Borough defendant in New Jersey

2020Since defendants and the Borough offered no other basis for their opposition to plaintiff's claim, the court should have rejected defendants' reliance on N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 and ordered that the Borough issue the corrective deed for that reason alone. "[I]n matters as to which no statute of limitations is directly applicable, courts first look to see whether there is an analogous statute that might appropriately fix the period of timeliness as to the equitable remedy." Fox v. A-1123-19T4 26 Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 422 (2012).

2020Since defendants and the Borough offered no other basis for their opposition to plaintiff's claim, the court should have rejected defendants' reliance on N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 and ordered that the Borough issue the corrective deed for that reason alone. "[I]n matters as to which no statute of limitations is directly applicable, courts first look to see whether there is an analogous statute that might appropriately fix the period of timeliness as to the equitable remedy." Fox v. A-1123-19T4 26 Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 422 (2012).

2026See K.P.S., 221 N.J. at 277 ("A fundamental tenet of collateral estoppel is that the doctrine cannot be used against a party unless that party either participated in or was 'in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.'") (quoting In re Est. of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20 (1994)).

2026See K.P.S., 221 N.J. at 277 ("A fundamental tenet of collateral estoppel is that the doctrine cannot be used against a party unless that party either participated in or was 'in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.'") (quoting In re Est. of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20 (1994)).

2025See Borough of Hamburg v. Trustees of Presbytery of Newton, 28 N.J.

2022Super. 196 , 221 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Mount Olive Complex v. Twp. of Mount Olive (Mount Olive II), 356 N.J.

2022The court explained that to establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution a plaintiff must establish "(i) others similarly situated generally had not [been] prosecuted for conduct similar to [plaintiff's] and (ii) the [g]overnment's discriminatory selection was based on impermissible ground[s] such as race, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 605 (1985).

2021In its written opinion granting summary judgment to the Borough, the trial court found as a matter of law t hat the activities at issue "constitute[d] discretionary, rather than ministerial, activities that fall within the immunity enumerated in the TCA at N.J.S.A. 59:3- 2." Citing Costa v. Josey, 83 N.J. 49, 55 (1980), the trial court determined that the Borough entered into the Agreement with the County "for cost-saving purposes," as evidenced by the Kimball Report and the "fact it was entered into pursuant to the Uniform Shared Services and Consolidation Act, N.J.S.A. 40A:65-1 . . . ." The

2020See Rochinsky v. State, Dept. of Transp., 110 N.J. 399 (1988); Miehl v. Darpino, 53 N.J. 49 (1968).

2019Co., 335 N.J.

2019See Brill, 142 N.J. at 524 .

2019Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.

2019Our primary purpose in construing a statute is to "identify and implement the legislative intent." Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 389 (2016).

2017As to municipal liability, plaintiffs alleged that the Borough defendants violated 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 , which provides that [e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

2017To prove the Section 1983 claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) "the activity in question was protected"; (2) that "his interest in the speech outweighs the state's countervailing interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it provides through its employees"; and (3) that "the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action." 12 A-3819-15T2 [Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 , 89 n.5 (2012) (quoting Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 2001)

2017To prove the Section 1983 claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) "the activity in question was protected"; (2) that "his interest in the speech outweighs the state's countervailing interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it provides through its employees"; and (3) that "the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action." 12 A-3819-15T2 [Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 , 89 n.5 (2012) (quoting Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 2001)

2017Ibid. (quoting Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363, 382 (1988)).

2017The motion judge dismissed Count Eight, retaliatory prosecution in violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 , stating "the United States Supreme Court 'has never recognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.'" (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 , 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 , 182 L.

2017The motion judge dismissed Count Eight, retaliatory prosecution in violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 , stating "the United States Supreme Court 'has never recognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.'" (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 , 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 , 182 L.

1991We are left with a feeling of unease whether their acts of possession were “of such a character as is calculated to inform the true owner,” Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L. 527, 545 (E. & A.1879), of their hostile possession.