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30 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Nixgreen2 sentences2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present 2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present | 3 | 3 |
Cordell v. BANK OF NORTH GEORGIAgreen2 sentences2020See OCGA §§ 9-11-6 (d) (stating that “[w]hen a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion”); 9-11-56 (c) (providing that summary judgment “motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing”); Cordell v. Bank of N. Ga., 295 Ga. App. 402, 405 (1) (b) ( 672 SE2d 429 ) (2008) (noting that “affidavits relied upon in support of a motion for summary 11 judgment must be on file for at least 30 days prior to the hearing”) (citation and punctuation omitted).8 But that rule is inapposite here because the dispossessory affidavit was not an e 2020See OCGA §§ 9-11-6 (d) (stating that “[w]hen a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion”); 9-11-56 (c) (providing that summary judgment “motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing”); Cordell v. Bank of N. Ga., 295 Ga. App. 402, 405 (1) (b) ( 672 SE2d 429 ) (2008) (noting that “affidavits relied upon in support of a motion for summary 11 judgment must be on file for at least 30 days prior to the hearing”) (citation and punctuation omitted).8 But that rule is inapposite here because the dispossessory affidavit was not an e | 3 | 3 |
Gunter v. Hamilton Bankgreen2 sentences1993“OCGA § 9-11-56 (c)[,] which requires that a motion for summary judgment be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for a hearing, and OCGA § 9-11-6 (d)[,] which requires that ‘(w)hen a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the *170 motion,’ have been construed together to mean that an affidavit relied on in support of a motion for summary judgment must be on file for at least 30 days prior to the hearing.” Gunter v. Hamilton Bank &c., 201 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 411 SE2d 115 ) (1991). 1993“OCGA § 9-11-56 (c)[,] which requires that a motion for summary judgment be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for a hearing, and OCGA § 9-11-6 (d)[,] which requires that ‘(w)hen a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the *170 motion,’ have been construed together to mean that an affidavit relied on in support of a motion for summary judgment must be on file for at least 30 days prior to the hearing.” Gunter v. Hamilton Bank &c., 201 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 411 SE2d 115 ) (1991). | 3 | 3 |
Brooks v. Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Venture, LLCgreen2 sentences2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present 2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present | 2 | 2 |
Thompson-El v. Bank of America, N.A.green2 sentences2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present 2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present | 2 | 2 |
McCaskill v. Carillogreen2 sentences2020To that end, in considering the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, and “all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”13 Summary judgment is appropriate, then, when “the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 And a defendant meets this burden when “the court is shown that the documents, affidavits, depositions[,] and other evidence in the 11 Nix, 273 Ga. at 154 (punctuatio 2020To that end, in considering the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, and “all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”13 Summary judgment is appropriate, then, when “the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 And a defendant meets this burden when “the court is shown that the documents, affidavits, depositions[,] and other evidence in the 11 Nix, 273 Ga. at 154 (punctuatio | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. PHOEBE PUTNEY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.green2 sentences2020To that end, in considering the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, and “all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”13 Summary judgment is appropriate, then, when “the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 And a defendant meets this burden when “the court is shown that the documents, affidavits, depositions[,] and other evidence in the 11 Nix, 273 Ga. at 154 (punctuatio 2020To that end, in considering the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, and “all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”13 Summary judgment is appropriate, then, when “the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 And a defendant meets this burden when “the court is shown that the documents, affidavits, depositions[,] and other evidence in the 11 Nix, 273 Ga. at 154 (punctuatio | 2 | 2 |
KELLY v. HARRIS Et Al.green2 sentences2020To that end, in considering the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, and “all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”13 Summary judgment is appropriate, then, when “the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 And a defendant meets this burden when “the court is shown that the documents, affidavits, depositions[,] and other evidence in the 11 Nix, 273 Ga. at 154 (punctuatio 2020To that end, in considering the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, and “all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”13 Summary judgment is appropriate, then, when “the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14 And a defendant meets this burden when “the court is shown that the documents, affidavits, depositions[,] and other evidence in the 11 Nix, 273 Ga. at 154 (punctuatio | 2 | 2 |
MINNIFIELD v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. Et Al.green2 sentences2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present 2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present | 2 | 2 |
