offense must outweigh all factors in Tennessee

2024“When a trial court relies solely on confinement factor (B) in determining that confinement is the appropriate sentence, then “the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Bottoms, 87 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2001) (quoting State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)).

2024“For this provision to apply, the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001) (first quoting State v. Cleaver, 691 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985), abrogated by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000); and then citing State v. Harley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)); State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tenn. 1981).

2026In that context, “the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006).

2026See State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006) (stating that when the seriousness of the offense forms the sole basis for denying an alternative sentence, a heightened standard applies, meaning that the trial court must make additional findings showing that “‘the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement” (quoting State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim

2026See State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006) (stating that when the seriousness of the offense forms the sole basis for denying an alternative sentence, a heightened standard applies, meaning that the trial court must make additional findings showing that “‘the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement” (quoting State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim

2024This Court has held that “[i]n order to deny an alternative sentence based on the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors - 16 - favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim.

2024“For this provision to apply, the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001) (first quoting State v. Cleaver, 691 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985), abrogated by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000); and then citing State v. Harley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)); State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tenn. 1981).

2020Moreover, a denial of alternative sentencing based on the need to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense requires that “the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Cleavor, 691 S.W.2d 541 , -12- 543 (Tenn. 1985); State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)).

2012If the seriousness of the offense forms the basis for the denial of alternative sentencing, Tennessee courts have held that “‘the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) and State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991

2011This court has held when a trial court denies alternative sentencing and imposes incarceration on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, “‘circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” Grissom, 956 S.W.2d at 520 (citing State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 454 (Tenn. Crim.

2025Our supreme court has concluded that to support the denial of alternative sentencing, the circumstances of the offense “as committed, must be ‘especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.” State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tenn. 1981).

2024“For this provision to apply, the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001) (first quoting State v. Cleaver, 691 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985), abrogated by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000); and then citing State v. Harley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)); State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tenn. 1981).

2025Our supreme court has held that in order to deny alternative sentencing based on the circumstances of the offense, the circumstances “must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.” State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

2024“For this provision to apply, the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001) (first quoting State v. Cleaver, 691 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985), abrogated by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000); and then citing State v. Harley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)); State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tenn. 1981).

2025“When a trial court relies solely on confinement factor (B) in determining that confinement is the appropriate sentence, then the circumstances of the offense as committed, must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.” State v. Bottoms, 87 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tenn. Crim.

2024“When a trial court relies solely on confinement factor (B) in determining that confinement is the appropriate sentence, then “the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Bottoms, 87 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 31, 2001) (quoting State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)).

2024“For this provision to apply, the circumstances of the offense ‘as committed, must be “especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring probation.’” State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001) (first quoting State v. Cleaver, 691 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985), abrogated by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000); and then citing State v. Harley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)); State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tenn. 1981).

2019See id. § 40-35-103(1)(B); see also State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014) (concluding that when the denial of alternative sentencing is based upon both considerations in 40-35-103(1)(B), the “heightened standard of review” does not apply); Trotter, 201 S.W.3d at 654 (concluding that when “the seriousness of the offense forms the [sole] basis for the denial of alternative sentencing, . . . the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of th

2024Further, when the -9- seriousness of the offense itself is the sole reason for denying probation, “the circumstances of the offense as particularly committed in the case under consideration must demonstrate that the defendant committed the offense in some manner more egregious than is contemplated simply by the elements of the offense.” Trent, 533 S.W.3d at 292-93 .

2024As such, “before a trial court can deny probation solely on the basis of the offense itself, the circumstances of the offense as particularly committed in the case under consideration must demonstrate that the defendant committed the offense in some manner more egregious than is contemplated simply by the elements of the offense.” Trent, 533 S.W.3d at 292-93 (emphasis in original); State v. Moreno, No. W2023-00316-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 836112 , at *6 (Tenn. Crim.

2001In order to deny an alternative sentence, which includes consideration of probation, based on the seriousness of the offense, “the circumstances of the offense as committed must be‘ especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tenn. Crim.

2001App. 1991) (citing State v. Cleavor, 691 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1985)); State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tenn. Crim.

2001App.1991)); see also State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 788-89 (Tenn. Crim.

1991This standard has essentially been codified in the first part of T.C.A. § 40-35-103(l)(B) which provides for confinement if it “is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense.” See State v. Fletcher, supra, 805 S.W.2d at 788 .

2026See State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006) (stating that when the seriousness of the offense forms the sole basis for denying an alternative sentence, a heightened standard applies, meaning that the trial court must make additional findings showing that “‘the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement” (quoting State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim

2019See id. § 40-35-103(1)(B); see also State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014) (concluding that when the denial of alternative sentencing is based upon both considerations in 40-35-103(1)(B), the “heightened standard of review” does not apply); Trotter, 201 S.W.3d at 654 (concluding that when “the seriousness of the offense forms the [sole] basis for the denial of alternative sentencing, . . . the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of th

2005App. 1991); State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 864-865 (Tenn. Crim.

2003Id. at 374-75 . -4- Under the 1989 Sentencing Act, sentences which involve confinement are to be based on the following considerations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103(1): (A) [c]onfinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct; (B) [c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or (C) [m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently be

2000State v. Housewright, 982 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim.

1999To sustain a denial of probation based on its suitability for providing deterrence, the "finding of deterrence cannot be conclusory only but must be supported by proof.” Davis, 940 S.W.2d at 560 (quoting State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn.1991)).