recoverable and unrecoverable claim in Texas

2025“Rather, fees are recoverable—and segregation is not required—if the legal work performed ‘advances both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim.’” Id. (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14); see also Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14 (“[W]e reaffirm the rule that if any attorney’s fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees.

2025“Rather, fees are recoverable—and segregation is not required—if the legal work performed ‘advances both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim.’” Id. (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14); see also Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14 (“[W]e reaffirm the rule that if any attorney’s fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees.

2015Tony Gullo “reestablished the rule that attorney’s fees are recoverable only if necessary to recover on a contract or statutory claim allowing them.” Varner v. Cardenas, 218 S.W.3d 68, 69 (Tex. 2007). 1890.001/55701 50 The only time that segregation is not required is “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Tony Gullo, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 (emphasis added).

2012A prevailing party must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable attorney’s fees in all cases, Varner v. Cardenas, 218 S.W.3d 68, 69 (Tex. 2007), unless he meets his burden of establishing that discrete legal services were rendered with respect to both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim.

2018See Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “[I]f any attorney’s fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313 . “[I]t is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id. at 313–14.

2011Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 ; Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 455 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2026A common set of underlying facts alone does not relieve a party of the duty to segregate its attorney’s fees between recoverable and unrecoverable claims; “it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id. at 313–14.

2022Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1991), which explained the former exception to the duty to 26 segregate attorney’s fees for claims arising out of same transaction that are “intertwined to the point of being inseparable.” However, the Supreme Court of Texas has since modified the holding in Sterling, explaining that “[i]ntertwined facts do not make [unrecoverable] fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14.

2025But even then, “it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id.

2025“Intertwined facts do not make tort [attorney’s] fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14 (recognizing that while “[i]t is certainly true that Chapa’s fraud, contract, and DTPA claims were all ‘dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances,’ . . . that does not mean they all required the same research, discovery, proof, or legal expertise” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017) (statin

2021But where segregation is required, attorneys are not required to “keep separate time records when[, for instance,] they drafted the fraud, contract, or DTPA paragraphs of [a] petition.” Id. at 314. “[A]n opinion w[ill] . . . suffice[] stating that, for example, 95 percent of their drafting time would have been necessary even if there had been no fraud claim.” Id.; see Young v. Dimension Homes, Inc., No. 01-14-00331-CV, 2016 WL 4536407 , at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also 7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C. v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 488,

2016Thus, “[i]f any attorney’s fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, the claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees.” 7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C. v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 488, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Tony Gullo, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14). “[T]o prevail on a contract claim a party must overcome any and all affirmative defenses (such as limitations, res judicata, or prior material breach), and the opposing party who raises them should not be allowed to suggest to the jury that overcoming those defen

2025However, an exception to the general rule exists where “discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id. at 499; Lowry v. Tarbox, 537 S.W.3d 599, 619 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (“[S]egregation is not required when the claims arise out of the same transaction and are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts.”).

2024However, an exception to the general rule exists where “discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313– 14; Lowry v. Tarbox, 537 S.W.3d 599, 619 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (“[S]egregation is not required when the claims arise out of the same transaction and are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts.”).

2019Texas courts recognize a narrow exception “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim” and thus “are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14; see In re Lesikar, 285 S.W.3d 577, 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“If a legal service necessary to the litigation of a claim for which attorneys’ fees are available also advanced a claim for which attorneys’ fees are not recoverable, then the exception to the general fee-segregation rule applies, and the amount of time or money that was reasonable to expend in

2016Texas courts recognize a narrow exception “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim” and thus “are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Id. at 313-14 ; ■see In re Lesikar, 285 S.W.3d 577, 585 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“If a legal service necessary to the litigation of a claim for which attorneys’ fees are available also advanced a claim for which attorneys’ fees are not recoverable, then the exception to the general fee-segregation rule applies, and the amount of time or money that was reasonable to expend in performing th

2011Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 ; see Potter, 230 S.W.3d at 466 (“An exception to the duty to segregate arises when the party’s claims are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts.”).