Porter Coatings v. STEIN STEEL & SUPPLY COMPANYgreen2 sentences1993Accord Porter Coatings v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 247 Ga. 631 ( 278 SE2d 377 ) (1981). 1993Accord Porter Coatings v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 247 Ga. 631 ( 278 SE2d 377 ) (1981). | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. American Acceptance Corp.green2 sentences1978The first two of those subsections provides that a party may "move with . . . supporting affidavits for a summary judgment” which "shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Additionally, § 6 (d) specifically provides: "When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion...” which in the case of a motion for summary judgment is "at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing” (CPA § *78 56 (c), supra;Davis v. American Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 265 ( 167 SE2d 222 ) (1969); Riverhill Community Assn. v. Cobb County Bd. 1978The first two of those subsections provides that a party may "move with . . . supporting affidavits for a summary judgment” which "shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Additionally, § 6 (d) specifically provides: "When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion...” which in the case of a motion for summary judgment is "at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing” (CPA § *78 56 (c), supra;Davis v. American Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 265 ( 167 SE2d 222 ) (1969); Riverhill Community Assn. v. Cobb County Bd. | 1 | 2 |
Trumpet v. Browngreen1 sentence2020See Trumpet, 215 Ga. App. at 300 (2) (writ of possession 8 As explained in Cordell, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), which requires that a motion for summary judgment be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for a hearing, and OCGA § 9-11-6 (d), which requires that when a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion, have been construed together to mean that an affidavit relied on in support of a motion for summary judgment must be on file for at least 30 days prior to the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Srm Group, Inc.green2 sentences2019Co. of America v. SRM Group, Inc., 348 Ga. App. 136, 141 (2) ( 820 SE2d 261 ) (2018). 2019Co. of America v. SRM Group, Inc., 348 Ga. App. 136, 141 (2) ( 820 SE2d 261 ) (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2019Accordingly, because the trial court addressed the underlying merits of the case in granting the Chatsworth LP and Blue Ridge HC’s 9 See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing” and grant of such a motion is appropriate only if record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”), (f) (authorizing continuance to permit additional discovery before ruling on summary judgment motion), (h) (granting right to directly appeal the par 2019Accordingly, because the trial court addressed the underlying merits of the case in granting the Chatsworth LP and Blue Ridge HC’s 9 See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing” and grant of such a motion is appropriate only if record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”), (f) (authorizing continuance to permit additional discovery before ruling on summary judgment motion), (h) (granting right to directly appeal the par | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Shivergreen2 sentences2017See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing”); Brown v. Shiver, 183 Ga.App. 207, 209 (2) ( 358 SE2d 862 ) (1987) (OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) “allows the party opposing a motion for summary judgment at least thirty days to respond before *779 the motion is heard”). 2017See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing”); Brown v. Shiver, 183 Ga.App. 207, 209 (2) ( 358 SE2d 862 ) (1987) (OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) “allows the party opposing a motion for summary judgment at least thirty days to respond before *779 the motion is heard”). | 1 | 1 |
Jacobsen v. Mullergreen2 sentences2014See Jacobsen v. Muller, 181 Ga. App. 382, 382-383 ( 352 SE2d 604 ) (1986) (explaining the interaction of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) and USCR 6.2 and 6.3). 2014See Jacobsen v. Muller, 181 Ga. App. 382, 382-383 ( 352 SE2d 604 ) (1986) (explaining the interaction of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) and USCR 6.2 and 6.3). | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2004See Division 2, infra. Whether and to what extent insurance provides coverage for the injuries claimed is an issue we do not reach and which remains for the trial court to determine. 6 The term “governmental immunity” is synonymous with “sovereign immunity.” Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 749 (4) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 2004See Division 2, infra. Whether and to what extent insurance provides coverage for the injuries claimed is an issue we do not reach and which remains for the trial court to determine. 6 The term “governmental immunity” is synonymous with “sovereign immunity.” Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 749 (4) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2000OCGA § 9-11-5 (a) states that “every written motion . . . shall be served upon each of the parties.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires that a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” However, our inquiry does not end here. “ ‘[T]he trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment.’ [Cits.]” Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 (1) ( 458 SE2d 876 ). 2000OCGA § 9-11-5 (a) states that “every written motion . . . shall be served upon each of the parties.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires that a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” However, our inquiry does not end here. “ ‘[T]he trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment.’ [Cits.]” Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 (1) ( 458 SE2d 876 ). | 1 | 1 |
