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12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rankovichgreen2 sentences1993In State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116, 122 , 765 P.2d 518, 524 (1988), we held that if an accused is charged with knowingly committing first degree murder, the accused is not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction. 1993In State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116, 122 , 765 P.2d 518, 524 (1988), we held that if an accused is charged with knowingly committing first degree murder, the accused is not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction. | 3 | 3 |
State of Arizona v. Alan Matthew Champagnegreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116 , 137 ¶ 60 (2019) (holding the trial court did not commit instructional error when, “without the voluntary intoxication instruction the jury could have rejected [defendant]’s claim of innocence but improperly concluded that his voluntary intoxication prevented him from forming the necessary intent for criminal liability”). ¶85 Nevertheless, even if the trial court erred in giving the duress instruction, such error was not fundamental because it did not amount to a comment on the evidence by the trial judge. 2020See, e.g., State v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116 , 137 ¶ 60 (2019) (holding the trial court did not commit instructional error when, “without the voluntary intoxication instruction the jury could have rejected [defendant]’s claim of innocence but improperly concluded that his voluntary intoxication prevented him from forming the necessary intent for criminal liability”). ¶85 Nevertheless, even if the trial court erred in giving the duress instruction, such error was not fundamental because it did not amount to a comment on the evidence by the trial judge. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Laversgreen2 sentences1993In State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 389 , 814 P.2d 333, 346 , cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 343 , 116 L.Ed.2d 282 (1991), we stated that to charge “knowingly” rather than “intentionally,” in order to preclude the introduction of evidence of intoxication, is an acceptable legal strategy under our statute. 1993In State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 389 , 814 P.2d 333, 346 , cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 343 , 116 L.Ed.2d 282 (1991), we stated that to charge “knowingly” rather than “intentionally,” in order to preclude the introduction of evidence of intoxication, is an acceptable legal strategy under our statute. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Andersengreen1 sentence2024Cf. Andersen, 177 Ariz. at 386 (rejecting claim that trial counsel was deficient by not requesting self- defense instruction where defendant testified that he shot victim by accident and did not present “the slightest evidence supporting a self-defense instruction”). | 1 | 1 |
Kansas v. Cheevergreen2 sentences2018In Cheever, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the admission of a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation on rebuttal, where the defendant presented a voluntary- intoxication defense and called an expert, whose own evaluation relied on the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, to testify on his behalf. 571 U.S. 87, 91-97 (2013). 2018Id. at 96-97 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2017See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005); State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 565, ¶ 18 , 74 P.3d 231, 239 (erroneous jury instruction subject to harmless error review) (citation omitted). 2017See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005); State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 565, ¶ 18 , 74 P.3d 231, 239 (erroneous jury instruction subject to harmless error review) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carbajalgreen2 sentences2017See State v. Carbajal, 128 Ariz. 306, 309 , 625 P.2d 895, 898 (1981). 2017See State v. Carbajal, 128 Ariz. 306, 309 , 625 P.2d 895, 898 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Danngreen2 sentences2017See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005); State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 565, ¶ 18 , 74 P.3d 231, 239 (erroneous jury instruction subject to harmless error review) (citation omitted). 2017See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005); State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 565, ¶ 18 , 74 P.3d 231, 239 (erroneous jury instruction subject to harmless error review) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nealgreen2 sentences1991Id.; see also Lavers, 168 Ariz. at 389 , 814 P.2d at 346 ; State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 98 , 692 P.2d 272, 277 (1984) ("even assuming [defendant] was intoxicated ... the jury could still properly convict him of first degree *50 murder if they believed he `knowingly' caused the victim's death"). 1991Id.; see also Lavers, 168 Ariz. at 389 , 814 P.2d at 346 ; State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 98 , 692 P.2d 272, 277 (1984) ("even assuming [defendant] was intoxicated ... the jury could still properly convict him of first degree *50 murder if they believed he `knowingly' caused the victim's death"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reffittgreen2 sentences1988State v. Reffitt, 145 Ariz. 452, 464 , 702 P.2d 681, 693 (1985). 1988State v. Reffitt, 145 Ariz. 452, 464 , 702 P.2d 681, 693 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2020A judge violates Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against commenting on evidence by expressing “an opinion as to what the evidence proves,” in a way that interferes “with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58 , 63 ¶¶ 28–29 (1998); see also Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27. 2020A judge violates Arizona’s constitutional prohibition against commenting on evidence by expressing “an opinion as to what the evidence proves,” in a way that interferes “with the jury’s independent evaluation of that evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58 , 63 ¶¶ 28–29 (1998); see also Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Bolton
