voluntary intoxication defense in Indiana

2001No case from this Court other than Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind.1984), has considered the need for a voluntary intoxication defense under either the federal or state constitution.

2001No case from this Court other than Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 1984), has considered the need for a voluntary intoxication defense under either the federal or state constitution.

1999Legue v. State, 688 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ind.1997) (citing Gibson v. State, 516 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind.1987)).

1997Gibson v. State, 516 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind.1987).

2016In Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 519-21 (Ind.2001), a defendant challenged the voluntary intoxication statute and argued that it was error to give the voluntary intoxication instruction because it violated his right to present a defense under the Indiana Constitution. 6 As the State observes, in Sanchez , our Supreme Court “undertook a comprehensive review of the [voluntary intoxication] statute” and concluded that it comported with the Indiana Constitution and did not violate a defendant’s right to present a defense.

2016The voluntary intoxication instruction in Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509 (Ind.2001), stated, "Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the charge of Rape and Confinement.

2014See Bowen v. State, 478 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. 1985); Anderson v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Ind. 1984); Hubbard v. State, 469 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. 1984).

1993See Hubbard v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 740, 742 .

2000Citing Curran v. State, 675 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), the defendant contends that this instruction impermissibly invaded the province of the jury, violating Article I, Section 19 by mandating a conviction upon the finding of certain facts and by requiring the jury to find specific facts in order to accept the voluntary intoxication defense.

2000Citing Curran v. State, 675 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), the defendant contends that this instruction impermissibly invaded the province of the jury, violating Article I, Section 19 by mandating a conviction upon the finding of certain facts and by requiring the jury to find specific facts in order to accept the voluntary intoxication defense.

1993See Hibshman v. State (1985), Ind.App., 472 N.E.2d 1276, 1278-1279 ; see also Cheney v. State (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 508, 512-513 (insufficient evidence of intoxication to warrant giving instruction, thus, error in the voluntary intoxication instruction given was harmless).

1993See Hibshman v. State (1985), Ind.App., 472 N.E.2d 1276, 1278-1279 ; see also Cheney v. State (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 508, 512-513 (insufficient evidence of intoxication to warrant giving instruction, thus, error in the voluntary intoxication instruction given was harmless).

2014See Bowen v. State, 478 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. 1985); Anderson v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Ind. 1984); Hubbard v. State, 469 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. 1984).

1987See, e.g., Cheney v. State (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 508, 512-513 ; Eagan v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 946, 951-952 ; Bowen v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 44, 46 ; Anderson v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 .

1986Defendant's tendered instruction No. 1 was virtually identical to the voluntary intoxication instruction previously reviewed in both Williams v. State (1980), Ind., 402 N.E.2d 954 , and Poe v. State (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 94 .

1986Defendant's tendered instruction No. 1 was virtually identical to the voluntary intoxication instruction previously reviewed in both Williams v. State (1980), Ind., 402 N.E.2d 954 , and Poe v. State (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 94 .

2014See Bowen v. State, 478 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. 1985); Anderson v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Ind. 1984); Hubbard v. State, 469 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. 1984).

1987See, e.g., Cheney v. State (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 508, 512-513 ; Eagan v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 946, 951-952 ; Bowen v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 44, 46 ; Anderson v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 .

2014Bowen, 478 N.E.2d 46 ; compare Pavey v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. 1986),1 with Tiller v. State, 541 N.E.2d 885 1 In Pavey v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that instruction was warranted on the voluntary 5 (Ind. 1989).2 Although the voluntary intoxication defense has been abolished in Indiana, we see no reason to depart from the Williams standard in evaluating whether evidence supports instructing the jury on the lack thereof.

2014We also find it significant that Fry never claimed to be intoxicated or otherwise asserted or argued an inability to form the requisite intent.3 Therefore, we intoxication defense where the evidence showed that defendant may have consumed seventeen to nineteen beers during the nine-hour-period before committing murder and had a 0.17% blood alcohol content one hour after the incident. 498 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ind. 1986). 2 In Tiller v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that instruction was not warranted on the voluntary intoxication defense where the evidence showed that defendant drank seven

1982In Carter v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 790 , the court per Shields, J., stated: We advise the reader of recent significant events.

1981See, Carter, supra, 408 N.E.2d at 804, n.33 .