Corry v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1994Corry v. Robinson, 207 Ga. App. 167, 170 (2) ( 427 SE2d 507 ) (1993); Gunter v. Hamilton Bank of Upper East Tenn., 201 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 411 SE2d 115 ) (1991). 1994Corry v. Robinson, 207 Ga. App. 167, 170 (2) ( 427 SE2d 507 ) (1993); Gunter v. Hamilton Bank of Upper East Tenn., 201 Ga. App. 379, 381 ( 411 SE2d 115 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Hurtgreen2 sentences1991Neither of these procedural safeguards was allowed ... in this case . . .’ , Thompson v. Hurt, 159 Ga. App. 656, 658 ( 284 SE2d 671 ) (1981).” 1991Neither of these procedural safeguards was allowed ... in this case . . .’ , Thompson v. Hurt, 159 Ga. App. 656, 658 ( 284 SE2d 671 ) (1981).” | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Wulfgreen2 sentences1989Leverich v. Roddenberry Farms, 253 Ga. 414 ( 321 SE2d 328 ); see Baker v. Wulf, 173 Ga. App. 674, 675 ( 327 SE2d 796 ). 1989Leverich v. Roddenberry Farms, 253 Ga. 414 ( 321 SE2d 328 ); see Baker v. Wulf, 173 Ga. App. 674, 675 ( 327 SE2d 796 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Eiberger v. Westgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wall v. Citizens & Southern Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gunter v. National City Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Riverhill Community Ass'n v. Cobb County Board of Commissionersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. Monroe
green
2 sentences1975"When the time fixed for the hearing arrives, and no service [of the rule nisi] has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the judge whether to *172 dismiss the motion, as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 SE 111 ), and [McMullen v. Citizens Bank, 123 Ga. 400 (1) ( 51 SE 342 )], or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected, as in Connor v. State [ 7 Ga. App. 83 ( 66 SE 482 )], Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 ( 33 SE 62 ), and Louisville & Nashville R. 1961Notwithstanding the fact that cases such as Webb v. Nobles, 195 Ga. 287 ( 24 S. E. 2d 27 ), and the authorities it cites at page 288, hold that it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge when the time fixed for a hearing arrives and no service has been effected, whether to dismiss the motion ( Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 , 37 S. E. 111 ), or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected ( Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 , 33 S. E. 62 ), those cases are all subject to being interpreted as applying only to the situation where the hearing on the motion was r | 5 | 1943–1975 |
Brown v. Hall
green
2 sentences1975"When the time fixed for the hearing arrives, and no service [of the rule nisi] has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the judge whether to *172 dismiss the motion, as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 SE 111 ), and [McMullen v. Citizens Bank, 123 Ga. 400 (1) ( 51 SE 342 )], or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected, as in Connor v. State [ 7 Ga. App. 83 ( 66 SE 482 )], Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 ( 33 SE 62 ), and Louisville & Nashville R. 1961Notwithstanding the fact that cases such as Webb v. Nobles, 195 Ga. 287 ( 24 S. E. 2d 27 ), and the authorities it cites at page 288, hold that it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge when the time fixed for a hearing arrives and no service has been effected, whether to dismiss the motion ( Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 , 37 S. E. 111 ), or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected ( Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 , 33 S. E. 62 ), those cases are all subject to being interpreted as applying only to the situation where the hearing on the motion was r | 5 | 1943–1975 |
Ward v. State
green
2 sentences1975"When the time fixed for the hearing arrives, and no service [of the rule nisi] has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the judge whether to *172 dismiss the motion, as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 SE 111 ), and [McMullen v. Citizens Bank, 123 Ga. 400 (1) ( 51 SE 342 )], or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected, as in Connor v. State [ 7 Ga. App. 83 ( 66 SE 482 )], Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 ( 33 SE 62 ), and Louisville & Nashville R. 1961Notwithstanding the fact that cases such as Webb v. Nobles, 195 Ga. 287 ( 24 S. E. 2d 27 ), and the authorities it cites at page 288, hold that it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge when the time fixed for a hearing arrives and no service has been effected, whether to dismiss the motion ( Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 , 37 S. E. 111 ), or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected ( Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 , 33 S. E. 62 ), those cases are all subject to being interpreted as applying only to the situation where the hearing on the motion was r | 5 | 1943–1975 |
Dennis v. Colley
green
