time fixed rule in Illinois

1989It is well settled that “[sjection 2 — 1401 is not intended to provide a review of an order from which a party could have appealed within the time fixed by rule, and cannot be invoked as a substitute for a party’s right to appeal.” (Chovan v. Floor Covering Associates, Inc. (1987), 159 Ill.

1989App. 3d 447, 449 , 512 N.E.2d 801 .) Furthermore, the motion was not brought before the trial judge (Judge Curry) who rendered the original judgment.

1988App. 3d 645 , 407 N.E.2d 193 .) Section 2-1401 is not intended to provide review of an order from which a party could have appealed within the time fixed by rule and cannot be invoked as a substitute for a party’s right to appeal.

1987Lofendo v. Ozog (1983), 118 Ill.

1987App. 3d 763 , 388 N.E.2d 789 .) Section 2-1401 is not intended to provide a review of an order from which a party could have appealed within the time fixed by rule, and cannot be invoked as a substitute for a party’s right to appeal.

1978Dowling v. Baker (1st Dist. 1975), 29 Ill.

1975(In re Petition to Annex Territory to Village of Willowbrook v. Carlson (1963), 42 Ill.App.2d 432 , 192 N.E.2d 553 ; Jones v. Jones (1961), 32 Ill.App.2d 64 , 176 N.E.2d 635 (abstract opinion).) Here, the railroad has shown no additional facts which, if known to the trial court, would have prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of Yellow Cab.

1975(In re Petition to Annex Territory to Village of Willowbrook v. Carlson (1963), 42 Ill.App.2d 432 , 192 N.E.2d 553 ; Jones v. Jones (1961), 32 Ill.App.2d 64 , 176 N.E.2d 635 (abstract opinion).) Here, the railroad has shown no additional facts which, if known to the trial court, would have prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of Yellow Cab.

1975(In re Petition to Annex Territory to Village of Willowbrook v. Carlson (1963), 42 Ill.App.2d 432 , 192 N.E.2d 553 ; Jones v. Jones (1961), 32 Ill.App.2d 64 , 176 N.E.2d 635 (abstract opinion).) Here, the railroad has shown no additional facts which, if known to the trial court, would have prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of Yellow Cab.

1975(In re Petition to Annex Territory to Village of Willowbrook v. Carlson (1963), 42 Ill.App.2d 432 , 192 N.E.2d 553 ; Jones v. Jones (1961), 32 Ill.App.2d 64 , 176 N.E.2d 635 (abstract opinion).) Here, the railroad has shown no additional facts which, if known to the trial court, would have prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of Yellow Cab.

1945People v. Duvall, 379 Ill. 535 ; People v. Causey, 367 Ill. 461 .

1945People v. Duvall, 379 Ill. 535 ; People v. Causey, 367 Ill. 461 .

1906The jurisdiction is a special, statutory one, and can be exercised only in the manner and under the conditions prescribed by the statute. .Every attempt, therefore, to grant the petition and organize a district where the prescribed notice has not been given is nugatory and void.” The case of McChesney v. People, 148 Ill. 221 , was an application by the county collector of Cook county for a judgment against lands for the collection of taxes and special assessments.