green
2 sentences2019Our legislature abolished all common law affirmative defenses, see A.R.S. § 13-103(A), and, on its face, A.R.S. § 13-503 clearly provides that voluntary intoxication caused by use of illegal drugs is not a defense. § 13-503 ("Temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary ingestion, consumption, inhalation or injection of alcohol, an illegal substance ... or other psychoactive substances or the abuse of prescribed medications does not constitute insanity and is not a defense for any criminal act or requisite state of mind." (emphasis added)). ¶60 Additionally, parties are "entitled to an 2019Our legislature abolished all common law affirmative defenses, see A.R.S. § 13-103(A), and, on its face, A.R.S. § 13-503 clearly provides that voluntary intoxication caused by use of illegal drugs is not a defense. § 13-503 ("Temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary ingestion, consumption, inhalation or injection of alcohol, an illegal substance ... or other psychoactive substances or the abuse of prescribed medications does not constitute insanity and is not a defense for any criminal act or requisite state of mind." (emphasis added)). ¶60 Additionally, parties are "entitled to an | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne
green
2 sentences2019The State countered that the jurors needed the instruction to understand what impact evidence of methamphetamine usage should have on their deliberations and consideration of the evidence. ¶58 Relying on State v. Payne , 233 Ariz. 484 , 314 P.3d 1239 (2013), the court gave the following voluntary intoxication instruction: "It is not a defense to any criminal act if the criminal act was committed due to the temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary ingestion, consumption, inhalation, or injection of alcohol or illegal substances." See id. at 517-18 ¶¶ 149-50, 314 P.3d at 1272 -73 . 2019The State countered that the jurors needed the instruction to understand what impact evidence of methamphetamine usage should have on their deliberations and consideration of the evidence. ¶58 Relying on State v. Payne , 233 Ariz. 484 , 314 P.3d 1239 (2013), the court gave the following voluntary intoxication instruction: "It is not a defense to any criminal act if the criminal act was committed due to the temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary ingestion, consumption, inhalation, or injection of alcohol or illegal substances." See id. at 517-18 ¶¶ 149-50, 314 P.3d at 1272 -73 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Glenn v. Chenowth
green
2 sentences2017Instead, as discussed above, the instruction informed the jury that a defendant may not rely on voluntary intoxication to dispute that he was unaware of his conduct or the circumstances. 4 STATE v. BARNES Decision of the Court ¶11 Further, contrary to Barnes’s argument, the facts in this case are not at all similar to the facts presented in Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271 , 226 P.2d 165 (1951). 2017Instead, as discussed above, the instruction informed the jury that a defendant may not rely on voluntary intoxication to dispute that he was unaware of his conduct or the circumstances. 4 STATE v. BARNES Decision of the Court ¶11 Further, contrary to Barnes’s argument, the facts in this case are not at all similar to the facts presented in Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271 , 226 P.2d 165 (1951). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Mikesell v. Morgan
green
1 sentence1993In State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 389 , 814 P.2d 333, 346 , cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 343 , 116 L.Ed.2d 282 (1991), we stated that to charge “knowingly” rather than “intentionally,” in order to preclude the introduction of evidence of intoxication, is an acceptable legal strategy under our statute. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. DeRosier
green
2 sentences1984No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the actual existence of the culpable mental state of intentionally or with the intent to is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of offense, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the culpable mental state with which he committed the act.” (Emphasis added) This statute has been interpreted to preclude evidence supporting a voluntary intoxication defense w 1984No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the actual existence of the culpable mental state of intentionally or with the intent to is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of offense, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the culpable mental state with which he committed the act.” (Emphasis added) This statute has been interpreted to preclude evidence supporting a voluntary intoxication defense w | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Ramos
green
2 sentences1984No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the actual existence of the culpable mental state of intentionally or with the intent to is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of offense, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the culpable mental state with which he committed the act.” (Emphasis added) This statute has been interpreted to preclude evidence supporting a voluntary intoxication defense w 1984No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the actual existence of the culpable mental state of intentionally or with the intent to is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of offense, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the culpable mental state with which he committed the act.” (Emphasis added) This statute has been interpreted to preclude evidence supporting a voluntary intoxication defense w | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.