2 sentences1975"When the time fixed for the hearing arrives, and no service [of the rule nisi] has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the judge whether to *172 dismiss the motion, as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 SE 111 ), and [McMullen v. Citizens Bank, 123 Ga. 400 (1) ( 51 SE 342 )], or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected, as in Connor v. State [ 7 Ga. App. 83 ( 66 SE 482 )], Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 ( 33 SE 62 ), and Louisville & Nashville R. 1961Notwithstanding the fact that cases such as Webb v. Nobles, 195 Ga. 287 ( 24 S. E. 2d 27 ), and the authorities it cites at page 288, hold that it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge when the time fixed for a hearing arrives and no service has been effected, whether to dismiss the motion ( Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 , 37 S. E. 111 ), or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected ( Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 , 33 S. E. 62 ), those cases are all subject to being interpreted as applying only to the situation where the hearing on the motion was r | 5 | 1943–1975 |
McMullen v. Bank
green
2 sentences1975"When the time fixed for the hearing arrives, and no service [of the rule nisi] has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the judge whether to *172 dismiss the motion, as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 SE 111 ), and [McMullen v. Citizens Bank, 123 Ga. 400 (1) ( 51 SE 342 )], or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected, as in Connor v. State [ 7 Ga. App. 83 ( 66 SE 482 )], Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 ( 33 SE 62 ), and Louisville & Nashville R. 1975"When the time fixed for the hearing arrives, and no service [of the rule nisi] has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the judge whether to *172 dismiss the motion, as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 SE 111 ), and [McMullen v. Citizens Bank, 123 Ga. 400 (1) ( 51 SE 342 )], or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected, as in Connor v. State [ 7 Ga. App. 83 ( 66 SE 482 )], Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 ( 33 SE 62 ), and Louisville & Nashville R. | 4 | 1943–1975 |
Wolff v. Sampson
green
2 sentences1954Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 (2) ( 33 S. E. 62 ); Wood v. Wood, supra. But when the time fixed for the hearing arrives, and no service has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge whether to dismiss the motion — as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 S. E. 111 ), and Wolff v. Sampson, 123 Ga. 400 ( 51 S. E. 335 ) — or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected, as in Martin v. Monroe, supra, and Louisville & Nashville R. 1953When the time fixed for the hearing arrives and no service has been effected, it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the judge whether to dismiss the motion, as was done in Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 ( 37 S. E. 111 ), and Wolf v. Sampson, 123 Ga. 400 ( 51 S. E. 335 ), or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected as in Con- nor v. State, supra, Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 ( 33 S. E. 62 ) and Louisville & Nashville R. | 3 | 1943–1954 |
Webb v. Nobles
green
2 sentences1961Notwithstanding the fact that cases such as Webb v. Nobles, 195 Ga. 287 ( 24 S. E. 2d 27 ), and the authorities it cites at page 288, hold that it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge when the time fixed for a hearing arrives and no service has been effected, whether to dismiss the motion ( Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 , 37 S. E. 111 ), or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected ( Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 , 33 S. E. 62 ), those cases are all subject to being interpreted as applying only to the situation where the hearing on the motion was r 1961Notwithstanding the fact that cases such as Webb v. Nobles, 195 Ga. 287 ( 24 S. E. 2d 27 ), and the authorities it cites at page 288, hold that it is generally a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge when the time fixed for a hearing arrives and no service has been effected, whether to dismiss the motion ( Smedley v. Williams, 112 Ga. 114 , 37 S. E. 111 ), or to continue the final hearing until service is perfected ( Martin v. Monroe, 107 Ga. 330 , 33 S. E. 62 ), those cases are all subject to being interpreted as applying only to the situation where the hearing on the motion was r | 2 | 1961–1975 |
Matjoulis v. Integon General Ins. Corp.
green
2 sentences2010Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459 (1) ( 486 SE2d 684 ) (1997). 2 See OCGA §§ 9-11-6 (d) (affidavit supporting a motion “shall be served with the motion”); 9-11-56 (c) (summary judgment motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing). 2010Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459 (1) ( 486 SE2d 684 ) (1997). 2 See OCGA §§ 9-11-6 (d) (affidavit supporting a motion “shall be served with the motion”); 9-11-56 (c) (summary judgment motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Leverich v. RODDENBERRY FARMS, INC.
green
2 sentences1989Leverich v. Roddenberry Farms, 253 Ga. 414 ( 321 SE2d 328 ); see Baker v. Wulf, 173 Ga. App. 674, 675 ( 327 SE2d 796 ). 1989Leverich v. Roddenberry Farms, 253 Ga. 414 ( 321 SE2d 328 ); see Baker v. Wulf, 173 Ga. App. 674, 675 ( 327 SE2d 796 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Ravan v. Stephens neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Victor v. First Trust & Deposit Co. neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Jones v. Howard green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Benton Bros. Ford Co. v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Peoples Financial Corp. v. Jones green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Nelson neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Connor v. State neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Roe v. Roe neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Wood v. Wood neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Allen v. Moore green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Bracero neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Howbert v. Heyle green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.