Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
32 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chambers v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2026Nonetheless, “where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against- penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). 12 ¶ 36 In determining whether such indicia exist, the court should consider whether “(1) the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant’s interest; and (4) 2026Nonetheless, “where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against- penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). 12 ¶ 36 In determining whether such indicia exist, the court should consider whether “(1) the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant’s interest; and (4) | 8 | 19 |
People v. Bowelgreen2 sentences2026Nonetheless, “where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against- penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). 12 ¶ 36 In determining whether such indicia exist, the court should consider whether “(1) the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant’s interest; and (4) 2026Nonetheless, “where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against- penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). 12 ¶ 36 In determining whether such indicia exist, the court should consider whether “(1) the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant’s interest; and (4) | 4 | 19 |
People v. Housegreen2 sentences2009The court therefore evinced its willingness to at least consider allowing the statement to be admitted under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule (see, e.g., People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 390 (1990)). 1993(See People v. House (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 323, 389-90 , 566 N.E.2d 259 ; People v. Bowel (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 58, 66-67 , 488 N.E.2d 995 ; People v. Tate (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 134, 143 , 429 N.E.2d 470 .) Thus, where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, such statements may be admitted pursuant to the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Olingergreen2 sentences2002“Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due to its lack of reliability unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.” People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1997); accord Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-99 , 35 L. 2002“Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due to its lack of reliability unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.” People v. Olinger , 176 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1997); accord Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 298-99 , 35 L. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wardgreen2 sentences2000See also People v. Ward , 154 Ill. 2d 272, 312-13 (1992) (whether a statement is admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception is an analytically distinct question from whether the statement is admissible as a party admission); M. 2000See also People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 312-13 (1992) (whether a statement is admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception is an analytically distinct question from whether the statement is admissible as a party admission); M. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lettrich
green
2 sentences1993(People v. Lettrick (1952), 413 Ill. 172, 178 .) The Supreme Court of the United States, and this court as well, have held that where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. 1990(People v. Lettrich (1952), 413 Ill. 172, 178 .) Where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, said declarations may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. | 4 | 1986–1993 |
People v. Tate
green
2 sentences1995(People v. Tate (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 134, 143 .) When justice requires, however, such extrajudicial declarations may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule if there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. 1995Generally, a third party's extrajudicial declarations, not made under oath, that he committed a crime are purely hearsay and are inadmissible, even though they are declarations against interest. ( People v. Tate (1981), 87 Ill.2d 134, 143 , 57 Ill.Dec. 572 , 429 N.E.2d 470 .) When justice requires, however, such extrajudicial declarations may be admissible under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule if there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. ( People v. Bowel (1986), 111 Ill.2d 58, 66 , 94 Ill.Dec. 748 , 488 N.E.2d 995 .) The United States Supreme Court so | 3 | 1990–1995 |
People v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2021The statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of such a statement if it exhibits “objective criteria of -22- trustworthiness.” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Tenney
green
2 sentences2013While courts generally will not admit an unsworn, out-of-court declaration that the declarant (rather the defendant on trial) committed the crime, even though the declaration is against the declarant’s penal interest, such a statement may be admitted under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule “where justice requires.” Id. at 433 . “[W]here the hearsay statement bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and is critical to the accused’s defense, its exclusion deprives the defendant of a fair trial in accord with due process.” Id. at 434 (citing Chambers, 410 U. 2013While courts generally will not admit an unsworn, out-of-court declaration that the declarant (rather the defendant on trial) committed the crime, even though the declaration is against the declarant’s penal interest, such a statement may be admitted under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule “where justice requires.” Id. at 433 . “[W]here the hearsay statement bears persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and is critical to the accused’s defense, its exclusion deprives the defendant of a fair trial in accord with due process.” Id. at 434 (citing Chambers, 410 U. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. McCallister
green
2 sentences2002McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d at 101 , citing Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d at 68 . 2002McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d at 100 , citing People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 66 (1986), citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 , 35 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Rice
green
2 sentences1996People v. Rice, 166 Ill. 2d 35 , 651 N.E.2d 1083 (1995). 1996People v. Rice, 166 Ill. 2d 35 , 651 N.E.2d 1083 (1995). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lee v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1992(Lee v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. 530, 539 , 90 L. 1992(Lee v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. 530, 539 , 90 L. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Kokoraleis
green
1 sentence1991A trial court’s ruling excluding statements against penal interest will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion (People v. Kokoraleis (1986), 149 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Carter
green
1 sentence1989People v. Carter (1988), 174 Ill. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.