sibling exception in California

2014As the court said in In re L.Y.L., and applying it here, “Valuing [H.’s] continuing relationship with [her sibling] . . . would deprive her of the ability to belong to a family, which is not in her best interests.” (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 953.) Mother contends that this case is similar to In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808 , where the sibling exception was applied.

2014The purpose of the sibling exception is to preserve longstanding sibling relationships that serve as “anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404 .) “[T]he concern is the best interests of the child being considered for adoption, not the interests of that child’s siblings.” (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 822 ; In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 49-50.) A parent asserting the sibling exception bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of a strong sibling relationship, and showing its severance would be detr

2022(In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 .) In In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287 , the mother claimed that her counsel rendered IAC because counsel failed to raise the sibling exception at the section 366.26 hearing.

2014In applying this standard, “we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record [in the light] most favorabl[e] to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. [Citation.]” (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251 .) The juvenile court’s finding the sibling exception to adoption did not apply must be upheld if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling, substantial evidence supports that ruling.

2024(Ibid.; D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 173 .) Additionally, it must be shown that maintaining contact is in the child’s best interest, particularly regarding their long-term emotional well-being, compared to the benefits of legal permanence through adoption.

2024(Ibid.; D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 173 .) Additionally, it must be shown that maintaining contact is in the child’s best interest, particularly regarding their long-term emotional well-being, compared to the benefits of legal permanence through adoption.

2022(In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 .) In In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287 , the mother claimed that her counsel rendered IAC because counsel failed to raise the sibling exception at the section 366.26 hearing.

2014The case is similar to In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293 , in which the court found the sibling exception inapplicable to a child who had been removed from her mother’s custody when she was only one and one-half-years-old and had been visiting her half-siblings between two and four times a month. “[A]lthough the [child] clearly enjoyed the time she spent with her half-siblings, there was no evidence that the detriment she might suffer if visits ceased presented a sufficiently compelling reason to forgo the stability and permanence of adoption by caretakers to whom she was closely

2015(In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373 .) Termination of parental rights is detrimental to the child when “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compare

2013(In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363 .) Termination of parental rights is detrimental to the child when “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the be

2004In particular, we conclude that the offer of proof procedure set forth in our earlier decision of In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 873 ] applies to the sibling exception to termination of parental rights.

2004In particular, we conclude that the offer of proof procedure set forth in our earlier decision of In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 873 ] applies to the sibling exception to termination of parental rights.

2025(See In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 .) We review the juvenile court’s underlying factual determinations for substantial evidence, and we then consider whether the court abused its discretion in its ultimate weighing of the competing interests at stake.

2024(See id. at pp. 1343–1344.) The party arguing the sibling exception applies bears the burden of producing evidence establishing the exception.

2023(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330 , 1339– 1340 (Lorenzo C.).) Rather, a court has discretion to order or deny a bonding study, and the standard of review applicable to challenge a court’s denial of a request for a bonding study is “whether, under all the evidence viewed in a 3 The court also concluded that the sibling exception to adoption did not apply. 9 light most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the juvenile court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding study.” (Id. at p. 1341.) When a parent’s request for a bonding study also involves a request for a co

2023(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330 , 1339– 1340 (Lorenzo C.).) Rather, a court has discretion to order or deny a bonding study, and the standard of review applicable to challenge a court’s denial of a request for a bonding study is “whether, under all the evidence viewed in a 3 The court also concluded that the sibling exception to adoption did not apply. 9 light most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the juvenile court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding study.” (Id. at p. 1341.) When a parent’s request for a bonding study also involves a request for a co

2023(In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 459 , 470.) Thus, “[w]hile it is not beyond the juvenile court’s discretion to order a bonding study” even after the termination of reunification services in situations in which “compelling circumstances” counsel in favor of such a choice, a court’s “denial of a belated 10 request for such a study is fully consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes, and with due process.” (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197 ; see In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61 , 69 (M.M.).) In this instance, Father did not seek the opportunity to obtain a bonding

2021(In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553 .) The factual predicate of the exception must be supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its discretion in weighing that evidence and determining detriment.

2015(In re Hector A. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 783, 791 ; In re L.

2015(See, e.g., In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 948-951; In re J.T. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 707, 719 .) 8 the permanency of adoption. [Citation.]”].) Accordingly, application of the sibling relationship exception will be rare, “particularly when the proceedings concern a young child . . . whose need for a competent, attentive and caring parent is paramount.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 593 ; accord, In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014 .) “‘[T]he language [of the statute] focuses exclusively on the benefits and burdens to the adoptive child, not the other

2015(See, e.g., In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 948-951; In re J.T. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 707, 719 .) 8 the permanency of adoption. [Citation.]”].) Accordingly, application of the sibling relationship exception will be rare, “particularly when the proceedings concern a young child . . . whose need for a competent, attentive and caring parent is paramount.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 593 ; accord, In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014 .) “‘[T]he language [of the statute] focuses exclusively on the benefits and burdens to the adoptive child, not the other

2014"In dependency litigation, non-jurisdictional issues must be the subject of objection or appropriate motions in the juvenile court; otherwise those arguments have been waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal." (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558 ; see also In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403 [father waived the sibling exception to adoption because he had failed to raise it at the section 366.26 hearing].) Mother's written offer of proof did not say that she was claiming the beneficial relationship exception to adoption.

2014(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 .) A challenge to the juvenile court’s determination of whether, given the existence of a sibling relationship, there is a compelling reason for determining termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child “is a quintessentially discretionary determination” calling for a high degree of appellate court deference.

2014(In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 , 1527.) A parent has standing at a section 366.26 hearing to argue that the sibling exception applies.

2014(In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1016 .) “In enacting this exception, the Legislature was concerned with preserving long-standing relationships between siblings which serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404 .) “[T]he sibling relationship exception permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not a sibling of that child.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54 .) “[T]he application of this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings c

2013(See In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 128 .) We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the sibling exception to adoption inapplicable in this case.

2013“The juvenile court does not have a sua sponte duty to determine whether an exception to adoption applies.” (In re Rachel M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295 , superseded by statute as stated in In re K.H. (2011) [footnote continued on next page] 20 Moreover, even if Mother and Father could establish a beneficial relationship, they cannot show that termination of the parental relationship was detrimental to K. and A. (In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315 .) We review this determination under an abuse of discretion standard.