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62 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1956–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cantu v. Stategreen2 sentences2016App. 2004) (rejecting claims that the “12/10 rule” violates various federal constitutional provisions); Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 649 (holding Article 37.071, § 2(f)(4) does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury’s discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness); Green v. State, 912 S.W.2d 189, 196-97 (Tex. Crim. 2010See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (“Because the consideration and weighing of mitigating evidence is an open-ended, subjective determination engaged in by each individual juror, we conclude that Article 37.071 § 2(f)(4) does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury's discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness”); see also Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 118 . | 5 | 5 |
Ex Parte Valdezgreen2 sentences2021The statute itself “does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury’s discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness.” Perry, 158 S.W.3d at 449 . 2008See Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438, 449 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). | 4 | 5 |
Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2024Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex.1989)). 2023Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989)). | 4 | 4 |
In Re Chavezgreen2 sentences2009See In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 229 . 2009See In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 229 . | 4 | 4 |
Theus v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Theus v. State , 845 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim. 2008Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Prystash v. Stategreen2 sentences2010App. 1997) (“Because the consideration and weighing of mitigating evidence is an open-ended, subjective determination engaged in by each individual juror, we conclude that Article 37.071 §2(f)(4) does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury’s discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness”); see also Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 534 (Tex. Crim. 2010See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (“Because the consideration and weighing of mitigating evidence is an open-ended, subjective determination engaged in by each individual juror, we conclude that Article 37.071 § 2(f)(4) does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury's discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness”); see also Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 118 . | 3 | 3 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2010App. 1999); Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 481 (Tex. Crim. 2010See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (“Because the consideration and weighing of mitigating evidence is an open-ended, subjective determination engaged in by each individual juror, we conclude that Article 37.071 § 2(f)(4) does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury's discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness”); see also Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 118 . | 3 | 3 |
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co.green2 sentences2001See Sterner , 767 S.W.2d at 691 . 2001See Sterner , 767 S.W.2d at 691 . | 3 | 3 |
Colella v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Lawton, 913 S.W.2d at 555-556 ; see also Colella, supra; McFarland, No. 71,557, slip op. at 49. 1998Lawton, 913 S.W.2d at 555-556 ; see also Colella, supra ; McFarland , No. 71,557, slip op. at 49. | 3 | 3 |
Mireles v. Texas Department of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2009See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174 ; Mireles , 9 S.W.3d at 131 (court cannot substitute its judgment for that of ALJ when applying substantial evidence standard of review). 2009See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.174; Mireles, 9 S.W.3d at 131 (court cannot substitute its judgment for that of ALJ when applying substantial evidence standard of review). | 2 | 2 |
in the Interest of A.C., J.Y., J.Y. Jr., L.B., and E.B., Childrengreen1 sentence2025The statutory regime governing protective order proceedings leaves trial courts with much discretion as to the duration of the order and its intrusion into the parent–child relationship. 43 In short, parents face a deprivation of their fundamental right for up to a lifetime if a trial court believes that their conduct rose to the level of a felony, regardless of whether the parent has been charged or convicted of a felony-level crime. 44 Underlying this discretion is the standard requiring that a preponderance of the evidence support the family violence findings, which may “misdirect the factf | 1 | 1 |
Shaw v. BMW Healthcare, Inc.green1 sentence2017American Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001); Shaw v. BMW Healthcare, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2002, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palaciosgreen1 sentence2017American Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001); Shaw v. BMW Healthcare, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2002, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
State of Texas v. Thomas, Jeremygreen1 sentence2017State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen1 sentence2016App. 2004) (rejecting claims that the “12/10 rule” violates various federal constitutional provisions); Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 649 (holding Article 37.071, § 2(f)(4) does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury’s discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness); Green v. State, 912 S.W.2d 189, 196-97 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
McBride v. Stategreen1 sentence2016App. 1995) (“[O]ur capital sentencing scheme passes constitutional muster with respect to the ‘eligibility decision.’”); McBride v. State, 862 S.W.2d 600, 611 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Martinez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garcia v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
Chafino v. Chafinogreen1 sentence2015Most of the appealable issues in a family law case are evaluated against an abuse of discretion standard, be it the issue of property division incident to divorce or partition, conservatorship, visitation, or child support." Chafino v. Chafino, 228 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no writ) citing Garcia v. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2015See Walker any health care liability claim, a physician who is v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Tex.2003) FN1 otherwise qualified to render opinions on such (discussing predecessor statute to § 74.351(c)). causal relationship under the Texas Rules of Evid- The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an ence.” TEX. | 1 | 1 |
| Maxwell v. Texas Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2015"Design of any public work, such as a roadway, is a discretionary function involving many policy decisions and the governmental entity responsible may not be sued for such decisions." State v. Rodriquez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1999 per curiam); See also Maxwell v. Tex. Dep't ofTransp., 880 S.W.2d 461,463 (Tex. App.- Austin 1994 , writ denied). | 1 | 1 |
| Calderon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ladd v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Renteria v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Russeau v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garza v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Commitment of Hill
green