2011Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14; see Potter, 230 S.W.3d at 466 (―An exception to the duty to segregate arises when the party‘s claims are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts.‖).

2011Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex.1991) (quoting Flint & Assoc. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied)); see also Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313-14 (Tex.2006) (“Kit is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.”).

2011Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Flint & Assoc. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622 , 624–25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied)); see also Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 , 313–14 (Tex. 2006) (“[I]t is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.”).

2024In making this determination, “we do not look at the legal work as a whole but parse the work into component tasks, such as examining a pleading paragraph by paragraph to determine which ones relate to recoverable claims.” Clearview 63 Props., 287 S.W.3d at 144 ; see Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313 (stating that when plaintiff’s attorneys were “drafting [plaintiff’s] pleadings or the jury charge relating to fraud, there is no question those fees were not recoverable”).

2018But “when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim[,] . . . they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 ; accord Clearview Props., L.P., 287 S.W.3d at 143 .

2025“The party seeking to recover attorney’s fees carries the burden of demonstrating that fee segregation is not required.” Petrello v. Prucka, 415 S.W.3d 420, 432 (Tex. 10 And, in any event, Clack waived his counterclaim for wrongful foreclosure by failing to submit a question to the jury about the remaining elements.

2025Because Appellants do not claim charge error, the Court evaluates the evidence “in light of the charge as given.” Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655 , 661 n.3 (Tex. 2012); City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 71 (Tex. 2000).

2024One of our sister courts has explained, “The language of section 6.708 is very broad, and we construe it to give the trial court discretion to award a party any or all of its costs incurred in a suit for dissolution of a marriage, even if the suit includes other claims as well.” Smith v. Deneve, 285 S.W.3d 904, 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). 2.

2022Because that order was interlocutory, as addressed in our disposition of Maria’s fourth issue, we conclude the trial court’s plenary power had not expired at the time it awarded attorney’s fees. 23 561 S.W.3d 683, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

2021Partnership v. First Nat’l Bank, 860 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, 1993) (Awarding fees under Section 114.064 of the Texas Property Code in a case involving a negligence claim and a conversion claim against a bank acting as a trustee and finding such claims against the trustee constituted a proceeding under the Trust Act for which fees could be awarded). [] Tony Gullo Motors, I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313-14 (Tex. 2006) specifies that attorneys’ fees must be segregated between time on claims for which fees can be recovered, and time on claims for which fees cannot be recovered;

2020Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Beyer, 235 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. 2007).

2016Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1991). “[I]t is 8 See Allen-Pieroni v. Pieroni, No. 05-15-00774-CV, 2016 WL 4039192 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (claim for slander of title does not support award of attorneys’ fees); I-10 Colony, Inc. v. Lee, 393 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (attorneys’ fees not recoverable on trespass to try title claim). –22– only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 31

2015Consultants, Inc., 361 S.W.3d 773, 784 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citation and quotation omitted).

2015See Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 ; see also Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. Settlement Funding, LLC, 358 S.W.3d 777, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 ).

2015However, a party is not required to segregate attorney’s fees if “discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim,” thus causing the fees to become “so intertwined that they cannot be segregated.” Id. at 313-14 ; A&L Eng’g and Consulting, Inc. v. Shiloh Apollo Plaza, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).

2015Id. at 313-14 ; Alief I.S.D. v. Perry, 440 S.W.3d 228, 245 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).

2010However, a party is not required to segregate attorney’s fees if “discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim,” thus causing the fees to become “so intertwined that they cannot be segregated.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14 ; see also Smith, 249 S.W.3d at 606 .

2008See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313-14 (Tex.2006) ("Intertwined facts do not make tort fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated."). [6] State Farm paid $1,071,600 for the structure; a total of $210,368.27 for the Osbornes' clothing and personal effects; $190,319.57 for alternative living expenses; $60,644.02 for furniture and similar items; and a total of $341,755.42 for various moving, storage, and cleaning expenses. [7] In Esparza v. Scott