discretion rule in Florida

1992The supreme court, however, reversed the district court and reinstated the new trial, relying principally on the broad discretion rule of Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1959).

1979NOTES [1] 501.204 Unlawful acts and practices (1) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. (2) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (1) of this section, due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1)), as from time to time amended. [2] Since the court did not state as a ground for the new trial that the ju

1973See Russo v. Clark, Fla. 1962, 147 So.2d 1 ; Danek v. Hoffman, Fla.App. 1966, 189 So.2d 893 .

1966More or less this same resume is set forth in Danek v. Hoffman, Fla.App. 1966, 189 So.2d 893 , in an opinion by Judge Shannon in which he tracks various decisions since Cloud v. Fallis, reaffirms the broad discretion rule, and notes that in that cause under review the record yielded totally inconsistent conclusions and that the trial court said that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

1966Cloud v. Fallis, supra, distinguishes between the broad discretion rule and the substantial evidence rule and provides for use of the broad discretion rule in the granting of new trials.

1966We pointed out in Grant that Cloud v. Fallis, Fla. App. 1959, 107 So.2d 264 , cert. denied 110 So.2d 669 (1959), discussed the two lines of opinion that had grown up in the past in Florida, the broad discretion rule, which supported a trial judge in granting a new trial, and the substantial evidence rule which in effect holds that if there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict the trial judge should not grant a new trial.

2019Because this question is grounded in law, we are “on the same footing as the trial court in determining the correct law to be applied and the broad discretion rule loses much of its force and effect.” Bulkmatic, 860 So. 2d at 444 (citing Am.

2004State v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), rev. denied, 786 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2001).

1999It was the unobjected to remarks which the courts were referring to as "unpreserved error." Hagan , 666 So.2d. at 587; Goutis, 699 So.2d at 760 . [2] There are exceptions to the broad discretion rule where the new trial is granted based on a question of law.

1999See Bush v. Brogan, 725 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Kinney for the proposition that whether facts, as found in recommended order of hearing officer, violate a rule or statute is a question of ultimate fact which an agency may not reject without adequate explanation); Langston v. Jamerson, 653 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (reversing EPC's order because EPC decided that the facts as found by the hearing officer constituted violations as a matter of law, but such determination was clearly a factual question and one left to the discretion of the hearing officer).

1997As explained in Wasden [ v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 474 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)], on the issue of the pervasive, prejudicial nature of the error, the trial court receives the benefit of the broad discretion standard.

1992Savers Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Sandcastle Beach Joint Venture, 498 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

1981In Weems v. Dawson, 352 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 1978), this court, based on the facts in that case, opted in favor of the latter doctrine and indeed in Wackenhut, which came later, the Supreme Court also seemed to favor the broad discretion rule.

1979Genie Drywall & Construction, Inc. v. Lyttons, Inc., 340 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).

1966Fundamentally more important than the verbal expressions of this rule is a distinction which, although seldom set forth, finds support in the decisions; the broad discretion rule has the most far-reaching effect in situations where the new trial has been granted on the ground that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the *449 evidence, Cloud v. Fallis, supra, and Pyms v. Meranda, Fla. 1957, 98 So.2d 341 , and conversely, the most limited application when the new trial is awarded on a non-evidentiary ground.

1966See McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, Fla. 1960, 123 So.2d 339 ; Nabelski v. Turner, Fla.App. 1965, 173 So.2d 729 ; Tye v. Ruark, Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 612 ; and Note, 16 U.Fla.L.Rev., 60, 70 (1963).