if the prosecutor presents, by such records, prima facie evidence of a prior conviction that satisfies the elements of the recidivist enhancement at issue, and if there is no contrary evidence, the fact finder, utilizing the official duty presumption, may determine that a qualify

2003If there is no evidence to the contrary, the trial court may consider the abstract and the facts of the particular case, and utilizing the official duty presumption, find a defendant was convicted of and served the term of imprisonment for the listed felony." ( People v. Haney (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 472, 475-76 , 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 547 .) In this case, the instruction given by the trial court correctly stated the law.

2014(In re Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146 [presumption that preparing docket entry was regularly performed; docket entries must ordinarily be deemed to speak the truth]; see Smith v. Smith (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 658, 662 [presumption that minutes of court are correct].) The official duty presumption merely shifts the burden of proof to the opposing party, who may rebut the presumption.