Borough brief in Pennsylvania

1956The solicitor for the school district has called to our attention the case of Wilkinsburg Borough v. Wilkinsburg Borough School District, 365 Pa. 254, 256 , 74 A. 2d 138 (1950), wherein the Chief Justice said of an ordinance imposing a tax on amusements at the rate of ten cents or fraction thereof, "There is no question as to the legality, under the authority granted by the Act of 1947, of the tax imposed by the borough on the privilege of attending any amusement . . ." The question of the imposition of a tax in excess of the statutory limit of 10% was not involved in that *74 case, nor was it

1956The solicitor for the school district has called to our attention the case of Wilkinsburg Borough v. Wilkinsburg Borough School District, 365 Pa. 254, 256 , 74 A. 2d 138 (1950), wherein the Chief Justice said of an ordinance imposing a tax on amusements at the rate of ten cents or fraction thereof, "There is no question as to the legality, under the authority granted by the Act of 1947, of the tax imposed by the borough on the privilege of attending any amusement . . ." The question of the imposition of a tax in excess of the statutory limit of 10% was not involved in that *74 case, nor was it

2024Given the Board’s role as factfinder, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board and is bound by the Board’s determinations of “witness credibility and evidentiary weight.” In re Rural Route Neighbors, 960 A.2d 856, 860 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). 10 On January 5, 2023, our Court granted the Borough’s motion to withdraw as a party to the appeal and excused the Borough from filing a brief. 11 Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329. 13 Valley Forge Greenes Associates, 838 A.2d 718, 729 (Pa. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

2024We are bound by the WCJ’s credibility determinations on appeal. 19 Lindermuth, 134 A.3d at 125 .

2023Our standard of review, however, pertains to whether the [ZHB], not the trial court, erred or abused its discretion.” In re Appeal of Brickstone Realty Corp., 789 A.2d 333 , 338 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). 5 The ZHB did not file a brief with this Court but, instead, notified the Court on September 7, 2022, that it joined in and adopted the Borough’s brief in its entirety. 7 Planning Code6 (]MPC[),]” the trial court did not also find the carport construction issue waived.

2017(Borough’s brief at 22.) The Borough relies on two cases for support, City of Philadelphia v. North-wood Textile Mills, Inc., 395 Pa. 112 , 149 A.2d 60 (1959), and Lord v. Borough of Pottstoum, 205 B.R. 48 (E.D.

2017(Borough’s brief at 22.) The Borough relies on two cases for support, City of Philadelphia v. North-wood Textile Mills, Inc., 395 Pa. 112 , 149 A.2d 60 (1959), and Lord v. Borough of Pottstoum, 205 B.R. 48 (E.D.

2017(Borough’s brief at 22.) The Borough relies on two cases for support, City of Philadelphia v. North-wood Textile Mills, Inc., 395 Pa. 112 , 149 A.2d 60 (1959), and Lord v. Borough of Pottstoum, 205 B.R. 48 (E.D.

2017(Borough’s brief at 22.) The Borough relies on two cases for support, City of Philadelphia v. North-wood Textile Mills, Inc., 395 Pa. 112 , 149 A.2d 60 (1959), and Lord v. Borough of Pottstoum, 205 B.R. 48 (E.D.

2017Citing case law from this Court, our Supreme Court in Visionquest stated that “testimony as to prior experiences with the specific proposed use, while the use was conducted unapproved or unlawfully, should be given greater weight in determining the detriment to the community as such testimony is clearly not speculative.” Id. at 918 (citing Tuckfelt v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 80 Pa.Cmwlth. 496 , 471 A.2d 1311 (1984); Atlantic Richfield Company v. City of Franklin Zoning Hearing Board, 77 Pa. Cmwlth. 102, 465 A.2d 98 (1983); Hannon v. Zoning Board of Wilkes-Barre, 3

2017Citing case law from this Court, our Supreme Court in Visionquest stated that “testimony as to prior experiences with the specific proposed use, while the use was conducted unapproved or unlawfully, should be given greater weight in determining the detriment to the community as such testimony is clearly not speculative.” Id. at 918 (citing Tuckfelt v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 80 Pa.Cmwlth. 496 , 471 A.2d 1311 (1984); Atlantic Richfield Company v. City of Franklin Zoning Hearing Board, 77 Pa. Cmwlth. 102, 465 A.2d 98 (1983); Hannon v. Zoning Board of Wilkes-Barre, 3