2 sentences2024“The proper discretion inquiry turns on the propriety of the question: 4 ‘a court abuses its discretion when its denial of the right to ask a proper question prevents determination of whether grounds exist to challenge for cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory challenges.’” Id. (quoting Babcock v. Nw. 2023“However, the proper discretion inquiry turns on the propriety of the question: ‘a court abuses its discretion when its denial of the right to ask a proper question prevents determination of whether grounds exist to challenge for cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory challenges.’” Id. (quoting Babcock v. Nw. | 3 | 2012–2024 |
Tennard v. Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
green
2 sentences2015The instruction is unconstitutional and narrows the jury’s discretion to factors that only concern moral blameworthiness. 141 The second motion found at Clerk’s Record 2 pp. 126-130 further attacks the laws limiting the jury’s consideration in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that relevant mitigation evidence is “evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove same fact or circumstance which a fact finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.” Tennard v. Drecke, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 , 124 S.Ct. 2567 , 2570 (2004). 2004In a supplemental point of error, appellant claims that it offends “the principles underlying [the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in] Tennard v. Dretke, [— U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 2562 , 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004)] to instruct a capital sentencing jury to disregard evidence that the jurors do not find to be sufficiently connected to the crime to reduce moral blameworthiness.” This Court has decided that the mitigation special issue “does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury’s discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness.” See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 648-49 (Tex.Cr. | 3 | 2004–2015 |
Rankin v. State
green
2 sentences2009Rankin, 974 S.W.2d at 712 . 2009Rankin, 974 S.W.2d at 712 . | 3 | 2009–2009 |
Clark v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008He noted that states already have the discretion to bar “unreliable or speculative testimony and to adopt rules to ensure the reliability of expert testimony.” Id. at 792 . 2008He noted that states already have the discretion to bar "unreliable or speculative testimony and to adopt rules to ensure the reliability of expert testimony." Id. at 792 . | 3 | 2008–2008 |
Herring v. New York
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 865 . 2005Id. at 865 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Arteaga v. California
green
2 sentences2004In a supplemental point of error, appellant claims that it offends "the principles underlying [the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in] Tennard v. Dretke , [ U.S. , 124 S.Ct. 2562 (2004)] to instruct a capital sentencing jury to disregard evidence that the jurors do not find to be sufficiently connected to the crime to reduce moral blameworthiness." This Court has decided that the mitigation special issue "does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury's discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness." See Cantu v. State , 939 S.W.2d 627, 648-49 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. deni 2004In a supplemental point of error, appellant claims that it offends “the principles underlying [the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in] Tennard v. Dretke, [— U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 2562 , 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004)] to instruct a capital sentencing jury to disregard evidence that the jurors do not find to be sufficiently connected to the crime to reduce moral blameworthiness.” This Court has decided that the mitigation special issue “does not unconstitutionally narrow the jury’s discretion to factors concerning only moral blameworthiness.” See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 648-49 (Tex.Cr. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Cornette v. Aldridge
green
2 sentences1977Foley v. Benedict, 55 S.W.Zd 805, 808, 810 (Tex. 1932); Cornette v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. 1977Foley v. Benedict, 55 S.W.2d 805 , 808 , 810 (Tex. 1932); Cornette v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1966, mand. overr.). | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
1 sentence2025Code § 85.025(a-1) (permitting trial courts to extend an order for any period exceeding two years upon making a requisite finding); id. § 85.022 (setting out actions that a trial court may prohibit a person found to have committed family violence from committing, including communication and contact with specific persons). 44 See id. § 85.025(a-1) (allowing the court to render a protective order “effective for a period that exceeds two years” if it finds that the person subject to the order committed an act constituting felony family violence, “regardless of whether the person has been charged | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In re R. R.
green
1 sentence2023In re R.R., 537 S.W.3d at 624 ; see also In re FamilyLink Treatment Servs., Inc., No. 03-22-00210-CV, 2022 WL 17478413 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Louis A. Carducci v. Donald T. Regan, Secretary, U.S. Treasury Department
green
1 sentence2018Carducci v. Regan , 714 F.2d 171 , 177 (D.C. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Earle v. Ratliff
green
2 sentences2015Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882 , failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.” 890 (Tex.1999); Mosely v. Mundine, 249 S.W.3d Id. § 74.351(r)(6). 775, 780 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). [1] As pertinent to this appeal, an “expert” STANDARD OF REVIEW means “with respect to a person giving opinion [7][8][9] Traditionally we apply an abuse of testimony about the causal relationship between the discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's de- injury, harm, or damages claimed and the alleged cision to deny a motion to *211 dismiss based on departure from the applicable standard of car 2015Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882 , failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.” 890 (Tex.1999); Mosely v. Mundine, 249 S.W.3d Id. § 74.351(r)(6). 775, 780 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). [1] As pertinent to this appeal, an “expert” STANDARD OF REVIEW means “with respect to a person giving opinion [7][8][9] Traditionally we apply an abuse of testimony about the causal relationship between the discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's de- injury, harm, or damages claimed and the alleged cision to deny a motion to *211 dismiss based on departure from the applicable standard of car | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Tyler Scoresby, M.D. v. Catarino Santillan, Individually and as Next Friend of Samuel Santillan, a Minor green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs red | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Sawyer v. Oregon ex rel. Huddleston green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Christian v. City of Gladstone green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Lawton v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. John W. Gardner, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and James L. Goddard, Commissioner of Food and Drugs green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Vasquez v. California green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Corwin v. United States neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Pryor v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Ramos green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Foley v. Benedict green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Trustees, Pleasant Grove Independent School Dist. v. Bagsby neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.