2016Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 193-95 (Ind. 1997). [11] Culver’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fall into the second or third categories: appellate counsel failed to (1) challenge statements by trial counsel made during voir dire that Culver characterizes as conceding his guilt, (2) challenge trial counsel’s alleged concession of his guilt by refusing voluntary manslaughter instructions, (3) properly investigate his mental health background, (4) secure an expert witness to testify regarding a voluntary intoxication defense, and (5) seek rehearing to argue that the In

2014Bowen, 478 N.E.2d 46 ; compare Pavey v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. 1986),1 with Tiller v. State, 541 N.E.2d 885 1 In Pavey v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that instruction was warranted on the voluntary 5 (Ind. 1989).2 Although the voluntary intoxication defense has been abolished in Indiana, we see no reason to depart from the Williams standard in evaluating whether evidence supports instructing the jury on the lack thereof.

2014We also find it significant that Fry never claimed to be intoxicated or otherwise asserted or argued an inability to form the requisite intent.3 Therefore, we intoxication defense where the evidence showed that defendant may have consumed seventeen to nineteen beers during the nine-hour-period before committing murder and had a 0.17% blood alcohol content one hour after the incident. 498 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ind. 1986). 2 In Tiller v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held that instruction was not warranted on the voluntary intoxication defense where the evidence showed that defendant drank seven

2008Dockery v. State, 644 N.E.2d 573, 578 (Ind.1994) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because there was insufficient evidence rebutting his entrapment defense); Weaver v. State, 643 N.E.2d 342, 343-44 (Ind.1994) (reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting the defendant’s voluntary intoxication defense).

2008Dockery v. State, 644 N.E.2d 573, 578 (Ind.1994) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because there was insufficient evidence rebutting his entrapment defense); Weaver v. State, 643 N.E.2d 342, 343-44 (Ind.1994) (reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting the defendant’s voluntary intoxication defense).

2002R. at 4934-35 (citing Ellis v. State, 508 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind.1987) (no error in failing to instruct on voluntary intoxication as a defense to murder where defendant did not pursue a defense of inability to form intent)). 10 In this appeal, Saylor conveniently glosses over the second ground for the trial court's refusal to give the voluntary intoxication instruction. 11 Rather, without citation to authority and with no elaboration, Saylor contends "[dlefense counsel's failure to comply with discovery was deficient performance which prejudiced Saylor by foreclosing a defense supported by the e

2002R. at 4934-35 (citing Ellis v. State, 508 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind.1987) (no error in failing to instruct on voluntary intoxication as a defense to murder where defendant did not pursue a defense of inability to form intent)). [10] In this appeal, Saylor conveniently glosses over the second ground for the trial court's refusal to give the voluntary intoxication instruction. [11] Rather, without citation to authority and with no elaboration, Saylor contends "[d]efense counsel's failure to comply with discovery was deficient performance which prejudiced Saylor by foreclosing a defense supported by t

2000The voluntary intoxication defense has "endured an unsteady evolution in Indiana law.” State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1302 (Ind.1996), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 681 N.E.2d 181 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1060 , 140 L.Ed.2d 121 (1998).

2000In 1980, the legislature revised the statute to limit the voluntary intoxication defense only to those offenses specifically defined by use of the phrases "with intent to” or "with the intention to.” Ind.Code Ann. '§ 35-41-3-5(b) (West 1986); Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d at 1302 .

2000The voluntary intoxication instruction in the present case does not contain directive language equivalent to that in Pritchard, 248 Ind. at 568 , 230 N.E.2d at 417 ("then you shall find such defendant guilty").

2000The voluntary intoxication instruction in the present case does not contain directive language equivalent to that in Pritchard, 248 Ind. at 568 , 230 N.E.2d at 417 ("then you shall find such defendant guilty").

1999Legue v. State, 688 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ind.1997) (citing Gibson v. State, 516 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind.1987)).

1997“To be categorized as fundamental error and thus to transcend our procedural requirements, the error must be blatant, and the potential for harm must be substantial and appear clearly and prospectively.” Nelson v. State, 274 Ind. 218, 220 , 409 N.E.2d 637, 638 (Ind.1980) (citations omitted). *509 Horan’s argument is that because the jury was told that the voluntary intoxication defense is only available for “with intent to” or “with an intention to” offenses, and Horan was charged with “knowingly” killing Bennett, the jury was effectively told that voluntary intoxication was not available as a

1997“To be categorized as fundamental error and thus to transcend our procedural requirements, the error must be blatant, and the potential for harm must be substantial and appear clearly and prospectively.” Nelson v. State, 274 Ind. 218, 220 , 409 N.E.2d 637, 638 (Ind.1980) (citations omitted). *509 Horan’s argument is that because the jury was told that the voluntary intoxication defense is only available for “with intent to” or “with an intention to” offenses, and Horan was charged with “knowingly” killing Bennett, the jury was effectively told that voluntary intoxication was not available as a