2017Citing case law from this Court, our Supreme Court in Visionquest stated that “testimony as to prior experiences with the specific proposed use, while the use was conducted unapproved or unlawfully, should be given greater weight in determining the detriment to the community as such testimony is clearly not speculative.” Id. at 918 (citing Tuckfelt v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 80 Pa.Cmwlth. 496 , 471 A.2d 1311 (1984); Atlantic Richfield Company v. City of Franklin Zoning Hearing Board, 77 Pa. Cmwlth. 102, 465 A.2d 98 (1983); Hannon v. Zoning Board of Wilkes-Barre, 3

2017Citing case law from this Court, our Supreme Court in Visionquest stated that “testimony as to prior experiences with the specific proposed use, while the use was conducted unapproved or unlawfully, should be given greater weight in determining the detriment to the community as such testimony is clearly not speculative.” Id. at 918 (citing Tuckfelt v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 80 Pa.Cmwlth. 496 , 471 A.2d 1311 (1984); Atlantic Richfield Company v. City of Franklin Zoning Hearing Board, 77 Pa. Cmwlth. 102, 465 A.2d 98 (1983); Hannon v. Zoning Board of Wilkes-Barre, 3

2017In its brief, the Borough explains: “Because there is presently no unconventional oil and gas development within the Borough, the focus of [Objectors’] evidence was associated with EQT’s existing [Trax Farm] unconventional well site in Union Township, Washington County, that was similar to what was proposed in the [Borough].” (Borough’s brief at 18.) 2 Previously, this Court reaffirmed that while an objector’s “bald assertions, personal opinions and speculation will not” suffice to prove detrimental impact on a community, “[t]estimony based on specific past experiences can satisfy this burden

2016Id. at 9 n. 3.

2015In so doing, the trial court relied on an unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Brown v. Montgomery County, 470 Fed.Appx. 87 (3d Cir.2012).

2008In doing so, the trial court stated: The resolution of this matter is controlled by a Pennsylvania Supreme court case decided in 1881, Baldwin v. City of Philadelphia, 99 Pa. 164 [, 1881 WL 13869 ] (Pa. 1881).

2003Also see Borough of Glendon v. Department of Environmental Resources, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 238 , 603 A.2d 226 (1992) (standing conferred upon the borough to challenge solid waste permit because of increased threat of municipal contamination). .

2003Also see Borough of Glendon v. Department of Environmental Resources, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 238 , 603 A.2d 226 (1992) (standing conferred upon the borough to challenge solid waste permit because of increased threat of municipal contamination). .

2002Citing City of Butler v. Clauser, 124 Pa.Cmwlth. 492 , 555 A.2d 1391 (1989), the trial court held that the Act applies to employees who have been forcibly removed from bargaining units by rulings of the PLRB.

2002Citing City of Butler v. Clauser, 124 Pa.Cmwlth. 492 , 555 A.2d 1391 (1989), the trial court held that the Act applies to employees who have been forcibly removed from bargaining units by rulings of the PLRB.

1996Ward argues that the analysis in Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966), and not the analysis in Campbell , controls the disposition of this ease.

1996Ward argues that the analysis in Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966), and not the analysis in Campbell , controls the disposition of this ease.

1980The Borough’s claim for indemnification is based upon well-settled Pennsylvania law that the liability of a municipality for injuries to third persons due to a defective or dangerous sidewalk is secondary to that of the abutting property owner: Flynn v. Chester, 429 Pa. 170, 173 , 239 A.2d 322 (1968); Brady v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa.Super. 607, 612 , 41 A.2d 355 (1945).

1980The Borough’s claim for indemnification is based upon well-settled Pennsylvania law that the liability of a municipality for injuries to third persons due to a defective or dangerous sidewalk is secondary to that of the abutting property owner: Flynn v. Chester, 429 Pa. 170, 173 , 239 A.2d 322 (1968); Brady v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa.Super. 607, 612 , 41 A.2d 355 (1945).

1980The Borough’s claim for indemnification is based upon well-settled Pennsylvania law that the liability of a municipality for injuries to third persons due to a defective or dangerous sidewalk is secondary to that of the abutting property owner: Flynn v. Chester, 429 Pa. 170, 173 , 239 A.2d 322 (1968); Brady v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa.Super. 607, 612 , 41 A.2d 355 (1945).

1980The Borough’s claim for indemnification is based upon well-settled Pennsylvania law that the liability of a municipality for injuries to third persons due to a defective or dangerous sidewalk is secondary to that of the abutting property owner: Flynn v. Chester, 429 Pa. 170, 173 , 239 A.2d 322 (1968); Brady v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa.Super. 607, 612 , 41 A.2d 355 (1945).

1978Department of Environmental Resources v. Borough of Carlisle, 16 Pa. Common *578 wealth Ct. 341, 330 A.2d 293 (1974).