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8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adams v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 22 , 123 P.3d 400 (stating that "mere proof of drinking or being drunk is not enough in many cases" to mount a voluntary intoxication defense); see also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 90 (Utah 1982) (noting that the defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense, and that the defendant must "show that his mind had been affected to such an extent that he did not have the capacity to form the requisite specific intent or purpose"). ¶ 51 In arguing that couns 2014See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 22 , 123 P.3d 400 (stating that "mere proof of drinking or being drunk is not enough in many cases" to mount a voluntary intoxication defense); see also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 90 (Utah 1982) (noting that the defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense, and that the defendant must "show that his mind had been affected to such an extent that he did not have the capacity to form the requisite specific intent or purpose"). ¶ 51 In arguing that couns | 2 | 3 |
Honie v. Stategreen2 sentences2016But, as explained above, "[elvidence of intoxication, be it witness testimony or a numerical measure of the defendant's actual blood aleohol content, is not sufficient to establish a voluntary intoxication defense." Honig, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 55 , 342 P.3d 182 . 2016But, as explained above, "[elvidence of intoxication, be it witness testimony or a numerical measure of the defendant's actual blood aleohol content, is not sufficient to establish a voluntary intoxication defense." Honig, 2014 UT 19, ¶ 55 , 342 P.3d 182 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Woodgreen2 sentences2014See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 22 , 123 P.3d 400 (stating that "mere proof of drinking or being drunk is not enough in many cases" to mount a voluntary intoxication defense); see also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 90 (Utah 1982) (noting that the defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense, and that the defendant must "show that his mind had been affected to such an extent that he did not have the capacity to form the requisite specific intent or purpose"). ¶ 51 In arguing that couns 2011See Adams, 2005 UT 62, ¶22 , 128 P.3d 400 (stating that mere proof of drinking or being drunk is not enough to mount a voluntary intoxication defense); Wood, 648 P.2d at 90 (noting that the defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bellgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Bell, 2016 UT App 157 , 20240108-CA 8 2026 UT App 73 State v. Meguerditchian ¶ 30, 380 P.3d 11 (“It is not enough to merely present evidence showing that the defendant was intoxicated. 2026See State v. Bell, 2016 UT App 157 , 20240108-CA 8 2026 UT App 73 State v. Meguerditchian ¶ 30, 380 P.3d 11 (“It is not enough to merely present evidence showing that the defendant was intoxicated. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 10856413green2 sentences2026Rather, to establish a viable voluntary intoxication defense, the defendant must point to evidence showing that he was so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the requisite mental 20240108-CA 25 2026 UT App 73 State v. Meguerditchian state for the crimes committed.” State v. Bell, 2016 UT App 157, ¶ 30 , 380 P.3d 11 (cleaned up). 2026See State v. Bell, 2016 UT App 157 , 20240108-CA 8 2026 UT App 73 State v. Meguerditchian ¶ 30, 380 P.3d 11 (“It is not enough to merely present evidence showing that the defendant was intoxicated. | 1 | 1 |
Wiggins v. Smith, Wardengreen2 sentences2014Relevant to Mr. Honie's claims, "the law does not require counsel to raise every available non-frivolous defense." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124-27 , 129 S.Ct. 1411 , 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (holding that in the insanity defense context, counsel is not obligated to raise claims that he "reasonably believed [were] doomed to fail"); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that "Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist th 2014Relevant to Mr. Honie's claims, "the law does not require counsel to raise every available non-frivolous defense." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124-27 , 129 S.Ct. 1411 , 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (holding that in the insanity defense context, counsel is not obligated to raise claims that he "reasonably believed [were] doomed to fail"); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that "Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lowgreen2 sentences2011It is important to note that the parties agreed in the trial court that Sellers was entitled to the instruction and that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for the trial court to accept that agreement. ¶ 21 In Utah, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense "if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify giving the requested instruction." State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 25 , 192 P.3d 867 (stating that a reasonable basis can be found from evidence presented by either 2011It is important to note that the parties agreed in the trial court that Sellers was entitled to the instruction and that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for the trial court to accept that agreement. ¶ 21 In Utah, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense "if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify giving the requested instruction." State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 25 , 192 P.3d 867 (stating that a reasonable basis can be found from evidence presented by either | 1 | 1 |
In re Girardgreen1 sentence2011See Adams, 2005 UT 62, ¶22 , 128 P.3d 400 (stating that mere proof of drinking or being drunk is not enough to mount a voluntary intoxication defense); Wood, 648 P.2d at 90 (noting that the defendant must "prove much more than [the fact that] he had been drinking" before committing the offense to be entitled to a voluntary intoxication defense). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Padillagreen1 sentence2011It is important to note that the parties agreed in the trial court that Sellers was entitled to the instruction and that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for the trial court to accept that agreement. ¶ 21 In Utah, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense "if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify giving the requested instruction." State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 25 , 192 P.3d 867 (stating that a reasonable basis can be found from evidence presented by either | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen1 sentence2011See generally Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 12 , 86 P.3d 742 (stating that the error was invited where the defendant's proposed instruction contained the same error as the instruction adopted by the trial court because by submitting the instruction, the defendant "affirmatively purported to list all `essential elements'"); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996) (determining instructional error was invited where defense counsel failed to object even when specifically asked). ¶ 13 Invited error does not, however, preclude our review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Geukgeuziangreen2 sentences2011See generally Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 12 , 86 P.3d 742 (stating that the error was invited where the defendant's proposed instruction contained the same error as the instruction adopted by the trial court because by submitting the instruction, the defendant "affirmatively purported to list all `essential elements'"); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996) (determining instructional error was invited where defense counsel failed to object even when specifically asked). ¶ 13 Invited error does not, however, preclude our review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2011See generally Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 12 , 86 P.3d 742 (stating that the error was invited where the defendant's proposed instruction contained the same error as the instruction adopted by the trial court because by submitting the instruction, the defendant "affirmatively purported to list all `essential elements'"); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996) (determining instructional error was invited where defense counsel failed to object even when specifically asked). ¶ 13 Invited error does not, however, preclude our review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Knightgreen2 sentences2011A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . "[C]onfidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the `more probable than not' portion of the spectrum." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 20 , 63 P.3d 56 (observing that reasonable probability "lies somewhere between `mere possibility' and `more likely than not'" (citing Knight, 734 P.2d at 920 )). ¶ 19 The State acknowledges that the voluntary intoxication instructio 2011A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . "[C]onfidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the `more probable than not' portion of the spectrum." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 20 , 63 P.3d 56 (observing that reasonable probability "lies somewhere between `mere possibility' and `more likely than not'" (citing Knight, 734 P.2d at 920 )). ¶ 19 The State acknowledges that the voluntary intoxication instructio | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blakegreen2 sentences2011A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . "[C]onfidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the `more probable than not' portion of the spectrum." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 20 , 63 P.3d 56 (observing that reasonable probability "lies somewhere between `mere possibility' and `more likely than not'" (citing Knight, 734 P.2d at 920 )). ¶ 19 The State acknowledges that the voluntary intoxication instructio 2011A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . "[C]onfidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the `more probable than not' portion of the spectrum." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 20 , 63 P.3d 56 (observing that reasonable probability "lies somewhere between `mere possibility' and `more likely than not'" (citing Knight, 734 P.2d at 920 )). ¶ 19 The State acknowledges that the voluntary intoxication instructio | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2011A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . "[C]onfidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the `more probable than not' portion of the spectrum." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 20 , 63 P.3d 56 (observing that reasonable probability "lies somewhere between `mere possibility' and `more likely than not'" (citing Knight, 734 P.2d at 920 )). ¶ 19 The State acknowledges that the voluntary intoxication instructio 2011A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . "[C]onfidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of the `more probable than not' portion of the spectrum." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 20 , 63 P.3d 56 (observing that reasonable probability "lies somewhere between `mere possibility' and `more likely than not'" (citing Knight, 734 P.2d at 920 )). ¶ 19 The State acknowledges that the voluntary intoxication instructio | 2 | 2011–2014 |
State v. Drej
green
2 sentences2017Where a jury is instructed on a voluntary intoxication defense, the prosecution must “disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15 , 233 P.3d 476 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 47 Thompson argues the State did not “meet its burden of disproving [his] affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication” 8 because his blood alcohol content was nearly three times the legal limit and there was some evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident, evidenced by the altercation at his home and his erratic driving 2017Where a jury is instructed on a voluntary intoxication defense, the prosecution must “disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15 , 233 P.3d 476 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 47 Thompson argues the State did not “meet its burden of disproving [his] affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication” 8 because his blood alcohol content was nearly three times the legal limit and there was some evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident, evidenced by the altercation at his home and his erratic driving | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Burke
green
2 sentences2017Where a jury is instructed on a voluntary intoxication defense, the prosecution must “disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15 , 233 P.3d 476 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 47 Thompson argues the State did not “meet its burden of disproving [his] affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication” 8 because his blood alcohol content was nearly three times the legal limit and there was some evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident, evidenced by the altercation at his home and his erratic driving 2017Where a jury is instructed on a voluntary intoxication defense, the prosecution must “disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15 , 233 P.3d 476 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 47 Thompson argues the State did not “meet its burden of disproving [his] affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication” 8 because his blood alcohol content was nearly three times the legal limit and there was some evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident, evidenced by the altercation at his home and his erratic driving | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Montoya
green
2 sentences2016But Bell contends that the State’s evidence countering the voluntary intoxication defense was so weak that the two felony counts should never have been submitted to the jury. ¶29 “When evaluating a motion for a directed verdict, the court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the facts,” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶32 , 84 P.3d 1183 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 2016But Bell contends that the State’s evidence countering the voluntary intoxication defense was so weak that the two felony counts should never have been submitted to the jury. ¶29 “When evaluating a motion for a directed verdict, the court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the facts,” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶32 , 84 P.3d 1183 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Griffin
green
1 sentence2016I 14 Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B "provides a mechanism for eriminal defendants to supplement the record with facts that are necessary for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel but which do not appear in the record." State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ¶ 17 , — P.3d —. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Knowles v. Mirzayance
green
2 sentences2014Relevant to Mr. Honie's claims, "the law does not require counsel to raise every available non-frivolous defense." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124-27 , 129 S.Ct. 1411 , 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (holding that in the insanity defense context, counsel is not obligated to raise claims that he "reasonably believed [were] doomed to fail"); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that "Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist th 2014Relevant to Mr. Honie's claims, "the law does not require counsel to raise every available non-frivolous defense." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124-27 , 129 S.Ct. 1411 , 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (holding that in the insanity defense context, counsel is not obligated to raise claims that he "reasonably believed [were] doomed to fail"); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (explaining that "Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist th | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2011We agree with the State that as a general proposition, jury instructions should be considered as a whole when reviewing their adequacy, see Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶ 13 , 18 P.3d 1123 . 2011We agree with the State that as a general proposition, jury instructions should be considered as a whole when reviewing their adequacy, see Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶ 13 , 18 P.3d 1123 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.